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PETITIONER: UNDAVILLI NAGARATHNAM & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: REDDI SATYANARAYANA MURTHI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/04/1976

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1830            1976 SCR  (3) 983  1976 SCC  (4)  20

ACT:      Transfer of  Property Act  1882-Secs. 76  (a)(e),  105- Meaning of  lease- Distinction  between lease  & settlement- Whether recital  in a  document  conclu-give-Andhra  Pradesh (Andhra Area)  Tenancy Act 1956 Secs. 2(f)(e) 16, 17 Meaning of Landlord and Tenant-Bar of jurisdiction.

HEADNOTE:      One Mr. Subbarayudu had no male issue. He had his wife, plaintiff No. 2, and two daughters, one of whom is plaintiff No. I  and another  defendant No.  4. The defendant No. I is the son  of defendant  No. 4.  Mr. Subbarayudu and plaintiff No. 2  made various gifts in favour of their daughters. Shri Subbrayudu   made a  settlement in  the year 1955 whereby he gave  the   properties  m  Schedules  A  and  to  the  first plaintiff. The  properties were to be enjoyed by Subbarayudu and plaintiff  No. 2  during their  life time  and after the death of  Subbarayudu plaintiff  No. 1  was to  get property mentioned in Schedule A and after the death of plaintiff No. 2 she  was to  get property  mentioned in  Schedule In 1958, Subbarayudu  was   alleged  to  have  executed  4  documents including a  Deed of  Revocation revoking  the settlement of 1955. In  1958, Subbarayudu  entered into  a  document  with defendant No.  1 giving  him possession  of the  property in which he  had life  interest.  The  document  provided  that defendant No.  1 should  deliver 43 bags of paddy every year to Subbarayudu  and take  a  receipt.  After  the  death  of Subbarayudu plaintiffs  Nos. 1  and 2  basing their claim on the settlement  of 1955  called upon  the defendant No. 1 to (deliver the  possession of  the property.  The  two  issues which now survive are whether defendant No. 1 is entitled to any protection  under the  Andhra Tenancy  Act and  secondly whether the  deed executed by Subbarayudu in favour of first defendant is  a settlement  deed or a lease. The Trial Court found that the E; settlement deed of 1955 was valid and that the subsequent  deed of  revocation was  invalid.  the  High Court confirmed  the said  findings. The  same are not under challenge. The Trial Court, however, held the document to be a settlement  deed and  not a lease and that. therefore, the first defendant was not entitled to any protection under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956. Accordingly, the Trial  Court decreed the suit of possession in favour of

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the plaintiffs.      The High  Court in  appeal came  to the conclusion that the document  satisfied all the conditions of the definition of lease  under section  105 of the Transfer of Property Act and could not be treated as settlement.      The appellant-plaintiffs contended      (1) That  the High  Court  was  wrong  in  holding  the document to be a lease and not a settlement.      (2) Subbarayudu  had reserved  only  life  interest  in Schedule and  Properties and after he gifted the same to the plaintiff No.  2 he  could not  in law  imperil her right to possession of  the same  after his  death by leasing out the same property.      (3) In any case it was not an act of prudent management of the properties in which he had only life interest and the principles applicable  to a  mortgagee in  possession  under section 76(a)  and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable in the present case and the lease would not be binding on the plaintiffs.      (4) Plaintiffs  are not landlords within the meaning of Section 2(f)  of the  Act and  the defendant  No. 1 is not a cultivating tenant under the plain tiffs. 984      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1.  The document  is described as Settlement Deed but that  recital is  not decisive of the real intent of the document. The  document makes  it clear  that the possession was handed over to defendant No. l; that the defendant No. I was to  give 43  bags of  paddy every  year and  it  further mentioned  "without   subjecting  me   to  do   any  expense whatsoever and  obtaining  proper  receipts  from  me".  The document does  not disclose  the disposition of the property by  a   grandfather  to   a  grandson  but  a  business-like instrument. [988C-E]      2. Subbarayudu  was old and the Settlement Deed made it clear that  during his  life time he would enjoy the produce of the  land. and  therefore‘ he  was keen  to have at least some paddy from the land during his life time as a source of income  and   perhaps  thought   that  his   grandson  would faithfully carry  out the  conditions without  creating  any difficulties. [699C-D]      3. Assuming  without deciding that the principles under section 76(a) & (e) of the Transfer of Property Act might be applicable, it  cannot be said that granting of the lease to defendant No.  1 in the entire circumstances of the case was not a  prudent act  of management of the properties. In view of the  relationship of  the  parties  that  was  a  natural arrangement for cultivation of the land. [989E-F]      4. When  a person  with  full  knowledge  of  the  law. ignorance of  which is  no  excuse,  enters  upon  a  lawful transaction or executes a valid document, the rights flowing from the  law cannot  be denied to those who are entitled to their benefit  on the  supposed theory of estoppel or a plea of contracting out by implication. [990A-B]      5. Section 2(f) defines a landlord to mean the owner of holding or  part  thereof  who  is  entitled  to  evict  the cultivating tenant  from such holding and includes the heirs and assigns,  legal representatives  of such  owners. Or per sons deriving  rights  through  him.  Section  2(c)  defines cultivating tenant  to mean  a person  who cultivates by his own labour  or by  hired labour  under his  supervision  and control any  land  belonging  to  another  under  a  tenancy agreement. express or implied. The High Court has found that defendant No. I was a cultivating tenant of the landlord. In

