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Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4668 OF 2007

Union of India … Appellant

Vs.

Devendra Kumar Pant & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J.

The first respondent was appointed as a Lab Assistant in the Research  

Designs and Standards Organisation (RDSO), Ministry of Railways, in the  

year 1972 and was subsequently promoted as Junior Research Assistant in  

1977 and Senior Research Assistant in 1983.  

2. The first Respondent (referred to as the 'respondent' as he is the only  

contesting  respondent)  was  selected  for  the  next  higher  post  of  Chief  

Research Assistant, and by order dated 30.6.1997, he was promoted to the  

said post with the condition that his promotion will be effective from the  

date of submission of fit certificate in B-1 medical category.

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3. The medical classifications for various categories of non-gazetted staff of  

RDSO, revised with a view to rationalize the medical  standards, were  

notified by the RDSO, Ministry of Railways, by Office Order No.4/1990  

dated 19.7.1990. The annexures to the said office order stated that the  

Committee  constituted  to  decide  upon  the  standards  of  medical  

examination had followed the following guidelines in rationalising the  

medical standards : (i) to the extent possible, the same medical standards  

were fixed for all RSDO staff of same capacity, doing similar type of  

work;  (ii)   the  requirements  stipulated  in  the  Medical  Manual  with  

respect  to the interest  of  public  safety and administration,  as  also the  

interests of the employee himself and his fellow workers were taken into  

account while fixing the medical standards; and (iii) any possibility of  

medical  decategorisation  during  promotion  were  

obviated/minimized,while  deciding  upon  the  medical  standards.  The  

Committee  had  also  recommended  that  in  cases  where  a  medical  

category, higher than that was then being followed, was recommended,  

the RDSO employees in those medical categories who were in service on  

1.6.1990 should be granted relaxation at the discretion of the ADG. The  

medical  standards that  was being followed till  introduction of  revised  

medical standards and the revised medical standards that was introduced  

by  office  order  dated  19.7.1990,  for  Research  Assistants,  were  as  

follows:

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Designation Class of Medical Examination  

Medical  category  before  revision  

Revised medical  category  introduced by office order  no.4 of 1990

Chief Research Assistant B1 B1

Senior Research Assistant B2 B1

Junior Research Assistant B3 B1

The main  distinction  between  B1 and B2 medical  categories  referred  to  

above  was  that  colour  perception  was  a  requirement  prescribed  for  B-1  

category but not for B2 category.  

4. When the promotion order dated 30.6.1999 required the respondent to  

submit B-1 Medical Category 'fit' certificate, the respondent filed objections  

contending  that  in  the  existing  RDSO  environment,  the  nature  of  work  

prescribed for the posts of JRA, SRA and CRA was the same, and as he was  

already cleared for B2 medical  category, it  was not necessary for him to  

secure  fitness  in  the  higher  medical  category  of  B1.  By  replies  dated  

24.7.1987 and 24.11.1997, the Directorate informed him that the different  

medical  categories  were  prescribed  in  pursuance  of  rationalisation  of  

medical standards, taking into account the requirements of the job, as also  

the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  public,  fellow workers  and  the  concerned  

employee  himself.  He  was  therefore  once  again  called  upon  to  present  

himself  before  the  authorized  Medical  Officer  for  medical  test  and  

certification.

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5. Being  aggrieved,  the  respondent  filed  OA No.395/1998 before  the  

Central  Administrative  Tribunal,  Lucknow  Bench,  praying  that  the  

promotion order dated 30.6.1997 to the extent it required him to produce Fit  

Certificate  in  B-1  medical  category  and  the  consequential  memos/orders  

dated 7.7.1997, 24.11.1997 and 17.7.1998 requiring him to present himself  

before the concerned medical officers for examination, be quashed. He also  

sought quashing of the office order No.4/1990 dated 19.7.1990 insofar as it  

related  to  classification  of  medical  category  in  respect  of  Research  

Assistants.  The  Tribunal  by  order  dated  20.5.2005  dismissed  the  said  

application  as  being  devoid  of  any  merit.  The  Tribunal  held  that  the  

rationalization  of  medical  standards  prescribed  in  Office  Order  dated  

19.7.1990 was on the basis of recommendations of a Committee constituted  

for that purpose, keeping in view the job requirements and the interests of  

the employee concerned as also other employees, and therefore it did not  

suffer from any infirmity. It also held that unless the respondent obtained the  

required B-1 category fit  certificate,  he will not be fulfilling the required  

medical standard for the post of Chief Research Assistant.

