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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: FILIP TIAGO DE GAMA OF VEDEM VASCO DE GAMA

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/11/1989

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) AHMADI, A.M. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR  981            1989 SCR  Supl. (2) 336  1990 SCC  (1) 277        JT 1989 (4)   529  1989 SCALE  (2)1226  CITATOR INFO :  D          1991 SC2027  (9)

ACT:     Land  Acquisition Act, 1894  Sections 4, 6,  23,  23(1A) and 30-A waras made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984-Entitlement  to higher Solatium and  additional  amount under Section 23( IA)--Consideration of.

HEADNOTE:     By  a  notification issued under Section 4 of  the  Land Acquisition  Act and published in the Government Gazette  on 26.10.1967,  the State Government declared its intention  to acquire the land of the Respondent on 23.2.1968. A notifica- tion under section 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette and  on  5.3.1969.  The Land  Acquisition  Officer  declared award,  determining compensation at the rate of 4 paise  per square  meter with solatium at 15 per cent. At the  instance of the respondent--claimant, a reference under section 18 of the  Act was made to the Distt. judge on May 28,  1985.  The Civil  Court awarded compensation at Rs.3 per  square  meter and  also awarded solatium at 15 per cent and interest at  6 per  cent from the date of taking possession of the land  by the State till payment of compensation. Being  dissatisfied, the Respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court seeking enhancement both of compensation and solatium at the rate of 30 per cent.     The  High  Court allowed the appeal, and  granted  three reliefs  viz;  (1) Additional amount at the rate of  12  per cent  of the market value from the date of the  notification under section 4 till the date of taking over possession; (2) interest  at the rate of 9 percent for the first  year  from the date of taking possession and 15 per cent for the subse- quent.  years and (3) Solatium at 30 per cent on the  market value.     The  appellant has thus filed the instant  appeal  after obtaining Special Leave.     There  is no grievance as regards the interest  awarded. The challenge relates to the grant of enhanced solatium  and the  additional amount of compensation. Appellants’  conten- tion  is  that sections 30(2) and 23(2) are not at  all  at- tracted  and  the claim of the Respondent on  the  said  two

