http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

PETITIONER: UJAGAR SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF THE PUNJABandJAGJIT SINGHv.THE STATE OF THE PUN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/02/1951

BENCH: AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA BENCH: AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA FAZAL ALI, SAIYID SASTRI, M. PATANJALI MUKHERJEA, B.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN

CITATION:  1952 AIR  350            1952 SCR  756  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1957 SC 281  (6)  RF         1964 SC 334  (9)  D          1967 SC1797  (7)  RF         1968 SC 327  (5)  R          1972 SC2431  (5)  R          1972 SC2481  (6)  F          1973 SC 844  (2)  RF         1973 SC 897  (6)  E&R        1974 SC1214  (7)  F          1982 SC1539  (5)  R          1982 SC1543  (11)  RF         1990 SC 231  (9)  F          1990 SC1086  (13)

ACT:     Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), ss. 3, 12--Deten- tion order--Non-specification of period of detention--Ground supplied  vague  and same as in  earlier  order--Particulars supplied  after  4 months--Legality  of  detention--Duty  to supply  particulars’as  soon as may be --Form  of  detention order---Order signed by Home Secretary--Validity.

HEADNOTE:     Non-specification  of any definite period in a  detention order made under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950, is not a material omission rendering the order invalid in  view of the provisions contained in clauses (4) (a)  and (7) (a) of Art. 22 the Constitution and s. 12 of the Act.    An  order  of detention which expressly states  that  the Government  of  the  State concerned was  satisfied  of  the necessity of 757 making  such an order and that it was made by the  order  of the Governor is not defective merely because it is signed by Home Secretary.      Communication  of the grounds of the order need not  be made  directly by the authority making the order but may  be made through recognized channels prescribed by the  adminis- trative rules of business.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

   The  past conduct or antecedent history of a person  can be taken into account in making a detention order, and as  a matter  of  fact, it is largely from  prior  events  showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference  could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner  prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.   If the  authority making an order is satisfied that the  ground on  which the detenue was detained on a former  occasion  is still available and that there was need for detention on its basis no mala fides can be attributed to the authority  from the fact that the ground alleged for the second detention is the same as that of the first detention.     Whether  grounds have been communicated "as soon as  may be" must depend on the facts of each case. No arbitrary time limit can be laid down.     The  recent rulings of the Supreme Court  establish  (a) that mere vagueness of grounds standing by itself and  with- out  leading to an inference of mala fides or lack  of  good faith  is not a justiciable issue in a court of law for  the necessity  of  making the order, inasmuch as the  ground  or grounds on which the order of detention was made is a matter for the subjective satisfaction of the Government or of  the detaining authority; (b) that there is nothing in the Act to prevent  particulars of the grounds being furnished  to  the detenu  within  a reasonable time so that he  may  have  the earliest opportunity of making a representation against  the detention order--what is reasonable time being dependent  on the facts of each case; (c) that failure to furnish  grounds with the speedy addition of such particulars as would enable the detenu to make a representation at the earliest opportu- nity  against  the detention order can be  considered  by  a court of law as an invasion of a fundamental right or  safe- guard  guaranteed by the Constitution, viz. being given  the earliest opportunity to make a representation; and (d)  that no  new grounds could be supplied to strengthen  or  fortify the original order of detention.      Where  the  petitioners against whom  detention  orders were made were given only vague grounds and there was  inex- cusable delay of nearly 4 months in acquainting them of  the particulars, held that their detention was illegal and  they should be released.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:-Petitions Nos. 149 and 167 of 1950. 758     Application  under  Art. 32 of the  Constitution  for  a writ in the nature of habeas corpus I      Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the  petitioner in  petition No. 149.  N.s. Bindra for the petitioner in Petition No. 167.    B.K.  Khanna,  Advocate-General of the Punjab,  for  the respondent in both the petitions.     M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, for the Union of India (Intervener in Petition No. 149).     1951.   February  23.   The Judgment of  the  Court  was delivered by   CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. --The earlier of the two petitions has been filed by one Ujagar Singh, under article 32 of  the Constitution  of India, for a writ of habeas corpus and  for an order of release from detention.  The latter petition  is a  similar one by one Jagiit Singh.  In both the  petitions, the respondent is the State of Punjab. The orders of  deten-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

