U.P. STATE SUGAR CORP. LTD. Vs NIRAJ KUMAR .
Case number: C.A. No.-003002-003002 / 2007
Diary number: 28965 / 2005
Advocates: VINAY GARG Vs
VENKATESWARA RAO ANUMOLU
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3002 OF 2007
U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. Now M/s Dowiala Sugar Company Ltd. Doiwala Through its Executive Director …Appellant
Versus
Niraj Kumar and Ors. …Respondents
With Civil Appeal No. 4697/2006 Civil Appeal No. 3189/2007 Civil Appeal No. 3190/2007 Civil Appeal No. 3191/07 Civil Appeal No. 3192/2007
JUDGEMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
This group of six appeals by special leave involving
identical issues was heard together and is being disposed of
by a common judgment.
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2. In Civil Appeal No. 3002/2007, both the parties are
represented by their counsel and, therefore, we deem it
appropriate to take up the facts from this appeal.
3. The appellants, U.P. State Sugar Corporation Limited, (for
short, “Corporation”), is engaged in manufacture of white crystal
sugar by vaccum process. The sugar Unit is a seasonal Unit
which functions for a period of about 5 months in a year
depending upon the allocation of sugar cane to the concerned
Unit by the Cane Commissioner, U.P.. During the crushing
season 1996-1997, the appellant engaged Niraj Kumar, the
respondent no. 1 (for short, “workman”), purely on
temporary/daily wages basis. According to the Corporation, the
workman was engaged as weighment Clerk as an additional
hand in the mid of the crushing season 1996-97 i.e. from
January 1, 1997; the workman worked upto April 15, 1997 and
on and after that date, his engagement ceased.
4. The workman raised an industrial dispute alleging that by
not engaging him in the next crushing season viz., 1997-98,
although he presented himself, his services were illegally
terminated. He set up the case that he had worked with the
Corporation during the crushing season 1996-97 from January
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1, 1997 for full second part and was, accordingly, entitled to be
engaged in next crushing season and although he presented
himself, he was not given any work and, thus, under the
Standing Orders his services are deemed to have been illegally
terminated.
5. The Corporation contested the claim of the workman and
set up the case that during the crushing season, the work load
in sugar Unit increases manifold which at times necessitates
engagement of additional hands on daily wages to cater to the
additional workload. During the crushing season 1996-97,
sugarcane purchase centres were allotted by the Cane
Commissioner which created additional workload and for that
additional hands were engaged on daily wages at various
centres. The workman was one of such additional hands. He
was engaged on January 1, 1997 and worked as such only upto
April 15,1997 whereafter the additional workload for which he
was engaged, came to an end and, therefore, his engagement
automatically ceased w.e.f. April 15, 1997. The Corporation
also stated that the duration of crushing season 1996-97 was
from November 19, 1996 until May, 1997. The Corporation
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denied that there was any illegal termination of services of the
workman.
6. Both the parties led oral as well as documentary evidence
in respect of their respective case. The Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, U.P. , Dehradun, after hearing the parties passed
the award on April 17, 2000 holding that by not engaging the
workman in the crushing season 1997-98 which was to start on
November 1997, the Corporation can be said to have terminated
the services of the workman illegally. The Labour Court
directed the Corporation to engage the workman in the next
season and also awarded compensation of Rs. 10,000/- to him.
7. The Corporation challenged the award before the
High Court of Uttranchal at Nainital. The principal ground taken
by the Corporation before the High Court was, as was the case
before the Labour Court, that the workman was a temporary
workman as classified under the Standing Orders and,
therefore, the direction of the Labour Court was not justified.
The workman defended the award before the High Court.
8. The High Court held that there was no perversity
in the finding recorded by the Labour Court that the workman
was a seasonal workman. However, taking note of a decision
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of this Court in Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited vs.
Ram Kishan1 , the High Court modified the award by directing
the Corporation to engage the workman in every crushing
season when the purchase centres are opened at mill or at any
other place.
9. The Standing Orders incorporating the conditions of
employment of workmen in Vaccum Pan Sugar Factories in
U.P. define ‘Season’ thus:
““Season” means the period commencing from the date when the crushing commences till the date when crushing ends. Provided that for these departments which are not in operation when crushing begins and which continue in operation after crushing ends, the “season” so far as it affects the workmen in those departments, shall commence with the date the department commences operation and shall end when the department ceases to be operated.”
10. Workmen, in the Standing Orders, are classified in six
categories viz. ; (i) Permanent, (ii) Seasonal, (iii) Temporary, (iv)
Probationers, (v) Apprentices, and (vi) Substitutes.
