REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    950              OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006)

U.P. State Road Transport Corporation … Appellant

Versus

Assistant Comnr. of Police (Traffic) Delhi … Respondent

With  Civil Appeal No.     951             OF 2009  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.2408 of 2006)

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

1. Leave granted in both the SLPs.  Both the appeals are being disposed

of through this common judgment.

2. Interpretation of a judgment of this Court, vis-à-vis the action taken

by the first respondent pursuant to or in furtherance thereof is in question in

these appeals.  In the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006, the

challenge  is  against  a  judgment  and  order  dated  9.9.2005  passed  by  a

Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.1958

of  2005 whereby and whereunder  a judgment  and order dated 10.8.2004

passed by a learned Single Judge of the said Court in Civil Writ Petition

No.8339 of 2002 was upheld.  The appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.2408

of  2006 is  against  the order  and  judgment  dated 9.9.2005 passed by the

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  Delhi  in  LPA  No.1956  of  2005

confirming an order dated 17.8.2004 passed by a learned Single Judge in

WP (C) No.13688 of 2004.

3. Since the facts in both the appeals are identical and since the same

legal questions arise in both the appeals, reference is being made to the facts

in  the  appeal  arising  out  of  SLP (C)  No.2359  of  2006.   Appellant  is  a

Corporation  constituted  and  registered  under  the  Road  Transport

Corporation Act, 1951, indisputably, for the purpose of plying of buses on

various routes falling within the State of Uttar Pradesh and National Capital

Territory of Delhi.  Several agreements as envisaged under sub-section (5)

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of  Section  88  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1988  (hereinafter  called  and

referred to for the sake of brevity as ‘the Act’) were executed.

4. A Public Interest Litigation in regard to observance of the norms of

safety on the roads came up for consideration before this Court in a writ

petition filed by one Shri M.C. Mehta which was registered as Writ Petition

(Civil) No.13029 of 1985.  This Court in exercise of its power under Article

32 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India issued the following

directions by an order dated 20.11.1997 :

“(a) No  heavy  and  medium transport  vehicles, and  light  goods  vehicles  being  four wheelers would be permitted to operate on the  roads  of  the  NCR  and  NCTT,  Delhi, unless  they  are  fitted  with  suitable  speed control  devices  to  ensure  that  they  do  not exceed the speed limit of 40 KMPH.  This will  not  apply  to  transport  vehicles operating  on  Inter-State  permits  and national  goods  permits.   Such  exempted vehicles  would,  however,  be  confined  to such routes and such timings during day and night as the police/transport authorities may publish.   It  is  made  clear  that  no  vehicle would be permitted on roads other than the aforementioned  exempted  roads  or  during the times other than aforesaid time without a speed control device.

(b) In  our  view  the  scheme  of  the  Act necessarily implies an obligation to use the vehicle in a manner which does not imperil public  safety.   The  authorities  aforesaid

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should,  therefore,  ensure that  the  transport vehicles  are not  permitted  to  overtake any other four-wheel motorized vehicle.

XXX XXX XXX

(e) Any breach  of  the  aforesaid  directions  by any person would, apart form entailing other legal consequences,  be  dealt  with  as  contravention  of the conditions  of  the  permit  which   could  entail suspension  /cancellation  of  the  permit  and impounding of the vehicle.

XXX XXX XXX

The  Government  is  directed  to  notify  under section 86(4) the officers of the rank of Assistant Commissioners  of  Police  or  above  so  that  these officers are also utilized for constituting the flying squads.

XXX XXX XXX

B. We direct the Union of India to ensure that the  contents  of  this  Order  are  suitably publicized  in  the  print  as  well  as  the electronic  media  not  later  than  November 22, 1997 so that every body is made aware of  the  directions  contained  in  the  Order. Such publication would be sufficient public notice to all concerned for due compliance.

C. We, direct that this Order will be carried out notwithstanding  any  other  order  or directions  by  any  authority,  Court  or Tribunal,  and  that  no  authority  shall interfere with the functioning of the police and  transport  department  in  so  far  as implementation  and  execution  of  these directions is concerned.”