tion  were  made under the preventive Detention  Act  IV  of 1950.  The  petitions are not connected  with  each   other, except that they raise the same grounds.    In petition No. 149 of 1950, Ujagar Singh was  originally arrested and detained  under  the East punjab Public  Safety Act  on 29th September, 1948.He was released on 28th  March, 1949,  but on the same date, there was an  internment  order against him.  On 29th September, 1949, he was rearrested. On 2nd March, 1950, an order of detention under the  Preventive Detention  Act, 1950, was served on him, and on  3rd  April, 1950, he was served with the grounds of detention dated 11th March,  1950.  Both in September, 1949, and in March,  1950, the ground alleged was ’ ’You tried to create public  disor- der  amongst tenants in Una Tehsil by circulating  and  dis- tributing  objectionable  literature issued  by  underground communists." Additional grounds were furnished in July 1950.    In  petition No. 167 of  1950, Jagjit Singh was  arrested on 24th July, 1948. under the provisions of the 759 Punjab Safety Act, 1947. After the East Punjab Public Safety Act,  1949, came into force, a fresh detention  order  dated 14th  May,  1949, was served on him and he continued  to  be kept in jail.  Grounds of detention were given to him on 7th September,  1949. A fresh order of detention under the  Pre- ventive  Detention Act (IV of 1950) dated 2nd  March,  1950, was  served on 7th March, 1950. Grounds of  detention  dated 11th  March,  1950, were served on him on 3rd  April,  1950. Both  in September 1949 and April 1950, the same ground  was given,  i.e., "In pursuance of the policy of  the  Communist Party, you were engaged in preparing the masses for  violent revolutionary campaign and attended secret party meetings to give effect to this programme." Additional or  supplementary grounds were served on 5th August, 1950.      Several  contentions  were advanced on  behalf  of  the petitioners challenging the legality of their detention  and urging that as the detention was unlawful and the  petition- ers’  fundamental  right of personal liberty  had  been  in- fringed, they should be set at liberty.  The points taken on their  behalf can be briefly summarised as follows_  As  the ground of detention now mentioned was the same as the ground specified  in 1948 or 1949, i.e., months earlier  under  the Provincial Acts, the order of detention was made mechanical- ly  and  was  really mala fide in the sense  that  there  is nothing to show that were was any fresh satisfaction on  the part of the detaining authority that detention was necessary in the interests of public order. Secondly, the grounds were not  given  "as  soon as may be", which  is  required  under section  7  of the Act; and as an unusually long  period  of time  elapsed between the order of detention and the  giving of  the grounds, the detention must be held to  be  unlawful after the lapse of a reasonable time.  Thirdly, the  grounds given  originally were so vague that they could not be  said to be grounds at all such as would enable the detenu to make any representation against the order.  Fourthly,  supplemen- tary grounds could not be furnished and should not be  taken into account in considering whether the 760 original  order was lawful, or whether the detention  became unlawful after a particular period of time. Two other points of  a  subsidiary nature were also raised, namely  that  the order  was bad as the period of detention was not  specified therein as appears to be required by section 12 and that the grounds  given did not purport to state that  the  authority making the order was the Governor of the State.      There  is no substance in the last two points.  Section

