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CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil)  4 of 2005

PETITIONER: Udai Singh Dagar & Ors

RESPONDENT: Union of India & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/05/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO.2537 OF 2007 [Arising out of  SLP (Civil) No. 11880 of 2006]

S.B. SINHA, J :          1.      Leave granted in S.L.P.

2.      Constitutionality and/ or applicability of the provisions of Section 30  of the Indian Veterinary Council Act, 1984 (for short "the Central Act") is in  question herein.   

3.      Before, however, embarking on the questions involved, we may at the  outset notice that the Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 11880 of  2006 arises out of a judgment and order dated 26.04.2006 passed by a  Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Writ  Petition No. 4619 of 1997 whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by  the appellant herein in regard to the applicability of Section 30 of the Central  Act was dismissed.  In the said writ petition, the following prayers were  made:

(a)     the declaration that the non-graduate  Veterinary Practitioners who are registered under  the Maharashtra Veterinary Practitioners Act, 1971  (for short to be referred as "the State Veterinary  Act") are eligible to practice Veterinary medicine  in the same manner and on such conditions as they  were prior to coming into force of the Indian  Veterinary Councils Act, 1984 ("Central  Veterinary Act" for short) in the State of  Maharashtra;

(b)     to declare that non-graduate Veterinary  Practitioners who are eligible to be registered  under the State Veterinary Act will be permitted to  practice Veterinary medicine in the same manner  and on such conditions as they were prior to the  coming into force of the Central Veterinary Act in  the State of Maharashtra; and  (c)     for directions to renew the registration of  non-graduate Veterinary Practitioners in the  register maintained by the State Council under the  State Veterinary Act til the coming into force of  the Central Veterinary Act.

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4.      The Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has  been filed by the petitioners representing similarly placed veterinary  practitioners from several States and Union Territories of India against the  Union of India as also the concerned States praying inter alia for the  following reliefs:

"a) issue an appropriate writ revoking and  declaring null and void the impugned Section 30 of  the Indian Veterinary Council Act, 1984 and b) issue an appropriate writ revoking and declaring  null and void Rule No. 37/45 of Indian Veterinary  Practitioners Regulation, 1992. ***                     ***                     *** l) issue a writ of mandamus/ any other appropriate  writ, order or directions restraining the  Respondents from acting/ giving effect to the  provisions of Section 30 of the Indian Veterinary  Council Act, 1984 and Rule No. 37/45 of Indian  Veterinary Practitioners Regulation, 1992 and the  above notifications mentioned in prayer clause (c)  to (k) above."

       In the writ petition, prayers have also been made for revoking and  declaring notifications issued by the respective State Governments in terms  of Section 30 of the Central Act as void.

5.      We will, however, record the facts of the matter from Civil Appeal  arising out of SLP (C) No. 11880 of 2006.             Appellant is an Association registered under the Trade Unions Act.  It  purports to represent the Veterinary Practitioners of the State of  Maharashtra.  The subject of legislation was a State subject.  The States of  Haryana, Bihar, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan, however, adopted  a resolution purported to be in terms of Clause (1) of Article 252 of the  Constitution of India requesting the Union of India to make a parliamentary  legislation to the effect that the matter may be regulated in those States by  Parliamentary Act.  Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said resolution,   Parliament enacted the Central Act being Act No. 52 of 1984.  It came into  force with effect from 18th August, 1984.  It was enacted with a view to  regulate veterinary practice and to provide, for that purpose, for the  establishment of a Veterinary Council of India and State Veterinary  Councils and the maintenance of registers of the veterinary practitioners and  for matters connected therewith.   

6.      We may hereafter notice some of the provisions of the Central Act.

7.      Sections 2(e), 2(f) and 2(g) of the Central Act read as under:

"(e) "recognised veterinary qualification" means  any of the veterinary qualifications included in the  First Schedule or the Second Schedule; (f) "register" means a register maintained under  this Act; (g) "registered veterinary practitioner" means a  person whose name is for the time being duly  registered in a register;"

8.      Section 3 provides for the establishment of the Central Council and  the State Councils.

9.      Sections 15, 22, 23, 30 and 67 of the Central Act read as under:

"15. (1) The veterinary qualifications granted by  any veterinary institution in India which are

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included in the First Schedule shall be recognised  veterinary qualifications for the purposes of this  Act, (2) Any veterinary institution in India, which  grants a veterinary qualification not included in the  First Schedule may apply to the Central  Government to have such qualification recognised  and the Central Government, after consulting the  Council, may, by notification in the Official  Gazette amend the First Schedule so as to include  such qualification therein and any such notification  may also direct that an entry shall be made in the  last column of the First Schedule against such  veterinary qualification declaring that it shall be a  recognised veterinary qualification only when  granted after a specified date. 22. Minimum standards of veterinary  education.-- (1) The Council may, by regulations, specify the  minimum standards of veterinary education  required for granting recognised veterinary  qualifications by veterinary institutions in those  States to which this Act extends. (2) Copies of the draft regulations and of all  subsequent amendments thereof shall be furnished  by the Council to the State Government concerned  and the Council shall, before submitting such  regulations or any amendments thereof, as the case  may be, to the Central Government for approval,  take into consideration the comments of the State  Government received within three months from the  furnishing of the copies as aforesaid. (3) The Central Government may, before  approving such regulations or any amendments  thereof, consult the Indian Council of Agricultural  Research. (4) The Committee constituted under section 12  shall from lime to time report to the Council on the  efficacy of the regulations and may recommend to  the Council such amendments thereof as it may  think fit. 23. Indian veterinary practitioners register.-- (1) The Council shall, as soon as may be after the  commencement of this Act, cause to be maintained  in such form and in such manner as may be  provided by regulations a register of veterinary  practitioners to be known as the Indian veterinary  practitioners register which shall contain the names  of all persons who possess the recognised  veterinary qualifications and who are for the time  being enrolled on a State veterinary register of the  State to which this Act extends. (2) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the  Council to keep the Indian veterinary practitioners  register in accordance with the provisions of this  Act and of any orders made by the Council, and  from time to time to revise the register and publish  it in the Gazette of India or in such other manner  as may be provided by regulations. (3) Such register shall be deemed to be a public  document within the meaning of the Indian  Evidence Act, 1872, and may be proved by a copy  published in the Gazette of India. (4) Each State Veterinary Council shall furnish to  the Council six printed copies of the State

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veterinary register as soon as may be after the 1st  day of April of each year and each State  Veterinary Council shall inform the Council  without delay of all additions, and other  amendments in the State veterinary register made  from time to time.

30. Right of persons who are enrolled on the  Indian veterinary practitioners register.-- No person, other than a registered veterinary  practitioner, shall-- (a) hold office as veterinary physician or surgeon  or any other like office (by whatever name called)  in Government or in any institution maintained by  a local or other authority; (b) practise veterinary medicine in any State : Provided that the State Government may, by order,  permit a person holding a diploma or certificate of  veterinary supervisor, stockman or stock assistant  (by whatever name called) issued by the  Directorate of Animal Husbandry (by whatever  name called) of any State or any veterinary  institution in India, to render under the supervision  and direction of a registered veterinary  practitioner, minor veterinary services. Explanation.-- "Minor veterinary services" means  the rendering of preliminary veterinary aid, like,  vaccination, castration, and dressing of wounds,  and such other types of preliminary aid or the  treatment of such ailments as the State  Government may, by notification in the Official  Gazette, specify in this behalf; (c) be entitled to sign or authenticate a veterinary  health certificate or any other certificate required  by any law to be signed or authenticated by duly  qualified veterinary practitioner; (d) be entitled to give evidence at any inquest or in  any court of law as an expert under section 45 of  the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, on any matter  relating to veterinary medicine. 67. Repeal and saving.-- As from the commencement of this Act in any  State, every other Act relating to any matter  contained in this Act and in force in that State  shall, to the extent to which that Act or any  provision contained therein corresponds, or is  repugnant, to this Act or any provision contained  in this Act, stand repealed and the provisions of  section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall  apply to such repeal as if such other Act were a  Central Act."

10.     The State of Bombay enacted Bombay Veterinary Practitioners Act,  1953 (for short "the 1953 Act").  The matter relating to veterinary practice in  the then State of Bombay as also the requisition in the service of the State  appointments for the purpose of veterinary duties was regulated.  The 1953  Act provided for maintenance of the register of the veterinary practitioners.   Sections 14, 19, 24 and 25, which are relevant for our purpose, read as  under: "14 (1)  Subject to the provisions of this Act, every  person shall, if he holds any of the qualifications  included in the Schedule be entitled on application  to be registered, on payment of a fee of Rs. 15 and  on giving evidence to the satisfaction of the  Registration Officer or the Registrar, as the case

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may be, of his possession of a qualification  entitling him for registration.

(2)     The State Government may, after consulting  the Registration Officer or the Council, as the case  may be, permit the registration of any person who  has been actually conducting veterinary practice in  the State of Bombay since a date prior to the 1st  day of January 1944, notwithstanding the fact that  he may not be possessing qualifications entitling  him to have his name entered in the register.

(3)     Every person for the time being registered  with the veterinary Council of any other State in  India under any law for the registration of  veterinary practitioners in force in such State shall,  if reciprocity of registration  has been arranged  with such Council, be entitled to be registered  under this Act, on making an application in that  behalf, on payment of a fee of Rs. 15 and on his  informing the Registration Officer or the Registrar,  as the case may be, of the date of his registration  under the said law and on giving a correct  description of his qualifications with the dates on  which they were granted.

(4)     Any person who has been convicted of a  cognizable offence as defined in the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1898, or who, being or having  been subject to military law has been convicted  under the Army Act or under the Indian Army Act,  1911 or under the Army Act, 1950, of an offence  which is also a cognizable offence as so defined  and any person who after due enquiry has been  held guilty by the Council of infamous conduct in  any professional respect may be refused  registration under this Act.

19.   No person shall, except with the sanction of  the State Government, hold any appointment for  the performance of veterinary duties in any  veterinary dispensary, hospital or infirmary which  is not supported entirely by voluntary contributions  or which belongs to a local authority or in any  public establishment, body or institution, unless he  is registered under this Act.

24  Notwithstanding anything contained in any law  for the time being in force, no person other than a  person registered under Part IV of this Act \026

(a) shall sign or authenticate any veterinary or  physical fitness certificate required by any law or  rule to be signed or authenticated by a duly  qualified veterinary practitioner, or  

(b)  shall be qualified to give evidence as an expert  under section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,  or any matter relating to veterinary science.

25:  No person shall add to his name any title,  description, letters or abbreviations which imply  that he holds a degree, diploma, licence or  certificate as his qualification to practice any

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system of veterinary science unless \026

(a)     he actually holds such degree, diploma,  licence or certificate; and  (b)     such degree, diploma, licence or certificate  is specified in the Schedule or his recognized by  law for the time being in force in India or in any  part thereof or has been conferred, granted or  issued by an authority empowered or recognized as  competent by the State Government to confer,  grant, or issue such degree, diploma, licence or  certificate."

11.     The State of Bombay was bifurcated into the State of Maharashtra and  the State of Gujarat with effect from 1st May, 1960.

12.     The State of Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Veterinary  Practitioners Act, 1971 (for short "the 1971 Act").  The said Act came into  force from 15th November, 1971.  Section 15 of the 1971 Act mandates the  State to cause a register to be prepared for veterinary practitioners of the  State and maintained in such form as may be directed.  The register is to  contain the name, address and qualification of every person registered  thereunder together with the date on which such qualification was acquired.

13.     Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 18 of the 1971 Act read as under:

"18 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every  person shall, if he holds any of the qualifications  included in the Schedule, be entitled on application  to be registered, on payment of such fee as may be  provided by regulations and on giving evidence to  the satisfaction of the Registration Officer or the  Registrar as the case may be, of his possession of a  qualification entitling him for registration. (2)     The State Government may, after consulting  the Registration Officer or the Council, as the case  may be, permit the registration of any person who  has been actually conducting veterinary practice in  the State of Maharashtra on such conditions as  may be provided for by regulations made for this  purpose, notwithstanding the fact that he may not  be possessing qualifications entitling him to have  his name entered in the register."