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5. In  the  first  appeal,  a  bus  of  the  appellant  Corporation  bearing

Registration  No.UP 14 Q 8755,  driven  by one  Shri  Shiv  Lal  was  found

overtaking another four wheel vehicle bearing Registration No. DL 1 LD

6452 and, thus, purported to have violated the conditions as enshrined in the

directions of this Court.  A proceeding under Sections 3/181, 66(i)/92A of

the Act was initiated.

In the said proceeding, fine of Rs.300/- was imposed.

6. Respondent, as a purported consequence of the penalty imposed upon

the driver of the said vehicle, initiated a proceeding under Section 86 of the

Act, directing :

“NOW  THEREFORE,  I.K.S.  Bedi,  Assistant Commissioner  of  Police/Traffic/East  district, Delhi in  exercise of powers delegated to me u/s read with 86(4) of M.V.Act, 1988 by STA Delhi vide  its  Board  Resolution  No.1/98,  dated 25.5.1998  hereby  require  General  Manager  s/o Shri Nil R/o UPSRTC, Lucknow, U.P. the permit holder top show cause as to why the said permit should not be suspended for a period of one month for the above mentioned violations.  Your reply, if any, should reach the undersigned within a period of 7 days from the date of the show cause notice, failing which,  it  will  be presumed that you have nothing  to  say  and  the  case  will  be  decided  ex parte on merits.

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You are also at liberty to appear before the undersigned within the stipulated period to make personal submissions, if any, in this regard.”

7. By reason of an order dated 20.12.2002, the permit was suspended,

stating :

“AND WHEREAS, it  is  evident  from the record brought up before the undersigned and submission that  the  permit  holder  has  violated  the  permit conditions  as  enshrined  in  the  directions  of Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  of  India  in  case  of M.C.Mehta  vs.  UOI.   It  is  also  evident  that  the permit holder has ignored the safety of the public on road and failed to exercise such supervision as was  necessary  on  his  employees  as  a  result  of which the vehicle violated the permit conditions, provisions  of MV Act framed there under to the extent that the vehicle was being driven in such a way which has dangerous for the public safety.

NOW  THEREFORE,  keeping  in  view  all the  facts  of  the  case,  reply  of  the  show  cause notice submitted by the permit holder on one hand and  on  the  other  hand  going  through  the  STA Board Resolution, permit conditions mentioned in the brochure  and directions  of  Hon’ble  Supreme Court of India in case of M.C.Mehta vs.  UOI, I, K.S.Bedi,  Assistant  Commissioner  of  Police, Traffic,  East  Distt.  Delhi  in  exercise  of  powers under section 86 of M.V.Act, 1988 and delegated to me vide STA Board Resolution No.1/98 dated 25.5.1998  do  hereby  suspend  the  permit  No.  of UP-14R-7231 of the said vehicle for a period of [7]  seven  days  from  the  date  of  depositing  the vehicle  at  Burari  Pit  (STA),Delhi  within  3  days

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positively and receipt  be submitted in this office alongwith the original permit of the vehicle which will be kept on the file till the expiry of suspension period.”

8. A writ  petition  was filed thereagainst  by the  appellant.   A learned

Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, by an order dated 10.8.2004, having

regard  to  the  directions  issued  by  this  Court  on  20.11.1997,  refused  to

interfere with the said order dated 20.12.2002, stating:

“Learned counsel for the respondent states that in fact the petitioner has not surrendered the bus in pursuance  to  the  order  for  suspension  of  the licence.  It is seen from the order-sheet that there is  no  interim  relief  granted  in  favour  of  the petitioner.  If the Petitioner has failed to comply with  the  directions  for  suspension  of  the permit/licence, it is open to the respondent to take appropriate measures not only to enforce the said order  but  to  take  further  action  against  the petitioner for not having complied with directions passed by the respondents.”

9. Without  preferring  a  Letters  Patent  Appeal  thereagainst,  a  Special

Leave  Petition  was  filed.   The  same  was  dismissed  as  withdrawn.

Thereafter  a Letters  Patent  Appeal  was filed against  the said order dated

10.8.2004.  It is, however, stated that another special leave petition filed in

identical matter was dismissed.  

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10. By  reason  of  the  impugned  judgment,  the  said  appeal  has  been

dismissed by the High Court.