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view of the conclusion that the instrument is of lease there is  no  difficulty  in  holding  that  Subbarayudu  was  the landlord and  on the  death or  Subbarayudu  plaintiffs  are landlords. Section  16 of  the Act  provides for  a  special forum for  adjudication of  disputes under the Act including eviction of  cultivating tenants and under section 17 of the Act  the   provisions  of   the   act   over-ride   anything inconsistent therewith  contain ed  in any pre-existing law. custom, usage,  agreement or  decree or  order of  a  Court. [990C-F, 991E-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1048 of 1968.      Appeal from  the Judgment  and Decree/order  dated  the 26th April  1967 of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 64  of 1962.      M. Natesan,  K. Jayaram  and R.  Chandrasekar, for  the Appellant.      B. V.  Subramanyam, I.  Balaiah and G. Narasimhulu, for Respondent No. 1.      Ex-parte for Respondents 2-4.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      GOSWAMI, J.-This  is an  appeal on certificate from the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 985      The  two  plaintiffs  in  the  original  suit  are  the appellants.  They  brought  a  suit  in  the  court  of  the Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry, for evicting defendants 1 to 3 from  the properties  in Schedule  A,  B  and  C  and  for delivery of  possession of  A and Schedule properties to the first plaintiff and of the Schedule properties either to the first  plaintiff  or  to  the  second  plaintiff.  The  suit properties  were   owned  and   possessed   by   Meenavalli. Subbarayudu of  Vedurupaka (hereinafter  to be  described as Subbarayudu). Subbarayudu  was the  husband  of  the  second plaintiff and  father of the first plaintiff. He had no male issue. He  had only  two  daughters,  plaintiff  No.  1  and defendant No.  4., who was the older of the two. Subbarayudu made various  dispositions  of  his  property  by  executing several documents  during his  life time  in favour  of  his daughters. So  did his  wife, the  second  plaintiff.  While making such  dispositions he  was  careful  enough  to  make provision for  himself and  for his  wife during  their life time. The fourth defendant was married in 1923 and defendant No. 1  is her  son. The first plaintiff was married in 1935. After  the  marriage  of  the  first  plaintiff  the  mother executed a  deed of  gift (Ex.  B-6) on February 13, 1935 in her favour  in respect  of certain land. On the same day her father also executed is her favour of deed of gift (Ex. B-7) in respect  of some other land. On June 7, 1935, Subbarayudu executed another  deed  of  gift  in  favour  of  his  first daughter, defendant No. 4, giving her also some land (Ex. B- 8). All the three documents were registered on the same day, namely, on  June 11, 1935. After about nine years the mother executed a  settlement deed (Ex. B-5) dated June 7, 1944, in respect of her joint 1/3 share in certain property in favour of her  two daughters to be shared by them equally reserving life interest  for herself.  Then followed a settlement deed (Ex. A-4)  of January  8, 1950   executed  by Subbarayudu in favour of  the first  plaintiff  living  her  ten  acres  of pasture land  as mentioned in- Schedule. Subbarayudu further executed a  registered deed dated January 23,1950 (Ex. A-B),

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described as  will, whereby he gave to his daughters all the properties barring  a few mentioned therein and stating that after his  own life time and after the life time of his wife all his  movable and  immovable properties would be taken in equal shares  by his  two daughters.  On April  14, 1955, he executed a settlement deed (Ex. A-l) hereunder he gave A and Schedule properties  to  the  first  plaintiff,  his  second daughter. By  this document  the A  Schedule property was to beyond by  the first  plaintiff  after  his  life  time  and Schedule property  after the life time of her parents. Three years later on August 4, 1958, Subarayudu executed four more documents including  a deed  of revocation.  Ex. B-10 is the document by  which the  earlier document Ex. A-l was revoked stating that the earlier one had been brought about by fraud and misrepresentation.  Ex. B-ll  was executed purporting to settle his  property on  both the daughters to be enjoyed in equal shares  after the life time of their parents. Ex. B-12 was executed  in favour  of his  wife and the elder daughter giving them  a certain extent of the land in Mellore village besides the  house sites  and houses  in Vedurupaka.  It was mentioned in  Ex. B-12  that after  his life  time his  wife would be in possession without powers of alianation and that thereafter the elder daughter 986 would  be  entitled  to  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the property as  an absolute  owner. Ex.  B-13 was  executed  in favour  of   the  first   defendant,  namely,   grandson  of Subbarayudu  through   his  first   daughter,   giving   him possession of  the properties  in which he had life interest stipulating at  the same  time that he (the first defendant) should deliver  forty three bags of paddy and obtain receipt from him every year during his life time. The plaintiffs’  case is  that Subbarayudu  had leased out A and Schedule  properties mentioned  in Ex. A-l on August 16, 1958,  to  the  third  defendant,  the  son  of  the  second defendant and  that both these defendants were in possession of the  properties as  tenants from  that time.  Subbarayudu died on  May S,  1960. After  his death  plaintiffs 1  and 2 basing their  claim on  Ex. A-l  respectively gave notice to the third defendant on June 14, 1960 and on July 11, 1960 to deliver back  the  lands  in  their  possession.  The  third defendant replied that he was only working as a farm servant under the  first defendant  and the  latter was  the  lessee under a  deed dated  August 4,  1950 and that the settlement deed in  favour of  the plaintiff‘s had been removed by late Subbarayudu. The  first plaintiff  also had trouble with the first defendant  when the latter drove away his watchman and lodged a  complaint with  the police claiming that he was in possession of  the lands. The first plaintiff thereupon sent a notice  on August 20, 1960, to the first defendant who, on the other  hand, asserted  his rights  in the  lands under a deed of settlement (Ex. B-13) dated August 4, 1958. That led to the  institution of the present suit by the plaintiff out of which this appeal has arisen.      The first  daughter of  Subbarayudu  was  impleaded  as defendant No. 4 in the plaint.      The first  and the  fourth  defendants  filed  separate written statements.  Defendants Nos.  2 and  3 filed  a memo adopting the written statement filed by the first defendant. All of  them repudiated the plaintiffs’ claim for possession of the lands.      Several issues  were raised,  but we  are concerned  in this appeal  only with  Issue No. S and the additional Issue No. 1 which are as follows      "Issue No.  5. Whether  defendant No.  1 is entitled to