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counts is not sustainable. 337 Partly allowing the appeal, this Court,     HELD: Section 30(2) provides that the amended provisions of  section 23(2) shall apply, and shall be deemed  to  have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by  the Collector or Court between 30th April 1982 and 24th  Septem- ber  1984, or to an appellate order therefrom passed by  the High Court or Supreme Court. The purpose of these provisions seems  to be that the awards made in that  interregnum  must get higher solatium in as much as to awards made  subsequent thereto. [343G-H]     If  there is obvious anamoly in the application of  law, the  Court  could shape the law to remove the  anamoly.  The Legislatures do not always deal with specific  controversies which  the  Court decide. They incorporate  general  purpose behind  the  statutory  words and it is for  the  Courts  to decide  specific cases. If a given case is well  within  the general purpose of the legislature but not within the liter- al  meaning of the statute, then the Court must  strike  the balance. So construing the Court held that benefit of higher solatium under section 23(2) should be available also to the present case. [344A-C]     In the instant case, on October 26, 1967, the  notifica- tion  under  section  4 was issued. On March  5,  1969,  the Collector  made the award. The result is that on  April  30, 1982  there was no proceeding pending before the  Collector. Therefore Section 30, sub-section (1)(a) is not attracted to the  case. Since the proceedings for  acquisition  commenced before  30th  April 1982 Section 30, sub-section  (1)(b)  is also  not  applicable  to the case. The  case  is  therefore really  gone  by both ways. The claimant  is  therefore  not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23(IA). [346E-F]     The purpose of incorporating Transitional Provisions  in any  Act or amendment is to clarify as to when and  how  the operative  parts of the enactments are to take  effect.  The transitional provisions generally are intended to take  care of the events during the period of transition. [343A]     Kamalajammaniavaru  v.  Special Land Acquisition   Offi- cer,  [1985]  1 SCC 582; Bhag Singh v.  Union  Territory  of Chandigarh,  [1985] 3 SCC 737; State of Punjab  v.  Mohinder Singh,  [1986] 1 SCC 365; Union of India v. Raghubir  Singh, [1989] 2 SCC 754; Towne v. Eisher, 245, U.S. 418,425,  1918; Lenigh  Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F.R. 547  at  553; Mahadeolal  Kanodia  v. The Administrator  General  of  West Bengal, [1960] 3 SCR 578, referred to. 338     Special Land Acauisition Officer,  Dandeli v. Soma Gopal Gowda, AIR 1986 Karnataka 179 at 183 (FB); Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai etc. etc. v. Government of Goa Daman & Diu &  Anr., AIR 1987 Bom. 214 at 217 (FB), overruled.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4802  of 1989.     From the Judgment and Order dated 7.9.1987 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 24 of 1986.     Anil Dev Singh, C. Ramesh, C.V.S. Rao and P.  Parmeshwa- ran for the Appellants.     S.K.  Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachher, Atul  Nanda  and S.M. Satin for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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K. JAGANNATHA SHETrY, J. Special Leave granted.     This  case raises yet another variant of a  vexed  ques- tion.  Does Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act,  1984 (as amended by Act 68 of 1984) providing for higher solatium proprio rigore apply to award made subsequent to 24  Septem- ber 1984 even though the acquisition commenced prior to  the said date. The appeal also raises another important question as  to the applicability of section 23(IA)  providing  addi- tional amount of compensation to award made in such acquisi- tion proceedings. The facts are not in dispute and may be stated as follows:     By notification under section 4 of the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 (the ’Act’) published in the Government Gazette on 26 October 1967, the State Government declared its intention to  acquire the land belonging to the respondent for  estab- lishing  Naval  Air Station Dabolim. On  23  February  1968, notification  under section 6 was published in the  Gazette. On 5 March 1969 the Land Acquisition Officer declared  award determining compensation at the rate of 40 paise per  square meter with solatium at 15 per cent.     The  claimant had sought reference under section  18  of the  Act  and  reference was duly made to  the  Civil  Court (District Judge). On 339 28th  May 1985, the Court after investigation of  the  claim awarded  compensation  at Rs.3 per square meter.  The  Court also  awarded solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 6  per cent  from  the date of taking possession  till  payment  of compensation. Not being satisfied, the claimant preferred an appeal  to  the High Court seeking  further  enhancement  of compensation  and also solatium at 30 per cent.  This  claim was apparently based on the new provisions introduced by the Amending Act 68 of 1984. The High Court accepted the  appeal and granted the reliefs in the following terms:               "The  impugned award dated 28th May, 1986,  is               modified.  The  appellant is entitled  to  the               added  benefits. In that he shall be  entitled               to have the compensation at the rate of 12% of               the  market value from the date of  section  4               notification  till the date of  possession  or               the  date of award, whichever is earlier.  The               appellant  is further entitled to interest  at               the  rate  of 9% for the first year  from  the               date of taking over possession and  thereafter               at the rate of 15% per annum till the date  of               deposit  or  payment as the case may  be.  The               appellant shall be entitled to further 15  per               cent  solatium in addition to the 15 per  cent               already granted to him. To the extent indicat-               ed above, the award shall stand modified."     The  High Court has thus granted three more  reliefs  to the  claimant: (i) Additional amount at the rate of  12  per cent of the market value from the date of notification under section  4  till the date of taking  over  possession;  (ii) interest at the rare of 9% for the first year from the  date of  taking  possession and 15 per cent  for  the  subsequent years;  and  (iii)  solatium at 30 per cent  on  the  market value.     There  is  no grievance made in this appeal  as  to  the second of the reliefs granted to the claimant. The  claimant is entitled to the interest under section 28 of the Act. The challenge  is  only against the first and the third  of  the said  reliefs. They were evidently given under  the  amended sections 23(IA) and 23(2) of the Act.     We  will first take up the question of solatium.  On  30

