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PETITIONER: U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARI SHANKER JAIN AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/08/1978

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1980 AIR   65            1979 SCR  (2) 355  1978 SCC  (4)  16

ACT:      Industrial Employment  (Standing Order),  1946 (Act 20. S. 138  Scope of-  Whether the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act,  1948 prevails  over the provision of Industrial Employment(Standing Orders)  Act or  vice  versa-  Scope  of rule  of   ejusdem   generis   explained   Maxim   Generalis specialibus non derogant, applicability of.

HEADNOTE:      Respondents were two workmen originally employed by M/s Seth lam   Gopal  and Partners,  who were  licensees for the distribution of electricity under the Electricity Act, 1910. There were  certified Standing  orders  for  the  industrial establishment of  the  said  licensees;  but  they  did  not prescribe any  age of  superannuation for the employees with the result  the workmen could continue to hours long as they were fit  and able to discharge their duties Pursuant to The purchase by  the appellant with effect from 1-12-1964 of the electricity undertaking of M/s Seth Ram Gopal, the employees in their  industrial establishment including the respondents became the  employee of  the appellant. I he appellant board which ii admittedly an industrial establishment to which the Industrial Employment  (Standing orders  Act.  1946  applies neither made nor got certified any standing orders as it was bound so  to do  under hat Act. The Board however considered the certified Standing orders of the establishment  Seth Ram Gopal as  applicable  to  their  employees  even  after  the purchase of the undertaking by the Board. However. On lay 2. 1970 the  Governor of  Uttar Pradesh  notified under Section 13-B o  the Industrial  Employment  (Standing  orders)  Act, 1946. a  regulation made by the U.P. State Electricity Board under Section  79(c) of  the electricity  Suppl.  Act,  1948 fixing the  age of  superannuation as S and 60 on a par with the other  State Govt. employees. Action in pursuance of the regulation as  notified by the Governor the appellant sought to retire  the respondents  on July 2, 1972 and July 7. 1972 respectively. On  their attaining  the age  of 58 years. The respondents filed  a Writ  Petition in  the  Allahabad  High Court challenging  the regulation  male by the Board and its notification by  the Governor  which was  dismissed. But the Division Bench  which heard  the special appeal preferred by

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then. Referred  three questions  to a  Full Bench  The  Full Bench answered the questions as follows:      ‘‘(l)     The Industrial  Employment  (Standing  Orders      1946 applies  to the  industrial establishment  of  the      State Electricity Board.      (2)  The  Standing  Orders  framed,  in  an  industrial           establishment by an electrical undertaking, do not           cease to  be operative  on  the  purchase  of  the           undertaking by  the Board  or on  framing  of  the           Regulations under Section 79(c) of the electricity           (Supply) Act 1918 and      (3)  Section  13-B   of   the   Industrial   Employment           (Standing orders  Act. 1946.  applies only  to the           industrial establishments of the Government and to           no other establishments. 356 Following the  opinion of the Full Bench, the Division Bench allowed the  special Appeal  and issued  a writ quashing the notification dated  May 28, 197) and directing the appellant not to  enforce the  regulation against  the respondents. he appellant obtained  a certificate  under Art.  133(1) of the Constitution and has preferred the appeal.      Allowing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD :  1. The  Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act. 1946 (Act 20) is a special law in regard to the matters enumerate(l in  the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to my of those matters are of no effect,  unless such  regulations are  either notified by the Government  under- Section  13-B  or  certified  by  the certifying  officer   under  Section  5  of  the  Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946. In regard to matters in respect  of which  regulations made by the Board have not been notified  by the  Governor or  in respect  of which  no regulations have  been made  by  the  Board  the  Industrial Employment (Standing  Orders Act shall continue to apply. In the present  case, the  regulation made  1. the  Board  with retired to  the  age  of  superannuation  having  been  duly notified by  the government  ,  the  regulation  shall  have effect. notwithstanding  the fact that it is a matter- which could be  the subject  matters of  Standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The respondents were,   therefore, properly  retired when  they attained the are of 58 years. [371A-F]      2. The  Industrial Employment  (Standing Orders) Act is an Act  specially designed to define the terms of employment of workmen  in industrial establishment, to give the workmen a collective  voice in  defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi- judicial authorities  by the  application  of  the  test  of fairness and reasonableness. It is an Act giving recognition and hard-won  and precious right of workmen. It is a Special Act expressly  and exclusively  dealing with  the  schedule- enumerated conditions  of service  or workmen  in industrial establishment. [364E-G]      Associated Cement  Co. Ltd.  v. P.  