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any protection under the Andhra Tenancy Act ?      Additional Issue No. 1 "Whether the deed dated 4-8-1958 executed by  late Meenavalli Subarayudu in favour of the 1st defendant is a settlement deed or a lease ?"      It may  be mentioned  that issue  were raised regarding the validity  of Ex.  A-l, Ex.  B-10, Ex. B-11 and Ex. B-13. The trial  court held  that Ex.  A-1 on which the plaintiffs based their  suit was  a valid  document.  The  trial  court further held that the deed of revocation (Ex. B-10) and deed of settlement  (Ex.  B-11)  were  invalid.  The  High  Court affirmed  these   findings  of  the  trial  court  and  that controversy is closed. 987      With regard  to Ex. B-13, the trial court held it to be a true  document and that it was a settlement deed and not a lease and  that the  first defendant was not entitled to any protection under  the Andhra  Pradesh (Andhra  Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (briefly the Andhra Act) and that defendants 2 and 3 were  not tenants in possession of the land at the time of institution of  the suit.  In the  view it  tools the  trial court decreed  the suit  for possession  of A  and  Schedule properties in  favour of  the first  plaintiff and directing that the future profits, which would be payable by the first defendant, were  to be  determined in  separate proceedings. The suit  was also decreed in favour of the second plaintiff for possession  of  the  Schedule  properties  with  similar orders regarding future profits.      On appeal  by the  defendants  the  High  Court,  after hearing the parties, remanded the matter for a finding under order 41,  rule 25,  Civil Procedure  Code, by  framing  the following issue:      "Whether the  plaintiffs accepted  the gift  of  A  and      Schedule properties  by  late  Subbarayudu  before  its      revocation on 4-8-1958 by late Subbarayudu" ?      The subordinate  judge returned a finding that the gift had been  accepted prior  to the  execution of  the deed  of revocation (Ex.  B-10). The  High Court thereafter heard the appeal and partly allowed the same.      The High  Court, in  disagreement with the trial court, came to  the conclusion that the document Ex. B-13 satisfied all the  conditions of the definition of lease under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act and could not be treated as a settlement. The High Court further observed:           "The term of lease is co-terminus with the life of      the lessor  with the result that as soon as the life of      Subbarayudu ended,  the  term  of  lease  automatically      expired. On the death of Subbarayudu the property would      pass to  the per  sons specified in Exc. A-1. That must      be the  normal incidents  of the  transaction under the      ordinary law.  At the  time of the transaction of lease      was entered  into the  Andhra Tenancy  Act had  already      come into  force. Subbarayudu  was the landlord and the      1st defendant  was the  cultivating tenant  within  the      meaning of  those terms  in the  Andhra Tenancy Act. On      the death  of  Subbarayudu  his  heirs,  assignees  and      successors would  likewise be  landlords and  they  are      entitled to evict the cultivating tenants".      Repelling the  contention of  the plaintiffs  that  the first defendant  was not  the tenant  of Subbarayudu at all, but only  a trespasser, the High Court held, on the oral and documentary  evidence  as  well  as  on  the  admissions  of defendants  2  and  3  with  regard  to  the  possession  of defendant No.  1 as a lessee, that the defendant No. 1 was a cultivating tenant  under the  plaintiffs on  the  death  of Subbarayudu. The  High Court  having come to that conclusion

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further held  that the plaintiffs could evict the defendants only under the provisions of the 988 Andhra Act  by making  an  appropriate  application  to  the Tehsildar and  not in  the present  suit in the civil court. The High  Court, therefore,  granted all  the reliefs prayed for by  the plaintiffs  except that  of eviction  from A and Schedule properties which was directed to be obtained by due recourse to. the provisions of the Andhra Act The High Court accordingly partly  allowed the  appeal refusing  the prayer for eviction from A and Schedule properties but at the same  time  declaring that  the plaintiffs  were entitled  to the suit properties  in terms  of Ex. A-l. The Schedule property was not  the subject  matter of appeal before the High Court and the decree in relation to that property was unaffected.      Mr. Natesan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants,  submits that  the High  Court is  wrong  in holding that Ex. A-1 is a lease and not a settlement.      We have  perused the  document (Ex.  B-13). It  is true that it  is described  in the  very  opening  words  of  the document as  "settlement deed".  But  that  recital  is  not decisive of  the real  intent of the document. Under section 105 of  the Transfer  of Property  Act, a lease of immovable property is  a transfer  of a  right to enjoy such property, made  for   a  certain  time,  express  or  implied,  or  in perpetuity, in  consideration  of a  price paid or promised, or of money, a share of  crops, service  or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically  or  on  specified  occasions  to  the transferor by  the transferee,  who accepts  the transfer on such  terms.   The  necessary  ingredients  mentioned  under section 105  of the,  Transfer of  Property Act are found in the document  (Ex. B-13). It is clear from the recitals that possession of the land was handed over by Subbarayudu to the first defendant  for enjoying  the same during the life time of Subbarayudu  inconsideration of ’’fortythree weighed bags of paddy  worth Rs. 800/....every year commencing from 15-1- 1959". The  document does  not disclose a disposition of the property by  a grandfather  to a  grandson out  of love  and affection but  is a business-like instrument. To illustrate, the document  refers to paddy to be delivered to Subbarayudu "without  subjecting  me  to  any  expenses  whatsoever  and obtaining proper  receipts from  me". It goes on to say that "payment not  borne by  receipt need  not be given credit to you". We  are satisfied that the document (Ex. B-13) fulfils the ingredients of a lease under section 105 of the Transfer of Property  Act. The  submission of  Mr Natesan, therefore, cannot be accepted.      Mr. Natesan  next contends  that Subbarayudu reserving; only "life interest" in the Schedule and properties after he had gifted  the same  to the  plaintiffs by A-1 on April 14, 1955, could not in law imperil their rights to possession of the same  after his death by leasing out the same properties in 1958  in the manner done in view of the provisions of the Andhra Act which had already come into force in 1956. At any rate, says  Mr. Natesan,  it  was  not  an  act  of  prudent management of  the properties  in which  he  had  only  life interest and  the principles  applicable to  a mortgagee  in possession under  section 76(a)  and (e)  of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable in the present case and the lease will not be binding on the plaintiffs. 989      In  Ex.  A-l  itself,  which  is  the  sheet-anchor  of plaintiffs’ claim, A there was reference, inter alia, to two things relevant  for consideration  on this  aspect  of  the

