02 September 1976
Supreme Court
Download

UNION OF INDIA Vs D.M. REVRI & CO.

Case number: Appeal (civil) 135 of 1972


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8  

PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D.M. REVRI & CO.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/09/1976

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2257            1977 SCR  (1) 483  1976 SCC  (4) 147

ACT:             Arbitration Act, 1940--Contract between lay parties  not         to be thwarted by narrow pedantic and legalistic interpreta-         tion--Intendment  of parties regarding validity of  arbitra-         tor’s appointment. whether material.

HEADNOTE:             The  respondent partnership firm, entered into  contract         with  the  appellant for the supply of  East  German  sugar.         Provision  for  arbitration was made in clause (17)  of  the         contract,  and  the arbitrator was to be  nominated  by  the         Secretary  in  the Ministry of Food & Agriculture.   In  the         present  dispute,  before an arbitrator was  nominated,  the         Ministry  of  Food  & Agriculture was  bifurcated  into  two         separate  Ministries and the subject-matter of the  contract         was allotted to the Ministry of Food.  The respondents  took         the  stand  that there was no longer any  Secretary  in  the         non-existent  Ministry  of Food and Agriculture  and  clause         (17)  of  the contract was a dead-letter.   The  appellant’s         proposal  to amend clause (17) to suit the  changed  circum-         stances,  was rejected by the respondents.  Thereafter,  the         two  Ministries were reintegrated into a Ministry of Food  &         Agriculture and two Secretaries were put incharge of the two         departments.   The Secretary, Food Department, on a  request         from the appellant under clause (17), appointed an  arbitra-         tor.  The respondents served on the appellant a notice under         C.P.C.  Sec. 80 but instead of proceeding to sue the  appel-         lants, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the  Arbitrator         without protest until award was made, The appellant’s appli-         cation  to  the Sub Judge, Delhi, for passing  a  decree  in         terms  of  the  award was resisted by  the  respondents  who         sought  to set aside the award, challenging the validity  of         the  Arbitrator’s appointment and contending that the  arbi-         tration agreement under clause (17) was made by only one  of         the  partners, and was not binding on the others.  The  Sub-         Judge rejected their objections and made the award a rule of         the  court.  An appeal to the High Court was allowed on  the         ground that on bifurcation of the Ministries clause (17)  of         the contract became dead, and could not be revived on  their         re-integration.         Allowing the appeal the Court,             HELD:  There were, after integration, two Secretaries in

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8  

       the  Ministry of Food & Agriculture, but the  argument  that         this  event  rendered the arbitration  agreement  vague  and         uncertain,  is based on a highly technical  and  doctrinaire         approach and is opposed to. plain common sense.  A  contract         is  a  commercial document between the parties and  must  be         interpreted  in such a manner as to give it efficacy  rather         than  to invalidate it.  It would not be right while  inter-         preting a contract entered into between two lay parties,  to         apply  strict  rules of construction  which  are  ordinarily         applicable  to  formal  documents.  The meaning  of  such  a         contract  must  be gathered by adopting a common  sense  ap-         proach and it must not be allowed to be thwarted by a narrow         pedantic  and legalistic interpretation.  The  Secretary  in         the  Ministry of Food and Agriculture in charge of  the  De-         partment of Food, would be the Secretary in the Ministry  of         Food  and Agriculture concerned with the subject  matter  of         the contract and under clause (17),  he would be the  person         intended by the parties to exercise the power of  nominating         the arbitrator.  Furthermore,  the respondents did not raise         any  objection  to  the appointment of  the  arbitrator  and         participated in the arbitration proceedings without protest,         indicating  the  clear intendment of the  parties  that  the         Secretary  in the Ministry of Food &  Agriculture  concerned         with the subject matter of the contract should be the person         entitled to nominate the arbitrator.  [488 B-E, 489 A-E]         484