D. Vyas,  [196(]  2 S.C.R. 974;  Rohtak Hissar  district Electricity  Supply Co. Ltd. v.  , State  of U.P.  an(l ors.,  [1966] 2  S.C.R. 863; Western India  Match Co.  Ltd. v.  Workmen, [1974]  1 S.C.R. 434; referred to.      3. The Electricity Supply Act does not presume to be an Act to  regulate the  conditions of service of the employees of State  Electricity Board.  It is  an act  to regulate the coordinated development  of electricity. It is a special Act in regard to the subject of development of electricity, even

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as the  Industrial Employment  (Standing orders)  Act  is  a special act  in regard  to  the  subject  of  conditions  of service of  workmen in industrial establishments. If section 79 of  he Electricity  Supply Act generally provides for the making o regulations providing for the conditions of service of the  employees of the Board, it can only be regarded as a general provision  which must yield o the special provisions of  the  Industrial  Employment  (Standing  orders)  Act  in respect of matters covered by the latter. Act. [365D-F]      4. The  reason for  the rule "Generalis specialibus non derogant", that a general provision should yield to specific provision is  this: In  passing a  special  Act,  Parliament devotes its  entire consideration to a. particulars subject. When a 357 General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament  has A  not repealed  or modified the former special Act  unless it  appears that  the Special  Act again levied consideration from Parliament [366-D]      The provisions  of the  Standing orders Acts therefore, must prevail  over Section  79(c) of  the Electricity Supply Act in  regard to  matters to which the Standing (Orders Act applies. It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate  the provisions  of  the  Industrial  Employment (Standing orders)  Act, embodying  as they  do hard-won  and precious rights  of workmen  and prescribing  as they  do an elaborate    procedure,     including    a    quasi-judicial determination,  by  a  general,  incidental  provision  like Section 79(c)  of the  Electricity Supply Act. lt is obvious that Parliament  did not  have before it the Standing orders Act,  when   it  passed   the  Electricity  Supply  Act  and Parliament never  meant that  the Standing orders Act should stand pr  alto repealed  by Section  79(c of the Electricity Supply Act. [366F-H]      Sukhdev Singh  v. Bhagat  Ram,  [1975]  3  S.C.R.  619; Rajasthan Electricity  Board n.  Mohan Lal,  [1967] 3 S.C.R. 277; held inapplicable.      5. The  true scope  of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words  of  a  general  nature  following  specific  and particular words  should be so construed as limited t things which are  of the  same nature  as those  specified. But the rule is  one which  has to  be "applied with caution aud not pushed too  far". It  is a  rule which  must be  confined to narrow bounds  so as  not to  unduly  or  necessarily  limit general and  comprehensive words.  If  a  broad-based  genus could consistently  be discovered there is no warrant to cut down general  words to  dwarf size.  If giant  it cannot be, dwarf it need not be. [369 A-B]      It  is   true  that   in  Section   1  3-B  the  specie specifically mentioned happen to be Government servants. But they also  possess this  common characteristic that they are all public servants enjoying a statutory status and governed by statutory  rules  and  regulations.  If  the  legislature intended to  confine the  applicability of  Section I 3-B to industrial undertakings  employing government  servants only nothing was  easier than  to say  so instead of referring to various rules  specially and  following it up with a general expression like the one in the instant case. [369B-D]      6. The  words ’rules  and  regulations’  have  come  to acquire a.  special meaning  when used in statutes. They are used to describe subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom  the statute  delegates that function. The words can have  MV  other  meaning  in  Sec.  1  3-B.  Therefore,  the expression  "workmen   .     whom  ..  any  other  rules  or regulations that  may be  notified in  this behalf means, in