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matter. Firstly, it is stated there:           "I and  my wife,  Bapanamma, who  is  your  mother      shall during  our life  time, be  in enjoyment of the A      Schedule  mentioned  property  and  Schedule  mentioned      property respectively  without powers of disposition by      way of  gift, sale, etc., but only enjoying the produce      got there by paying all Government taxes".      Secondly, further:           "After my  life time  you take possession of the A      Schedule mentioned  property and  after  your  mother’s      life-time the Schedule mentioned property".      In the  first extract just set out, Subbarayudu made it clear that during his life he would enjoy the produce of the land "got there by paying all Government taxes". Subbarayudu was already  an old  man in  1955 and  was apparently unable personally to  look after  cultivation of the land. His wife and younger  daughter were  also, perhaps, considered by him no better  for the  purpose. Besides, it appears that he was keen to  have at  least some  paddy to  come to him from the land during  his life time as a source of income and perhaps thought  that  his  grandson,  the  first  defendant,  would faithfully  carry   out  the   conditions  without  creating difficulties. This  position does  not appear  to have  been disapproved even  by the  plaintiffs during the life time of Subbarayudu.      Assuming, but  not deciding,  that the principles under section 76(a)  and (e)  of the  Transfer of Property Act may even be  applicable in this case, we are unable to hold that granting of  the lease  to defendant  No. 1  in  the  entire circumstances  of   the  case  was  not  a  prudent  act  of management of the properties. In view of the relationship of the parties,  that was a natural arrangement for cultivation of the land.      Mr. Natesan  drew our attention to several decisions of this Court  dealing with  section  76  of  the  Transfer  of Property Act  and in particular to the decision in Prabhu v. Ramdev & ors.(l), wherein this Court held that-           "even in  regard to tenants inducted into the land      by a  mortgagee cases  may arise  where we said tenants      may acquire  rights of  special character  by virtue of      statutory provisions  which by,  in the meanwhile, come      into operation.  A permissible settlements  a mortgagee      in possession  with a  tenant in  the course of prudent      management and the springing up of rights in the tenant      conferred or  created by statute based on the nature of      the land  and possession  for the  requisite period, it      was observed, was a different matter altogether". 990      Counsel  submits  that  the  present  case  is  clearly distinguishable from  the above  case  since  prior  to  the execution of  Ex. B-13  in 1958  the Andhra  Act had already come into  force and it was not a case where certain special rights were created "in the meanwhile".      When a person with full knowledge of the law, ignorance of which  is no  excuse, enters upon a lawful transaction or executes a  valid document,  the rights flowing from the law cannot be  denied to those who are entitled to their benefit on the  supposed theory of estoppel or a plea of contracting out  by   implication.  Prabhu’s  case  (supra)  is  not  an authority for  such a  proposition which  counsel  seeks  to spell out. The provisions of the Andhra Act will, therefore, be attracted to the tenancy created by Ex. B-13.      It  is  further  contended  by  Mr.  Natesan  that  the plaintiffs are  not landlords  within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Andhra Act. He also submits that defendant No. 1