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April 1982, the corresponding Bill of the Amending Act 68 of 1984,  namely, Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill  1982,  was introduced  in Parliament. On 24th September 1984 it  became law  as  the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 68  of  1984, when it received assent of the President. Before the  amend- ment, Section 23(2) provided solatium at 15 340 per  cent on the market value. After amendment by Act 68  of 1984  solatium was raised to 30 per cent on the market  val- ued. Section 23(2) now reads:               "23(2) In addition to the market value of  the               land,  as above provided, the Court  shall  in               every case award a sum of (thirty per  centum)               on such market value, in consideration of  the               compulsory nature of the acquisition."     The  question herein is whether the higher  solatium  is attracted to the present case. Section 23(2) has been  given limited retrospectivity by supplying transitional provisions under section 30(2). Section 30(2) reads:               "30. Transitional provisions:               (1)        xxxxxx                      xxxxxxx               xxxxxxxx               (2)  The  provisions  of  sub-section  (2)  of               Section 23 of the principal Act, as amended by               clause  (b)  of Section 15 and Section  18  of               this Act respectively, shall apply, and  shall               be  deemed  to have applied, also to,  and  in               relation  to, any award made by the  Collector               or  Court or to any order passed by  the  High               Court  or Supreme Court in appeal against  any               such award under the provisions of the princi-               pal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the               date  of introduction of the Land               Acquisition  (Amendment)  Bill, 1984,  in  the               House of the People) and before the  commence-               ment of this Act."     The  scope of retrospective operation of  Section  23(2) was  first explained in Kamalajammaniavaru v.  Special  Land Acquisition  Officer,  [1985] 1 SCC 582. A two  Judge  Bench held that the award of 30 per cent solatium will apply  only where  the award appealed against was made by the  Collector of  Court  during the period between 30 April  1982  and  24 September  1984. This decision was rendered on  14  February 1985.  Shortly  thereafter there was another decision  by  a three-Judge Bench in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chand- igarh,  [1985]  3  SCC 737. There a contrary  view  was  ex- pressed.  It was held that even if an award is made  by  the Collector  or  Court  on or before 30 April,  1982,  and  an appeal  against such award is pending before the High  Court or the Supreme Court on 30 April 1982 or is filed subsequent to  that  date,  30 per cent solatium  under  section  23(2) should be 341 allowed.  In taking that view, Bhag Singh overruled  Kamala- jammannavaru and approved of the opinion expressed in anoth- er  three-Judge Bench in State of Punjab v. Mohinder  Singh, [1986] 1 SCC 365. But the recent Constitution Bench in Union of  India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 2 SCC 754 has  overruled Bhag  Singh and Mohinder Singh and reiterated the  view  ex- pressed in Kamalajammanaivaru. Pathak, CJ., speaking for the Court in Raghubir Singh case rounded off his discussion thus (at 782):               "We think that what Parliament intends to  say               is  that the benefit of section 30(2) will  be               available to an award by the Collector or  the