6. The respondent filed W.P. No.1800/2005 before the Allahabad High  

Court,  challenging the  order  of the Tribunal.  Before the High Court,  the  

respondent raised a new contention based on section 47(2) of the Persons  

With  Disabilities  (Equal  Opportunities,  Protection  of  Rights  and  Full

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Participation)  Act,  1995  (for  short  ‘the  Act’)  which  provided  that  “no  

promotion  shall  be  denied  to  a  person  merely on  the  ground  of  his  

disability”. His contention was that the  B1 medical category was of a higher  

standard  than  B2,  as  it  required  colour  perception  in  addition  to  the  

requirements prescribed for B2 category; that lack of colour perception or  

reduced colour perception was a ‘disability’; and that as he was otherwise  

qualified, having regard to section 47(2), promotion could not be denied to  

him on the ground of  any disability  which existed  with  reference  to  B1  

medical standard. The said contention found favour with the High Court and  

by order dated 8.11.2006, it allowed the writ petition. The High Court held  

that having regard to section 47(2) of the Act, as explained by this Court in  

Union of India v. Sanjay Kumar Jain [2004 (6) SCC 708], no person could  

be denied promotion merely on the ground of disability unless there was a  

notification exempting the establishment from the provisions of section 47  

of the Act; and that as there was no such notification exempting RDSO from  

the provisions of section 47 of the Act, the respondent could not be denied  

promotion. It therefore issued a direction that if the respondent submitted  

himself for medical examination and was found fit for B2 Medical category,  

he should not be denied promotion on the ground that he did not fulfil the  

requirements of B1 medical category. The said order is challenged by the  

employer in this appeal by special leave.

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7. In the original application filed before the Tribunal, the petitioner had  

not raised any contention based on section 47 of the Act. He had merely  

contended that as the nature of work of Senior Research Assistant and Chief  

Research Assistant was one and the same and as he was already cleared for  

B2 medical  category  standard,  there  was  no need for  getting  the  further  

clearance for B1 medical category standard for the purpose of promotion.  

The respondent did not also seek any relaxation of the requirement relating  

to higher medical standard, as his contention was that such a higher medical  

standard was inapplicable and unnecessary. In fact, even in the writ petition,  

the petitioner did not raise the ground based on section 47(2) of the Act, but  

merely  reiterated  his  earlier  contention.  Only  during  arguments,  he  

contended that  his  inability  to  fulfill  the  higher  standard  of  B1 category  

could not be a ground for denying him promotion, having regard to section  

47(2) of the Act.   The said contention was entertained by the High Court  

without  giving  proper  opportunity  to  the  appellant  to  meet  it.  The  High  

Court without any discussion assumed that having regard to the said sub-

section and the interpretation thereof  by this Court in Sanjay Kumar Jain,  

the respondent could not be denied promotion on the ground that he did not  

qualify in B1 medical category.  

8. The question that arises for our consideration is whether refusal by the  

appellant to give effect to the promotion of respondent unless he obtains fit

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certificate in B-1 medical  category, violates section 47(2) of the Act.   In  

short, what falls for our consideration in this case is the scope and purport of  

sub-section (2) of section 47 of the Act, which provides that no promotion  

shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability.  

9. An examination  of  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Act  is  necessary  

before considering the said question. The Act was enacted to give effect to  

the proclamation on the full  participation and equality of the people with  

disabilities. Chapter IV relates to education to children with disabilities. It  

contains provisions requiring appropriate governments and local authorities  

to  make  provisions  for  free  education  and  for  making  schemes  and  

programmes for non-formal education to children with disabilities. Chapter  

VI relates to employment for persons with disabilities. It contains provisions  

for  identification  of  posts  which  could  be  reserved  for  persons  with  

disabilities  and formulating schemes for ensuring employment of persons  

with disabilities. Chapter VII contains provisions for affirmative action by  

making  special  schemes  to  provide  aids  and  appliances  to  persons  with  

disabilities and making preferential allotment of land for certain purposes.  