11. A seasonal workman is:
“One who is engaged only for the crushing season:
Provided that if he is a retainer, he shall be liable to be called on duty at any time in the off-season and if he refuses to join or does not join, he shall lose his
1 JT 1995 (6) SC 547
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lien as well as his retaining allowance. However, if he submits a satisfactory explanation of his not joining duty, he shall only loss his retaining allowance for the period of his absence.”
12. Under the Standing Orders, a temporary workman
is one who is engaged for a work of temporary or casual nature
or to fill in a temporary need of extra hands on permanent,
seasonal or temporary posts.
13. It is pertinent to notice that for a temporary workman,
Standing Orders do not provide for any lien of employment in
the succeeding season based on the employment in the last
preceding season. As regards, seasonal workmen, there are
special conditions. Clause K(1) of the Standing Orders is
relevant for this purpose which reads thus:
“ K. Special conditions governing employment of seasonal workmen-
1. A seasonal workman who has worked or, but for illness or any other unavoidable cause, would have worked under a factory during the whole of the second half of the last preceding season will be employed by the factory in the current season.
Explanation – Unauthorised absence during the second half of the last preceding season of a workman has not been validly dismissed under these Standing Orders and of a workman who has been re- employed by the management in the current season, shall be deemed to have been condoned by the management.”
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14. The question that falls for our consideration is:
whether in the facts noticed above, the workman was engaged
as a temporary workman or seasonal workman and whether he
is entitled to be re-employed in the succeeding year?
15. It is not that the daily rated employees engaged
during the season by the Corporation automatically become
seasonal workmen. If an employee is engaged for work of a
temporary or casual nature like additional workload during a
season, his engagement would be that of a temporary workman.
Having perused the award of the Labour Court carefully, we
find it difficult to fathom on what basis the Labour Court
recorded the finding that the first respondent was engaged as
seasonal workman. The burden lay on the workman to establish
that he was engaged as ‘seasonal workman’. There is no
material from which it can be held that the workman has
discharged his burden. The High Court brushed aside the
objection raised by the Corporation that respondent no.1 was
engaged on temporary basis in one line by observing that the
counsel of the petitioner has not been able to show any
perversity in the finding recorded by the Labour Court. In our
view, the finding recorded by the Labour Court that the
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respondent No. 1 was engaged as a seasonal workman, is
based on no legal evidence and High Court was not justified in
affirming the said finding.
16. Even if we assume that the respondent no. 1 was
engaged as a seasonal workman, it is pertinent to notice that
before the Labour Court, it was an admitted position that the
crushing season 1996-97 commenced from November 11, 1996.
That the season came to an end on May 3, 1997 was not
disputed. It was also an admitted position before the Labour
Court that the workman was engaged on January 1, 1997 and
worked upto April 15, 1997. These admitted facts would amply
show that the workman had neither worked in the previous full
crushing season nor he remained in employment during the
whole of the second half of the crushing season 1996-97. The
Standing Orders contemplate lien of a seasonal workman in the
succeeding crushing season if he has worked in the previous full
crushing season or in the whole second half of that crushing
season. It is true that ‘second half of the crushing season’ is
not defined in the Standing Orders but in absence thereof an
ordinary meaning of the expression “second half of the crushing
season” has to be given and that would mean the crushing
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season be divided into two parts and later part of the crushing
season would be second half of the season.
17. To be entitled for reemployment in the succeeding
crushing season, a seasonal workman has to show that he
worked in the previous full crushing season or in whole of the
second half of the last preceding year. Merely because
workman has worked during the part of the previous crushing
season, he does not become entitled for re-employment in the
succeeding season. If a claim of re-employment is based on
engagement in the second half of season, such engagement has
to be for full second half of the season i.e. until the end of that
season. In view of the admitted facts that have come on record
and legal position discussed above, the conclusion is
inescapable that workmen in these appeals have no right to be
re-employed in the succeeding crushing season. We are,
therefore, unable to uphold the decision of the High Court.
18. Before we part with the judgment, we may observe
that the decision of this Court in Morinda Cooperative Sugar
Mills Limited 1 referred to by the High Court in its judgment has
no application to the present fact situation and the High Court
was not right in directing the Corporation to engage the workman
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in every crushing season as and when the purchase centres are
opened at mill or at any other place based on that judgment.
19. As a result of foregoing discussion, these appeals
have to be allowed and are allowed. The judgment of the High
Court and the award impugned in the present appeals are set
aside. The parties will bear their own costs.
……………………J (Tarun Chatterjee)
…….……………..J (R. M. Lodha)
New Delhi July 31, 2009.
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