06 May 2009
Supreme Court
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U.SUVETHA Vs STATE BY INSP.OF POLICE

Case number: Crl.A. No.-000938-000938 / 2009
Diary number: 27748 / 2008
Advocates: PRAMOD DAYAL Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  938      OF 2009 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.7163 of 2008)

U. Suvetha  …. Appellant

Versus

State by Inspector of Police and another …. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Whether  the  term  “relative  of  husband  of  a  woman”  within  the  

meaning  of  Section  498A of  the  Indian  Penal  Code should  be  given  an  

extended meaning is the question involved herein.

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3. Respondent  No.2  was married  to  one  Tutus  Gunaraj  on  18th May,  

2005.  Allegedly, he had some connection with the appellant.  On coming to  

know about the same the first informant asked her husband thereabout.  She  

was  allegedly  ill  treated.   She  was  left  by  her  husband  to  live  with  her  

mother-in-law  at  Cuddalore  while  he  went  to  his  place  of  work  at  

Sivagangai.   

4. Allegedly dowry demands were again made, the details whereof are  

not necessary to be noticed.  However, we may notice that portion of the  

allegations made in the first information report,  which is relevant for our  

purpose.  It reads as under :-  

“Even though properly advised my husband he has  not  cut  the  illegal  relationship  with  the  said  Swetha.  If I talk about her, my husband beat me  and tortured me.  My mother-in-law also abetting  him.  If my husband received the salary, he gave  the same with his aunt  Thangam, then whenever  required, at that time he get the money from her  for his expenses.  Even though my mother-in-law  has known very well about the illegal intimacy of  the husband with Swetha wantonly given married  me with him.  The address of the said lover Swetha  is  D/o.  Venka  Takrishnan,  No.167,  Majestic  Colony  Valasaravakkam,  Alwarthirunagar,  Chennai-50,  for  not  paying  the  money  and  jewellery  my  husband  of  my  mother-in-law  compelled me to get divorce and tortured me.  I am  tolerating all these hardships.  In the deepavali of  the year 2006 my husband told me that he is going  to his native and left me with my parents’ house.  

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Hence my father send/issued a legal notice to my  husband  and  my  mother-in-law  on  13.11.2006,  then even though conciliation talks made, but the  said conciliation failed on 12.1.07.  My husband  filed petition for divorce.  Hence I request you to  take  immediate  action  on  my complaint  and get  back  my  dress  and  my  TV  Scooty  NoTN05  C  4971.   My  husband  and  my  mother-in-law  concealed  the  true  facts  and  married  me  and  spoiled my life.  Hence, I also request you to take  action against  them and file  a  case against  them  and  get  punished  them in  accordance  with  law.  My husband  and  mother-in-law  tortured  and  ill- treated  me  by  demanding  dowry.   They  have  scolded me with untoward and untolerable words  and beat  me so many times and treated me very  badly.  Hence, I pray to take action in accordance  with  law  against  them  and  punish  them.   My  husband’s  aunt  Tmt.  Thangam,  her  son-in-law  Utha, and his concubine Swetha all  are inducing  my husband and my mother-in-law to ill treat me  and  tortured  me.   Hence  I  request  you  to  take  action  against  those  persons  and punish  them in  accordance in law after filing a case.”  

5. Inter alia on the premise that the allegation made against the appellant  

in  the  first  information  report,  even  if  it  be  given  face  value,  does  not  

disclose  an  offence  under  Section  498A  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  an  

application for discharge was filed by her.  The same was dismissed on 25th  

March, 2008.  A revision application filed thereagaisnt has been dismissed  

by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment dated 1st August,  

2008.   

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6. In the first information report except at one place the appellant has  

been described by the first informant as ‘girl friend’ of her husband and only  

at the end the word ‘concubine’ has been used.   

The core question which arises for consideration is as to whether the  

‘girl friend’ would be a ‘relative of husband of a woman’ in terms of Section  

498A of the Indian Penal Code.  

Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:-

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman  subjecting her to cruelty.

Whoever,  being the husband or the relative of the  husband  of  a  woman,  subjects  such  woman  to  cruelty shall  be punished with imprisonment  for a  term which may extend to three years and shall also  be liable to fine.

