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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ZORA SINGH ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/11/1991

BENCH: KANIA, M.H. BENCH: KANIA, M.H. MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1991 SCR  Supl. (2) 478  1992 SCC  (1) 673  JT 1991 (4)   538        1991 SCALE  (2)1128

ACT:     Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894--Section  23(1-A)--Benefit under--Entitlement  of Land Acquisition  Act,  1894--Section 23(1-A)  "Award"---Construction--"Award" whether ‘decree  ’, "Court" whether "Collector ".     Land  Acquisition Act, 1894--Section 23(1-A)  read  with Section  30(1)(a)  of the Land  Acquisition  Amendment  Act, 1984--Applicability  of.

HEADNOTE:     The  lands of the respondent and other land owners  were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.     Notifications  under  sections 4 and 6 of the  Act  were published on 10.5.1979 and 27.3.1981 respectively.     The  respondent  and other land owners  filed  Reference Applications u/s 18 of the Act against the award before  the District Judge.     The  District Judge classifying the acquired  land  into various  grades awarded compensation and also granted  bene- fits u/s 23(1-A) of the Act to the respondent and other land Owners. Hence, the State appealed to the High Court.     Those  land-owners,  who  were not  satisfied  with  the compensation  awarded and those to whom benefit u/s  23(1-A) were not granted, also appealed to the High Court.     The  Single Judge of the High Court confirmed the  grant of  benefits  u/s 23(1-A) of the Act and also  granted  such benefits to those cases, where such benefits were not  given by the District Judge.     The  State preferred the Letters Patent  Appeals  before the  Division Bench of the High Court, contending  that  the respondent and 479 other  land owners were not entitled to the benefit of  sec- tion 23(1-A) of the Act; that the section 23(1-A) was intro- duced by the Land Acquisition(Amendment) Act, 1984; that  as the Collector had made his award on 31.3.1981 the provisions of  section  23(1-A) of the Act was not  applicable  to  the cases of the respondent and other land owners.     The  Division  Bench  of the High  Court  dismissed  the Letters  Patent  Appeals  of the State.  Hence  the  present appeals by special leave were filed by the State before this

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Court.     The parties before this Court made the same  submissions which were made before the High Court. Dismissing the appeal, (CA No.4568 of 1991) this Court,     HELD:    1.    A   perusal   of   the   provisions    of sub-section(1-A) of section 23 makes it clear that the  said sub-section  deals with substantive rights and it confers  a substantive right to claim the additional amount  calculated as set out in the said sub-section in the circumstances  set out  therein. Similarly, sub-section(2) of Section  23  also confers  a  substantive right on the claimant  to  a  higher solatium. [486 E-F]     2.   The  provisions of the Act,  being  substantive  in nature,  can  have only prospective application  unless  the language  in which the provisions are couched, read  in  the context, shows that the intention of the legislature was  to give  retrospective  effect to them. The  language  of  sub- section(1-A) of section 23 shows that a duty is cast on  the court  to  award an amount calculated as stated  therein  in addition  to the market value of the land acquired  for  the period  commencing from the date of the publication of  sec- tion  4 of the Notification to the date of the award of  the Collector  or  the date of taking possession,  whichever  is earlier. [486 F-G]      3.   The  expression "award" used  in  section  23(1-A) suggests  that the intention of the legislature was to  make the  provisions of the said sub-section applicable to  cases where  the Collector had yet to make his award or the  Trial Court  hearing  the Reference under Section 18 of  the  Land acquisition Act has still to make its award after the coming into  force of the said sub-section on September  30,  1984. [486 H-487 A] 480     4.   The expression "award" is to be distinguished  from the  expression "decree" and hence, it appears that  in  the absence of any contrary or inconsistent provision in the Act the  provisions of subsection(1-A) of section 23  would  not come into play where the awards had been made by the Collec- tor  earlier  as well as by the Reference Court but  on  the date  of  coming  into effect of the  said  sub-section,  an appeal  from  the said award might have been  pending  in  a court.  In that case, the court would not be "awarding"  any amount  but would be making a "decree" for an  amount.  [487 B-C]     5.   By reason of the provision of section  30(1)(a)  of the Amendment Act of 1984 the provisions of section  23(1-A) of the Act were, by a deeming provision, made also  applica- ble  to every proceeding for the acquisition of  land  under the Act where the Collector had not made his award by.April, 30,1982.  On a correct interpretation of the  provisions  of section 23(1-A) read with section 30(1)(a) of the  Amendment Act  of 1984, an additional amount calculated in the  manner indicated in section 23(1-A) is also payable in those  cases where  the  Collector had not made his award  on  or  before April  30,1982,  but  the Court might have  made  its  award before September 24,1984. [487 D-E]     6.   The construction that is being given to the  provi- sions  of  section 23(1-A) and section 30(1)(a) will,  in  a sense,  limit  the benefits strictly  conferred  by  section 30(1)(a) to only those cases, where the Collector as well as the  Court have made their respective awards  between  April 30,1982  and September 24, 1984. That cannot be  helped,  as that is the result of the plain grammatical construction  of the clear language used in the relevant provisions. [487  E- F]