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the context  of Sec.  13-B,  workmen  enjoying  a  statutory status, in  respect  of  whose  conditions  of  service  the relevant  statute   authorises  the   making  of   rules  or regulations. The  expression cannot be construed so narrowly as  to  mean  Government  servants  only;  nor  can  not  be construed  so   broadly  as  to  mean  workmen  employed  by whomsoever including  private employers,  so long  as  their conditions of  service are  notified by the Govt. under Sec. 13-B [369D-F]      The words  ’nothing in this Act shall apply’ are not to be interpreted  to literally  as to  lead to absurd results. The only  reasonable construction  that an  be put  upon the language of Section 13-B is that a rule of regulation, it 358 notified by  the Government,  will exclude the applicability of the  Act to the extent that the rule or regulation covers the field.  To that  extent and to that extent only "nothing in the Act shall apply". [307 F-G]      Raman Nambissan  v. State  Electricity Board  [1967]  1 L.L.J. 252 and Thiruvenkataswami v. Coimbatore Municipality, [1968] 1 L.L.J. 361 explained.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2199 of 1977.      From the  Judgment and  Decree dated 29-11- 1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 378 of 1974.      G. B. Pai and O. P. Rana for the Appellant.      R. K. Garg, V. J. Francis) , Madan Mohan, K.P. Aggarwal and Mrs. Manju Gupta, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.      Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli for the Intervener.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J. The  case is  primarily  concerned with the  age of  retirement of  two obscure  workmen but it raises question  of general  importance  concerning  workmen employed by most statutory bodies and corporations. It is on such chances that the development of our law depends.      The two workmen were originally employed by Messrs Seth Ram  Gopal   and    Partners  who  were  licensees  for  the distribution of  electricity under  the  Indian  Electricity Act, 1910.  There were  certified Standing  orders  for  the industrial  establishment   of  M/s.   Seth  Ram  Gopal  and partners. The  certified Standing  orders did  not prescribe any age of superannuation for the employees. I ht, according to the  workmen meant  that they  could continue  to work as long as  they were  fit and  able to discharge their duties. The electricity  undertaking  of  Ms.  Seth  Ram  Gopal  and Partners was  purchased br The U.P. State Electricity Board, with effect  from 15-12-1964,  under The  provisions of  the Electricity (Supply)  Act, 1948.  The employees  of Seth Ram Gopal and  Partners became  the employees  of the  U.P.  the Electricity Board. The U.P. State Electricity Board which it is no  longer disputed  is an  industrial  establishment  to which the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, applies, neither  made nor got certified any Standing orders as it  was bound so to do under that Act. But it is evident, though  no   admitted  from   two  letters,   one  from  the Superintending Engineer in reply to a letter dated 31-12-166 from  the   Executive  Engineer   and  the  other  from  the Certifying  officer   for   Standing   orders   and   Labour Commissioner to  the General  Secretary  of  the  Employees’ Union  that   the  Board  and  the  workmen  considered  the certified Standing orders of the establishment of Seth Ran

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359 Gopal and  Partners as  applicable to  them even  after  the purchase of  the undertaking by the Board. This, however, is not very  material. The  Board, as we said earlier, made and not certified  no standing orders either in regard to age or superannuation or in regard to any other matter Mentioned in the schedule to the Standing orders Act. We may mention here that by  reason of  a notification  dated 17-1-1959  "age of superannuation or  retirement, rate of pension or ally other facility which  the employers  may like  to extend or may be agreed upon  between the  parties’ is one of‘ the matters in respect of which an employer to whom the Standing orders Act applies is  bound to  make  Standing  orders  and  get  them certified. However,  on May  28, 1970. the Governor of Uttar Pradesh notified.  under  Section  13-B  of  the  Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946. a regulation made by the U.P.  State: Electricity Board under Section 7(c) of the Electricity (Supply)  Act, ]948.  The  notification  was  as Follows.           "No. 3822-2/70/XXIII-PB-15EH-67                        May 28, 1970.           In pursuance  of the  provision of Section 13-B of      the Industrial  Employment (Standing  Orders) Act, 1948      (Act No. 20 of 1946), the Governor is pleased to notify      in the official Gazette that the U.P. State Electricity      Board has  made the  following Regulations  under  sub-      section (c)  of Section  79 of  the Electricity (Supply      Act, 1948) (Act No. 54 of 1948)-           ‘‘Notwithstanding  any   rule  if   one  order  or      practice hitherto  followed,  the  date  of  compulsory      retirement of an employee of the Board will be the date      on which he attains the age of 58 years; provided that-           (i)  in the  case of  the inferior servants of the                Board,   whose   counterparts   under   State                Government are  at present  entitled to serve                upto  the   age  of  60  years,  the  age  of                compulsory retirement  will be  the  date  on                Which they attain the age of 60 years.           (ii) the  Board   or  its  subordinate  appointing                authority may  require an  employee to retire                after he  attains or  has attained the age of                55 years  on three  months’’ notice  or three                months’  salary   in  lieu   thereof  without                assigning any reason". Acting in  pursuance of  this regulation  as notified by the Governor, the  Board sought to retire the two respondents on July  2,  1972  and  July  7,  1972  respectively  on  their attaining the  age of  58 years.  