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             Court made between the aforesaid two dates  or               to an appellate order of the High Court or  of               the Supreme Court which arises out of an award               of the Collector or the Court made between the               said  two  dates. The word ’or’ is  used  with               reference to the stage at which the proceeding               rests  at  the  time when  the  benefit  under               section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the               proceeding  has terminated with the  award  of               the Collector or of the Court made between the               aforesaid  two dates, the benefit  of  section               30(2)  will  be  applied to  such  award  made               between  the aforesaid two dates. If the  pro-               ceeding  has  passed to the  stage  of  appeal               before the High Court or Supreme Court, it  is               at  that  stage when the  benefit  of  section               30(2) will be applied. But in every case,  the               award  of the Collector or of the  Court  must               have  been  made between April  30,  1982  and               September 24, 1984."     In  stating thus, the decision has set at rest the  con- troversy  as  to  entitlement of higher  solatium  to  cases pending as on the date of commencement of the Amending  Act. Section 23(2) was held to apply to awards made in between 30 April  1982  and 24 September 1984. Obviously they  must  be awards in acquisition commenced prior to the said dates. The award  may  be of the Collector or Court. One or  the  other must receive thirty per cent solatium on the market value of the  land.  More important, that the higher  solatium  could also  be  given by the High Court or the  Supreme  Court  in appeals against such award.     But  these decisions do not solve the problem  presented here.  The award with which we are concerned does  not  fall within  the  interregnum i.e. between 30 April 1982  and  24 September  1984. To repeat the facts: The  acquisition  com- menced  on 26 October 1967 when the notification under  sec- tion 4(1) of the Act was published. On 5 March 342 1969  the  Collector made the award and on 28 May  1985  the reference court made the award. Both the awards, thus appar- ently  fall  outside  the period  prescribed  under  section 30(2).     Counsel  for the appellant on the aforesaid facts  rules out  the applicability of section 30(2) in the first  place. Secondly,  he  also ruled out the applicability  of  section 23(2). The first contention was based on the plain terms  of Section  30(2)  and the second on the  ground  that  section 23(2)  with its isolated splendour is not  retrospective  in operation. He thus submitted that the claimant’s case  could not  be saved for higher solatium either under  Transitional Provisions or by amended Section 23(2) of the Act and it was gone both ways.     This  submission reminds us of the words of  Shakespeare in the Merchant of Venice, where Luncelot tells Jessica:               "Truely  then  I fear you are damned  both  by               father  and  mother. When I shun  scylla  your               father,  I  fail into charybdis  your  mother.               Well,  you are gone both ways." (The  Merchant               of Venice 3.5).     The  submission  that  Section 23(2) by  itself  has  no retrospective operation seems to be justified. It is signif- icant  to note that section 23(2) forms part of a scheme  of determining compensation for land acquired under the Act. It provides  30  per cent solatium on the market value  of  the land in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acqui-

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sition.  It  thus operates on the market value of  the  land acquired.  The  market value of the land is required  to  be determined  at the date of publication of  the  notification under  section 4(1). It cannot be determined with  reference to  any  other date. That has been  expressly  provided  for under section 23(1) of the Act. In the instant case, section 4(1)  notification  was published on 20  October  1967.  The Amending  Act  68 of 1984 came into force  on  24  September 1984. The amended section 23(2) by itself is not  retrospec- tive in operation. It can not proprio vigore apply to awards in respect of acquisition proceedings commenced prior to  24 September 1984. If, therefore, section 30(2) does not  cover the present case, then amended Section 23(2) has no part  to play.     This  in effect is the result of the plain meaning  rule of  interpreting  Section 30(2) of the Amending  Act  68  of 1984. But then, it would seem very odd indeed and  anomalous too  to exclude the present case from the operation of  sec- tion 30(2). Section 30(2) is the Transitional 343 Provisions. The purpose of incorporating Transitional Provi- sions  in any Act or amendment is to clarify as to when  and how  the operative parts of the enactments are to  take  ef- fect. The Transitional Provisions generally are intended  to take care of the events during the period of transition. Mr. Francis Bennion in his book on Statutory Interpretation  (14 Edition, p. 442) outlines the purpose of such provisions:               "189. Transitional Provisions               Where an Act contains substantive, amending or               repealing  enactments,  it commonly  also  in-               cludes transitional provisions which regulates               the coming into operation of those  enactments               and  modify their effect during the period  of               transition. Where an Act fails to include such               provisions expressly, the Court is required to               draw such inferences as to the intended  tran-               sitional arrangements as, in the light of  the               interpretative criteria, it considers  Parlia-               ment to have intended."     The  paramount object in statutory interpretation is  to discover  what the legislature intended. This  intention  is primarily  to be ascertained from the text of  enactment  in question.  That  does not mean the text is to  be  construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its  nature or  purpose.  A  statute is neither a literary  text  nor  a devine revelation "Words are certainly not crystals,  trans- parent  and unchanged" as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely  and properly warned. (Town v. Eisher, 245, U.S. 418, 425, 1918). Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said.  "Stat- utes  should  be construed, not as theorems of  Euclid,  but with  some  imagination  of the purposes  which  lie  behind them."  (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 2 18 F.R.  547 at 553.)     Section  30(2) provides that amended provisions of  Sec- tion 23(2) shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the collector or Court between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984, or  to an  appellate  order therefrom passed by the High  Court  or Supreme  Court. The purpose of these provisions seems to  be that  the  awards made in that interregnum must  get  higher solatium  in  as  much as to awards made  subsequent  to  24 September  1984.  Perhaps it was thought  that  awards  made after the commencement of the Amending Act 68 of 1984  would be taken care of by the amended Section 23(2). The case like the present one seems -to have escaped attention by innocent