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   7.  The Court would not be justified in giving an unduly restricted  meaning  to the provisions  of  section  23(1-A) unwarranted  by the plain language of the sub-section.  [487 F]     8.  Section 23(1-A) refers clearly to the duties of  the court. The court is defined by section 3(d) as the principal court of original jurisdiction, except in the  circumstances set  out  in the said subsection, which would be  the  court having jurisdiction to decide the reference under section 18 of  the Act. There, is therefore, no warrant to read in  the place  of  the  word "Court" in  Section  23(1-A)  the  word "Collector".  Moreover, the decision of such a court  deter- mining  compensation is regarded as an award under the  Act. In the light of the provisions, there is no warrant to  give an unduly restricted meaning to section 23(1-A) of the  Act. [487 G-488 A] 481     9.  On the plain language of section 23(1-A) itself, the duty  was  cast on the court to award an  additional  amount calculated as prescribed therein which would mean that  such amount  is directed to be awarded by the court, namely,  the Reference court, in all cases which are pending before  that court on September 1, 1984. Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 30 lays down that the provisions of section 23(1-A) of the  Act are also made applicable to all proceedings for the acquisi- tion  of  any  land  under the said  Act  pending  on  April 30,1982,  where  no  award had been made  by  the  Collector before  that  date.  At first glance this  would  appear  to suggest  that the additional amount referred to  in  section 23(1-A)  could not be awarded where the Collector  had  made his award before April 30,1982. But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits available to the  claimants on  a plain reading of section 23(t-A). This is  clear  from the  use of the word "also" in the opening part  of  section 30(1). [489 E-H]     10. In the present case as the Reference court has  made its award after September 24,1984 the benefit of the  provi- sions of Section 23(1-A) was clearly available to the claim- ant. [491 D]     Jaiwant  Laxman  P.Sardesai etc. v. Government  of  Goa, Daman  and Diu and Another etc., AIR 1987  Bombay  214(F.B.) and Union of India & Others v. Filip Tiago De Gama of  lied- era Vasco De Gains, [1990] 1 SCC 277, overruled..     State  of  Punjab v. Krishan Lal, AIR  1987  Punjab  and Haryana  222(F.B.);  and Maya Devi and Others v.  The  Union Territory  of Chandigarh, 1988 Punjab Law Journal  189,  ap- proved.     Union  of  India  and ,Another etc.  v.  Raghuvir  Singh (dead) by Lrs. etc., [1989] 2 SCC 754; K. Kamala  Jammannia- varu  v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985] I SCC  582 and  Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh,  [1985]  3 SCC 737, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4568 of 1991.     From the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.89 of the  Punjab & Haryana High Court in LPA No. 1251 of 1987. WITH CA Nos 4569 - 4686/91 482     M.  Chandra Sekhar, Additional Solicitor  General,  G.L. Sanghi, Hatbans Lal, Har Dev Singh, S.P. Goyal, Harinder Pal