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1972.              Appeal  by Special Leave from the  Judgment  and  Order         dated 12-8-71 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. No. 47-D  of         1964.         Gobind Das and Girish Chandra, for the Appellant.              Bakshi  Shiv  Charan Singh and Harbans Singh,  for  the         Respondents.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by              BHAGWATI, J., This appeal, by special leave, is direct-         ed  against  a judgment of the High Court of  Delhi  setting         aside  an award made by an arbitrator on the ground that  he         was  not  a validly appointed arbitrator and  hence  had  no         jurisdiction  to  arbitrate  and make an  award.  The  facts         giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly  stated         as follows.             The  respondents--a  partnership  firm--entered  into  a         contract with the appellant for the supply of 30,000 tons of         East  German sugar at the rate and as the terms  and  condi-         tions set out in a letter dated 3rd July, 1954 addressed  by         the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Ministry of         Food & Agriculture to the respondents.  The Ministry of Food         and  Agriculture  was concerned with the  subject-matter  of         this contract and hence clause (9) provided that   "superin-         tendence   and inspection of quality, weight and packing  of         sugar Shall be made by a reputable superintending agency  to         be  approved by the Government of India, in the Ministry  of         Food & Agriculture" and clause (10) stipulated for  delivery         to  be  made  to "authorities or parties  nominated  by  the         Ministry of Food and Agriculture".  There was provision  for         arbitration  made  in clause (17) and that clause  also  re-         ferred  to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.  It was  in         the following terms:                        "ARBITRATION:   All questions,   disputes  or                  differences whatsoever which may at any time  arise                  between  the parties to the agreement touching  the

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8  

                agreement  or the subject-matter  thereof,  arising                  out  of  or in relation thereto and whether  as  to                  construction  or otherwise shall be referred  to  a                  single  arbitrator  for decision.   Such  a  single                  arbitrator  shall be nominated by the Secretary  to                  the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and                  Agriculture  in  his absolute  discretion  and  the                  decision  of  such arbitrator shall  be  final  and                  binding  upon the parties.  The  reference  to  the                  arbitrator  shall be governed by the provisions  of                  the  Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 as  amended  from                  time to time and the rules made thereunder."         It  appears that disputes arose between the  appellant  and.         the   respondents in regard to the fulfilment of  this  con-         tract.   The  appellant  made a claim  for  payment  of  Rs.         3,29,107-8-0 against the respondents by a letter dated  11th         August, 1956 and threatened to recover it from the  security         furnished  by the respondents through  their  bankers.   The         respondents  disputed  the claim of the  appellant  and   by         their   letter dated 23rd August, 1956 pointed out  that  it         was not competent to the: appellant to recover the amount of         the demand from the bankers of the         485         respondents  without first. establishing its claim by  arbi-         tration or suit. The respondents intimated to the  appellant         that they were prepared to go to arbitration and.  suggested         that  it would be better still, .if a special case  for  the         opinion  of  the court were stated under section 90  of  the         Code  of Civil Procedure.  The respondents also  claimed  to         recover  from  the  appellant  under  the  contract  diverse         amounts aggregating to Rs. 6,05,689.  There was no  response         to this letter from the appellant and no steps were taken by         the appellant to have the disputes referred to an arbitrator         nominated  by  the  Secretary in the Ministry  of  Food  and         Agriculture as provided in clause (17) of the Contract.   In         the meantime, as a result of an order made by the  President         under  clause  (3) of Article 77 of  the  Constitution,  the         Ministry  of  Food and Agriculture was bifurcated  into  two         separate  Ministries, one of Food and the other of  Agricul-         ture,  with effect from 19th October,  1956  and sugar,  the         subject-matter of the contract, came to be allotted to   the         Ministry  of Food.  The respondents, by their  letter  dated         9th November, 1956, pointed out to the Secretary,   Ministry         of Food that by reason of this bifurcation, the Ministry  of         Food  and Agriculture  has ceased to exist and there was  no         Secretary  in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture  and  the         arbitration  agreement contained in clause (17) of the  con-         tract had, therefore, become a dead letter and was no longer         enforceable  and  once again called upon  the  appellant  to         agree in stating a special case for the opinion of the court         failing  which   the respondents would have to file  a  suit         against  the appellant.  This letter also did not evoke  any         response from the appellant and the disputes remained  unre-         solved.             On  13th/l4th February, 1956 the appellant  addressed  a         letter to the respondents stating that since the Ministry of         Food  and Agriculture was bifurcated into Ministry  of  Food         and  Ministry  of  Agriculture, it was  necessary  to  amend         clause (17) of the Contract so as to provide for arbitration         by  "the  Secretary  to the Ministry,  Government  of  India         administratively dealing with the subject of contract at the         time  of reference to arbitration, or if there is no  Secre-         tary,  the administrative head of such Ministry at the  time         of such reference" and proposed an amendment to that  effect         for  the acceptance of the respondents. The respondents,  by