The respondents  thereupon filed  a   writ  petition   in  the   Allahabad  High  Court challenging  the   regulation  mad  by  the  Board  and  its notification by 360 the Governor.  Their contention  was that  the Board was not competent to  make a  regulation  in  respect  of  a  matter covered by  the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act. The writ  petition as  dismissed by  a learned Single Judge. The respondents  preferred a special appeal and the Division Bench which  heard the  Special Appeal in the first instance referred the following three questions tc a Full Bench:           " (1)  Whether the Industrial Employment (Standing      orders)   Act,   1946   applies   to   the   Industrial      establishments of the State Electricity Board ?           (2) Whether  the standing  orders  framed  for  an      Industrial establishment  of an  electrical undertaking      cease  to   be  operative   on  the   purchase  of  the

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    undertaking  by   the  Board   or  on  the  framing  of      regulations under  section  79(c)  of  the  Electricity      (Supply) Act, 1948?           (3)  Whether   section  13-B   of  the  Industrial      Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, applies only to      industrial establishments  of the Government or also to      other industrial establishments ? The Full Bench answered the questions as follows:           "l. The  Industrial Employment  (Standing  orders)      Act 1946  applies to  the industrial  establishments of      the Ste Electricity Board.           2. The  Standing Orders  framed in  an  industrial      establishment by an electrical undertaking do not cease      to b  operative on  the purchase  of the undertaking by      the Board  or  on  framing  of  the  regulations  under      section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.           3.  Section  13-B  of  the  Industrial  Employment      (Standing  Orders)  Act,  1946,  applies  only  to  the      industrial establishments  of the  government and to no      other establishments". Following the  opinion of the Full Bench, the Division Bench allowed the  Special Appeal  and issued  a Writ quashing the notification dated May 28, 1970 and directing the U.P. State Electricity Board  not to enforce the regulation against the appellants before  them. The  U.P. State  Electricity Board, having obtained  a Certificate  from the  High  Court  under Article 133(1)  of  the  Constitution,  has  preferred  this appeal. 361      Shri G.  B. Pai  learned Counsel  for the appellant did not canvass  A the  correctness of  the answer  of the  Full Bench to  the first question referred to it. He confined his attack to  the answers  to the  second and  third questions. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram(1),  and Rajasthan  Electricity  Board  v.  Mohan Lal(2), Shri  Pai argued  that the  U.P.  State  Electricity Board was  an authority  within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution  and that  the regulations made b the Board under Section  79(c) of  the Act  had the  ’full  force  and effect of  the statute  and the  force  of  law"  so  as  to displace, over-ride  or supersede  Standing Orders  made and certified under the Industrial Employment (Stanching orders) Act. which,  he submitted wee mere contractual conditions of service subjected  to a  quasi-judicial process  and  which, therefore,  could   not  take  precedence  over  legislative processed regulations. The learned Counsel further submitted that Section  79(c) of  the Electricity  Supply  Act  was  a special law and that it prevailed over the provisions of the Industrial Employment  Standing orders  Act. Alternately, he submitted, the  notifying of the regulation regarding age of superannuation  under   Section  13-B   of  the   Industrial Employment Standing orders Act excluded the applicability of that Act  in regard to the subject of age of superannuation. He  urged   that  Section   13-B  was  no  confined  in  its application to  Government undertakings  only  or  to  cases where there were comprehensive sets of rules, as was thought by the High Court.      Shri R.  K. Garg,  for the  Workmen contended  that the Industrial Employment  (Standing  orders)  Act  was  an  act specially  designed   to  define   and   secure   reasonable conditions   of    service   for   workmen   in   industrial establishments employing  one hundred or more workmen and to that end  to compel employers to make Standing orders and to et them  certified by  a quasi-judicial  authority. It  was, therefore, a  special Act  with  reference  to  its  subject