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Singh,  Ms. Naresh Bakshi, S.M. Sarin, P.N. Puff, M.K.  Dua, Ms. Madhu Moolchandani, Manoj Swamp, Dr.(Ms.) Meera Agarwal, R.C. Mishra, M.N. Krislmamam, K.P. Sunder Rao, Attar  Singh, S.N.  Terdal,  Hemant Sharma, T.C. Sharma,  N.D.  Garg,  Ms. Kusum Chowdhary and S.P. Sarin for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J. Leave granted.     Counsel heard. As the controversy before us is a limited one and relates only to the question of granting of  benefit of  the  provisions of Section 23(1-A) introduced  into  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as  "the said  Act") by the Land Acquisition (Amendment)  Act,  1984, (referred  to  hereinafter as "the Amendment Act  of  1984") only  a few facts are necessary for the appreciation of  the submissions made before us.     This appeal, arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No, 14297  of 1990 by Special Leave, is directed against the judgment of a Division  Bench  of  the Punjab and Haryana  High  Court  in Letters  Patent  Appeal No.1251 of 1987. The  other  appeals before us are connected appeals filed by the Union of  India or the claimants. The respondent was the owner of a piece of land in one of the villages in District Bhatinda in  Punjab. Land admeasuring 74375 acres situated in various villages in Bhatinda  District including the land of the respondent  was acquired by the appellants under the said Act.         The Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act  were published on May 10,1979 and March 27,  1981,  re- spectively. The Special Land Collector made and declared his award  of compensation in respect of the acquisition of  the said land and several other plots of land on March  31,1981. Being aggrieved by the said award, the respondent and other landowners filed Reference applications under Section 18  of the  said  Act which were decided by  the  learned  District Judge  concerned  in 1985 and 1986. The  land  acquired  was classified  into  various grades  and  compensation  awarded accordingly. In the case before us and several other similar cases  the  benefits under Section 23(1-A) of the  said  Act were  granted to the land-owners. The State appealed to  the High  Court.  In several other cases where the  land  owners were not satisfied with the compensation awarded,  including the  cases where the benefits conferred by  Section  23(1-A) were  not awarded the land owners filed appeals  before  the High Court. 483          What is relevant for our purpose is that a  learned Single Judge of the High Court confirmed the grant of  bene- fits  under Section 23(1-A)of the said Act where such  bene- fits  had  been granted by the learned  District  Judge  and awarded the same where that had not been done by the learned District  Judge.  Letters Patent Appeals were filed  by  the State  being dissatisfied with the judgment of  the  learned Single Judge.         It  was  submitted on behalf of the Union  of  India before  the Division Bench deciding the Letters  Patent  Ap- peals  that the claimants/land owners  were not entitled  to the benefit of Section 23(1-A) of the said Act introduced by the said Amendment Act, 1984 as aforestated. It was  submit- ted on behalf of the appellants that the right to get  addi- tional  amount at the rate of 12% per annum on the  enhanced amount  of compensation from the date of Notification  under Section 4 of the said Act and till the date of the award  of the Collector or the date of taking possession whichever  is earlier conferred under the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the said Act was available only in cases where the Collector made  his  award after 30th  day of April, 1982,  being  the

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date of the introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill,  1982  in  the House of the  People,  whereas  in  the present case, the Collector had made his award on March  31, 1981. Reliance was placed on the Judgment of a Full Bench of the  Punjab  and  Haryana High Court in State of  Punjab  v. Krishan  Lal, AIR (1987) Punjab and Haryana, 222. The  Divi- sion Bench repelled this contention and pointed out that the learned  Chief  Justice H.N. Seth, who spoke  for  the  Full Bench  in  Krishan  Lal’s case (supra)  had  explained  that judgment  in the  subsequent decision rendered in Maya  Devi and Others v. The Union Territory of Chandigarh, Punjab  Law Journal (1988) 189. and pointed out that the land owner  was entitled to the additional amount in terms of Section  23(1- A)  of  the  Amendment Act of 1984 if  the  proceedings  for determination  of compensation were decided after  September 24, 1984,  and since the Regular First Appeal in respect  of the  proceedings for determination of the  compensation  was decided  after September 24, 1984, the  Court while  adjudi- cating upon the amount of compensation payable to the claim- ant  was  bound to grant the additional amount in  terms  of Section  23(1-A) of the said Act. The Division Bench in  its impugned  judgment  gave to the claimant the benefit of  the added  amount  referred to in Section  23(1-A) of  the  said Act.  The same submissions have been made on behalf  of  the respective parties before us.          Before discussing the submissions of the respective parties,  it would not be out of place to set out the  rele- vant provisions of the said Act.          The  said  Act, namely, the Land  Acquisition  Act, 1894, provides for compulsory acquisition of land. The  term ’Award’ has not been defined in 484 the  said Act. Sub-clause (d) of Section 3,  the  definition section, defines the expression ’Court’ as follows:               "(d)the  expression ’Court’ means a  principal               Civil  Court of original jurisdiction,  unless               the  appropriate Government has appointed,  as               it is hereby empowered to do, a special  judi-               cial officer within any specified local limits               to  perform  the function of the  Court  under               this Act.’     Part  II  of  the said Act deals with  the  question  of acquisition  of land. Section 11 of the said Act deals  with the  enquiry  and award of compensation  by  the  Collector. Section  11-A which was introduced into the said Act by  the Land  Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No.68 of  1984) provides  for  the period within which the  award  shall  be made. Generally speaking, it prescribes that the period  for making  the award is limited to two years, and  the  section provides that, if the award is not made within that  period, the entire proceedings for acquisition of land shall  lapse. There  is a proviso to the said section and an  Explanation, but it is not necessary to consider the same for the purpose of this case. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 which is includ- ed in Part III of the said Act runs as follows:               "18. Reference to Court-                     (1)  Any person interested who  has  not               accepted the award may, by written application               to  the Collector, require that the matter  be               referred  by the Collector for the  determina-               tion of the Court, whether his objection be to               the  measurement  of the land, the  amount  of               compensation,  the person to whom it  is  pay-               able, or the apportionment of the compensation               among the persons interested."