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

12 of the Act does not require that the period of  detention should be specified in the order itself where the  detention is  with a view to preventing any person from acting in  any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.   The section  itself  provides that he can  be  detained  without obtaining  the  opinion of an Advisory Board  for  a  period longer than three months but not exceeding one year from the date of detention.  Normally, the detention period shall not exceed  three  months,   unless an  Advisory  Board  reports before  the expiration of the said period that there  is  in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.  See  arti- cle  22,  clause (4), sub-clause (a)  of  the  Constitution. Under sub-clause (7) (a) of the same article, Parliament may by  law  prescrib,  the circumstances under which,  and  the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law  provid- ing  for preventive detention without obtaining the  opinion of  an Advisory Board in accordance with the  provisions  of sub-clause  (a)  of clause (4)."  Therefore,  detention  for more than three months can be justified either on the ground of an opinion of the Advisory Board sanctioning or  warrant- ing longer detention or on the ground that the detention  is to secure the due maintenance of public order, in which case it  cannot exceed one year in any event, as stated. in  sec- tion  12 of the Preventive Detention Act.  It is thus  clear that the period is not to exceed three months generally, but may go up to one year in certain special cases.  In view  of these  provisions,  the non-specification  of  any  definite period 761 in the detention order is not a material omission  rendering the order itself invalid.     Under  section  3 of the Preventive Detention  Act,  the authority  to make the order is the State Government.   Sec- tion 166 (1) of the Constitution provides that all executive action  of the Government of a State, shall be expressed  to be taken in the name of the Governor.  The orders of  deten- tion expressly state that the Governor of Punjab was  satis- fied  of  their  necessity and that they were  made  by  his order.   The orders are signed no doubt by the  Home  Secre- tary,  but  this  is no defect.  The  communication  of  the grounds  need not be made directly by the  authority  making the  order. Section 7 does not require this. The  communica- tion  may be through recognized channels prescribed  by  the administrative rules of business.     Let  us now turn our attention to the main  contentions. There is nothing strange or surprising in the fact that  the same  grounds have been repeated after the lapse of  several months  in  both the cases, when it is remembered  that  the petitioners  were  under detention and in  jail  during  the whole of the intervening period.  No fresh activities  could be attributed to them.  There could only be a repetition  of the  original  ground or grounds, whether good or  bad.   It does  not  follow  from this that the  satisfaction  of  the detaining authority was purely mechanical and that the  mind did  not  go with the pen.  The past conduct  or  antecedent history of a person can be taken into account when making  a detention  order,  and, as a matter of fact, it  is  largely from  prior events showing the tendencies or inclinations of the  man  that  an inference could be drawn  whether  he  is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial  to the maintenance of public order.  If the authority satisfied himself  that  the original ground was still  available  and that  there  was need for detention on its  basis,  no  mala fides  can  be attributed to the authority  from  this  fact

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

alone.     The  Act does not fix the time within which the  grounds should be furnished to the person detained. 762 It merely states that the communication must be "as soon  as may be". This means reasonable despatch and what is reasona- ble  must  depend on the facts of each case.   No  arbitrary time limit can be set down. The delays in the  communication of  the  grounds in the two petitions have  been  adequately explained by the Home Secretary who says  in this affidavits that  grounds had to be supplied to nearly 250  detenus  and that the printing of the necessary forms occupied some time. According to him, he made an order even on 11-3-1950 for the supply of the grounds.     The  extreme vagueness of the grounds is alone  left  as the  chief line of attack. As stated already,  the  original ground  communicated  in  Petition No. 149 of  1950  is  "to create  public  disorder amongst tenants in  the  Tehsil  by circulating and distributing objectionable literature issued by  underground  communists."  In the  other  petition,  the ground is "In pursuance of the policy of the Communist Party you were engaged in preparing the masses for violent revolu- tionary campaign and attended secret party meetings to  give effect  to  this programme." We shall leave  aside  for  the moment the supplementary grounds furnished later.     There  can  be little doubt that in both the  cases  the grounds  furnished in the first instance were highly  vague. If we had only Iswar Das’s case to go by, Petition No. 30 of 1950, such vagueness by itself would constitute a justifica- tion for release of the petitioners.  Since the date of that decision,  however. this Court had to consider the  question at  great length in two cases from Bombay and  Calcutta  re- spectively--Cases Nos. 22 and 24 of 1950--where the  subject of  the  meaning and scope of section 7  of  the  Preventive Detention Act and article 22, sub-clauses (5) and (6)of  the Constitution of India. came up for elaborate  consideration. The  said cases were decided on 25th January, 1951,  and  we are now governed by the principles laid down in these  judg- ments.  It was held by a majority of the Judges in Case  No. 22 of 1950 (1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram Sridhar Vaidya [1951]  S.C.R. 167. 763 (a)  that mere vagueness of grounds standing by  itself  and without  leading  to an inference of mala fides or  lack  of good faith is not a justiciable issue in a court of law  for the  necessity of making’ the order, inasmuch as the  ground or  grounds  on which the order of detention was made  is  a matter for the subjective satisfaction of the Government  or of the detaining authority; (b) that there is nothing in the Act to prevent particulars of the grounds being furnished to the detenu within a reasonable time, so that he may have the earliest opportunity of making a representation against  the detention  order--what  is  reasonable  time being dependent on  the  facts  of each case; (c) that  failure  to  furnish grounds  with  the speedy addition of  such  particulars  as would  enable  the detenu to make a  representation  at  the earliest  opportunity  against the detention  order  can  be considered by a court of law as an. invasion of a  fundamen- tal right or safeguard guaranteed by the Constitution, viz., being  given the earliest opportunity to make a  representa- tion;and  (d)  that  no new grounds  could  be  supplied  to strengthen or fortify the original order of detention.     We are not concerned so much with the earlier history of the detenus as with what happened to them under the  Preven-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