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matter. The  Electricity Supply  Act, on the other hand, was intended  "to   provide  for   the  rationalisation  of  the production and  supply of  electricity,  and  generally  for taking measures  conducive to  electrical development.’’  It was not  specially designed  to  define  the  conditions  of service of employees of Electricity Board or to displace the Standing orders Act. The power given to an Electricity Board under Section  79(c) to  make regulations providing for "the duties of  officers and  servants of  the  Board  and  their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service" was no more than the usual, general power possessed by every      (1) [1975] 3 SCR 619.      (2) [1967] 3 SCR 377. 362 employer. Shri  Garg argued  that the  Industrial Employment Standing orders  Act was  a special Act which dealt with the special subject  of conditions  of employment  of workmen in industrial establishments  and, therefore,  in the matter of conditions  of   employment   of   workmen   in   industrial establishments, it  prevailed over  the  provisions  of  the Electricity Supply  Act. He urged that under Section 13-B of the Standing orders Act, Government undertakings which had a comprehensive set  of rules alone could be excluded from the applicability of  the Act.  He submitted  that to  permit  a single rule  or regulation  made for  limited purpose  to be notified under Sec. 13-B would have the disastrous effect of excluding the  applicability of  the whole  of the  Standing Orders Act.      Before  examining  the  rival  contentions,  we  remind ourselves that the Constitution has expressed a deep concern for the  welfare of workers and has provided in Art, 42 that the State  shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of  work and  in Art.  43 that  the  State  shall endeavour to  secure, by  suitable legislation  or  economic organization  or   in  any   other  way,   to  all  workers, agricultural or  otherwise, work,  a living wage, conditions of  work  ensuring  a  decent  standard  of  life  and  full enjoyment or  leisure etc.  These are  among the  "Directive Principles of  State Policy".  The mandate  of Article 37 of the Constitution  is that  while the Directive Principles of State Policy  shall not  be enforceable  by any  Court,  the principles are  ‘nevertheless fundamental  in the governance of the  country’ and  ‘it shall  be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws’. Addressed to Courts, what the  injunction means is that while Courts are not free to direct  the making  of legislation,  Courts are  bound to evolve, affirm  and adopt principles of interpretation which will further  and  not  hinder  the  goal  set  out  in  the Directive Principle  of  St  Policy.  This  command  or  the Constitution must be over present n the minds of judges when interpreting statutes  which council them selves directly or indirectly with  matters et  out in the Directive principles of State Policy      Let us  now examine the various provisions their proper contact with  a view to resolve the problem before us. l the Industrial Employment  (Standing Orders)  Act, 194(.  Before the passing  of the  Act conditions or service of industrial employees s were invariably ill defined and were hardly over know  with   even  a  slight  Degree  of  precision  to  the employees. There  was no uniformity of conditions of service f(hr employees  discharging identical  duties in fl the same establishment. Conditions  of service  were generally  e and the result  of oral  arrangements which left the employees t Te mercy of the employer. With the growth of the trade union move

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363 ment and  the  right  of  collective  bargaining,  employees started putting  A forth  their demands  to end this sad and confusing state  of affairs. Recognising the rough deal that was being  given to workers 1 employers who would not define their  conditions   of  service   and  he   inevitability  f industrial strife  in  such  a  situation,  the  legislature intervened and  enacted the  Industrial Employment  Standing Orders Act.  It was  stated in  the statement of objects and reasons;           "Experience  has   shown  that  "Standing  orders"      defining  the  conditions  of  recruitment,  discharge,      disciplinary action,  holidays, leave  etc., go  a long      way towards minimising, friction between the management      and workers  ill industrial undertakings. Discussion on      the subject at the tripartite Indian Labour Conferences      revealed  a   consensus  of   opinion  in   favour   of      legislation. The  Bill accordingly seeks to pr vide for      the framing  of "Standing  orders"  in  all  industrial      establishments employing one hundred and more workers". It was,  therefore, considered,  as stated  in the  preamble "expedient to require employers in industrial establishments to  define  with  sufficient  precision  the  conditions  of employment under  them and to make the said conditions known to workmen  employed by  them". The  scheme or  the Act,  as amended in  1956  and  as  it  now  stands,  requires  every employer of  an industrial  establishment as  defined in the Act to  submit to  the  Certifying  officer  draft  Standing orders, that  is, "Rules  relating to matters set out in the schedule", proposed  by him  for adoption  in his industrial establishment. This  is mandatory.  It has to be done within six months after the commencement of the Act. ’Failure to do so is  punishable and  is further made a continuing offence. The draft Standing orders are required to cover every matter set out in the schedule. The schedule enumerates the matters to be  provided in  the Standing  orders  and  they  include classification of  workmen, Shift  working,  attendance  and late coming.  