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8  

       their letter in reply dated 26th February, 1957, declined to         accept  the  proposal for amendment of clause  (17)  of  the         contract  and  once again reiterated that  the   arbitration         agreement contained in that clause was "dead and  unenforce-         able".   However,  within a short time  thereafter,  another         order was issued by the President under clause (3) of  Arti-         cle 77 of the Constitution integrating the Ministry of  Food         and the Ministry of Agriculture into one single  Ministry of         Food  and  Agriculture with effect from  23rd  April,  1957.         This  Ministry of Food and Agriculture had two  departments,         one  of Food and the other of Agriculture, and there  was  a         Secretary  incharge  each  department.  It  seems  that  the         appellant requested the Secretary, Department of Food in the         Ministry of Food and Agriculture to nominate an  arbitration         for adjudicating upon the disputes which had arisen  between         the appellant and the respondents in terms of clause (17)         the  Contract and the Secretary, Department of Food  in  the         Ministry  of  Food and Agriculture, by a letter  dated  27th         February,  1958,  nominated Shri  A.V.  Vishwanath  Shastri,         Advocate, to act as sole arbitrator to         486         adjudicate  upon such disputes.  On the same  day,  the  re-         spondents served a notice on the appellant under section  80         of  the  Code of Civil Procedure demanding  payment  of  the         amounts due to the respondents and stating that in case  the         appellant  failed  to meet these  demands,  the  respondents         would  have  to file a suit against the  appellant.   Though         respondents  gave this notice under section  80 of the  Code         of Civil Procedure, they did not proceed to file a suit, but         instead filed their statement of claim before the arbitrator         and  in the statement  they claimed payment of an  aggregate         sum  of Rs.  7,89,858/- from  the appellant and also  prayed         for  a  declaration  that  the contract   stood  "final  and         properly  performed"  by the   respondents.   The  appellant         filed its reply disputing the claim of the respondents.  The         appellant  also field a statement making its own claim   for         Rs. 3,29,107-8-0 against the respondents.  It was stated  in         paragraph  18  of the statement of claim  of  the  appellant         "that under Clause 17 of the contract the Secretary Food and         Agriculture Ministry of the Government in his discretion has         the  right to nominate a sole Arbitrator and refer the  dis-         pute  to the Arbitrator and that has been duly done on  27th         February,1958, and the parties have been duly notified under         Secretary to  the Government letter No. SIMP-3(4C) dated the         27th  February, 1958". The respondents filed  their  written         statement  denying the claim of the appellant and  in  para-         graph  18 of this written statement they averted "That  para         18  of the Statement of Claim of the Government of India  is         not  objected to".  The proceedings in connection  with  the         claim of the respondents and the counter-claim of the appel-         lant were carried on before the arbitrator and the  respond-         ents  participated  in the arbitration  proceedings  without         objection  or protest against the jurisdiction of the  arbi-         trator.  The arbitrator ultimately made an award against the         respondents.           The  appellant made an application before  the  Sub-Judge,         Delhi to pass a decree in terms of the award.  The  respond-         ents  resisted  the application of the appellant and  sought         to  set aside the award mainly on two grounds.   One  ground         was that Daljeet Singh, a partner of the respondents, had no         power to bind the other partners by an arbitration agreement         and hence clause (17) of the contract was not binding on the         respondents,  and the other was that the arbitrator was  not         validly appointed and he had, therefore, no jurisdiction  to         enter  upon  the reference and adjudicate upon the  disputes