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   Section  23 deals with the matters to be  considered  by the Court for determining the compensation to be awarded for the  land acquired under the said Act. We may  mention  here that under the general scheme of the said Act, the landowner whose  land  has been acquired is entitled to  be  paid  the market-value of the land acquired as prevailing at the  time of  the  publication  of the notification  under  Section  4 issued together with the solatium at the prescribed rate  in consideration  of the compulsory nature of the  acquisition. Prior to the coming into effect of the Amendment Act of 1984 solatium was fixed at the rate of 15 per centum. Sub-section (1-A)  which was introduced into Section 23 of the said  Act by the Amendment Act of 1984 runs as follows:               "In addition to the market value of the  land,               as  above provided, the Court shall  in  every               case award an amount calcu-               485               lated  at  the rate of twelve per  centum  per               annum  on  such market-value  for  the  period               commencing on and from the date of the  publi-               cation  of the notification under  Section  4,               subsection (1), in respect of such land to the               date of the award of the Collector or the date               of taking possession of the land, whichever is               earlier."     By the said Amendment Act of 1984 the expression "thirty per  centum"  was  substituted in place  of  the  expression "fifteen per centum" in sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the said Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 now runs as follows:               "(2)  In addition to the market-value  of  the               land,  as above provided, the Court  shall  in               every case award a sum of thirty per centum on               such  market-value,  in consideration  of  the               compulsory nature of the acquisition." .lmo     These  amendments were effected in the Land  Acquisition Act (the said Act) by the Land Acquisition (Amendment)  Act, 1984,  ("the  Amendment Act of 1984") as  set  out  earlier. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 of the Amendment  Act of 1984 run as follows:               "30 Transitional Provisions:               (1)  The  provisions of sub-section  (1-A)  of               Section  23 of the principal Act, as  inserted               by Clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall               apply,  and shall be deemed to  have  applied,               also to, and in relation to,                    (a) every proceedings for the acquisition               of any land under the principal Act pending on               the 30th day of April, 1982 the date of intro-               duction  of the Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)               Bill,  1982,  in the House of the  People,  in               which no award has been made by the  Collector               before that date;                    (b) every proceeding for the  acquisition               of any land under the principal Act  commenced               after  that date, whether or not an award  has               been  made  by the Collector before  the  com-               mencement of this Act.               (2)  The  provisions  of  sub-section  (2)  of               Section  23  and Section 28 of  the  principal               Act,  as amended by Clause (b) of  Section  15               and Section 18 of this Act respectively  shall               apply,  and shall be deemed to  have  applied,               also to, and in relation to, any award made by               the Collector or Court or to any order  passed