Leave and holidays, termination of employment, suspension or dismissal for misconduct, means of redress for wronged workmen  etc. Item  No. 11  of the  Schedule IS "Any other matter  which may  be prescribed".  By a  notification dated 17 1959 the Government of Uttar Pradesh has prescribed "Age o  superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any other facility  which the employer may like to extend or may be agreed upon between the parties" as a matter requiring to be provided  in the  Standing orders. On receipt o the draft Standing Orders from the employee, the Certifying officer is required to  forward a  copy of  the same to the trade union concerned or the workmen inviting them to prefer objections, if any.  Thereafter the  Certifying officer  is required  to give a  hearing to  the employer  and  the  trade  union  or workmen as the case may be 7-526SCI/78 364 and to  decide  "whether  or  not  any  modification  of  or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to render  the draft  Standing orders  certifiable under the Act’. Standing  orders are certifiable under the Act only if provision i  made therein  for every  matter set  out in the schedule, if  they are  in conformity with the provisions of the Act  and if  the Certifying  officer adjudicates them as fair and  reason 3  able. The Certifying officer is invested with the  powers of  a  Civil  Court  for  the  purposes  of receiving  evidence,   administering  oaths,  enforcing  the attendance  of   witnesses  etc.   etc.  The  order  of  the Certifying Officer is subject to an appeal to the prescribed

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appellate  authority.   The  Standing   orders  as   finally certified  are   required  to   be  entered  in  a  Register maintained  by  the  Certifying  officer.  The  employer  is required to  prominently post  the Certified Standing orders on special  boards in.  maintained for that purpose. This is the broad  scheme of  the Act.  The Act  also  provides  for exemptions.  About  that,  later.  The  Act,  as  originally enacted, precluded  the Certifying officer from adjudicating upon the  fairness or  reasonableness of  the draft Standing orders submitted by the employer but an amendment introduced in 1956  now casts  a duty  upon the  Certifying officer  to adjudicate upon  the fairness or reasonableness of the Draft Standing orders.  The Scheme of the Act has ben sufficiently explained by  this Court  in Associated Cement t Co. LTD. v. f. D. Vyas(l), Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd’. v.  State of U.P. & Ors.(2), and Western dia Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen. The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is  thus seen he an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workman in industrial establishments, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment  and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi-judicial authorities by the application of the test  of fairness  and  reasonableness.  It  is  ar  Act giving recognition  and form to hard-won and precious rights of workman.  We have  no hesitation  in saying  that it is a Special Act  expressly  and  exclusively  dealing  with  the schedule-enumerated conditions  (hf service  of  workmen  in industrial establishments.      Turning net  to the  Electricity Supply  Act, it is, as its preamble says. An Act to provide for the rationalisation of the  production and  supply of electricity, and generally for taking  measures conducive  to electrical  development". The statement  of objects  and reasons  and a  lance at  the various provisions of the Act show that the primary object      (1) [1960] 2 SCR 974      (2) [1966] 2 SCR 863      (3) [1974] I SCR 434 365 Of the  Act is to provide for the coordinated, efficient and economic   development of electricity in India on a regional basis  consistent  with  the  needs  of  the  entire  region including semi-urban  and rural areas. Chapter II of the Act provides for  the constitution  of the  Central  Electricity Authority and  Chapter III  for the  constitution  of  state Electricity Boards.  Chapter IV  prescribes the  powers  and duties of  state  Electricity  Boards,  and  Chapter  V  the Boards’ works and trading procedure. n Chapter VI deals with the Board’s  finance, Accounts  and Audit. Chapter VII (from S, 70  to S.  83) which  is headed  "Miscellaneous" contains various miscellaneous  provisions amongst  Which are  S.  78 which empowers  the Government to make rules and S. 79 which empowers the Board to make regulations in respect of matters specific in  clauses (a)  to (k) of that Section. Clause (c) of S.  79 is  "the duties  of officers  and servants  of the Board, and  their salaries,  allowances and other conditions of‘ service".  This, of  course is no more than the ordinary general power,  with which every employer is invested in the first instance, to regulate the conditions of service of his employees. It  is an  ancillary or incidental power of every employer, The  Electricity Supply Act does not presume to be an  Act  to  regulate  the  conditions  of  service  of  the employees of  state Electricity  Boards. It  is  an  act  to regulate the coordinated development of electricity. It is a special Act  in reread  to the  subject  of  development  of electricity, even  as the  Industrial  Employment  (Standing