11. Mr.  Ashok  Srivastava,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

appellant  urged that having regard to the provisions of Section 86 of the

Motor  Vehicles  Act,  the  respondent,  not  being  the  appropriate  State

Transport Authority, could not have directed impounding of the bus and/or

suspension of the permit.

It  was  urged  that  as  the  State  of  U.P.  has  entered  into  a  mutual

agreement  with  the  National  Capital  Territory  of  Delhi  in  regard  to  the

plying of buses in the National Capital region, the terms and conditions laid

down therein being binding on both the parties in the event of any violation

of any provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the rules framed thereunder or

the conditions of permit, the rules applicable to the State of U.P. shall be

attracted.  Even otherwise, the learned counsel would contend in relation to

a inter-State permit, the State which had merely countersigned could only

withdraw the same but would have no jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the

permit as such.   

12. Mr. Qadri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on

the other hand would contend :

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1) The order dated 20.12.2000 having been passed in compliance of this

Court’s order, the impugned judgment of the High Court should not

be interfered with.

2) This  Court,  having  dismissed  the  special  leave  petition  whereafter

only  a  letters  patent  appeal  was  filed,  the  present  appeal  is  not

maintainable.

13. The National Capital Territory of Delhi, in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Section 86(4) of the Act, having delegated its power to various police

authorities,  the respondent  had the  requisite  jurisdiction to  pass  an order

suspending  the  permit  in  terms thereof.   Our attention in  this  behalf  has

been drawn to Rule 61-A as inserted by Notification dated 19.5.1998, which

reads as under:

“`DELEGATION  OF  POWERS  FOR SUSPENSION OF PERMIT : The State Transport Authority  may  by  general  or  special  resolution recorded  in  its  proceedings  and  subject  to  the restrictions, limitation and conditions that it  may impose,  delegate  to  Group  `A’  and  Group  `B’ Gazetted Officers, its powers under section 86 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to suspend a permit or  to  recover  from the  holder  thereof  a  sum of money  agreed  upon  in  accordance  with  sub- section  (5)  of  section  86  of  the  Motor  Vehicles Act, 1988.

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Provided that the State Transport Authority may delegate its powers as mentioned hereinabove by specifying the designation of the officer(s) and the name of the Government department/branch in which the said officer (s) may be serving if it  is necessary to do so.”

14. Pursuant  thereto  or  in  furtherance  therof,  the  State  Transport

Authority had delegated its power in favour of the respondent in terms of a

circular  letter  dated  23.9.1998  containing  the  resolution  passed  by  the

Authority.  Respondent, even otherwise, having regard to the provisions of

Section  207  of  the  Act  had  the  requisite  jurisdiction  to  detain  the  bus.

Respondent having the requisite power to suspend the operation of permit

granted by the U.P. State Transport Authority even if a wrong provision had

been  maintained,  it  need  not  be  held  that  the  impugned  order  is  wholly

without jurisdiction.   

15. The Act  was enacted to  consolidate and amend the law relating to

motor  vehicles.   Chapter  V  of  the  Act  deals  with  control  of  transport

vehicles.  Section 66 of the Act provides for the necessity of permits stating

that no owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as

a  transport  vehicle  actually  carrying  any  passengers  or  goods  save  in

accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a

Regional  or  State  Transport  Authority  or  any  prescribed  authority

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authorizing him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which

the vehicle is used.  The power to control Road Transport Corporation is

vested in the State under Section 67 of the Act.  Section 68 provides for

constitution of Transport Authorities.  Section 71 provides for the procedure

of Regional Transport Authority in the matter of considering application for

stage carriage permit.  Section 72, inter alia, provides for any or more of the

conditions as stated in sub-section (2) of Section 72 to be attached to the

permit.  Section 80 provides for the procedure of filing of application for

and grant of permits.  Section 84 provides for general conditions attaching

to all permits.  Section 86 deals with cancellation and suspension of permits,

sub-section (1) whereof reads as under :

“Section  86  -  Cancellation  and  suspension  of permits.—(1)  The  transport  authority  which granted  a  permit  may cancel  the  permit  or  may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit-

(a) on the breach of any condition specified in section 84 or of any condition contained in the permit, or

(b)  if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit, or

(c) if the holder of the permit ceases to own the vehicle covered by the permit, or  

(d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation, or

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(e) if  the holder  of  the goods carriage permit, fails  without  reasonable  cause,  to  use  the vehicle  for  the  purposes  for  which  the permit was granted, or

(f) if  the  holder  of  the  permit  acquires  the citizenship of any foreign country:

Provided that  no  permit  shall  be  suspended  or cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the  holder  of  the  permit  to  furnish  his explanation.”

Section  88  of  the  Act  provides  for  validation  of  permits  for  use

outside the region for which it is granted.  Sub-Section (4) thereof reads as

under :

“(4) The  provisions  of  this  Chapter  relating  to the  grant,  revocation  and  suspension  of  permits shall apply to the grant, revocation and suspension of countersignatures of permits:

Provided  that  it  shall  not  be  necessary  to follow the procedure laid down in Section 80 for the  grant  of  countersignatures  of  permits,  where the permits granted in any one State are required to  be  countersigned  by  the  State  Transport Authority  of  another  State  or  by  the  Regional Transport Authority concerned as a result  of any agreement  arrived  at  between  the  States  after complying  with  the  requirements  of  sub-section (5).”

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Sub-sections  (5),  (6),  (7)  and  (8)  of  Section  88  lay  down  the

procedure or provide for entering into the agreements between the States to

fix the number of permits.

Section  89  of  the  Act  provides  for  an  appeal  from such  an  order

wherefor the State Government is required to constitute Transport Appellate

Tribunals in such numbers as it thinks fit.  

Section  207  of  the  Act  authorises  any  police  officer  to  seize  and

detain any motor vehicle in the event he has reason to believe that it has

been or was being used in contravention of the provisions of section 3 or

section 4 or section 39 or without the permit required by sub-section (1) of

section 66 or in contravention of any condition of such permit relating to the

route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle

may be used  in the prescribed manner and for the said purpose to take or

cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe

custody of the vehicle.  

16. The  directions  issued  by  this  Court  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction

under Article 32 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India must be

held to be in addition to the conditions contained in the permit and/or the

provisions of the Act.

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17. Regulation of motor vehicles is vested in the State and/or statutory

authorities.   Ordinarily,  they should  exercise  their  power  within  the four

corners thereof.

Right  to ply a vehicle in terms of the provisions of the Act or the

Rules framed thereunder is a statutory right.  Where a person, including a

juristic person, is conferred a right to carry on business, regulation thereof

should ordinarily be governed by the statute under which the permit  has

been granted.  Although in view of several decisions of this Court and, in

particular,  Vishaka  & Ors. V.  State  of  Rajasthan  & Ors. [(1997)  6  SCC

241], even if additional regulatory measures are laid down, the same, in our

opinion, should be construed strictly.   

18. Keeping in mind the aforementioned legal principles,  we may now

consider the effect of the directions issued by this Court.  

19. Paragraph ‘A’ of the directions has been issued upon the Police and

all other authorities entrusted with the administration and enforcement of

the Act and generally with the control of the traffic.  The direction upon the

authorities to ensure that the transport vehicles are not permitted to overtake

any four wheels motorized vehicle was issued as in the view of this Court,

the scheme of the Act necessarily implied an obligation to use the vehicle in

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a manner which does not imperil public safety.  Clause (e) of the order must

be construed in the light of the purpose and object for which the Act was

enacted.

20. The  direction  that  any  breach  will  be  considered  to  be  in

contravention  of  the  conditions  of  the  permit  which  could  entail

suspension/cancellation of the permit and impounding of the vehicle must

be read in the light of the provisions of the Act and not de hors the same.

This Court could not and, in fact, did not while issuing the said direction

confer  a  statutory  authority  upon  a  person  who  did  not  have  any  such

authority  under  the  statute.   An  order  passed  by  an  authority  without

jurisdiction,  it  is  trite,  would  be  a  nullity.   It  would,  therefore,  be

preposterous to presume that this Court would confer jurisdiction upon an

authority whose order would be a nullity and, thus, non est in the eye of law.