Explanation-For  the  purpose  of  this  section,  "cruelty" means-

(a)  Any willful conduct which is of such a nature  as  is  likely  to  drive  the  woman  to  commit  suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to  life,  limb  or  health  whether  mental  or  physical) of the woman; or

(b) Harassment  of  the  woman  where  such  harassment is with a view to coercing her or  any person related to her to meet any unlawful  demand for any property or valuable security  or  is  on  account  of  failure  by  her  or  any  person related to her meet such demand.”

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7. The aforementioned provision was inserted in the Indian Penal Code  

by reason of The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No.45  

of 1983). The statement of objects and reasons thereof reads as under :-  

“The  increasing  number  of  Dowry  Deaths  is  a  matter of serious concern.  The extent of the evil  has been commented upon by the Joint Committee  of the Houses to examine the working of Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961.   Cases  of  cruelty  by  the  husband  and  the  relatives  of  the  husband  which  culminate in suicide by, or murder of, the hapless  woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction  of the cases involving such cruelty. It is therefore  proposed  to  amend  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and  the  Indian  Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only  with  cases  of  Dowry  Death  but  also  cases  of  cruelty to married woman by their in laws.”

8. The High Court opined that the word ‘paramour’ and the ‘concubine’  

stand on the same footing.  In arriving at the said opinion, it agreed with the  

decision  of  a  Division  Bench  of  Andhra  Pradesh  High  in  Vungarala  

Yedukondalu  v.  State of Andhra Pradesh, [  1988 CRI.  L.j.  1538 ] and  

differed with the decision of the Bombay High Court, to opine :-

“The term “relative” has not been defined in Indian  Penal  Code  and  in  the  absence  of  any  such  definition,  we  have  to  go  by  the  precedents.  Assuming  that  the  allegations  made  against  the  

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petitioner viz., that she is the concubine of A1 is  true,  then,  it  is  to  be  held  that  there  is  a  living  relationship between the petitioner and A1 in the  case and there are specific allegations to the fact  that  only  at  the  instigation  of  the  revision  petitioner, A1 is harassing the second respondent  and as such this Court is of the considered view  that a charge under Section 498-A of IPC among  other offence has also been rightly framed against  the revision petitioner.”  

9. Ingredients of 498A of the Indian Penal Code are :-

a). The woman must be married

b) She  must  be subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment;  and  

c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown  either by husband of the woman or by the relative  of her husband.”

10. Appellant herein had not been charged for abetment of a crime.  Any  

conspiracy  amongst  the  accused  persons  has  also  not  been  alleged.   A  

woman  in  terms  of  the  aforementioned  provision  must  be  subjected  to  

cruelty by her husband and/or his relative.  The word ‘cruelty’ has also been  

defined in the explanation appended thereto.  It is in two parts.  Clause (a) of  

the said explanation refers to a conduct which is likely to drive the woman to  

commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health  

(whether  mental  or  physical);  clause  (b)  provides  for  harassment  of  the  

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woman, where such harassment, is with a view to coercing her or any person  

related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable  

security.   

It is not the case of the first informant that the appellant had any role  

to play with regard to demand of dowry.   

11. The  word  ‘cruelty”  having  been  defined  in  terms  of  the  aforesaid  

explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto.  Living with another  

woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose  

of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion,  

would not attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.   

An offence in terms of the said provision is committed by the persons  

specified therein.  They have to be the ‘husband’ or his ‘relative”.  Either the  

husband of the woman or his relative must be subjected to her to cruelty  

within the aforementioned provision.   

If  the  appellant  had  not  been  instigating  the  husband  of  the  first  

informant to torture her, as has been noticed by the High Court, the husband  

would be committing some offence punishable under the other provisions of  

the Indian Penal  Code and appellant  may be held guilty  for abetment of  

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commission of such an offence but not an offence under Section 498A of the  

Indian Penal Code.   

12. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term ‘relative’ must be  

assigned a meaning as is commonly understood.  Ordinarily it would include  

father, mother, husband  or wife, son, daughter,  brother, sister, nephew or  

niece,  grandson or  grand-daughter  of  an individual  or  the  spouse  of  any  

person.  The meaning of the word ‘relative’ would depend upon the nature  

of the statute.  It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or  

adoption.   

The  word  ‘relative’  has  been  defined  in  P.  Ramanatha  Aiyar  

Advanced Law Lexicon – Volume 4, 3rd Edition as under :-

“Relative,  “RELATIVE”  includes  any  person  related  by  blood,  marriage  or  adoption.  [Lunacy  Act ].