14.     Section 23 of the 1971 Act contained an identical provision which is  in pari materia with the provisions of the 1953 Act.  Section 26 empowers  the Council to call for information and attend examination.  Section 33  provided for control in the following terms:

"33.    If it shall appear to the State Government on  the report of the Council or otherwise, that the  course of study and examinations prescribed by  any of the institutions specified in column 1 of the  Schedule conferring the qualifications described in  column 2 of that Schedule with their abbreviations  specified in column 3 thereof are not such as to  secure the possession by persons obtaining such  qualifications of the requisite knowledge and skill  for the efficient practice of their profession, or if it  shall appear to the State Government, on the report  of the Council or otherwise, that the course of  study and examinations prescribed by any  institution conferring a qualification not entered in

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the Schedule are such as to secure the possession  by persons obtaining such qualification of the  requisite knowledge and skill for the efficient  practice of their profession, it shall be lawful for  the State Government from time to time by  notification in the Official Gazette, to direct that  the possession of any qualification entered in the  Schedule shall not entitle any person to registration  under this Act or to direct that the possession of  any qualification not entered in the Schedule shall,  subject to the provisions of this Act, entitle a  person to be so registered as the case may be, and  the Schedule shall thereupon be deemed for all  purposes be altered accordingly."

15.     Section 37 of the 1971 Act provides for a rule making power whereas  Section 38 thereof provides for regulation making power.  In terms of the  provisions of Sections 18, 26 and 33 ’recognised veterinary qualifications’  were laid down in the schedule appended to the 1971 Act, item No. 20 and  24 whereof read as under:

"Serial  No. Institutions (1) Qualifications (2) Abbreviation  for  registration (3) *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 20. Bombay Veterinary  College (1) Graduate of Bengal  Veterinary College (2) Graduate in  Veterinary Science G.B.V.C. *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 24. Nagpur Veterinary  College Two-year Diploma  Certificate

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\005"

16.     The State of Maharashtra in exercise of its power conferred upon it  under Sub-section (1) of Section 38 read with Sub-section (2) of Section 18  of the 1971 Act made regulations known as "The Maharashtra Veterinary  Practitioners (Conditions for registration of persons actually conducting  veterinary practice) Regulations 1981" (for short "the 1981 Regulations").   Regulation 3 reads as under:

"3    (I)     The conditions on which the registration  of any person under sub-section (2) of section 18  of the Act may be permitted shall be as follows,  namely:

(a)     the said person shall possess a certificate of  completion of practical and theoretical training  course:-

(i)     prescribed by any Government  functioning in the Bombay area.  Hyderabad  area of Vidarbha region before the formation  of the State of Maharashtra and who is  actually conducting practice in the State of  Maharashtra, since then: or

(ii)    Prescribed or recognized by the  Government of Maharashtra from time to  time, after the formation of the State of  Maharashtra and who is actually conducting  practice in the State of Maharashtra, since  then, for eligibility for appointment to a post  of Livestock Supervisor, Stockmen,  Stockmen-cum-Health Assistant or  Veterinary Assistant: or

(b)     Shall have at the time of registration,  practical experience for a period of not less than  ten years in compounding and dispensing under  any registered veterinary practitioners possessing a  degree in veterinary science of a statutory  University."

17.     Similar legislations were existing in many other States.

18.     Although the Central Act came into force in 1984, several States did  not adopt the same.  On or from 1997, the Central Act was made applicable  to the States of Haryana, Bihar, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan and  all Union Territories.

19.     The State of Maharashtra issued a notification dated 26th August, 1997  in terms of Section 30 of the Central Act specifying minor veterinary  services to be rendered by the Veterinary Science Certificate or Diploma  holders in the Government Service or in Semi-Government organizations.

20.     The contention of the writ petitions inter alia is that having regard to  the fact that the veterinary practitioners who were possessing ’diploma in  veterinary science’ or ’certificate in veterinary science’ which were  recognized by the State of Maharahstra and some other States they could not  have been divested of their right to practice by reason of the Central Act on  the premise that they having the requisite qualification had a fundamental  right in terms of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on veterinary  practice or continue to be in the service of the State and any restriction  placed on such rights should not only be a reasonable one but also in public  interest.  The Central Act, insofar as it purports to take away such right to

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practice or to be continued in service, thus, imposes an unreasonable  restriction interfering with their fundamental right inasmuch as the degree  holders alone cannot serve the rural areas.  Our attention in this behalf has  also been drawn to the letters addressed by some Members of the Parliament  to the concerned Ministries stating that in the event the services of the  petitioners are dispensed with, the same would not be in public interest.   

21.     The second leaf of argument both in the writ petition as also in the  civil appeal arising out of the SLP is that having regard to the provisions of  Section 67 of the Central Act, the provisions of Section 6 of the General  Clauses Act having been made applicable, the rights and liabilities accrued  prior to coming into force of the Central Act must be held to be saved.

22.     The contention of the Union of India and the respective State  Governments, on the other hand, is that keeping in view the number of  veterinary colleges which have been opened in the states, the services of a  large number of degree holders can be utilized therefor and in fact thousands  of such degree holders are still unemployed.  In any event, the State can, for  maintaining better standard in profession, lay down qualification which need  not satisfy the test of public importance particularly in view of the fact that  the Parliament or the States by making suitable enactments can always lay  down the qualifications for carrying on any profession.   

23.     Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it was urged, would have no  application in a situation of this nature inasmuch as the very fact that the  Central Act intended to bring about a new situation, the same would ipso  facto be a pointer to the fact that both the Central Act and the State Act  cannot stand together.

24.    The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, by reason of the  impugned judgment, has upheld the contention of the respondents herein.  It,  however, opined that relief (c) prayed for by the writ petitioners before it, in  view of the notification issued on 1st August, 1997 in terms whereof the  Central Act had been introduced in the State of Maharashtra with effect from  the first day of August, 1997, did not survive.  It furthermore held that in  view of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Central Act as  existing veterinary practitioners whose names appeared in the register part I  maintained by the State Veterinary Council are duly protected, relief (a) as  reproduced hereinbefore would be covered thereby.