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             by  the High Court or Supreme Court in  appeal               against               486               any  such  award under the provisions  of  the               principal  Act  later the 30th day  of  April,               1982,  the  date of introduction of  the  Land               Acquisition  (Amendment)  Bill. 1982,  in  the               House  of the People and before the  commence-               ment of this Act."               (emphasis supplied by us)     On  behalf  of  the appellants reliance  was  placed  by learned  Counsel on the decision of this Court in  Union  of India  and Others v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem  Vasco  De Gama,  [1990] 1 SCC 277. The respondent, on the other  hand, placed  strong reliance on the decision of a Full  Bench  of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai and etc. v.  Government of Goa, Daman Diu and Another etc,  AIR  1987 Bombay  214. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment  of  the Bombay High Court it was submitted by the  respondent/claim- ant  that a wide and liberal interpretation should be  given to the provisions of sub-section (1-A) of section 23 and the amount calculated as set out in the said sub-section awarded in  all cases where any proceeding was pending in any  court including  the High Court or this Court in  connection  with the determination of compensation for the land acquired.  We may  mention that both the parties referred us to the  deci- sion of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India and  Another  etc:.  v. Raghuvir Singh (dead)  by  Lrs  etc, [1989]  2 SCC 754. We propose to discuss these  decisions  a little later but before doing so, we propose to analyse  the relevant provisions of the said Act and the effect thereof.     A  perusal  of the provisions of  sub-section  (1-A)  of Section  23 makes it clear that the said  sub-section  deals with  substantive rights and it confers a substantive  right to claim the additional amount calculated as set out in  the said  sub-section  in  the circumstances  set  out  therein. Similarly,  sub-section  (2) of Section 23  also  confers  a substantive  right  on the claimant to  a  higher  solatium. Under  the  well-settled rules of interpretation,  the  said provisions of the said Act, being substantive in nature, can have  only  prospective application unless the  language  in which the provisions are couched, read in the context, shows that the intention of the legislature was to give retrospec- tive  effect  to them. The language of sub-section  (lA)  of Section  23 shows that a duty is cast on the court tO  award an  amount calculated as stated therein in addition  to  the market value of the land acquired for the period  commencing from the date of the publication of the Section 4  Notifica- tion  to the date of the award of the Collector or the  date of taking possession, whichever is earlier.                                 (Emphasis supplied) The  expression  "award" used in section 23  (I-A)  suggests that the 487 intention  of the legislature was to make the provisions  of the said subsection applicable to cases where the  Collector had  yet  to make his award or the Trial Court  heating  the Reference  under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act  had still  to make its award after the coming into force of  the said  sub-section  on  September 30,  1984.  The  expression "award" is to be distinguished from the expression  "decree" and hence, it appears that in the absence of any contrary or inconsistent  provision  in the said Act the  provisions  of sub-section  would  not come into play where the  award  had been made by the Collector earlier as well as by the  Refer-

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ence  Court but   ton the date of coming into effect of  the said sub-section, an appeal from  the said award might  have been  pending in a court. In that case, the Court would  not be "awarding" any amount but would be making a "decree"  for an amount.      By  reason of the provision of section 30(1)(a) of  the Amendment  Act of 1984 the provisions of section 23(1-A)  of the  said  Act were, by a deeming provision, made  also  ap- plicable  to  every proceeding for the acquisition  of  land under  the  said Act where the Collector had  not  made  his award  by April 30,1982. On a correct interpretation of  the provisions of section 23 (1-A) read with section 30(1)(a) of the  Amendment Act of 1984, an additional amount  calculated in  the manner indicated in section 23(1-A) is also  payable in those cases where the Collector had not made his award on or  before  April 30, 1982, even in cases  where  the  court might have made its award before September 24, 1984.      It  is  true  that the aforesaid  construction  we  are giving  to  the provisions of Section  23(1-A)  and  Section 30(1)(a)  will,  in  a sense, limit  the  benefits  strictly conferred by Section 30(1)(a) to only those cases where  the Collector  as well as the Court have made  their  respective awards between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 but, in our view, that cannot be helped as that is the result of the plain grammatical construction of the clear language used in the relevant provisions. We are of the opinion that we would not  be justified in giving an unduly restricted meaning  to the  provisions of Section 23(1-A) unwarranted by the  plain language of that sub-section as appears to have been done in the case of Union of India and Others v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama discussed more particularly hereinaf- ter,  in order to give a wider meaning of the provisions  of Section  30(1)(a).  Section 23(1-A) refers  clearly  to  the duties  of  the Court. As we have already pointed  out,  the court  is defined by Section 3(d) as the principal court  of original  jurisdiction, except in the circumstances set  out in  the  said sub-section, which would be the  court  having jurisdiction to decide the reference under Section 18 of the said  Act.  There, is therefore, no warrant to read  in  the place of the word 488 "Court"  in Section 23(1-A) the word "Collector".  Moreover, the  decision  of such a court determining  compensation  is regarded  as  an award under the said Act. In the  light  of these  provisions,  there is no warrant to  give  an  unduly restricted  meaning to Section 23(1-A) of the said  Act,  as pointed out above.     Coming now to the decisions cited before us we find that in the case before the Full Bench of the Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai and etc. v. Govern- ment of Goa, Daman and Diu and Another etc. (AIR 1987 Bombay 214) the facts were that the Notification under Section 4 of the  said Act was published on October 3, 1969, in the  Gov- ernment  Gazette of the Government of Goa. The  Notification under  Section  6 was published on June 10,  1971  The  Land Acquisition  Officer declared his award on August  2,  1972. All  these  events undoubtedly occurred prior to  April  30, 1982.  However, on a Reference made under Section 18 of  the said Act on December 24, 1973, the Civil Court  investigated the  claim  and gave its award on June 24, 1985.  The  award was, therefore, made by the Court not before April 30, 1982, but  after  September 30, 1984, when the provisions  of  the Land  Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984, had  already  come into  effect.  It  was, therefore,  strictly  speaking,  not necessary  for the court to make any  observation  regarding