5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8  

       between  the parties.  Both these grounds were  rejected  by         the  learned Sub-Judge and the award was made a rule of  the         court.   The respondents thereupon  preferred an  appeal  to         the High Court.  The same two grounds were also urged in the         appeal.   Out of them, the first ground relating to lack  of         authority in Daljeet Singh to bind the respondents by clause         (17) of the contract Was negatived by the High Court and  it         was held that clause being an integral part of the contract,         the authority of Daljeet Singh to enter into the contract on         behalf  of the respondents extended also to clause  (17)  of         the  contract  and  in any event, the  conduct  of  all  the         partners  showed that Daljeet Singh had authority on  behalf         of  the  other  partners  to  enter  into  the   arbitration         agreement   contained in clause (17) of the  contract.   The         second   ground, however,  found favour with the High  Court         which  held that in view of the bifurcation of the  Ministry         of Food and Agriculture into two separate Ministries,         487         one  of Food and the other of Agriculture, by the  Presiden-         tial Order, which came into effect from 19th October,  1956,         the  arbitration  agreement in clause(17)  of  the  contract         became  dead  and unenforceable and  nothing  that  happened         thereafter  could  revive it and in any  event,  even  after         reintegration  of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture  into         one  single Ministry of Food and Agriculture,  the  arbitra-         tion   agreement  could not be given effect to  since  there         were  then  two  Secretaries  in the Ministry  of  Food  and         Agriculture and clause (17) of the contract did not indicate         as  to which Secretary was to  exercise the power  of  nomi-         nating the arbitrator, with the result that the  arbitration         agreement  suffered from the fault of vagueness  and  uncer-         tainty.  The High Court accordingly allowed the  appeal  and         set  aside  the  award made by the  Arbitrator.   Hence  the         present appeal by the appellant with special leave  obtained         from this Court.             The  only question debated before us in this appeal  was         as  to  whether  the appointment of the  arbitrator  by  the         Secretary,  Department  of Food in the Ministry  of  Food  &         Agriculture  was  a valid appointment.   Obviously,  if  the         appointment was invalid, the arbitrator would have no juris-         diction  to arbitrate upon the disputes between the  parties         and  the  award  would be invalid.   But,   an   alternative         argument  was  also advanced on behalf of the  appellant  to         sustain the award and it was that the respondents not having         raised  any objection to the appointment of  the  arbitrator         and participated in the arbitration proceedings without  any         demur  or protest, it was not open to them, after the  award         was  made,  to challenge it on the ground of  invalidity  of         appointment  of  the arbitrator.   The  respondents,  having         taken  the  chance of obtaining the award in  their  favour,         could not denounce the award when it went against them.   We         will first examine whether the appointment of the arbitrator         was valid, for, if it was, the second question, which raises         the issue of waiver, would not arise.             Now,  clause  (17)  of the contract  provided  that  all         disputes  arising out of the contract shall be  resolved  by         arbitration.   It embodied an arbitration agreement  between         the parties.  It also laid  down  the machinery for appoint-         ment  of  the arbitrator.  It provided that  the  arbitrator         shall be nominated by the Secretary in the Ministry of  Food         &  Agriculture  in his absolute discretion.  There  was  un-         doubtedly a Ministry of Food & Agriculture at the time  when         the contract was made and there was one and only one  Secre-         tary  in that Ministry, so that at the date of the  contract         there  could be no question as to who was the person  autho-

6

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8  

       rised to nominate the arbitrator,  The same position contin-         ued to obtain also at the time when  disputes  arose between         the parties.  But before an arbitrator could be nominated by         the  Secretary  in  the Ministry of Food  &  Agriculture  to         adjudicate  upon  these  disputes, the Ministry  of  Food  &         Agriculture was bifurcated into two separate Ministries  and         it ceased to exist as Ministry of Food & Agriculture.   Then         obviously there was no individual who fiIIed the description         of  "Secretary in the Ministry of Food &  Agriculture"  and,         consequently the machinery for appointment of the arbitrator         became unworkable.  If the matter had rested there, a  ques-         tion could well have arisen whether, despite the  break-down         of the machinery for nomination of an arbitrator, the  arbi-         tration agreement in clause (17)          15--1104SCI/76         488         could still be enforced by the Court by appointing an  arbi-         trator  in a proceeding under section 20 of the  Arbitration         Act.   But  the position again changed and the  Ministry  of         Food  & Agriculture came into being as a result of  integra-         tion  of the Ministry of Food and the Ministry  of  Agricul-         ture,  with  this change, namely, that the new  Ministry  of         Food & Agriculture had two departments, one of Food and  the         other  of Agriculture and there was a Secretary incharge  of         each  department.  There were thus, after  integration,  two         Secretaries  in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture  and  the         argument  of  the respondents was--and that  argument  found         favour  with  the High Court--that this event  rendered  the         arbitration  agreement vague and uncertain, inasmuch  as  it         did not specify which of the two Secretaries was to nominate         the  arbitrator "in his absolute discretion".   Though  this         argument appears attractive at first sight, a little scruti-         ny  will reveal that it is unsound. It is based on a  highly         technical  and doctrinaire approach and is opposed to  plain         commonsense.           it  must  be remembered that a contract  is  a  commercial         document  between the parties and it must be interpreted  in         such  a  manner as to give efficacy to the  contract  rather         than  to invalidate it.  It would not be right while  inter-         preting a contract, entered into between two lay parties, to         apply  strict  rules of construction  which  are  ordinarily         applicable to a conveyance and other formal documents.   The         meaning  of such a contract must be gathered by  adopting  a         commensense  approach  and  it must not  be  allowed  to  be         thwarted by a narrow pedantic and legalistic interpretation.         Here,  at the time when  the arbitrator came to be nominated         and  the reference was made, there was a Ministry of Food  &         Agriculture and there was a Secretary in that Ministry,  but         the  only difficulty, according to the High Court, was  that         there were. instead of one, two Secretaries and it could not         be predicated as to which Secretary was intended to exercise         the power of nominating an arbitrator.  We do not think this         difficulty  is at all real.  Let us consider, for a  moment,         why in clause (17), the power to nominate an arbitrator  was         conferred  on the Secretary in the Ministry of Food &  Agri-         culture  and not on a Secretary in any other  Ministry.  The         reason  obviously was that at the date of the  contract  the         Secretary  in  the Ministry of Food &  Agriculture  was  the         Officer dealing with the subject-matter of the contract.  If         this  object and reason of the provision of clause  (17)  is         kept  in  mind, it will become immediately  clear  that  the         "Secretary in the Ministry of Food &  Agriculture"authorised         to nominate an arbitrator was the Secretary incharge of  the         Department of Food who was concerned with the subject-matter         of  the contract.  The Secretary incharge of the  Department