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orders) Act  is a  special Act  in regard  to the subject of Conditions   of    Service   of    workmen   in   industrial establishments. If  Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act generally provides  for the  making of regulations providing for the  conditions of  service of  tile  employees  of  the Board, it  can only  be regarded as a general provides which must yield  to the  special  provisions  of  the  Industrial Employment (Standing  orders)  Act  in  respect  of  matters covered by the latter Act.      The maim  "Generalia specialibus non derogant" is quite well known.  The  rule  flowing  from  the  maxim  has  been explained in  Mary Seward v. The owner of the "Vera Cruz"(l) as follows:           "Now if anything be certain it is this, that where      there are  general words  in a  later  Act  capable  of      reasonable and  sensible application  without extending      them  to  subjects  specially  dealt  with  by  earlier      legislation, you  are not  to  hold  that  earlier  and      special legislation  indirectly repealed,  altered,  or      derogated from  merely by  force of such general worlds      without any  indication of a particular intention to do      so".      (1) [1884] 10 AC 59 at 68. 366 The question  in Seward  v. Vera  Cruz was whether Sec. 7 of the Admiralty  Court Act of 1861, which gave jurisdiction to that Court-over "any claim for damage done by any ship" also gave jurisdiction  over claims  for loss of life which would otherwise come  under the  Fatal Accidents  Act. It was held that the  general words  o Sec. 7 of the Admiralty Court Act did not exclude the applicability of the Fatal Accidents Act and therefore,  the Admiralty  Court had  no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages for loss of life.      The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to  a specific provision is this: In passing a Special Act,  Parliament  devotes  its  entire  consideration  to  a particular subject.  When  a  General  Act  is  subsequently passed, it  is logical  to presume  that Parliament  has not repealed or  modified  the  former  Special  Act  unless  it appears that  the Special  Act again  received consideration from  Parliament.  Vide  London  and  Blackwall  Railway  v. Lighthouse District board o Works(l) and Thorpe v. Adams(2). In J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. state f Uttar Pradesh(3), this Court observed (at p. 1174):           "The rule  that general provisions should yield to      specific provisions  is not an arbitrary principle made      by lawyers  and judges  but  springs  from  the  common      understanding of  men and  women  that  when  the  same      person gives two directions one covering a large number      of matters in general and an other to only some of them      his intention  is that  these latter  directions should      prevail as  regards these  while as regards us the rest      the earlier direction should have effect".      We have  already shown  that the  Industrial Employment (Standing orders)  Act is  a  Special  Act  dealing  with  a Specific  subject,   namely  the   conditions  of   service, enumerated  in   the  Schedule,  of  workmen  in  industrial establishments. It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought  to   abrogate  the   provisions  of  the  Industrial Employment (Standing  orders) Act embodying as they do hard- won and  precious rights  of workmen and prescribing as they do  an   elaborate  procedure,  including  a  quasi-judicial determination, by  a general, incidental provision like Sec. 79(c) of  the Electricity  Supply Act.  It is  obvious  that Parliament did  not have  before it  the Standing orders Act

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when it  passed the  Electricity Supply  Act and  Parliament never meant  that  the  Standing  orders  Act  should  stand protanto re  pealed by  Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We  are clearly  of the view that the provisions of the Standing orders  Act must  prevail  over  S.  79(c)  of  the Electricity Supply  Act, in  regard to  matters to which the Standing orders Act applies.      (1) 26 L. J. Ch. 164 = 69 E.R. 1048.      (2) (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 125      (3) A. r. R. 1961 S. C. 1170 . 367      Shri G.  B. Pai,  relying  on  what  was  said  in  the Rajasthan state A Electricity Board case and Sukhdev Singh & Ors’s case argued that the regulations made under Sec. 79(c) of the  Electricity Supply  Act being  statutory  in  nature stood on  so high  a pedestal  as to override, by their very nature, the  Standing orders  made under the Standing orders Act. The  observations  on  which  he  relied  are,  in  the Rajasthan State Electricity Bard case:           "The  state,  as  defined  in  Art.  12,  is  thus      comprehended to  include bodies created for the purpose      of promoting  the educational and economic interests of      the  people.   The  State,   as  constituted   by   our      Constitution, is  further specifically  empowered under      Art. 298  to  carry  on  any  trade  or  business.  