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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6495 of 2005

PETITIONER: UMED SINGH

RESPONDENT: ARYA SAMAJ SEWA SADAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/07/2006

BENCH: Dr.AR. Lakshmanan & Altamas Kabir

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

WITH CIVIL APPEALS NOs. 6496 & 6497 OF 2005

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

       The appellant, Umed Singh, was inducted as a tenant of  the suit premises by one Sewa Ram  at a monthly rent of  Rs.100/-  for residential purposes.  One Mohan Lal was also  a  tenant of a portion of the building.  The said Sewa Ram  executed a Will in favour of the respondent-society, Arya Samaj  Sewa Sadan, on 15th March,  1984.  Soon thereafter, on 5th  June, 1984, Sewa Ram  died.         On 25th  March, 1994, the respondent filed ejectment suit  against the appellant herein under Section 13 (3) (a) (i)  of the   Haryana Urban (Control of Rent) & Eviction Act, 1973 (hereafter  referred to  as ’the Act’) for  non-payment of rent  from 1st  December, 1989 to 31st March, 1994 and also on the ground of  bona fide requirement for starting  a library in the suit  premises.  It may be indicated that the respondent-society also  filed a suit against the other tenant,  Mohan Lal, but the same  was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the ground that  running of a library could not  be equated with the expression  "use or occupation by the landlord for  purposes of residence".   An appeal preferred by the society against  Mohan Lal was  allowed and the judgment of the trial court was set aside.   Ultimately, however, the High Court set aside the judgment  of  the Appellate Authority and restored the decision of the Rent  Controller.         In the meantime, by its judgment and order dated 31st  January, 2000, the Rent Controller decreed the  eviction  petition filed by the society against Umed Singh on the ground  of bona fide requirement and an appeal preferred therefrom by  Umed Singh  was dismissed by the appellate  authority on 24th  August, 2000.   Umed Singh filed a Revision Petition before the  High Court on 7th November, 2000 against the said judgment of  the appellate authority dated 24th August, 2000.  The said  Revision Petition was dismissed by the High Court on 22nd  November, 2000.  Subsequently, having regard to  the decision  of the High Court in the case of Mohan Lal, the other tenant,  whereby the society’s eviction petition had been dismissed,  Umed Singh filed a Review Petition before the High Court on  21st  December, 2000 relying on the decision  in Mohan Lal’s  case.  In view of  the  High Court’s decision in Mohan Lal’s case,  the order dated 22nd November, 2000 dismissing Umed Singh’s   Revision Petition was recalled and upon further consideration of

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the  provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the  Act  and its  different interpretations by two Division Benches of the  expression "for his own use  and occupation"  as used in the  said section, the learned  Judge  referred the matter to the Chief  Justice  for  the following question to be examined by a larger  Bench, namely,  "’Whether his own occupation’ and  the ’residential purpose’ in relation to  a corporate body/juristic  person can  be read in wider perspective or in  stricto senso of the dictionary  meaning?"

       The aforesaid reference was placed before  the Full Bench  of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which considered the  question referred  to it in great  detail in its judgment dated 23rd  August, 2002, in the context of  Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the   Act.   While considering  the  Reference, the attention  of the Full  Bench was drawn  to the observations made by the learned   Single Judge in  Mohan Lal’s case in C.R.No.1217/2000,   wherein reference was  made to a decision of this Court in the  case of Attar Singh vs. Inder Kumar, reported in  (1967) 2 SCR  50,  which was  a decision rendered under the provisions of the  East Punjab Urban Restrictions Act, No.III of  1949 (hereinafter  referred to as "the 1949 Act"). The learned Single Judge relied  on the finding in the said decision  that as the respondent- landlord required the land not for business or trade but only for  constructing a house for himself, he was not entitled to eject the  appellant under Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the 1949 Act  from the  rented land.   After considering the decision of this Court in the  aforesaid case, the Full Bench   made a distinction between the  facts of Attar Singh’s case and those of the  case before it  upon  holding  that the expression "his own occupation" had been  restricted by virtue of the restraints provided in Section 13 (3)  (a) (ii) of the  1949 Act.   Upon considering the submissions  made, the Full Bench held that all buildings which were not   "non-residential buildings" would be "residential buildings".   Furthermore,  the expression "business or trade" are so   intertwined that they are complementary  to each other and it is  imperative  to be seen in each case as to whether activities   which are  to  be carried out  in the building are   attended with  business and/or trade  or not.  If such element is missing in the  activity  which is to be carried on or is to be carried out in the  building, such buildings would not be  defined as "non- residential building".   Upon holding as aforesaid, the Full Bench answered the  question referred to it, as extracted hereinabove, in the  following manner:- "Any activity, whether it is to be carried  out or is being carried on in  a building by  a  juristic person or an individual but is  not tainted with business or trade and is  essentially not connected with profit and  loss, such activity would not render the  usage of the building as "non residential  building".   Unless the user has been  defined under a statute to be commercial  dehors   of element of profit and loss, such  building shall be termed as "non- residential building".  Thus, in each case it  shall have to be examined whether the  element of business or trade has crept in  with the necessary element of profit and  loss and as a sequel thereto, the purpose

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and object of occupation by the landlord  shall stand defined accordingly."