25.     Before us Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned senior counsel advanced  arguments on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C)  No. 11880 of 2006 whereas Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appeared  on behalf of the writ petitioners in the writ petition.   

26.    The submission of the learned counsel is that Section 67 of the Central  Act must be read in two parts.  By reason of the first part, it is conceded that  the State Act stands repealed, but it is contended that once the first part of  Section 67 comes into force, by reason of the second part, Section 6 of the  General Clauses Act is given effect to.  In terms of Clauses (b) and (c) of  Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, not only the previous operation of any  enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder but also  any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred  under any enactment so repealed would stand protected.  In that view of the  matter, those diploma holders who were on the register maintained by the  State are entitled to continue to practice.  Our attention in this behalf has also  been drawn to the fact that prior to 11th August, 1993, the Maharashtra  Veterinary Council is said to have imposed a condition de’hors the 1971 Act  refusing to register certificate holders unless they were appointed in  government or semi-government institutions and the validity thereof was  pending consideration in writ petition No. 3377 of 1993 before the Bombay  High Court and as only by a judgment dated 15.01.2003, the impugned  condition has been set aside as a result whereof 25,000 certificate holders  who could not get themselves also became entitled to the reliefs therefor.

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27.     The submission of the learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf  of the Union of India, the Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf  of the Veterinary Council of India and Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior  counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Maharashtra, on the other hand,  is that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be attracted only when no  different intention appears in the new Act.  It was pointed out that there  exists a distinction between a simple repeal and repeal of an Act substituted  by another.  If the new Act provides for something which is wholly different  from the purview of the repealed act, evidently, a different intention would  appear.

28.     Article 19 of the Constitution of India provides for protection of  certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.  Sub-clause (g) of clause (1)  of Article 19 of the Constitution of India confers a fundamental right to  protect any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.   Clause (6) of Article 19 reads as under:

"19.    Protection of certain rights regarding  freedom of speech, etc. \026  (1) **** (2) **** (3)  **** (4)  **** (5)  **** (6)  Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause  shall affect the operation of any existing law in so  far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making  any law imposing, in the interests of the general  public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of  the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in  particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall  affect the operation of any existing law in so far as  it relates to, or prevent the State from making any  law relating to, -  

(i)  the professional or technical qualifications  necessary for practising any profession or carrying  on any occupation, trade or business, or

(ii)  the carrying on by the State, or by a  corporation owned or controlled by the State, of  any trade, business, industry or service, whether to  the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or  otherwise."

29.     The above provision is in two parts.  It empowers Parliament and the  State Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the  right conferred by the sub-clause (g) of Clause (1) of Article 19 of the  Constitution of India in the interest of the general public.  The second part of  the said provision provides that in particular nothing therein shall affect the  operation of an existing law insofar as it relates to or prevents the State from  making any law inter alia relating to the profession or technical  qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any  occupation, trade or business.  By reason of a statute - law, therefore,  undoubtedly, qualifications can be laid down inter alia for practising any  profession or carry on any occupation.

30.     Such qualifications had been laid down by the State Act.  If by reason  of the Central Act, a higher qualification has been laid down, the same, in  our opinion, would prima facie be presumed to have been enacted in the  interest of the general public.

31.     We may notice that several States did not make any legislation  covering the field like the State of Maharashtra.  Some States, however, did.

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32.     Any profession which deals with the life of a human being or an  animal may be regulated or controlled.  Essential qualifications can be laid  down for the purpose of entry in the State services.  In the State of  Maharashtra, rendition of veterinary service was primarily the responsibility  of the Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samities, as specified in Section 100  (1)(a) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samities Act, 1961.

"100. (1) (a)  It shall be the duty of a Zilla Parishad  so far as the district fund at its disposal will allow,  to make reasonable provision within the District  with respect to all or any of the subjects  enumerated in the First Schedule as amended from  time to time under sub-section (2) (in this Act  referred to as "the District List") and to execute or  maintain works or development schemes in the  District relating to any such subjects."

33.     Item No. 14 of the First Schedule and Item Nos. 9 and 10 of the  Second Schedule appended to the said Act read as under:  

"First Schedule  

14.     Veterinary aid (excluding District  Veterinary Hospitals but including veterinary  dispensaries, veterinary aid centres and village  veterinary chests).

Second Schedule  

(9)    Village Veterinary Chests. (10)    Veterinary Aid Centres."

        34.     It is somewhat interesting to note that even in terms of the 1953 Act,  there was no provision for allowing a diploma holder to practice.   

35.     The validity of a statute would ordinarily be tested keeping in view  the social conditions as were existing on the date of coming into force  thereof.  It is one thing to say that a law causes hardship to a section of the  people but it is another thing to say that the same would be unconstitutional.   It may be that with the passage of time, a statute which was intra vires on the  date of coming into force of the Act may be considered to be ultra vires.   However, for that there should be sufficient materials which are either  brought on record or of which the court can take judicial notice.  The  difficulty would arise where the materials brought on record may provide for  divergent views.  In such a situation, the court will not ordinarily exercise its  power of judicial review over legislation.  The facts on the basis whereof the  Legislature of a State or the Parliament had chosen to rely upon should be  the guiding factor.  The Legislature of Executive can have several choices or  options to deal with a matter, and courts cannot say which choice or option  should have been preferred.

36.    Before us, the Union of India as also the various States including the  State of Maharashtra, have placed certain facts.  According to the State  Governments, despite coming into force of the Central Act they had not  opted therefor, immediately as they had to make a detailed study of the  applicability thereof in the fact situation obtaining in that particular State.   We may by way of example consider the material placed before us by the  State of Maharashtra, from a perusal whereof it appears that it is true that  when qualified graduate veterinary doctors were not available in sufficient  numbers, service of unqualified/diploma holders were utilized. But today we  are living in a changed scenario. About 260 post graduates are produced  every year and about 2000 qualified graduates are found to be without the  job. It has been pointed out that prior to 1970 only 1 Veterinary Graduate

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was working in each Community Development Block and around 10-15  veterinary Graduates in each district, whereas this situation has changed  drastically in 2005.   