Chapter  VIII  relates  to  non-discrimination.  Section  44  deals  with  non-

discrimination in transport. Section 45 deals with non-discrimination on the  

road.  Section  46  deals  with  non-discrimination  in  the  built  environment.

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Section 47 with which we are concerned, deals with non-discrimination in  

government employment, and it is extracted below:

“47.  Non-discrimination  in  Government  employments.—(1)  No  establishment  shall  dispense with,  or reduce in rank, an employee  who  acquires a disability during his service:

Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for  the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same  pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that it is not possible to adjust the employee against any  post,  he may be kept  on a  supernumerary post  until  a  suitable  post  is  available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.

(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of  his disability;

Provided that the appropriate-Government may, having regard to the type  of work carried on in any establishment,  by notification and subject  to  such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt  any establishment from the provisions of this section.”      

(emphasis supplied)

10. The scope of section 47 in general was considered by this Court in  

Kunal Singh v. Union of India [2003 (4) SCC 524]. This Court held :  

“Chapter VI of the Act deals with employment relating to persons with  disabilities, who are yet to secure employment. Section 47, which falls in  Chapter  VIII,  deals  with  an  employee,  who  is  already  in  service  and  acquires  a  disability  during  his  service.  It  must  be borne  in  mind  that  Section  2  of  the  Act  has  given  distinct  and  different  definitions  of  “disability” and “person with disability”. It is well settled that in the same  enactment if two distinct definitions are given defining a word/expression,  they must be understood accordingly in terms of the definition. It must be  remembered that a person does not acquire or suffer disability by choice.  An employee, who acquires disability during his service, is sought to be  protected  under  Section  47  of  the  Act  specifically.  Such  employee,  acquiring disability,  if not protected, would not only suffer himself, but  possibly all those who depend on him would also suffer. The very frame  and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature. The very  opening part of the section reads “no establishment shall dispense with, or  reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service”.  The section further provides that if an employee after acquiring disability  is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other

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post with the same pay scale and service benefits; if it is not possible to  adjust the employee against any post he will be kept on a supernumerary  post  until  a  suitable  post  is  available  or  he  attains  the  age  of  superannuation, whichever is earlier. Added to this no promotion shall be  denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability as is evident from  sub-section (2) of Section 47. Section 47 contains a clear directive that the  employer  shall  not  dispense  with  or  reduce  in  rank  an  employee  who  acquires  a  disability  during  the  service.  In  construing  a  provision  of  a  social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended  to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation,  the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be  preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose  of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain casting statutory  obligation  on the employer  to  protect  an employee  acquiring disability  during service.”    

11. We may next  refer  to the  decision in  Sanjay Kumar Jain (supra),  on  

which  considerable  reliance  was  placed  by  the  High  Court  and  the  

respondent.  One  S.K.Jain  was  working  in  a  Group  ‘C’  post  in  the  

Railways. He applied for promotion to a Group ‘B’ post. He qualified in  

the written test and was directed to undergo medical examination as per  

Para  531(b)  of  IREM  (the  Indian  Railway  Establishment  Manual).  

Passing of the medical  test  was a requirement before a candidate was  

called for viva voce test. S.K.Jain was found to be medically unfit as he  

was visually handicapped. He was therefore not called for viva voce test  

nor selected for promotion. The order dated 20.9.2000 by which he was  

informed that  he  was  not  being  called  for  viva  voce  as  he  had been  

declared  medically  unfit,  was  challenged  before  the  Central  

Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the provisions of the Act  

and newly introduced para 189A of IREM which laid down that there

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shall  be  no  discrimination  in  the  matter  of  promotion  merely  on  the  

ground  of  physical  disability,  were  not  kept  in  view  and  therefore  

quashed the said order dated 20.9.2000. The said decision was upheld by  

the High Court having regard to section 47(2) of the Act.  Before this  

Court,  the  Railways  submitted  that  the  proviso  to  sub-section  (2)  of  

section  47  permitted  the   appropriate  government  to  exclude  by  

notification, any establishment from the provisions of section 47 and the  

said provision indicated that in appropriate cases the protection/benefit  

provided by sub-section (2) of section 47 could be denied, and therefore  

this court may deny the protection under section 47(2) to S. K. Jain. This  

Court  held  that  unless  a  notification  was  issued  by  the  appropriate  

Government, exempting the establishment from the provisions of section  

47, having regard to the type of work carried in any establishment, an  

establishment cannot be exempted from the operation of section 47(2) of  

the Act. This Court therefore upheld the decision of the Tribunal and the  

High  Court.  Thus  the   issue  that  was  considered  by  this  Court  was  

whether exemption from the operation of section 47(2) could be claimed,  

when there was no exemption notification under the proviso to section 47  

of the Act,  by the appropriate Government.  The scope and purport  of  

section 47(2) did not really arise for consideration, nor considered in that  

decision. The observation of this court that sub-section (2) of Section 47  

in crystal clear terms, provided that no promotion shall be  denied to a

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person merely on the ground of his disability, strongly relied on by the  

respondent, is not enunciation of any principle, but a reiteration of what  

is stated in the section. Therefore the assumption of the High Court that  

according to the interpretation of section 47(2) by this court in  Sanjay  

Kumar Jain, even if the respondent was not able to qualify in medical  

category B1 because of lack of or reduced colour perception, he could  

not be denied promotion and that he should be subjected only to a B2  

category medical examination, is baseless. It is unfortunate that the High  

Court has totally misunderstood the scope and purport of section 47(2) of  

the Act and the decision in Sanjay Kumar Jain.  

12. Sub-section  (2)  of  section  47  provides  that  no  promotion  shall  be  

denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability. 'Disability' as per  

the  definition  in  section  2(i)  of  the  Act,  means  blindness;  low  vision;  

leprosy-cured, hearing impairment, locomotor disability, mental retardation;  

and mental illness. “Person with disability” is defined in clause (t) of section  

2, as a person suffering from not less than forty percent of any disability as  

certified  by  a  medical  authority.  What  is  significant  is  all  persons  with  

disability are not treated equally or similarly, under the Act. The benefits  

extended under the Act depends upon the nature of disability and extent of  

disability.  Different  principles  relating  to  non-discrimination  apply  

depending  upon  the  context  in  which  the  benefit  is  extended.  Let  us

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illustrate.  Section 33 refers to reservation of posts for persons or class of  

persons with disability. But it however makes it clear that the reservations  

will be made only to those suffering from (i) blindness or low vision, (ii)  

hearing impairment, (iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy. There is no  

provision  for  reservation  of  posts  for  persons  suffering  from  mental  

retardation,  mental  illness or leprosy-cured,  though they are also 'persons  

with  disability'.  On  the  other  hand  section  39  requires  all  educational  

institutions to reserve seats for persons with disability,without restricting the  

reservation only to certain categories of persons with disability. Similarly  

some of  the  provisions  in  sections  44,45  and  46  with  reference  to  non-

discrimination  in  transport,  non-discrimination  on  the  road  and  non-

discrimination  in  the  built  environment  may  be  user-specific  depending  

upon the nature of disability, that is some are meant only for persons with  

locomotor disability and some for persons suffering from blindness or low  

vision and not  for others.  Therefore  the provisions  of  the Act  cannot  be  

applied mechanically to all persons with any and every kind of disability. It  

will be necessary to keep in view, the object of the Act, identification of the  

category  of  persons  for  whom a particular  beneficial  provision  has  been  

made, and the extent of the benefit provided.   

13. 'Blindness' is a disability defined in clause (b) of section 2 and refers  

to (i) total absence of sight or (ii) visual acuity not exceeding 6/60 or 20/200

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(snellen) in the better eye with correcting lenses; or (iii) limitation of the  

field of vision sub tending an angle of 20 degree or worse. 40% disability  

referred to in Section 2 (t) to identify persons with disabilities, will apply to  

categories (ii)  and (iii)  of section 2(b) but will  be irrelevant  in regard to  

persons with total absence of sight falling under category (i) of section 2(b).  

Section  2(u)  defines  a  “person  with  low  vision”  as  “a  person  with  

impairment of visual functioning even after treatment or standard refractive  

correction but  who uses  or  is  potentially  capable  of  using vision for  the  

planning or execution of a task with appropriate assitive device”.   Lack of  

colour  perception  is  neither  blindness  nor  low  vision  and  is  therefore  

apparently not a disability under the Act.  It is therefore, doubtful whether a  

person lacking colour perception can claim to be a person entitled to any  

benefit under the Act. Be that as it may. We will examine the issue assuming  

that respondent is a person with disability.   

14. Section 32 refers to identifications of posts which can be reserved for  

persons  with  disability.  Section  33  deals  with  reservation  of  posts  for  

persons  with  disability.  Sections  32  and  33  therefore  apply  to  pre-

employment situation, that is where persons with disability are yet to secure  

employment. Section 47 applies to a post-employment situation, that is to  

those who are already in government employment. Section 47 contains two  

distinct provisions. The first is a provision for non-discrimination when an

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employee who is already in government employment acquires a disability  

during his service. Sub-section (1) extends the following protection to the  

employees in government service who acquire a disability during service :  

(a) their service shall not be dispensed with or reduced in rank on the ground  

that they acquired a disability during service; and (b) if an employee who  

acquires  a  disability  during  service  is  not  suitable  for  the  post  he  was  

holding, he could be shifted to some other post with same pay scale and  

service benefits, and if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any  

post,  he should be kept  on a supernumerary  post  until  a  suitable  post  is  

available or until he attains the age of superannuation whichever is earlier.

15. Sub-section  (2)  of  section  47  deals  with  non-discrimination  in  

promotion  and  provides  that  no  promotion  shall  be  denied  to  a  person  

merely on the ground of his disability. This would mean that a person who is  

otherwise eligible for promotion shall not be denied promotion  merely or  

only on the ground that he suffers from a disability. Thus section 47(2) bars  

disability  per se being made a disqualification for promotion. To give an  

example, a person working as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) suffering from  

the disability of low vision, cannot be denied promotion to the post of Upper  

Division Clerk (UDC) merely because of his disability. This is because the  

efficiency  with  which  he  functioned  as  a  LDC will  be  the  same  while  

functioning as a  UDC also  and the disability  as  such will  not  affect  his

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functioning in a higher post. But the position is different if the disability  

would affect the discharge of functions or performance in a higher post or if  

the  disability  would  pose  a  threat  to  the  safety  of  the  co-employees,  

members  of  the  public  or  the  employee  himself,  or  to  the  assets  and  

equipments of the employer. If promotion is denied on the ground that it will  

affect the safety, security and performance, then it is not denial of promotion  

merely on the ground of his disability,  but is denial of promotion by reason  

of the disability plus something more, that is adverse effect of the disability  

upon the employee's performance of the higher duties or functions attached  

to the promotional post. It is significant that section 47(2) does not provide  

that even if the disability comes in the way of performance of higher duties  

and functions associated with the promotional post, promotion shall not be  

denied. Section 47(2) bars promotion being denied to a person on the ground  

of disability, only if the disability does not affect his capacity to discharge  

the higher functions of a promotional post. Where the employer stipulates  

minimum  standards  for  promotion  keeping  in  view  safety,  security  and  

efficiency,  and  if  the  employee  is  unable  to  meet  the  higher  minimum  

standards  on account  of  any disability  or  failure  to  posses  the  minimum  

standards, then section 47(2) will not be attracted, nor can it be pressed into  

service for seeking promotion. In other words where the disability is likely  

to affect the maintenance of safety and security norms, or efficiency, then  

the  stipulation  of  standards  for  maintaining  such  safety,  security  and

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efficiency  will  not  be  considered  as  denying  a  person  with  disability,  

promotion, merely on the ground of his disability.