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is not a cultivating tenant under the plaintiffs.      By section  2(f) of the Andhra Act, " ’landlord’ means, the owner  of a  holding or  part thereof who is entitled to evict the  cultivating tenant from such holding or part, and includes the heirs, assignees, legal representatives of such owner, or person deriving rights through him".      By section 2(c) of the said Act, " ’cultivating tenant’ means a  per son who cultivates by his own labour or by that of any  other member  of his family or by hired labour under his supervision  and control,  any land belonging to another under a  tenancy agreement, express or implied, but does not include a mere intermediary".      The High  Court has  found that  defendant No.  1 was a cultivating tenant of the landlord under Subbarayudu relying on Ex. B-13 r and also on admissions by the defendants 2 and 3 who  conceded possession of the land by defendant No. 1 as a lessee  under Subbarayudu and their own possession as farm servants under  the first  defendant. We  have no  reason to take a contrary view.      In  view   of  our  conclusion  that  Ex.  B-13  is  an instrument of  lease, there is no difficulty in holding that Subbarayudu was  the quondam landlord of the first defendant within the  meaning of  section 2(f)  of the Andhra Act.Once that is established, section 10 of the Andhra Act takes care of the tenancy that has been created under Ex. B-13.      Section 10 of the Andhra Act at the relevant time reads as under :            "10(1) "The minimum period of every lease entered      into between  a landlord  and his cultivating tenant on      or after  the commencement  of this  Act, shall  be six      years. Every  such lease  shall be in writing and shall      specify the  holding, its  extent and  the rent payable      therefor,  with  such  other  particulars,  as  may  be      prescribed. The  stamp  and  registration  charges  for      every such lease shall be borne by the landlord and the      cultivating tenant in equal shares. 991           (2) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-      section (1)  all tenancies  subsisting on  the date  of      promulgation  of   the  Andhra   Cultivating   Tenants’      Protection  ordinance,  1956  (Andhra  ordinance  1  of      1956),  and   protected  by  that  ordinance,  and  all      subsequent tenancy  agreements entered  into up  to the      commencement of  this Act,  shall continue for a period      of five  years from  the 1st  June 1956  or  until  the      expiry of  the lease in the normal course, whichever is      later, on  the same terms and conditions as before, but      subject to  the determination  of fair  rent in case of      dispute.           (3)  After  such  termination,  the  landlord  may      resume the land from the cultivating tenant without any      notice,  and   if  the   tenant  does   not   surrender      possession, the  landlord may  by an application before      the  Tahsildar   obtain  an   order  for   delivery  of      possession in the prescribed manner".      Thus under  section 10(1) when Ex. B-13 was executed on August 4,  1958, the lease created would by statute continue up to  August 4,  1964 and even for further periods by later amendments of  the Act.  Taking the  original section  10(1) itself, the  landlord Subbarayudu died in May 1960 and there is no  question of the lease ceasing on his death in view of the clear  provision under  section 10(1).  As assignees  by gift  the   plaintiffs  are   landlords  on   the  death  of Subbarayudu. Under  section 11,  the  ownership  thus  being changed on  the death  of the  landlord, the  tenancy, which

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subsists by  operation of  law, will  continue on  the  same terms and  conditions for the unexpired portion of the lease under the  scheme of  the Act  as  amended.  The  expression "currency of  the lease"  in section  1-1 will  include  the statutory extension of the lease under the provisions of the Andhra Act.      Termination of tenancy under the Andhra Act is provided for under  section 13.  Under section 16" there is a special forum for  adjudication of  disputes under the Act including eviction  of  cultivating  tenants.  Under  section  17  the provisions of  the Andhra Act override anything inconsistent therewith contained  in any  preexisting law, custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a Court.      It is,  therefore,  clear  that  the  civil  litigation between the  parties  having  established  their  respective rights based on the two documents, Ex. A-1 and Ex. B-13, and the plaintiffs  being landlords  and defendant No. 1 being a cultivating tenant,  eviction will  have to be sought for in accordance with  the provisions  of the Andhra Act. The High Court is  right in  refusing eviction through the process of the civil court.      In the  result we  are unable  to  interfere  with  the judgment and  decree  of  the  High  Court.  The  appeal  is dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. P.H.P.    Appeal dismissed. 992