37.     An attempt has been made in the counter-affidavit to demonstrate that  due to availability of qualified graduates, duties and responsibilities of  diploma holders were curtailed and shifted towards the degree holders.  Considering the worldwide trend having regard to international conventions  and covenants, the plea of the petitioners to continue old practices, cannot be  sustained.

38.     Similar is the position in the State of Rajasthan as from its counter  affidavit, it would appear that the number of veterinary doctors are sufficient  to provide for the veterinary services in the State and many degree holders  are still unemployed.

39.     We, therefore, are of the opinion that even in the matter of laying  down of qualification by a statute, the restriction imposed as envisaged  under second part of Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India  must be construed being in consonance with the interest of the general  public.  The tests laid down, in our opinion, stand satisfied.  We may,  however, notice that Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India  stands on a higher footing vis-‘-vis Clause (5) thereof.  We say so in view of  the celebrated decision of this Court in State of Madras v. V.G. Row [(1952)   SCR 597] wherein it was stated:

"15. \005 It is important in this context to bear in  mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever  prescribed, should be applied to each individual  statute impugned, and no abstract standard or  general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid  down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the  right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying  purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and  urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby,  the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing  conditions at the time, should all enter into the  judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors  and forming their own conception of what is  reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given  case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and  the scale of values of the Judges participating in  the decision should play an important part, and the  limit to their interference with legislative judgment  in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of  responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering  reflection that the Constitution is meant not only  for people of their way of thinking but for all, and  that the majority of the elected representatives of  the people have, in authorising the imposition of  the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable."   40.     The tests laid down therein, viz., the test of reasonableness as also  general public interest, however, may not ipso facto apply in a case  involving Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.  

41.     Here we may deal with the extent of judicial review permissible under  Article 19(6). It was observed in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. and  Ors.,   AIR 1954 SC 728 by Mukherjea, J. at p. 727 in the following terms: The new clause in Article 19(6) has no doubt been  introduced with a view to provide that a State can  create a monopoly in its own favour in respect of any  trade or business; but the amendment does not make  the establishment of such monopoly a reasonable  restriction within the meaning of the first clause of

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Article 19(6). The result of the amendment is that the  State would not have to justify such action as  reasonable at all in a court of law, and no objection  could be taken to it on the ground that it is an  infringement of the rights guaranteed under Article  19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 42.     The validity of a law creating a State monopoly came into question in  Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 691 wherein  Gajendragadkar, J. observed: "’A law relating to’ a State monopoly cannot, in the  context, include all the provisions contained in the said  law whether they have direct relation with the creation  of the monopoly or not. In our opinion, the said  expression should be construed to mean the law relating  to the monopoly in its absolutely essential features. If a  law is passed creating a State monopoly, the Court  should enquire what are the provisions of the said law  which are basically and essentially necessary for  creating the State monopoly. It is only those essential  and basic provisions which are protected by the latter  part of Article 19(6). If there are other provisions made  by the Act which are subsidiary, incidental or helpful to  the operation of the monopoly, they do not fall under  the first part of Article 19(6).  

... the amendment (First Amendment) clearly indicates  that State monopoly in respect of any trade or business  must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interests  of general public, so far as Article 19(1)(g) is  concerned."

43.     The position of law has since been consistently reiterated in M/s.  Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. and another etc. v. State of Orissa and  others [AIR 1991 SC 672], State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. L. Abu Kavur  Bai and Ors. [AIR 1984 SC 326], Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v.  State of Assam and others [(1989) 3 SCC 709], Utkal Contractors and  Joinery (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Orissa [AIR 1987 SC 2310], Rasbihari  Panda and Ors. v. The State of Orissa [AIR 1969 SC 1081], Amritsar and  Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [AIR 1969 SC 1100], etc.

44.     In Dr. Mukhtiar Chand and Others v. State of Punjab and Others  [(1998) 7 SCC 579] this Court primarily dealt with the right to practice the  medical profession as also the related question of right to well being of a  person as being part of life.  In exercise of the power under Rule 2(ee)(iii) of  the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 the State of Punjab had issued a  Notification dated 29.10.1967 declaring all the Vaids/Hakims who had been  registered under the East Punjab Ayurvedic and Unani Practitioners Act,  1949 and the Pepsu Ayurvedic and Unani Practitioners Act, 2008 BK and  the Punjab Ayurvedic and Unani Practitioners Act, 1963 as persons  practising modern System of Medicine for purposes of the Drugs Act. The  aforementioned rule defined "Registered Medical Practitioner".  A medical  practitioner who was registered with the Board of Ayurvedic and Unani  System of Medicines, Punjab, and was practising modern system of  medicines was served with an order prohibiting him from keeping in his  possession any allopathic drug for administration to patients and further  issuing general direction to the chemists not to issue allopathic drugs to any  patient on the prescription of the said doctor. The medical Practitioner in  response to the action moved the Punjab & Haryana High Court and claimed  that he was covered by the said notification and was entitled to prescribe  allopathic medicine to his patients and store such drugs for their treatment.  The High Court held the said notification ultra vires to the provisions of rule  2 (ee) (iii) of the Drugs Rules as also contrary to the provisions of Indian  Medical Council Act, 1956 and dismissed the writ petition. 45.     In that case, this Court has noticed a distinction between maintenance  of a State register and a Central register.  Therein this Court while

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considering the provisions of Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970  observed:

"43\005For a person to be registered in the Central  Register, Section 25 enjoins that the Registrar  should be satisfied that the person concerned was  eligible under that Act for such registration.  Keeping this position in mind, if we read Section  17(3)(b), it becomes clear that the privileges which  include the right to practise any system of  medicine conferred by or under any law relating to  registration of practitioners of Indian medicine for  the time being in force in any State on a  practitioner of Indian medicine enrolled on a State  Register of Indian Medicine, are not affected by  the prohibition contained in sub-section (2) of  Section 17."   46.     In regard to the applicability of Clause (6) of Article 19 of the  Constitution of India, it was stated: "48. The right to practise modern scientific  medicine or Indian system of medicine cannot be  based on the provisions of the Drugs Rules and  declaration made thereunder by State  Governments. Indeed, Ms Indira Jaising has also  submitted that the right to practise a system of  medicine is derived from the Act under which a  medical practitioner is registered. But she has  strenuously argued that the right which the holders  of a degree in integrated courses of Indian  medicine are claiming is to have their prescription  of allopathic medicine honoured by a pharmacist  or a chemist under the Pharmacy Act and the  Drugs Act. This argument is too technical to be  acceded to because prescribing a drug is a  concomitant of the right to practise a system of  medicine. Therefore, in a broader sense, the right  to prescribe drugs of a system of medicine would  be synonymous with the right to practise that  system of medicine. In that sense, the right to  prescribe an allopathic drug cannot be wholly  divorced from the claim to practise allopathic  medicine."   47.     Such is not the case here.

48.    Furthermore, the Central Act is flexible.  It not only recognizes the  degrees granted by the institutions recognized by it, it provides extension of  grant of such recognition to other institutions also if they satisfy the tests.   Undoubtedly, such a flexible situation has been created by reason of the  Central Act only to meet the exigencies of the situations arising in future, if  any.

49.    It is not for this Court to arrive at a conclusive opinion that the rural  areas continue to be heavily dependant on the certificate holders for  providing essential veterinary services as was submitted on behalf of the  petitioners.  The State is presumed to know the needs of the citizens.   

50.    Our attention has been drawn to a Constitution Bench decision of this  Court in Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa and Others [AIR 1963 SC 1047 :  1963 Supp (2) SCR 691] wherein two extreme positions were taken by the  learned counsel for the parties.  In the said decision, the court was dealing  with the right of a State to create a State monopoly in the kendu leaves.  Whereas the contention of the learned Attorney General was that creation of  such a monopoly is not required to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the

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contention of the counsel for the petitioners was that the court is entitled to  consider the same.  It was held that if a law is passed creating a State  monopoly, the court should enquire as to what are the provisions of the said  law which are basically and essentially necessary therefor and only essential  and basic provisions are protected by the latter part of Clause (6) of Article  19 of the Constitution of India.  It is not a case where the Central Act makes  any provision which are subsidiary, incidental or helpful to the operation of  the main provisions of the Act.

51.    We have noticed hereinbefore, that it has been conceded before us  and, in our opinion, rightly so, that the provisions contained in Section 30 of  the Central Act constitute a reasonable restriction within the meaning of the  first part of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India and the fundamental  rights under Article 19(1)(g) thereof.    

52.    If the legislative power of the Parliament vis-‘-vis the State  Government in this behalf is considered, a’fortiori the State will have the  legislative competence to lay down the qualification therefor.

53.    It is one thing to say that laying down such qualification or taking  away the right of the practitioners to continue their practice is  unconstitutional but it is another thing to say that the same cannot be given  retrospective effect.   

54.     A statute does not operate retrospectively only because a person’s  right to continue in profession comes to an end.  A person will have a right  to enter into a profession and continue therewith provided he holds the  requisite qualification.  As and when a qualification is laid down by a law  within the meaning of Sub-clause (g) of Clause (1) of Article 19 of the  Constitution of India, the same would come into effect.  In other words, it  would act prospectively and, thus, not retrospectively, inasmuch as the  practice he had already enjoyed is not taken away.

55.     In Delhi Pradesh Registered Medical Practitioners v. Director of  Health, Delhi Admn. Services and Others [(1997) 11 SCC 687], this Court  rejected a similar contention to the effect that only because the practitioners  got their names registered in the discipline of Ayurveda, they would have a  right to practice in such discipline as registered medical practitioners, and  the privileges which a registered practitioner has stood protected by sub- section (3) of Section 17 of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970  stating:

"5. We are, however, unable to accept such  contention of Mr Mehta. Sub-section (3) of Section  17 of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act,  1970, in our view, only envisages that where  before the enactment of the said Indian Medicine  Central Act, 1970 on the basis of requisite  qualification which was then recognised, a person  got himself registered as medical practitioner in  the disciplines contemplated under the said Act or  in the absence of any requirement for registration  such person had been practising for five years or  intended to be registered and was also entitled to  be registered, the right of such person to practise in  the discipline concerned including the privileges of  a registered medical practitioner stood protected  even though such practitioner did not possess  requisite qualification under the said Act of 1970.  It may be indicated that such view of ours is  reflected from the Objects and Reasons indicated  for introducing sub-section (3) of Section 17 in the  Act."

56.     Noticing the objects and reasons of the legislation, it was held:

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"As it is not the case of any of the writ petitioners  that they had acquired the degree in between 1957  (sic 1967) and 1970 or on the date of enforcement  of provisions of Section 17(2) of the said Act and  got themselves registered or acquired right to be  registered, there is no question of getting the  protection under sub-section (3) of Section 17 of  the said Act. It is to be stated here that there is also  no challenge as to the validity of the said Central  Act, 1970\005" 57.     We may now consider the second limb of submissions, viz., whether  the rights and privileges of the certificate holders are protected in terms of  Section 67 of the Act.

58.     The General Clauses Act, 1897 governs Parliamentary Acts.  The  subject matter of the legislation is a State legislation.  The Central  Government stepped in only because of the resolutions adopted by some  State Governments at the outset and resolutions adopting the Central  Government by other States at a later stage, viz., 1997.  Section 6 of the  General Clauses Act, therefore, was referred to in Section 67 of the Central  Act creating a legal fiction as if both the Central Act and the State Act are  enacted by the Parliament.  In absence of such a legal fiction raised, the  provisions of either the General Clauses Act, 1897 or the respective State  General Clauses Act would have no application.  It, therefore, does not  create any right.  It does not make Section 6 of the General Clauses Act ipso  facto applicable.  Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be attracted  but it would have no application if a different intention appears.

59.     We have noticed the contention of the learned Senior Counsel  appearing on behalf of the petitioners that there exists an inconsistency  insofar as whereas under the Central Act only the degree holders are entitled  to be enrolled in the register maintained by the Central Council; the State  Act recognizes the diploma and certificate holders also.

60.     Veterinary services in terms of the Central Act is in two parts (1)  veterinary services and (2) minor veterinary services.  What would be the  minor veterinary services has been laid down by reason of a notification  issued by the respective State Governments in exercise of their power under  clause (b) of Section 30 of the Central Act.  Once such a notification has  been issued, indisputably, those who are not otherwise entitled to resort to  veterinary practices within the meaning of the Central Act can be asked to  perform the jobs of minor veterinary services.

61.     A distinction exists between a repeal simpliciter and a repeal by an  Act which is substituted by another Act.

62.     This legal position operating in the field is clear from the proposition  laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar  Singh [(1955) 1 SCR 893] wherein the law has been laid down in the  following terms:

"... Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the  consequences laid down in Section 6 of the  General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the  section itself says, a different intention appears. In  the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any  room for expression of a contrary opinion. But  when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on  the same subject we would undoubtedly have to  look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for  the purpose of determining whether they indicate a  different intention. The line of enquiry would be,  not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old  rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an

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intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore  subscribe to the broad proposition that Section 6 of  the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is  repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh  legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such  cases also unless the new legislation manifests an  intention incompatible with or contrary to the  provisions of the section. Such incompatibility  would have to be ascertained from a consideration  of all the relevant provisions of the new law and  the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not  material. It is in the light of these principles that  we now proceed to examine the facts of the present  case."   63.     In Gammon India Ltd. v. Special Chief Secretary and Others [(2006)  3 SCC 354], this Court held:

"73. On critical analysis and scrutiny of all  relevant cases and opinions of learned authors, the  conclusion becomes inescapable that whenever  there is a repeal of an enactment and simultaneous  re-enactment, the re-enactment is to be considered  as reaffirmation of the old law and provisions of  the repealed Act which are thus re-enacted  continue in force uninterruptedly unless the re- enacted enactment manifests an intention  incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of  the repealed Act. Such incompatibility will have to  be ascertained from a consideration of the relevant  provisions of the re-enacted enactment and the  mere absence of the saving clause is, by itself, not  material for consideration of all the relevant  provisions of the new enactment. In other words, a  clear legislative intention of the re-enacted  enactment has to be inferred and gathered whether  it intended to preserve all the rights and liabilities  of a repealed statute intact or modify or to  obliterate them altogether. 74. On the touchstone of the principles of law  culled out from the judgments of various courts  applied to the facts of these cases lead to a definite  conclusion that the Assistant Commissioner  (Commercial Taxes), Warangal Division was fully  justified in initiating and completing the  proceedings under the A.P. GST Act even after it  is repealed."   64.     Yet again in India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer,  Bhavanipore and Others [(1975) 3 SCC 512], this Court held:

"16. It is now well-settled that repeal connotes  abrogation or obliteration of one statute by  another, from the statute book as completely as if it  had never been passed; when an Act is repealed, it  must be considered (except as to transactions past  and closed) as if it had never existed. (Per Tindal,  C.J., in Kay v. Goodwin and Lord Tenterdon in  Surtees v. Ellison cited with approval in State of  Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co.). 17. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but one of  substance, depending upon the intention of the  legislature. If the intention indicated expressly or  by necessary implication in the subsequent statute  was to abrogate or wipe off the former enactment,

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wholly or in part, then it would be a case of total or  pro tanto repeal. If the intention was merely to  modify the former enactment by engrafting an  exception or granting an exemption, or by super- adding conditions, or by restricting, intercepting or  suspending its operation, such modification would  not amount to a repeal (see Craies on Statute Law,  7th Edn. pp. 349, 353, 373, 374 and 375; Maxwells  Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. pp. 164, 390  based on Mount v. Taylor; Southerlands Statutory  Construction 3rd Edn. Vol. I, para 2014 and 2022,  pp. 468 and 490). Broadly speaking, the principal  object of a repealing and amending Act is to excise  dead matter, prune off superfluities and reject  clearly inconsistent enactments see Mohinder  Singh v. Harbhajan Kaur."   65.     The legal position as to where there is a repeal of an enactment and  simultaneously re-enactment whether the re-enacted enactment manifests an  intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the repeal statute  has to be ascertained upon consideration of all the relevant provisions of the  re-enacted enactment.  This is no longer res integra.   

66.     Mr. Nariman, however, would submit that in terms of Section 6(1)(c)  of the General Clauses Act which corresponds to Section 17(1)(c) of the  English Interpretation Act, 1978 not only a vested or accrued right but also  an inchoate right is protected.  Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed  on a decision of the Court of Appeal on Chief Adjudication Officer and  another v. Maguire [1999 (2) ALL ER 859], where it is stated:

"The relevant overpayment there had been made before  the legislation changed but the fact of such  overpayment was not discovered until afterwards. The  Secretary of State sought to contend that s.53 was  retrospective. In holding not, the House of Lords  decided rather that s.119 could still be operated to effect  recovery (albeit with greater difficulty for the Secretary  of State) in respect of pre-repeal overpayments. Having  cited s.16(1)(c) (of Interpretation Act 1978.) Lord  Woolf said this:  "Inchoate rights and obligations and liabilities are  covered by (c). This was established by Free Lanka  Insurance Co Ltd v Ranasinghe [1964] AC 541. In that  case the Privy Council had no difficulty in construing  the Ceylon Interpretation Ordinance 1900 as including  an inchoate or contingent right and the same approach  should be adopted to the interpretation of ’right,’  ’obligation,’ or ’liability’ in s.16 of the Act of 1978.  The section clearly contemplates that there will be  situations where an investigation, legal proceeding or  remedy may have to be instituted before the right or  liability can be enforced and this supports this  approach."  

67.    Whether such a right is protected or not must be considered having  regard to the statute in question.  If a right has crystallized before the  repealing Act comes into force, by reason of repeal of the earlier statute  indisputably the right crystallized cannot be taken away.

68.    Section 17(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1978 provided that where an  Act repeals a previous enactment and substitutes new provisions for the  enactment repealed, the repealed enactment remains in force until the  substituted provisions come into force.

69.     We are not beset with such a situation in the instant case.  The right of

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the petitioners to practise in the field of veterinary practice has expressly  been taken away.  When such a right has been taken away upon laying down  an essential qualification therefor which the petitioners admittedly do not  possess, the right of the petitioners to continue to practice despite the fact  that they do not fulfill the criteria laid down under the Parliamentary Act or  the Central Act would not survive.

70.     The expression "unless a different intention appears" contained in  Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, thus, in this case, would be clearly  attracted.  A right whether inchoate or accrued or acquired right can be held  to be protected provided the right survives.  If the right itself does not  survive and either expressly or by necessary implication it stands abrogated,  the question of applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would  not arese at all.  [See Bansidhar and Others v. State of Rajasthan, (1989) 2  SCC 557 and Thyssen Stahlunion Gmbh v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.,  (1999) 9 SCC 334] 71.     For the reasons aforementioned, we respectfully agree with the view  taken by the High Court. 72.     The submission of Mr. Lalit that Parliament while enacting other laws  laying down the qualifications for practice in some other profession allowed  the practitioners with lesser qualification to continue is not of much  consequence.  Parliament in its wisdom while enacting some other statutes  might have done so.  But it may be that in a case of this nature where with  the passage of time new diseases have been discovered and new techniques  and tools are to be put in place for treating the animals (even wild animals),  a higher qualification laid down for combating the current problem cannot  per se be held to be unreasonable only because persons with lesser  qualifications are not allowed to continue to practice or enter into the  services of the government or semi-government organizations.

73.     A faint submission has been made that whereas Section 19 of the 1953  Act or Section 23 of the 1971 Act provided for a mandatory obligation on  the part of the practitioners to get themselves registered so as to enable them  to obtain appointment in the services of the State or other local authorities or  public corporations, no such restriction was prescribed for general medical  practitioners.   

74.     On the first flush, the submission appears to be attractive.  The  liability of a person to get himself registered on the State register, in our  opinion, is imperative so as to enable the State to control the profession as  such.  We have seen hereinbefore that the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and  Panchayat Samities Act, 1961 confers the responsibility of providing  veterinary services on the Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samities.  Nothing  has been shown to us that any person could start practice in veterinary  services without getting himself registered.  Hence, in our opinion, the  answer to the said question appears to be in the negative inasmuch as a  legislative act must be read with the regulations framed.  A subordinate  legislation, as is well known, when validly framed, becomes a part of the  Act.   

75.     Regulation 3 provides for the mode and manner in which registration  of a medical practitioner has to be carried out.  The 1973 Act was enacted  for registration of veterinary practitioners.  Section 23 must be read in that  context.  The Act also does not provide for carrying on any profession as  such.  It is difficult to assume that practice in veterinary service would be  wholly unregulated despite the preamble of the Act.   

76.     Regulation 3 encompasses within its fold both the categories, viz.,  practitioners as also the employees.

77.     The necessity to maintain a register cannot be minimized unless the  name of a person is placed on the register.  It may not be possible for the  State or even the Veterinary Council to keep a watch on the performance of  the said persons and in particular when a complaint is made against him.   Only when a person’s name is placed on the register, the question of striking

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off his name therefrom in the event of commission of a professional or other  misconduct would arise.  A person who is in service, in the event of his  committing any misconduct, may also be held to be subject to disciplinary  action.

78.     For the aforementioned purpose, we are of the opinion that the statute  being vague, a purposive construction thereto must be given.

79.     In Francis Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation, purposive construction  has been described in the following manner:

"A purposive construction of an enactment is one which  gives effect to the legislative purpose by\027 (a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where  that meaning is in accordance with the legislative  purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal  construction), or (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal  meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose  (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained  construction)."

       [See also Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay  Environmental Action Group and Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 434 and National  Insurance Co. Ltd.  v. Laxmi Narain Dhut, 2007 (4) SCALE 36]

80.     We cannot also accept the submission of Mr. Nariman that, as for  certain reasons with which we are not at present concerned, a large number  of certificate holders could not file application for getting themselves  registered, they have derived an accrued right to have their names entered in  the register.  For the purpose of registration, the conditions laid down under  Regulation 3 were to be fulfilled.  A person, thus, is not entitled to be  registered by the State Council or the Central Council only because he holds  an educational qualification.  Several other factors are required to be taken  into consideration therefor.  The right to practice or right to be in service or  right to obtain an appointment in government or semi-government  organization would, thus, be dependant upon a person’s name being  registered therefor in the State or Central register, as the case may be.  So  long their names are not on the register, the question of their acquiring any  vested or accrued right does not arise.  In a case of this nature, the court  cannot confer a right to practice on the certificate holders despite the fact  that their names do not find place in the register maintained by the State  Council or the Central Council.

81.     Despite our aforementioned findings, we are of the opinion that those  who are in service of the State or the semi-government or local self  government organizations must be held to have a right to continue in service.   The employees of the State enjoy a status.  A person who enjoys a status can  be deprived therefrom only in accordance with law having regard to the  nature of right conferred on him under Article 311 of the Constitution of  India.  The law in this behalf, in our opinion, is clear.  Their nature of duty  may change but they would be otherwise entitled to continue in service.  The  State of Maharashtra or for that matter even the other States have issued  notification (s) in terms of clause (b) of Section 30 of the Central Act.   Minor veterinary services, therefore, having been specified in terms of the  said notification, those certificate holders who are in the services of the State  or the other semi-government organizations are entitled to continue in  service, subject of course to, carrying out their duties strictly in terms of the  notification issued by the State under clause (b) of Section 30 of the Central  Act.  In the event, any State has not issued such a notification, they may do  so.

82.     For the reasons aforementioned, the writ petition and the civil appeal  are dismissed, subject to the aforementioned observations and directions.   No costs.