The  expression  “REALTIVE”  means  a  husband  wife, ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister.  [Estate Duty Act].

“RELATIVE” means in relation to the deceased,

a) the wife or husband of the deceased; b) the  father,  mother,  children,  uncles  and  

aunts of the deceased, and c) any issue of any person falling, within either  

of  the preceding sub-clauses  and the other  party to a marriage with any such person or  issue [Estate Duty Act].  

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A  person  shall  be  deemed  to  be  a  relative  of  another if, and only if, -

a) they are the members of a Hindu undivided  family, or

b) they are husband and wife; or   c) the one is related to the other in the manner  

indicated in Schedule I-A [Companies Act,  1956].

“RELATIVE” in relation to an individual means –

a) The mother, father, husband or wife of the  individual, or

b) a  son,  daughter,  brother,  sister,  nephew or  niece of the individual, or

c) a  grandson  or  grand-daughter  of  the  individual, or  

d) the spouse of any person referred to in sub- clause (b) [Income tax Act].  

“REALTIVE” means –  

1) spouse of the person ; 2) brother or sister of the person ;  3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person; 4) any  lineal  ascendant  or  descendant  of  the  

person; 5) any  lineal  ascendant  or  descendant  of  the  

spouse of the person;  [Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act]."

Random  House  Webster’s  Concise  College  Dictionary  defines  

‘relative’ at page 691 to mean :-  

“Relative  n.  1.  a  person  who  is  connected  with  another  or  others  by  blood  or  marriage.2.  something having, or standing in, some relation to  something  else.  3.  something  dependent  upon  external conditions for its specific nature, size, etc.  

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(opposed  to  absolute).   4.   a  relative  pronoun,  adjective, or adverb. – adj. 5. considered in relation  to something else; comparative: the relative merits  of gas and electric heating. 6. existing or having its  specific nature only by  relation to something else;  not absolute or independent: Happiness is relative.  7.  having  relation  or  connection.  8.  having  reference : relevant; pertinent (usually fol. by to):  two  facts  relative  to  the  case.  9.  correspondent;  proportionate: 10. depending for significance upon  something else: “Better” is a relative term. 11.  of  or designating a word that introduces a subordinate  clause  and  refers  to  an  expressed  or  implied  element  of  the  principal  clause:  the  relative  pronoun  who  in  “That  was  the  woman  who  called.” 12.  (of a musical  key) having the same  key signature as another key: a relative minor.”   

13. Further more,   the  provision  is  a  penal  one.  It,  thus,  deserves  strict  

construction.  Ordinarily,  save  and  except  where  a  contextual  meaning  is  

required to be given to a statute, a penal provision is required to be construed  

strictly.   

This  Court  in  T.  Ashok  Pai  v.   Commissioner  of  Income  Tax,  

Bangalore, [ 2007 (8) SCALE 354 ] held as under :-

“19. It is now a well-settled principle of law that  the  more  is  the  stringent  law,  more  strict  construction  thereof  would  be  necessary.  Even  when the burden is required to be discharged by an  assessee,  it  would  not  be  as  heavy  as  the  prosecution.  [See  P.N.  Krishna  Lal  and  Ors.  v.  Govt.  of  Kerala  and  Anr.  1995  Supp  (2)  SCC  187].”

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[See also Noor Aga  v.  State of Punjab, [ 2008 (9) SCALE 681].  

14. A  Three  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court,  however,  in  Shivcharan  Lal  

Verma and another  v.  State of M.P., [2002 (2) Crimes 177 SC = JT (2002)  

2 SC 641] while interpreting Sedction 498A of the Indian Penal Code, in a  

case  where  the  prosecution  alleged that  during the  life  of  the  first  wife-

Kalindi,  appellant  therein  married for  the  second time,  Mohini,  but  after  

marriage both Kalindi and Shiv Charan tortured Mohini as a result thereof,  

she ultimately committed suicide by burning herself, opined :-.     

“..One,  whether  the  prosecution  under  Section  498A  can  at  all  be  attracted  since  the  marriage  with  Mohini  itself  was  null  and  void,  the  same  having  been  performed  during  the  lifetime  of  Kalindi.  Second,  whether  the  conviction  under  Section 306 could at all be sustained in the absence  of  any  positive  material  to  hold  that  Mohini  committed suicide because of any positive act on  the  part  of  either  Shiv Charan or  Kalindi.  There  may be considerable force in the argument of Mr.  Khanduja, learned counsel for the appellant so far  as  conviction  under  Section  498A is  concerned,  inasmuch  as  the  alleged  marriage  with  Mohini  during  the  subsistence  of  valid  marriage  with  Kalindi is null and void. We, therefore, set aside  the conviction and sentence under Section 498A of  the IPC.”

15. A Two Judge Bench of this Court, however, in  Reema Aggarwal v.  

Anupam, [ (2004) 3 SCC 199 ], while construing the expression ’husband’  

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opined that the word should not be given a restricted meaning to include  

those, who had married for the second time strictly in accordance with law,  

stating :-

“…If  such restricted  meaning  is  given,  it  would  not further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it  would  be  against  the  concern  shown  by  the  legislature  for  avoiding  harassment  to  a  woman  over  demand of  money  in  relation  to  marriages.  The first exception to Section 494 has also some  relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy  will not apply to “any person whose marriage with  such husband or wife has been declared void by a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction”.  It  would  be  appropriate to construe the expression “husband”  to  cover  a  person  who  enters  into  marital  relationship  and  under  the  colour  of  such  proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects  the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in  any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated  in the relevant provisions — Sections 304-B/498- A,  whatever  be  the  legitimacy  of  the  marriage  itself  for  the  limited  purpose  of  Sections  498-A  and 304-B IPC. Such an interpretation, known and  recognized as purposive construction has to come  into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a  definition  of  “husband”  to  specifically  include  such  persons  who  contract  marriages  ostensibly  and  cohabit  with  such  woman,  in  the  purported  exercise of their role and status as “husband” is no  ground  to  exclude  them  from  the  purview  of  Section 304-B or 498-A IPC, viewed in the context  of  the  very  object  and  aim  of  the  legislations  introducing those provisions.”

16. It  is  not  necessary to go into the controversy as  to whether  Reena  

Agarwal (supra) was correctly decided or not as we are not faced with such a  

situation  here.   We  would  assume  that  the  term  ‘husband’  would  bring  

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within  its  fold  a  person who is  said  to  have  contracted  a  marriage  with  

another woman and subjected her to cruelty.   

17. Herein, as noticed hereinbefore, relationship of the appellant with the  

husband of the first informant, is said to have been existing from before the  

marriage.  Indisputably they lived separately.  For all intent and purport the  

husband was also living at a separate place.  The purported torture is said to  

have been inflicted by the husband upon the first informant either at her in-

law’s place or at her parents’ place.  There is no allegation that appellant had  

any role to play in that regard.   

18. By no stretch of imagination a girl friend or even a concubine in an  

etymological sense would be a ‘relative’.  The word ‘relative’ brings within  

its purview a status.  Such a status must be conferred either by blood or  

marriage or adoption.  If no marriage has taken place, the question of one  

being relative of another would not arise.

19. We may notice that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rajeti Laxmi v.  

State of Andhra Pradesh, [ 1 (2007) DMC 797 ], held as under :-

“4. The entire  reading of the charge-sheet  and  the statements of L.Ws. 1 to 7, goes to show that it  is nobody’s case of the accused or the prosecution  that A-6 is the relative of husband of L.W. 1. She  

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is  only  concubine  of  A-1  and  having  illicit  intimacy with him.  Therefore, in the absence of  any averment in the charge-sheet or any statement  that she is a relative of A1, I am of the opinion that  the offence under Section 498A, IPC do not attract  to  A-6.   Even  as  per  the  dictionary  meaning  “relative” means a person connected by blood or  marriage  or  ‘a  species’  related  to  another  by  common origin”.   Simply because A-6 is  having  illicit intimacy with A-1, it cannot be said that she  is  a  relative  of  A-1.   Accordingly,  the  Criminal  Petition  is  allowed  quashing  the  proceedings  in  C.C. No.233 of 2004 for the offence under Section  498-A, IPC, against the petitioner,A-6.  Insofar as  the other offences are concerned, it may go on.”