21. The aforementioned directions must be construed having regard to the

reasons  assigned  in  support  thereof.   This  Court  analysed  each  of  the

relevant  chapters  and the provision of  the Act.   It  considered a proposal

made by the Transport Commissioner whereby maximum punishment was

proposed  to  be  raised.   It,  in  the  aforementioned  backdrop,  took  into

consideration  the  realities  and  chaotic  state  of  road  traffic  in  National

Capital  Region  and  National  Capital  Territory  of  Delhi.   Referring  to

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Section 207 of the Act which empowers any police officer or other person

authorised  in  this  behalf,  to  detain  vehicles  used  without  certificate  of

registration permit etc., it was opined:  

“In our opinion, the existing provisions in the Act alone are sufficient to clothe the members of the police  force  and  the  transport  authorities  with ample powers to control and regulate the traffic in an  appropriate  manner  so  that  no  vehicle  being used  in  a  public  place  poses  any  danger  to  the public  in  any  form.   The  requirement  of maintaining  the  motor  vehicles  in  the  manner prescribed and its use if roadworthy in a manner which  does  not  endanger  the  public,  has  to  be ensured by the authorities  and this is  the aim of these  provisions  enacted  in  the  Act.   As  earlier stated,  we  reach  this  conclusion  even  without reference  to  the  general  powers  available  to  the police officers under the Police Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

{See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. [(1997) 8 SCC 770]}.

22. What was emphasized is that empowerment of the authority.  Such

empowerment must be within the broad framework of the Act.  The judge

made law in an area covered by the Parliamentary Act should not be applied

in an expansive manner.  Nothing should be deduced therefrom.   

23. A decision is an authority, it is trite, for which it decides and not what

can logically be deduced therefrom.  This wholesome principle is equally

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applicable in the matter of construction of a judgment.  A judgment is not to

be construed as a statute.  It must be construed upon reading the same as a

whole.  For the said purpose, the attending circumstances may also be taken

into consideration.  {See Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai [(2005) 4

SCC 772]}.

24. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of

the High Court  did  not  pose  unto  themselves  the  correct  question(s).   It

misread the provisions of Section 86 to hold that respondent was clothed

with  the jurisdiction of  suspension  and/or  cancellation  of  the  permit  and

impounding of the vehicle in terms of the order of the Court.  This Court

had merely spelt out the consequences emanating from contravention of the

directions.  Such directions, if read with the provisions of the Act, would

mean  that  the  procedure  for  suspension/cancellation  of  the  permit  and

impounding  of  the  vehicle  must  be  followed  as  contained  in  the  Act.

Jurisdiction for the said purpose must be exercised by the authority under

the statute.   No statutory authority, whether empowered by this  Court  or

otherwise, can act de hors the statute.

25. The width and breadth of Article 142 of the Constitution although is

wide, any direction issued thereunder by reason of an interpretation should

not be expanded.  The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court did

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precisely  this.   The  Division  Bench  unfortunately  did  not  consider  this

aspect of the matter.  It is true that in one case the Special Leave Petition

was  dismissed.  But  it  was  an  unreasoned  order.   It  did  not  create  any

precedent.   Thus,  when  a  Letters  Patent  Appeal  was  maintainable,  the

Division Bench could have and, in our opinion, should have determined the

question  in  accordance with  law.  We, therefore,  are of  the  opinion that

violation  of  the  directions  of  this  Court  would  merely  entail  the

consequences which would mean that the respondent could proceed to take

action only in accordance with law including the provisions  contained in

Section 88 of the Act.

26. Indisputably, the Lieutenant Governor of National Capital  Territory

of  Delhi  inserted  Rule  61-A in  the  Rules  by  reason  whereof  the  State

Transport Authority had been vested with the power to delegate its powers

in favour of any other authority. A purported resolution was passed by the

State Transport Authority which is to the following effect:

“Now that the necessary rule has been gazetted it is  proposed  that  the  power  to  suspend  permits under  section  86  may   now  be  delegated  in accordance  with  Rule  61-A  of  the  Delhi  Motor Vehicles  Rules,  1993  to  officers  of  the  category that were empowered vide Resolution no.28/1997 dated 21-11-1997 subject to the condition that the delegation shall be liable to be reviewed from time to time and also subject to the limitation  that the

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power  to  charge  compounding  fees  in  lieu  of suspension  in  case  of  fatal  accidents  by  stage carriage buses shall be exerciseable by officers of the  level  of  Deputy  Director  and  above  of  the Transport Department only in accordance with the procedure  laid  down  vide  resolution  no.3/1997 dated  2-4-1997.”