16. When invoking or applying the provisions of the Act,  it is necessary  

to keep in view that the intention of the Act is to give a helping hand to  

persons with disability so that they can lead a self-reliant life with dignity  

and freedom. But the intention of the Act is not to jeopardize the safety and  

security of the public, co-employees, or the employee himself or the safety  

and  security  of  the  equipments  or  assets  of  the  employer  nor  to  accept  

reduced  standards  of  safety  and efficiency merely  because  the  employee  

suffers from a disability. In this case, office order No.4/1990 makes it clear  

that the minimum medical standards have been fixed taking into account the  

requirements  in  the  medical  manual  with  reference  to  interest  of  public  

safety, interest  of the employee himself and fellow employees and in the  

interest of the administration. If any employee or group of employees are of  

the view that a particular  minimum medical standard prescribed does not  

serve  the  interest  of  public  safety,  interest  of  the  employee  and  fellow  

employees or the interest of administration, but has been introduced only  

with  the  intention  of  keeping a  person with  disability  from securing the  

promotional post, it is always open to him or them to give a representation  

to the employer to review/revise the minimum medical standards. On such  

representation the employer will refer the issue to a committee of experts to

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take appropriate decision, if that was not already done. But once a decision  

regarding medical  standards has been taken by the management  bonafide  

and in  the  usual  course  of  business  on the  report/recommendation  of  an  

expert committee, the same cannot be found fault with on the ground that it  

affects the right of a person with disability for promotion.           

17. As noticed above, in this case the higher medical standard of B1 was  

prescribed not only for the post of Chief Research Assistant but for Senior  

Research Assistants and Junior Research Assistants. As the respondent with  

a  B2  medical  category  clearance,  had  already  been  appointed  as  Senior  

Research  Assistant,  he  cannot  be  reduced  from that  rank  merely  on  the  

ground that  under the revised guidelines,  the post  requires  a B1 medical  

standard  clearance.  But  when  the  issue  of  promotion  comes  up,  the  

requirement of B1 medical standard cannot be dispensed with. It should be  

remembered  that  for  Chief  Research  Assistant,  the  minimum  medical  

standard was B1 even before the revision of standards whereby the medical  

standard for even Senior Research Assistant was revised from B2 to B1. The  

said standard having been fixed in the interest of the public safety, as also  

interest  of the employee concerned, co-employees and administration, the  

respondent  cannot,  by  relying  upon  section  47(2)  of  the  Act,  avoid  

subjecting himself to medical examination for ascertainment of B1 medical  

category fitness.

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18. Prescription of a minimum medical standard for promotion should be  

considered as such, and should not be viewed as denial of a promotional  

opportunity  to  a  person  with  disability.  We  may  illustrate.  When  an  

advertisement for the post of a police inspector prescribes a minimum height  

or a minimum chest measurements or a minimum physical stamina, a person  

who lacks the same and therefore denied appointment, cannot contend that  

he is discriminated on the ground of physical disability. Firstly being short  

or very thin or lacking stamina is not a physical disability but a physical  

characteristic. Therefore in such a situation the question of applicability of  

the Act does not arise at all. If a person not having a colour perception is  

denied appointment to the post of a driver, he cannot complain that he is  

discriminated on the ground of his disability.  Same would be the position  

where the colour perception is a required minimum standard for a particular  

post.  A  person  not  possessing  it  is  not  being  denied  appointment  or  

promotion on the ground of disability. The denial is on the ground of non-

fulfillment  of  a  minimum  required standard/qualification.  Viewed  

accordingly, it will be seen that section 47(2) is not attracted at all.   

19. Therefore we are of the view that the section 47(2) only provides that  

a  person  who  is  otherwise  eligible  for  promotion  shall  not  be  denied  

promotion merely on the ground that he suffers from disability. The use of

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the words ‘merely on the ground’ shows that the section does not provide  

that if the disability comes in the way of performing the higher duties and  

functions  associated  with  the  promotional  post,  promotion  shall  not  be  

denied.  In other words promotion shall  not be denied to a person on the  

ground of his disability only if the disability does not affect his capacity to  

discharge the higher functions of a promotional post.                           

20. The appeal is therefore allowed, and the order of the High Court is set  

aside and the order of the Tribunal is restored, resulting in the respondent’s  

original petition before the Tribunal being dismissed.

………………………..J. (R V Raveendran)

New Delhi; ………………………J. July  9, 2009. (P Sathasivam)