7

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8  

       of Food filled the description "Secretary in the Ministry of         Food  & Agriculture" ’yen in clause (17).   The  respondents         relied  strongly  on the use of the definite  article  ’the’         before the words "Secretary in the Ministry of Food &  Agri-         culture" and urged that what the parties to the contract had         in mind was not a Secretary in the Ministry of Food &  Agri-         culture,  but the Secretary in the Ministry of Food &  Agri-         culture  and that clearly postulated one definite  Secretary         in  the  Ministry of Food & Agriculture and not one  of  two         Secretaries  in that Ministry.  This is, in our  opinion,  a         hyper technical argument which seeks to make a         489         fortress out of the dictionary and ignores the plain intend-         ment  of the contract.  We fail to see why the Secretary  in         the  Ministry of Food & Agriculture incharge of the  Depart-         ment  of Food could not be described as the  Secretary.   He         would be the Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture         concerned  with  the subject-matter of  the   contract   and         dearly  and indubitably he would be the person  intended  by         the parties to exercise the power of nominating the arbitra-         tor.   The  parties to the contract obviously could  not  be         expected  to use the words "a Secretary in the  Ministry  of         Food  & Agriculture", because their intendment was not  that         any  Secretary in the Ministry of Food & Agriculture  should         be entitled to exercise the power of nominating an  arbitra-         tor, but it should only be the Secretary in the Ministry  of         Food & Agriculture concerned with the subject-matter of  the         contract.   That  is  why the use of  the  definite  article         ’the’.  It is also significant to note that when the  Secre-         tary in charge of the Department of Food in the Ministry  of         Food & Agriculture nominated the arbitrator, the respondents         did not raise any objection to the appointment of the  arbi-         trator  and  participated  in  the  arbitration  proceedings         without any protest.  The respondents knew at that time that         there  were  two  Secretaries in the Ministry  of  Food  and         Agriculture and the appointment of the arbitrator was.  made         by the Secretary in charge of the Department of Food and yet         they  acquiesced  in the appointment of the  arbitrator  and         took  part  in the proceedings.  This circumstance  is  also         clearly indicative of the intendment of the parties that the         Secretary  in the Ministry of Food &  Agriculture  concerned         with the subject-matter of the contract should be the person         entitled to nominate the arbitrator. Or else the respondents         would have objected to the appointment of the arbitrator and         declined to participate in the arbitration proceedings or at         any rate, participated under protest.  We are, therefore, of         the  view that the arbitrator was validly nominated  by  the         Secretary in charge of the Department of Food in the  Minis-         try of Food & Agriculture.             This  view  renders it unnecessary for  us  to  consider         whether  by  participating  in the  proceedings  before  the         arbitrator  without  objection  or protest  and  taking  the         chance  of obtaining an award in their favour, the  respond-         ents  could  be said to have waived  the   defect   in   the         appointment of the arbitrator.             We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order  of         the  High  Court and while dismissing  the  application  for         setting  aside  the  award, pass a decree in  terms  of  the         award.   Having  regard to the peculiar  facts  and  circum-         stances  of the case, we make no order as to costs  through-         out.         M.R.                                        Appeal allowed         490

8

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8