A  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  Bombay  High  Court,  Bench  at  

Aurangabad, in Swapnaja   v.  State of Maharashtra and another  ,   [ Criminal  

Application No.388 of 2008 decided on 21.4.2008 ], opined :-

“….Even  assuming  that  due  to  her  extramarital  relation with husband of the respondent No.2, she  is being ill-treated or subjected to harassment by  her  husband  and  his  relatives,  then  also  it  is  difficult to say that the applicant is accountable to  answer  the  charge  for  offence  punishable  under  Section 498-A of the I.P.C.  For, she is not related  to  husband  of  the  respondent  No.2  nor  can  be  regarded  as  the  person,  who  can  fall  within  explanation  (a)  or  (b)  of  Section  498-A  of  the  I.P.C.”

To the similar effect is the law laid down by the same High Court in  

Ranjana Gopalrao Thorat  v.  State of Maharasthra, [ 2007 CRI.L.J. 3866 ].   

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A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, however, preferred to  

follow  Shivcharan  Lal  Verma  (supra) in  preference  to  Reena  Aggarwal  

(supra) to hold that precedentially the former is binding on the High Court,  

stating :-

“ Therefore  the  decision  in  Shivcharan  Lal  Verma (supra)  will  clearly  take  precedence  over  the  decision  in  Reema  Aggarwal  (supra).   That  being  the  case,  the  arguments  advanced  by  the  learned Counsel for the petitioners would have to  be accepted that the provisions of Section 498-A  IPC  would  not  be  attracted  inasmuch  as  the  marriage  between  Mohit  Gupta  and  Shalini  was  null  and  void  and  Mohit  Gupta  could  not  be  construed  as  a  ‘husband’  for  the  purposes  of  Section 498-A IPC.  Clearly, therefore, the charge  under Section 498-A IPC cannot be framed and the  Metropolitan Magistrate had correctly declined to  frame any charges under Section 498-A IPC.”   

Similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of the same High  

Court in  Capt. Rajinder Tiwari  v.  The State (NCT of Delhi), [ Criminal  

Revision P. No. 872 of 2006 decided on 14.12.2006 ], stating :

“9. As  already  indicated  above,  insofar  as  the  charge under Section 498A IPC is concerned, that  issue is no longer open for debate.  The same has  been decided by this Court in the case of Mohit  Gupta & others (supra)  applying the ratio of the  Supreme Court decision in the case of Shivcharan  Lal  Verma (supra).   Since the  marriage  between  

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Rajidner and Meenakshi was a nullity in view of  the  pendency  of  Rajinder’s  divorce  proceedings  qua his first wife, the offence under Section 498A,  which  is  specific  to  “husband”,  would  not  be  maintainable, therefore, the impugned order needs  to be corrected on this ground also.”   

 20. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that a learned Single Judge  

of the Kerala High Court in John Idiculla  v.  State of Kerala, [ 2005 M.L.J.  

(Crl.) 841 ] relying on Reema Agarwal (supra) gave a wider meaning to the  

word “second wife” to hold :-

“25. The test under Section 498A IPC is whether  in  the  facts  of  each  case,  it  is  probable  that  a  woman is treated by friends, relatives, husband or  society as a "wife" or as a mere "mistress". If from  the pleadings and evidence the Court finds that the  woman concerned is regarded as wife and not as a  mere mistress, she can be considered to be a 'wife'  and consequently as  'the relative of  the husband'  for purpose of Section 498A IPC. Proof of a legal  marriage in the rigid sense as required under civil  law  is  unnecessary  for  establishing  an  offence  under  Section  498A  IPC.  The  expression  "marriage"  or  "relative"  can  be  given  only  a  diluted meaning which a common man or society  may  attribute  to  those  concepts  in  the  common  parlance, for the purpose of Section 498A IPC. A  second wife who is treated as wife by the husband,  relatives, friends or society can be considered to be  'the  relative  of  the  husband'  for  the  purpose  of  Section 498A of IPC. If she inflicts cruelty on the  legally-wedded  wife  of  the  husband,  an  offence  under Section 498A IPC will not lie against her.”

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21. Applying  the  principles  laid  down in  various  decisions  referred  to  

above, we have no doubt, in our mind, that the appellant is not a relative of  

the husband of the first informant.   

22. For the reasons aforementioned,  the  impugned judgment cannot  be  

sustained.  It is set aside accordingly.  The appeal is allowed.   

…………………………..J.    [ S.B. Sinha ]

…………………………..J.    [ R.M. Lodha ]

New Delhi May 06, 2009

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