       In view of the above, the interpretation of Section 13 (3) (a)  (i) of the Act  in Mohan Lal’s case was overruled.  Subsequently,   the Review Petition  which was pending was also dismissed by  virtue of the decision rendered in the Reference.   These three appeals which were filed by the tenant, Umed  Singh against the initial judgment  of the High Court  in the  Civil Revision  filed by the tenant and the judgment rendered by  the Full Bench and the subsequent dismissal of the Review  Petition, have been heard together and are being disposed of by  this common judgment.         On behalf of the appellant, it  was  sought to be  argued  that the decision of the Full Bench was erroneous, inasmuch as  Section 13 (3) (a) of the Act referred to  residential buildings and  clause (i) thereof could only be interpreted  in respect of such  residential building.  It was urged  that  running a library  could  by no stretch of imagination be  said to be for residential   purposes and the expression "own occupation" could only be in  relation to use and occupation  for residential purpose.  It was  submitted that the Full Bench of the High Court  had  failed to  consider the fact that the aforesaid provisions would have to be  interpreted in the context  of  residential use and not for any  other purpose.  It was urged that the view taken by the Full  Bench was erroneous and was liable to be set aside and both  the Civil Revision Application and the Review Petition filed by  the appellant before the High Court were liable to be allowed.         Such submissions were vehemently opposed on behalf of   the respondent-society and it was submitted that all non- residential purposes  need not be connected with commercial  activity as had been provided for in clause (ii) of Section 13 (3)  (a)  which contemplates a form of    commercial activity but  has  also been included in the expression "own occupation" in case  of a "residential building".         Reference was made  to the decision of this Court in Atul  Castings Ltd. vs. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, 2001 (5) SCC 133,  wherein it was observed that when a premises had been leased  for residence only,  and there  was no specific clause in the  agreement that not even one room could be used as a study  room for the members of the family for doing office work at  home, such activity could still be undertaken in the leased  premises, particularly in the  days of computer, internet and  other like facilities which are  kept at home for convenience and  use.         Since we have been called upon to consider the provisions  of Section  13 (3) (a) (i) and (ii) of the  Act in the background of  the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Punjab and  Haryana High Court, the same  is reproduced hereinbelow for  the sake of reference:-

"13.Eviction of tenants.\027 (3) A   landlord  may apply to the Controller  for an order directing the tenant to  put the landlord in possession \026

(a)     in the case of a residential  building, if,--

(i) he requires it for his own occupation, is  not occupying another residential building  in the urban area concerned and has not  vacated  such  building without sufficient  cause after the commencement of the  1949 Act in the said urban area:

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(ii)    he requires it for use as an office  or consulting room  by his son who  intends to start practice as a lawyer,  qualified architect or chartered  accountant or as  a "registered  practitioner" within the meaning of  that expression used in the Punjab  Medical Registration Act, 1916, the  Punjab Ayurvedic and Unani  Practitioners Act, 1963, or the Punjab  Homoeopathic Practitioners Act,  1965, or for the residence of his son  who is married:

Provided that such son is not occupying  in  the urban area concerned  any other  building for use as  office; consulting room  or residence, as the case may be, and has  not vacated it without sufficient cause  after the commencement of the  1949 Act."

There is no ambiguity that the provisions referred to  are  to be considered in the case of a residential building.  In other  words, we will have to  consider whether Sub-clause (i)  makes  it obligatory on the part of the landlord to use the premises  purely for residential purposes only or whether the  expression  "own occupation"   also  connotes use of the  premises for non- commercial purposes, i.e. for  purposes  unconnected with  business or trade. The respondent-society  intends  to  use the premises in  question for running a public library without any profit which  would bring the same   within the ambit  of non-commercial  use.  The Full Bench of the High Court was, therefore,  fully  justified in arriving at the conclusion that the suit premises  would be covered by  the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the   aforesaid Act.    The respondent being a society, cannot have  any residential requirement in respect of a premises and its  activities will have to determine the nature of its use  of a  premises.  A juristic person cannot have  need of residence  but  may use  a premises for non-commercial purposes.   Since the  society  intends to use the premises for itself for a non- commercial purpose, unconnected with any business or trade,  it must, in our view, come within  the ambit of Section 13 (3) (a)  (i) of the   Act and more particularly so having regard to Clause  (ii) which contemplates use  of the residential premises even for  purposes  such as  a consulting room for a lawyer or other  professionals.        We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the reasoning  of the Full Bench while considering the provisions of Section 13  (3) (a) (i) of the Act and, in our view, the appeals before us are  devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs.