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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6602-6603 of 2001

PETITIONER: Udai Raj Singh & Ors

RESPONDENT: Hari Ram & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/04/2008

BENCH: Arijit Pasayat & P.Sathasivam & Aftab Alam

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T NON-REPORTABLE

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.6602-6603 OF 2001

AFTAB ALAM,J.

1.      These two appeals, one against the judgment of the Allahabad  High Court in the main Writ Petition (Civil Misc.Writ Petition  No.4413/78) and the other against the order in the Review Petition  (Civil Misc.Review Petition No.6816 of 1998) filed by the appellants  arise from the proceedings under the U.P.Consolidation of Holdings  Act.  The subject-matter of the dispute are three plots bearing  Nos.641, 642 and 803 situate at village Barhat, Pargana Shakiabad,  District Ghazipur.  The contest over the disputed land had begun  between Kedar and Badri sons of Sarju Ram and Ghurahu  respectively on the one side and Baij Nath son of Daroga Singh and  others on the other.  In course of the proceedings the original  contestants died and the litigation was carried on by their respective  heirs and legal representatives.  The appellants before this Court are  the sons of Daroga Singh and Baij Nath and the respondents are the  sons of Kedar, Badri and Rupu. 2.      In the basic year the disputed land was undeniably recorded in  the names of Sarju and Ghurahu i.e. predecessors-in-interest of the  respondents.  The village where the land is situated was brought under  consolidation operations by notification, dated October 2, 1956.  In  the consolidation proceedings the Assistant Consolidation Officer by  his order dated June 7, 1959, found Baij Nath and others in possession  of the disputed land.  He held them as Sirdars and directed for  entering their names in respect of the disputed plots.   No appeal was  filed against the order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer  and the matter was allowed to rest at that stage.  Later on, Kedar and  Badri filed an objection under Section 12 of the Act claiming that they  were the bhumidars, in possession of the disputed plots and the names  of Daroga Singh and others were wrongly recorded in respect of those  plots in the revenue records.  The Consolidation Officer found that the  dispute involved the question of title and by his order, dated October  3, 1961 referred the matter to the Civil Judge.  The Civil Judge by his  order, dated October 5, 1962 referred the matter for arbitration.  The  Arbitrator by his Award, dated August 12, 1964 held that Badri  Ghurahu and others were the bhumidars of the disputed land and  further found that Baij Nath and others were not the Sirdars of the  plots in dispute.  The Civil Judge confirmed the Award by order,  dated January 8, 1965.  Against the order of the Civil Judge, Baij Nath  and others filed a revision before the High Court and the High Court  remanded the matter to the Consolidation Officer for deciding the  question of Sirdari rights claimed by them. 3.      The Consolidation Officer framed issues in light of the remand  order and on a consideration of the materials produced by the two

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sides passed the order, dated April 13, 1973 holding that Baij Nath  was Sirdar of the plots in dispute and the entry of his name should be  maintained.  He gave directions accordingly.  Against the order passed  by the Consolidation Officer the side of Kedar and Badri took the  matter in appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation,  Ghazipur.  The Settlement Officer by order, dated December 1, 1973  allowed the appeal and reversed the finding of the Consolidation  Officer.  The order of the Settlement Officer was based mainly on the  revenue records.  Against the Appellate order the side of Baij Nath  filed a revision before the Deputy Consolidation Officer, Ghazipur.  In  the revision one of the grounds raised by them was that earlier the  other side had filed Suit No.658 of 1955 seeking a decree of  permanent injunction against the defendants (the side of Baij Nath)  in  regard to the disputed plots.  The suit was dismissed by the Civil  Court and hence, it was no longer open to the other side to question or  challenge their possession of the disputed land. 4.      The revisional authority did not consider the aforesaid point  raised by the appellants or for that matter any other points raised on  their behalf and disposed of the revision in a somewhat curious  manner.  It noted the facts of the case and the points urged on behalf  of the two sides and then abruptly gave the operative direction under  the heading ’order’.  There is no indication in the order why the  revisional authority deemed fit to uphold the appellate order or why  he accepted the case of Kedar and Badri in preference to the pleas  raised by the side of Baij Nath.  On a plain reading the revisional  order appears to us to be quite unsustainable.  The appellants then  took the matter to the High Court.  But before the High Court too the  writ petition was dismissed without any proper consideration of the  pleas raised on their behalf.  The High Court simply referred to some  of the observations made by the Settlement Officer and dismissed the  writ petition.  In review, the point with regard to the earlier suit, being  title Suit No.658 of 1955 was specifically pressed but the High Court  brushed it aside by observing that since the suit was dismissed for  default there was no decision on merits deciding the rights of the  parties.   5.      We are afraid, that can hardly be accepted as a proper  consideration of the consequences of the dismissal of the suit between  the same parties in regard to the disputed land.   6.      On hearing counsel for the appellant and on going through the  materials on record, including the orders coming under challenge we  are satisfied that the revisional order and the two orders passed by the  High Court are unsustainable in law.  We, accordingly, set aside the  order dated February 10, 1978 passed by the ADM/Deputy  Consolidation Officer, Ghazipur in Revision No.16 as well as the  orders of the High Court, dated November 25, 1997 in Civil  Misc.Writ Petition No.4413 of 1978 and the other, dated August 6,  1998 in Civil Misc.Review Petition No.6816 of 1998 and rem1it the  matter to the revisional authority.   7.      As the matter has become very old it is expected that the  revisional authority will finally dispose of the matter after hearing  both the sides in accordance with law within four months from the  date of the receipt of the order. 8.      In the result the appeals are allowed but with no order as to  costs.