tive  Detention  Act, 1950. OverloOking the  fact  that  the ground mentioned In March 1950 was the same as that given in September 1949, and condoning the vagueness in the  original ground furnished in both the cases to support the making  Of the  order, it is impossible to justify the delay of  nearly four  months in furnishing what have been called  additional or supplementary grounds,     Let us take up Petition No. 149 first.   In the  grounds furnished  in  July  1950, there are several  which  do  not apparently relate to the original ground. "You were  respon- sible  for  hartal by labourers working on  Bhalera  Dam  in October  1947"....  "You  instigated  labourers  working  in Nangal  in 1948 to go on strike to secure the acceptance  of their demands"    "After release you absconded yourself from your village and 99 764 remained  untraced for a considerable period"   ....   "When you  were  re-arrested on 29-9-1949,  lot  of  objectionable communist  literature  was  recovered  from  your   personal search"--are  instances of new grounds, and they have to  be eliminated  therefore from consideration. In Jagjit  Singh’s petition  No. 167 of 1950, the supplemental  grounds,  which are as many as ten in number, are dated 31-7-1950, but  they were  served on him on 5-8-1950, that is two days  after  he had prepared his petition to this court under article 32  of the  Constitution.  The grounds may be taken as  particulars of   the  general allegation  made against him  on  3-4-1950 when  the  original grounds of detention were  served.   But the  time factor to enable him to make a  representation  at the  earliest opportunity was not borne in mind  or  adhered to.  In the affidavit of Shri Vishan Bhagwan, Home Secretary to  the  Punjab Government, dated 6th  September,  1950,  no explanation has been offered for this abnormal delay in  the specification of the particulars.  This delay is very unfor- tunate  indeed. But for its occurrence the petitioner  would not  have been able to urge that one of the valuable  rights guaranteed  to him by the Constitution has   been  violated. It  is not alleged  b.y  the Home Secretary that the  detenu was  furnished with these particulars when he  was  arrested and detained under the Provincial Act and that  consequently it was considered unnecessary to give him the same  particu- lars  once over.  On the other hand, the detenu’s  complaint has throughout been that he was given no particulars at  all till the 5th August, 1950.     As  the petitioners were given only vague grounds  which were  not  particularised or made specific so as  to  afford them the  earliest  opportunity  of  making  representations against their detention orders, and their having been  inex- cusable  delay in acquainting them with particulars of  what was alleged. the petitioners have to be released, the  rules being made absolute.  Ordered accordingly. 765     PATANJALI  SASTRI J.--I concur in the order proposed  by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.     DAS J.--In view of the majority decision in Case No.  22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Acharya), I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother.            Order accordingly. Petition No. 194 of 1950 Agent  for  the petitioner: R.R. Biswas. Agent  for the respondent: P.A. Mehta. Agent for the intervener: P.A. Mehta. Petition No. 167 of 1950 Agent for the petition: R.S. Narula.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehla.