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PETITIONER: UDAI CHAND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHANKER LAL & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/02/1978

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  765            1978 SCR  (2) 809  1978 SCC  (2) 209

ACT: Special  leave,  revocation of under rule 6 of  Order  XLVII read  with  rule  10 of Order XVI  of  Supreme  Court  Rules 1966--Special  leave obtained by misrepresentation of  facts should be revoked--Constitution of India Article 136.

HEADNOTE: The  respondents  are  the  legal  representatives  of   one Surajmal,  who had purchased suit shop by a registered  sale deed   dated  17-5-1965,  from  one  Bhurdas  to  whom   the petitioner  had  executed  two rent  notes,  Exhibit  8  and Exhibit 10, specifically mentioning the name of Bhurdas,  as the  owner of the shop. The petitioner was notified  of  the said sale deed by a registered letter dated 25-6-1965  which was  received by him on 29-6-1965.  Surajmal terminated  the tenancy  of  the petitioner by a registered notice  in  July 1965, coupled with the demand for arrears of rent.  Upon the failure to comply with the notice to quit, a suit was  filed against   the  petitioner  on  23-11-65.    The   petitioner contested the suit denying the execution of any rent note in favour  of  Bhurdas and pleaded having taken the  shop  from another individual, Mahant Ram Ratan Das.  In the course  of litigation, the petitioner prayed for an issue to be  framed on  the question whether there was legal necessity  for  the transfer  in favour of the plaintiff by Bhurdas,  which  was refused.  In revision against the said interlocutory  order, the High Court refused to interfere taking the view that the petitioner  was  estopped  from  questioning  the  title  of Bhurdas as his landlord by reason of the principle laid down in Section 116 of the Evidence Act. Ultimately,  upon the decree of eviction by the trial  Court and  affirmed by the First Appellate Court,  the  defendant- petitioner  again challenged the view that he  was  estopped from  questioning  the title of Bhurdas, by  way  of  second appeal before the High Court.  The High Court dismissed  the appeal   quoting  a  recital  in  Exhibit  10  wherein   the petitioner has admitted the ownership of the shop by Bhurdas to whom he would pay rent.  The petitioner thereafter  filed special leave petition and obtained ex-parte ad-interim stay of eviction by alleging in Ground No. 7 that the rent  note, Exhibit  10, no where stated that Bhurdas was the  owner  of

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the shop and, therefore, there was no proper appreciation of the said Exhibit. The  respondent filed an application for revocation  of  the special  leave  petition.  Revoking the  special  leave  and dismissing it the Court. HELD  : In dealing with application for special  leave,  the Court  naturally  takes statements of facts and  grounds  of fact  contained in the petitions at their face value and  it would  be  unfair to betray the confidence of the  Court  by making statements, which are untrue and misleading.  Supreme Court  cannot permit abuse of the process of law and of  law courts. [812 BC] Hari  Narain  v.  Badri  Das, [1964] 2 SCR  203  @  209  and Rajabhal  Abdul  Rehman Munshi v. Vasudev  Dhanjibhai  Mody, [1964] 3 SCR 481 @ 488 & 493 followed and reiterated The King v. Williams & Ors. [1914] 1 K. B. 608, The King  v. The  General Commissioners" for the Purposes of  the  Income Tax  Acts for the District of Kensington’ [1917] 1 K B.  486 and  Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram ; Ors.  AIR  1951 All 746 referred to. Observation: Supreme Court cannot mitigate possible rigours of any law by permitting  defaulting  tenants to hold up  their  evictions indefinitely  or for inordinately long periods on flimsy  or unsustainable grounds. [813 B-C] 810

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Miscellaneous  Petition No. 8783 of 1977. (Application for additional grounds etc.) In the matter of :- Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2478 of 1977 From the Judgment and Order dated 3-5-1977 of the  Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Civil 2nd Appeal No. 403 of 1975. Badridas Sharma and S. R. Srivastava for the Petitioner. Dr.   L. M. Singhvi, S. M. Jain, Dalveer Bhandari and S.  K. Jain for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG,  C.J. The plaintiff landlord had purchased a shop by  a sale  deed  dated 17th May, 1965, and  then  terminated  the tenancy  of the defendant-petitioner by a registered  notice in  July, 1965, coupled with a demand for arrears  of  rent. Upon  the failure of defendant to comply with the notice  to quit  a suit was filed against the  defendant-petitioner  on 23rd  November, 1965.  During the pendency of that suit  the Rajasthan  Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act,  1950, was  made  applicable by a notification  dated  30th  March, 1967, to Rajgarh town where, the shop is situated. The defendant petitioner had denied having executed any rent note  in favour of Bhurdas, the  predecessor-in-interest  of the  plaintiff landlord who had also notified the  defendant petitioner  of  the  sale in favour of the  plaintiff  by  a registered  notice  dated 25th June, 1965, received  by  the defendant  petitioner  on 29th June,  1965.   The  defendant petitioner  pleaded  having  taken  the  shop  from  another individual.  Mahant Ram Ratan Das. In  the course of litigation, the  defendant-petitioner  had asked  for  an issue to be framed on the,  question  whether there was legal necessity for the transfer in favour of  the plaintiff.   In  other  words, he had  questioned,  at  that stage,  the legality of transfer in favour of the  plaintiff on  the  ground  of.  want  of  title  in  the   plaintiff’s

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predecessor-in-interest and also on the ground that the sale deed  was  invalid.   The  High Court  had,  however,  on  a revision  application preferred by the  defendant-petitioner rejected the demand of the tenant for framing of an issue on the  question  whether  there was legal  necessity  for  the transaction.  The ground for this rejection was that, as the defendant petitioner had obtained possession under a tenancy from  Bhurdas,  the predecessor-in-interest of  the  present landlord, Surajmal, the defendant petitioner Udai Chand, was estopped  from  questioning  the title of  his  landlord  by reason  of  the principle laid down in Section  116  of  the Evidence Act. Ultimately,  upon  the decree for eviction,  the  defendant- petitioner  had  again  challenged  the  view  that  he  Was estopped  from  questioning the title of Bhurdas.   On  this question  the learned judge who heard the second  appeal  in the High Court observed 811               "I  would  like  to  mention  here  that   the               learned-  Counsel  for the appellant  did  not               challenge the correctness of the finding  that               the rent notes Ex. 8 and Ex.  10 were executed               by  the defendant in favour of  Bhurdas.   The               learned Counsel for the appellant also did not               challenge  the  genuineness of the  sale  deed               dated  May  17, 1965 executed  by  Bhurdas  in               favour of Surajmal". The  High Court then quoted the recitals of Ex.  10  showing that  the defendant had admitted that the shop was owned  by Bhurdas   to  whom  he  would  pay  rent.   The   defendant- petitioner’s second appeal was, therefore, dismissed by  the High Court. The defendant-petitioner then filed a special leave petition in  this  Court  under Article 136.  Ground  No.  7  of  the grounds of special leave petition was :               "That   the   Hon’ble   Court   should    have               appreciated that the rent note Ext. 10 nowhere               states  that  Bhoordas was the  owner  of  the               house  and hence the inference of the  Hon’ble               Judge  that the petitioner had  admitted  that               Bhoordas  was  the owner of the shop,  is  not               correct  and hence the judgment  under  appeal               deserves to be set aside". On  17th  May,  1977, the  learned  Vacation  Judge  granted special  leave to appeal to this Court and also an  ex-parte order staying dispossession pending disposal of a notice  of motion. The respondent’s application for revocation of special leave to  appeal is now before us.  The respondents have  filed  a true  copy of the rent deed Ex. 10.  A perusal of  it  shows that there was a specific mention of Bhurdas as the owner of the  shop  in dispute which, the  defendant  petitioner  had taken  on rent.  Hence, there could be no getting away  from the  fact that the defendant petitioner had made  a  clearly false   and  misleading  assertion  in  his  special   leave petition.   We  fail  to  see  what  point  other  than  the applicability  of  Section  116 of the  Evidence  Act  could possibly arise in the case.  The whole case was concluded by findings of fact.  Nevertheless, the special leave  petition was  granted in this Court.  We think that the  only  reason why  such  leave  could have been granted was  that  it  was misrepresented to the Court that the rent note in favour  of Bhurdas  did  not contain an admission of the  ownership  of Bhurdas.   This was certainly a misstatement of  a  material fact which was of decisive importance in the case.  In fact,

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it  was a serious misrepresentation on the only point  which could possibly arise in the case. We  have  heard  learned counsel for  both  sides.   Learned Counsel for the, defendant petitioner is unable to give  any explanation for the false assertion in ground No. VII of his special  leave petition except that the learned Counsel  had himself misunderstood the ’document, because of other facts, in   the  case.   We  are  unable  to  accept  this   flimsy explanation  as  a sufficient justification  for  the  false assertion. 812 Reference   was  made  by  the  learned  Counsel   for   the respondents to The King v. Williams & Ors.(1), and The  King v. The General Commissioners for the Purposes of the  Income Tax Acts for the District of Kensington (2)  which are cases of  misleading assertions by petitioners made in  affidavits to  support  grounds  for writ  petitions.   He  also  cited Asiatic  Engineering  Co.  v.  A chru Ram  &  Ors.  (3),  on principles governing refusal of relief on writ petitions due to misrepresentation or suppression of material facts.  More relevant   is   :   Hari  Narain   v.   Badri   Day(4),where Gajendragadkar,  J.,  speaking for this Court  said  (at  p. 209):               "In  dealing  with  applications  for  special               leave,  the  Court naturally takes  statements                             of  fact and grounds of fact contained  in  th e               petitions at their face value and it would  be               unfair  to betray the confidence of the  Court               by  making  statements which  are  untrue  and               misleading,’. In that case, this Court revoked the grant of special  leave despite  the  fact  that Mr. Setalvad, who  had  argued  the special leave petition at the time of its grant, had  stated that,  so far as he recollected, the special leave  was  not granted  on  the ground on which  misrepresentation  by  his client had taken place. The last mentioned case was cited with approval in  Rajabhai Abdul  Rehman  Munshi v. Vasudev Dhanjibhai  Mody(5),  where Sarkar and Shah.JJ. pointed out (at p. 488) :               "Exercise  of  the jurisdiction of  the  Court               under   Art.  136  of  the   Constitution   is               discretionary,  it is exercised sparingly  and               in  exceptional  cases,  when  a   substantial               question of law fans to be determined or where               it  appears to the Court that interference  by               this  Court  is necessary  to  remedy  serious               injustice.  A party who approaches this  Court               invoking  the  exercise  of  this   overriding               discretion  of the Court must come with  clean               hands.   If  there  appears on  his  part  any               attempt  to overreach or mislead the Court  by               false  or untrue statements or by  withholding               true information which would have a bearing on               the  question of exercise of  the  discretion,               ’the  Court would be justified in refusing  to               exercise the discretion( or if the  discretion               has  been exercised in revoking the  leave  to               appeal granted even at the time of hearing  of               the appeal". And, Hidayatullah J., said (at p. 493-494) there               "The  powers exercisable by this  Court  under               Art.  136 of the Constitution are not  in  the               nature of a general appeal.  They enable  this               Court   to   interfere  in  cases   where   an

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             irreparable (1)   [1914] 1 K.B. 608. (2)  [1917] 1 K.B. 486. (3)  A.I.R. 1951 All 746 (4)  [1964] 2 S.C.R.203 at 209. (5)  [1964] 3 S.C.R. 481 at 488 and 493. 813               injury   has  been  caused  by  reason  of   a               miscarriage of justice due to a gross  neglect               of law or procedure or otherwise and there  is               no  other  adequate remedy.   The  article  is               hardly  meant  to afford relief in a  case  of                             this  type where a party is in default of  ren t               because  he withdrew a deposit lying in  court               but who cannot, on the record of the case,  be               shown  to have withdrawn the amount.   If  the               petition  had mentioned that the  decision  of               the  appeal court had proceeded on the  ground               that the amount was taken out, it is difficult               to  imagine that this Court would  have  given               special   leave  to  decide  a   question   of               discretion". We  are  constrained to observe that the  tendency  to  file appeals  in  hopeless cases only to gain time and  ward  off eviction  has  assumed  alarming  proportions.   We   cannot mitigate   possible  rigours  of  any  law   by   permitting defaulting  tenants to hold up their evictions  indefinitely or for inordinately long periods on flimsy or  unsustainable grounds.  We cannot permit abuses of the process of law  and of law Courts. Accordingly,  we  allow this application for  revocation  of special  leave.  We hereby revoke the special leave  granted and  reject the special leave petition.  We also vacate  the stay granted.  The application for urging additional grounds is  rejected.   The plaintiff-respondent  will  get  special costs. S.R.                                Petition allowed. 814