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the  legal  position in a case where both the  Collector  as well  as the Court in a Reference under Section 18 had  made their  respective awards before April 30,1982. Moreover,  we find  that  the judgment appears to proceed  on  a  somewhat unwarranted  assumption.  This is clear from  the  following observations  which appear at paragraph 5 of  the  aforesaid Report (p 217):               "It  is not in dispute that where on the  date               of  the commencement of the amending  Act  any               proceedings for determination of  compensation               were  pending before the Collector under  Sec-               tion  11 of the Act or before the Court  under               reference  under  Section  18 of  the  Act  or               before the High Court in appeal under  Section               54  of  the Act, then the amended  section  23               (I-A) would be applicable to such proceedings,               in absence of subsection (1) of Section 30."     In our view, it was erroneously taken as undisputed that had the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 30 not been in existence, the provisions of the amended section  23(1-A) would have applied to a case where the Collector as well  as the  Court  had already made their award  before  April  30, 1982,  but an appeal was pending in the High Court on  April 30,  1982,  or on the commencement of the  Land  Acquisition (Amendment)  Act. As we have already pointed out,  the  cor- rectness of this as- 489 sumption is very much in dispute before us. In these circum- stances,  we find ourselves unable to accept as correct  the view taken by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court to the extent  that it extends the operation of the  provisions  of section 23(1-A) even to cases where the Collector as well as the  Reference Court had made their awards before April  30, 11982, in the case before the Full Bench of the Bombay  High Court  in Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai and etc. v.  Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and Another etc., AIR 1987 Bombay 214.     As  far as the decision of a Division  Bench  comprising two  learned  Judges  of this Court in Union  of  India  and Others v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama  [1990] 1  S.C.C.  277  strongly relied upon by  the  appellants  is concerned,  we find that in that case the  Land  Acquisition Officer made his award determining the compensation on March 5,  1969.  On a reference under Section 18 the  Civil  Court made its award on May 28, 1985, that is, even after  Septem- ber  24,1984, when the Amendment Act of 1984 came  into  ef- fect.  The view taken by the Division Bench is that, as  the Collector had made his award before April 30, 1982, then the additional amount referred to in section 23 (1-A) could  not be awarded. This view has been taken on the basis that  sub- section  (1)(b) of Section 30 of the said Act provides  that the  provisions  of section 23(1-A) shall be  applicable  to every  acquisition  proceeding commenced after  April  3  O, 1982,  irrespective  of the fact whether the  Collector  has made  the  award on or before September 24, 1984,  and  that sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not refer to court  award and  the  court  award is used only in  sub-section  (2)  of Section  30. (See para 21 of the said report). We find  that on  the plain language of section 23(1-A) itself,  which  we have  set  out earlier, the duty was cast on  the  Court  to award an additional amount calculated as prescribed  therein which  would mean that it is directed to be awarded  by  the court,  namely, the Reference Court, in all cases which  are pending  before that court on September 1,1984.  Sub-section (1)(a)  of Section 30 undoubtedly lays down that the  provi- sions of section 23(1-A) of the Act are also made applicable

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to all proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the said Act pending on April 30, 1982, where no award had  been made by the Collector before that date. At first glance this would appear to suggest that the additional amount  referred to  in section 23 (1-A) could not be awarded where the  Col- lector  had made his award before April 30, 1982.  But  this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits  avail- able to the claimants on a plain reading of section 23(1-A). This is clear from the use of the word "also" in the opening pan of section 30(1). In our opinion, the view taken by  the Bench  comprising two learned Judges of this Court  in  that case  cannot be accepted as correct as it is too narrow  and unduly  cuts  down the operation of  the  benefit  conferred under the 490 plain  language of section 23 (1-A) of the said Act. As  far as the provisions of section 30(2) are concerned, we do  not feel  that we are called upon to interpret the same in  this decision.  In our view, therefore, the said decision  cannot be  accepted as good law in so far as it lays down  that  in order to bring the provisions of section 23(1-A) of the said Act  into play the Collector must have made his award  after April 30, 1982.     Coming to the decision in Union of India and Another  v. Raghuvir  Singh (dead) by Lrs. (Supra) referred to  earlier, we find that it mainly concerned itself with the  provisions of section 30(2) of the said Amendment Act with which we are not  directly  concerned here and in  that  connection,  the Constitution  Bench  of this Court has  made  the  following observations (p. 779):               "In  construing section 30(2), it is  just  as               well  to be clear that the award made  by  the               Collector  referred to here is the award  made               by  the  Collector  under Section  11  of  the               parent Act, and the award made by the Court is               the  award  made by Principal Civil  Court  of               Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of  the               parent  Act on a reference made to it  by  the               Collector under Section 19 of the parent  Act.               There can be no doubt that the benefit of  the               enhanced solatium is intended by section 30(2)               in  respect of an award made by the  collector               between  April  30, 1982,  and  September  24,               1984,  Likewise  the benefit of  the  enhanced               solatium  is extended by section 30(2) to  the               case  of  an award made by the  Court  between               April  30, 1982, and September 24, 1984,  even               though it be upon reference from an award made               before April 30, 1982."               The Court went on to point out that (p.780):               "Section  30(2) of the Amendment  Act  extends               the benefit c. the enhanced solatium to  cases               where  the  award by the Collector or  by  the               Court  is  made between April  30,  1982,  and               September 24, 1984, or to appeals against such               awards  decided  by  the High  Court  and  the               Supreme  Court  whether the decisions  of  the               High  Court or the Supreme Court are  rendered               before September 24, 1984, or after that date.               All that is material is that the award (empha-               sis supplied) by the Collector or by the Court               should have been made between April 30,  1982,               and  September 24, 1984. We find ourselves  in               agreement with the conclusion reached by  this               Court  in  K. Kamalajammanniavaru  v.  Special

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             Land Acquisition Officer, (1985) 1 SCC 582 and               491               find  ourselves unable to agree with the  view               taken  in  Bhag Singh v.  Union  Territory  of               Chandigarh  [1985]  3 SCC  737.  The  expanded               meaning given to section 30 (2) in the  latter               case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably               from  the  language of  that  sub-section.  It               seems  to us that the learned Judges  in  that               case  missed  the  significance  of  the  word               ’such’ in the collocation ’any such award’  in               section  30(2). Due significance must  be  at-               tached  to that word, and to our mind it  must               necessarily  intended that the appeal  to  the               High Court or the Supreme Court, in which  the               benefit  of  the enhanced solatium  is  to  be               given,  must be confined to an appeal  against               an  award  of the Collector or  of  the  Court               rendered between April 30, 1982, and September               24, 1984."     We  find  that  this decision which was  rendered  by  a Constitution Bench of this Court comprising 5-learned Judges runs in no way counter to the view which we have taken  and, in  fact,  it leads some support to the view  which  we  are taking.  In the case before us, as the Reference  Court  has made  its award after September 24, 1984 the benefit of  the provisions  of section 23(1-A) was clearly available to  the claimant as held in the impugned judgment.     In  the result, the appeal arising out of Special  Leave Petition (Civil) No.14297 of 1990 in Union of India v.  Zora Singh must be dismissed with costs.     As far as the other appeals filed by the Union of  India which  have been heard together with the Zora  Singh’s  case are  concerned, learned Counsel for the Union of  India  has not  drawn our attention to any material difference  in  the relevant facts therein from the facts in Zora Singh’s  case. In fact, the arguments proceeded on the footing that all the relevant  facts were the same as in the case of Zora  Singh. In  a  result,  all these appeals must  also  be  dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.      As  far as the appeals before us which have been  filed by  the  claimants are concerned, the same will have  to  be placed before appropriate Benches of this Court for disposal in the light of this decision. V.P.R.                                        Appeals   dis- missed. 492