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lack of due care in the drafting. 344 The result would be an obvious anomaly as will be  indicated presently. If there is obvious anomaly in the application of law the Court could shape the law to remove the anomaly.  If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to  absurd- ity or inconsistency, the Court could discard such interpre- tation and adopt an interpretation which will give effect to the  purpose  of  the legislature. That could  be  done,  if necessary  even by modification of the language used.  [See: Mahadeolal  Kanodia  v. The Administrator  General  of  West Bengal,  [1960]  3 SCR 5/8]. The legislators do  not  always deal  with  specific controversies which the  Court  decide. They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory  words and  it  is for the courts to decide specific  cases.  If  a given case is well within the general purpose of the  legis- lature  but not within the literal meaning of  the  statute, then the court must strike the balance.     The criticism that the literal interpretation of Section 30(2), if adhered to would lead to unjust result seems to be justified. Take for example; two acquisition proceedings  of two  adjacent pieces of land, required for the  same  public purpose.  Let  us say that they were initiated on  the  same day--a  day sometime prior to 30 April 1982. In one of  them the award of the Collector is made on 23 September 1984  and in  the other on 25 September 1984. Under the terms of  Sec- tion  30(2) the benefit of higher solatium is  available  to the first award and not to the second. Take another example; the  proceedings of acquisition initiated, say, in the  year 1960 in which award was made on 1 May 1982. Then the amended Section  23(2) shall apply and higher solatium is  entitled. But  in an acquisition initiated on 23 September  1984,  and award  made  in the year 1989 the higher solatium  is  ruled out.  This is the intrinsic illogicality if the  award  made after 24 September 1984, is not given higher solatium.  Such a  construction  of  Section 30(2) would  be  vulnerable  to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution and it should be avoided. We, therefore, hold that benefit of higher solatium under section 23(2) should be available also to the  present case. This would be the only reasonable view to be taken  in the  circumstances of the case and in the light of the  pur- pose  of  Section  30(2). In this view of  the  matter,  the higher  solutium  allowed by the High Court is  kept  undis- turbed.     This  takes  us  to the second question  which  we  have formulated  at  the beginning of the judgment:  Whether  the claimant  is entitled to additional amount  of  compensation provided under Section 23(IA) of the Act? This is equally  a fundamental question and seemingly not covered by any of the previous decisions of this Court. 345 Section 23(IA) reads as follows:               "In addition to the market value of the  land,               as  above provided, the court shall  in  every               case award an amount calculated at the rate of               twelve  per  centum per annum on  such  market               value  for the period commencing on  and  from               the  date of the publication of the  notifica-               tion  under  Section 4,  sub-section  (!),  in               respect  of such land to the date of award  of               the Collector or the date of taking possession               of the land, whichever is earlier.                        Explanation: In computing the  period               referred to in this sub-section any period  or               periods  during which the proceedings for  the