27. Vires  of  the  said  delegation  not  being  under  challenge,  we would

assume the same to be valid.  The question, however, is as to whether even

in terms of the said delegated power, the respondent could direct suspension

of permit of a bus belonging to appellant and in respect whereof inter-State

permit had been granted by the U.P. State Transport Authority.   

28. Section 86 of the Act, on a plain reading, clearly confers power to

suspend  a  permit  only  on  the  authority  which  had  granted  it.  Even  the

conditions therefor have been laid down.   

29. It is not in dispute that inter-State permits have been granted pursuant

to  the  agreements  entered  into  by  and  between  the  State  of  U.P.  and

National Capital Territory of Delhi.  Mr. Srivastava has placed before us a

sample copy of the Agreement.  Paragraph 4 of the said Agreement refers to

stage carriage (substantive permits).  Paragraph 14 of the said Agreement

provides  for  the  general  powers.   We may refer  to  some of  the  clauses

thereof:

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“(ii) Permits issued within the terms of reciprocal agreement  shall  be  countersigned immediately  on  presentation  before  the Regional  Transport  Authority  or  the  State Transport  Authority  subject  to  payment  of countersignature fee and other taxes due to that State.  

(iv) Except  as  provided  otherwise  in  the agreement,  the  vehicles  of  the  one reciprocating State plying in the other State shall  be governed by the  rules,  other  than the provisions relating to payment of taxes and fees, and fare of the State which granted the permit.

(v) Before any action is taken for breach of the provisions of the  Motor  Vehicle  Act,  1988  and  the  Rules  framed thereunder against  the State Transport  Undertakings  of the reciprocating State a prior reference to the Head of the State Transport Undertaking concerned shall be made in  order to decide if departmental action would not be adequate  instead   of  prosecuting  them in  the  Court  of Law.”

30. In terms of the aforementioned Agreement also, thus, in case of any

violation by any driver of any vehicle for which such carriage permit had

been granted, it is the authorities of the State of U.P. who could take action.

The rules framed by the State of U.P. alone would be applicable in relation

thereto.   Thus,  Rule  64A  of  the  Delhi  Rules  pursuant  whereto  or  in

furtherance whereof the delegation of power in favour of the respondents

had been made, would not apply.  Even otherwise, the countersigning State

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would not be entitled to suspend or cancel the permit of a vehicle wherefor

a stage carriage permit has been granted by the State of U.P.  

31. The question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of

the  Madras  High  Court  in  Gajalakshmi  Ammal  Manonmaniammal  Bus

Service  vs.  The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras & Anr.  [AIR

1962 MADRAS 173] wherein interpreting the provisions of Section 63 of

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which is in pari materia with Section 86 of

the Act, it was held:

“(3) There can be no doubt that overloading of passengers in a stage carriage is  a breach of the conditions of the permit.  Section 63 relates to the issue  of  permits  over  inter-district  routes.   Sub- section (1) of that section provides that  a permit granted  by  the  Regional  Transport  Authority  of one region could be valid for another region, if the Regional Transport Authority of the latter region counter-signs  the  permit.   It  follows  from  the provisions  of  the  section  that  the  original  or primary permit is granted under S.60 and that S.63 (1) only provides for its validation by a counter- signature.  Section  63  (3)  only  means  that  the power of suspension would apply even in regard to  breach  of  a  condition  with  respect  to  inter district  permits,  i.e.,  it  confers  a  power  on  the authority  granting  the  primary  permit  to  take cognizance of offences in the course of the route, even though such route is outside his jurisdiction and to cancel or suspend the permit, if there is a breach of any condition relating to the same.  We are  therefore  of  opinion  that  the  Regional Transport Authority of  North Arcot, who issued

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the  original  permit,  had  jurisdiction  to  impose punishment  in  respect  of  the  breach  of  the conditions of the permit, even if any such breach took place in the South Arcot Dt.”

32. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh

High Court in A. Annamalai vs. State Transport Authority Andhra Pradesh

& ors. [AIR 1962 AP 148] wherein Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as His Lordship

then was) held :

“From  a  reading  of  this  section  it  is  seen  that where  the  vehicle  is  to  be  used  in  two or  more regions in the same State,  that authority is given jurisdiction in which the majority of the route is to be  operated,  or  if  the  route  is  equally  divided between  two  regions  in  the  same  state,  that authority  has  jurisdiction  where  the  vehicle  is kept.   When  it  comes  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the authority where the vehicle is plying between two States,  the  Legislature  has  vested  jurisdiction  in that  authority where  the  applicant  resides  or  has his  principal  place of business.   There is  a clear indication in this section to vest the jurisdiction in that authority which has control over the applicant by reason of his being domiciled within that state.

The counter signature by the countersigning authority under S.42 is dependent upon the grant of the primary permit.  If the permit is cancelled by  the  primary  authority,  the  vehicle  cannot possibly  be  plied  in  the  region  of  the countersigning  authority;  but  if  the countersignature is cancelled for any breach of the conditions  imposed  by  the  countersigning authority, the vehicle can be plied up that region.

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In such circumstances,  therefore,  the anomaly to which the learned advocate for the petitioner has adverted  does  not  in  fact  exist  because,  for  the breach of any independent conditions imposed by the countersigning authority which conditions are not  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  primary authority,  it  is  only  the  countersigning  authority that can cancel the counter signature.  But if the conditions  of  the  permit  issued  by  the  primary authority  are  merely  counter  signed,  then  the jurisdiction to cancel the permit for any breach of the conditions in the region of the counter signing authority would vest in the primary authority also because such suspension or cancellation would be the  only  effective  method  of  control  over  such stage carriage permit holder.  The cancellation of the countersignature, as we have already indicated, would be ineffective.”

33. Submission of Mr. Qadri  that action could have been taken by the

respondent  in exercise of its  power under other provisions of the Act,  in

particular Section 207 thereof, cannot be accepted. The respondent has not

exercised its jurisdiction under Section 207.  Even the conditions precedents

for  exercise  of  the  said  jurisdiction  did  not  exist  in  the  case.   If  the

respondent for the reasons stated hereinbefore was not entitled to pass an

order suspending the permit, the entire proceeding was vitiated in law.  It

could not  have even issued a notice therefor.   It  is,  therefore, not a case

where the respondent had even otherwise jurisdiction to suspend a permit

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but  merely  a  wrong  provision  was  quoted  in  the  notice  and  by  reason

whereof no prejudice was caused to appellant.  

34. For  the  self  same  reasons,  submission  of  Mr.  Qadri  that  if  the

impugned order is set aside, the same shall give rise to another illegal order

is also without any force.  Respondent has exercised its jurisdiction on a

wrong premise.  It will be a repetition to state that it was not a case where

jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 207 or any other provisions of

the Motor Vehicles Act could be exercised.  In a case of this nature where

exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the statutory authority is found to be

wholly illegal, we are not in a position to agree with the submission of Mr.

Qadri that this Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under

Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   It  is  really  a  matter  of  some

surprise to us that such a contention has been raised by a State against a

State.   By  reason  of  the  order  impugned,  permit  of  the  vehicle  was

suspended for  a period of  seven days.  However,  the  said  period is  over.

While exercising jurisdiction under Section 207 of the Act, the respondent

could not have directed production of the bus for the period during which

the permit was directed to be suspended.  Power of detention of a vehicle, as

noticed hereinbefore, could be exercised only for a limited purpose. Such a

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power could not include a power directing the owner of a bus to produce the

offending vehicle for the purposes mentioned in the notice.  

35. For the  reasons  aforementioned,  the impugned judgment  cannot  be

sustained.  They are set  aside accordingly.  The appeals are allowed and

consequently the orders impugned in the writ petitions will stand quashed.

There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

……………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..…………………………..…J. [Cyriac Joseph]

New Delhi; February 12, 2009

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