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             aquisition of the land were held up on account               of any stay or injunction by the order of  any               court shall be excluded." The objective words used in this sub-section are similar  to those  that are used in Section 23(2). It enjoins a duty  on the Court to award the additional amount at twelve per  cent on  the market value of the land for the  period  prescribed thereunder.  But  this  again is a part of  the  scheme  for determining compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act.  It also  operates on the market value of the land acquired.  It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation since market value has to be determined as on the date of publica- tion of notification under section 4(1). But the legislature has given new starting point for operation of section 23(IA) for  certain cases. That will be found from Section 30  sub- section  l(a) and (b) of the Transitional  Provisions.  They read as follows:               Section 30: Transitional Provisions:               (1)  The  provision  of  sub-section  (IA)  of               Section  23 of the principal Act, as  inserted               clause  (a) of section 15 of this  Act,  shall               apply,  and shall be deemed to  have  applied,               also to, and in relation to:               (a)  every proceeding for the  acquisition  of               any  land under the principal Act  pending  on               the 30th day of April 1982 the date of  intro-               duction  of the Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)               Bill  1982  [in the House of  the  People]  in               which no award has been made by the  Collector               before that date.               346               (b)  every proceeding for the  acquisition  of               any  land  under the principal  Act  commenced               after  that date, whether or not an award  has               been made by the Collector before the date  of               commencement of this Act."     Entitlement of additional amount provided under  Section 23(1A)  depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings  as on 30 April 1982 or commencement of acquisition  proceedings after that date. Section 30 sub-section (1)(a) provides that additional  amount  provided under Section 23(IA)  shall  be applicable  to  acquisition proceedings pending  before  the Collector  as on 30 April 1982 in which he has not made  the award before that date. If the Collector has made the  award before  that  date then, that additional  amount  cannot  be awarded. Section 30 sub-section (1)(b) provides that section 23(l-A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced  after  30  April 1982 irrespective  of  the  fact whether  the  Collector has made an award or not  before  24 September  1984. The final point to note is that Section  30 sub-section (1) does not refer to Court award and the  Court award is used only in section 30 sub-section (2).     In the case before us, on 26 October 1967, the notifica- tion under section 4 was issued. On 5 March 1969 the Collec- tor  made  the award. The result is that on  30  April  1982 there  was  no  proceedings pending  before  the  Collector. Therefore, section 30 sub-section (1)(a) is not attracted to the  case. Since the proceedings for  acquisition  commenced before 30 April 1982, section 30 sub-section (1)(b) is  also not applicable to the case. Here, the case is really gone by both ways. It cannot be saved from Scylla or Charybdis.  The claimant  is, therefore, not entitled to  additional  amount provided under Section 23( I-A).     Before  we part with the case, it is important  that  we should  refer  to two authorities of the High  Courts  which

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have taken contrary view.     As  to  the applicability of Section 23(IA)  to  pending cases, the Karnataka High Court in Special Land  Acquisition Officer, Dandeli v. Soma Gopal Gowda, AIR 1986 Karnataka 179 at 183 (FB) has expressed the view that for giving an  addi- tional  amount  calculated at the rate of 12  per  cent  per annum on the market value of the land, no distinction  could be made respecting lands acquired before or after the coming into force of the Amending Act. In all pending cases whether on  reference or on appeal, the Court is required  to  apply the  provisions of Section ’23(1A) in determining  compensa- tion  payable  to claimants. For this conclusion  the  Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in 347 Bhag Singh case. The Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxman  P. Sardesai  etc. etc. v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu  and Ant.,  AIR  1987  Bom 214 at 217 (FB) has  also  accepted  a similar  line of reasoning. In fact the reasons are so  much similar, the cases look like twins.     Both  the  High Courts have focussed  attention  on  the terms  and  phraseology used in Section 30  sub-section  (1) namely,"   .....  shall apply, and shall be deemed  to  have applied, also to, and in relation has also been  proceedings for  acquisition   .....  ". The conclusion  has  also  been rested on the mandatory words of Section 23(lA). It was said that  it enjoins a duty on the court to award the amount  in every case and that mandate of the legislature could not  be ignored. The decision of this Court in Bhag Singh appears to be the single motive force guiding the approach and reaching the  conclusion.  But  it may be noted  that  the  aforesaid phraseology  used  in Section 30 sub-section  (1)  is  quite similar  to  that used in Section 30  sub-section  (2).  The scope  of those words has already been examined and no  more need  to be stated in that regard since Bhag Singh has  been overruled  in  Raghubir Singh. The view taken  by  the  High Courts of Karnataka and Bombay therefore, could no longer be cosidered as good law and the said decisions are accordingly overruled.     In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The  judg- ment  of  the High Court is modified  and  the  compensation award  under  Section 23(IA) is deleted.  The  judgment  and decree    in   other   respects   are   kept    undisturbed. ’ In  the  circumstances of the case, we make no order  as  to costs. Y.   Lal                                              Appeal allowed. 348