The      circumstance  that  the  Board  under  the  Electricity      Supply Act  is required  to carry on some activities of      the nature  of trade  or commerce  does not, therefore,      give any  indication that  the Board  must be  excluded      from the  scope of the word "state" as used in Art. 12.      On  the   other  hand,  there  are  provisions  in  the      Electricity Supply  Act which  clearly  Show  that  the      powers conferred  on the  Board include  power to  give      directions, the  disobedience of which is punishable as      a criminal  offence. In  these circumstances, we do not      consider it at all necessary to examine the cases cited      by Mr. Desai to urge before us that the Board cannot be      held to  be an  agent or  instrument of the Government.      The  Board  was  clearly  an  authority  to  which  the      provisions  o   Part  III   of  the  Constitution  were      applicable". and in Sukhdev Singh’s case (at p. 627):           "Rules,  regulations,  schemes,  Bye-laws,  orders      made  under  statutory  powers  are  all  comprised  in      delegated legislation" at p. 628)           "Subordinate legislation has, if validly made, the      full force and effect of a. statute" and (at p. 684-685)           "Rules and  Regulations of the oil and Natural Gas      Commission,  Life   Insurance  Corporation,  Industrial      Finance Corporation have the force of law.           The employees  of these  statutory bodies  have  a      statutory status and they are entitled to a declaration      o being  in employment  when their dismissal or removal      is in contravention of statutory provisions. 368           These statutory  bodies are authorities within the      meaning of Art. 12 o the Constitution".      The proposition that statutory Bodies are ’authorities’ within the  meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, that the employees of  these bodies  have a statutory status and that regulations made  under the  statutes creating  these bodies have the  force of  law are  not in  dispute before  us. The question is  not whether  the employees and the Board have a

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statutory status; they undoubtedly have. The question is not whether the regulations made under Sec. 79 have the force of law; again,  they undoubtedly  have. The question is whether Sec. 79(c)  of the  Electricity Supply  Act is a general law and therfore  regulations cannot be made under it in respect of matters  covered by  the Industrial  employment (Standing order) Act,  a special  law. That  question we have answered and  the  answer  to  that  question  makes  irrelevant  the submissions based  on the  statutory status of the employees and the statutory force of the regulations.      Next,  we   turn  to   the  submission   based  on  the notification made  under Sec.  13-B of  the Standing  orders Act. Section 13-B reads as follows:           "13B. Nothing  in  this  Act  shall  apply  to  an      industrial establishment  in  so  far  as  the  workmen      employed therein  are persons  to whom  the Fundamental      and     Supplementary     Rules,     Civil     Services      (Classification,  Control   and  Appeal)  Rules,  Civil      Services  (Temporary   Service)  Rules,  Revised  Leave      Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence,      Service (Classiffication,  Control and Appeal) Rules or      the Indian  Railway Establishment  Code  or  any  other      rules or  regulations that  may  be  notified  in  this      behalf by  the appropriate  Government in  the official      Gazette, apply".      The notification  made by  the Government  has  already been extracted by us. Some doubts were expressed whether the U.P. state electricity Board had in fact made the regulation and whether  the Government  merely  notified  the  relation without applying its mind. The learned counsel appearing for the Board  and the  Government placed before us the relevant records and  note-files and  we are satisfied that the Board did make  the regulation  and the  Government did  apply its mind.      The High  Court expressed the views that the expression any other  rules or  regulations"  should  be  read  ejusdem generis with  the expressions "Fundamental and Supplementary Rules", "Civil  Services, Control, Classification and Appeal Rules" etc.  So read, it was said, the provisions of Section 13-B could only be applied to industrial establish 369 ments in  which  the  workmen  employed  could  properly  be described as  Government servants.  We are  unable to  agree that the  application of  the ejusdem  generis rule leads to any such  result. The  true scope  of the  rule of  "ejusdem generis"  is  that  words  of  a  general  nature  following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things  which are  of the same nature as those specified. But the  rule is  one which  has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far". It is a rule which must be confined to narrow  bounds so as not to unduly or unnecessarily limit general and  comprehensive words.  If  a  broad-based  genus could consistently be discovered, there is no warrant to cut down general  words to  dwarf size.  If giant  it cannot be, dwarf it  need not  be. It  is true  that in  Sec. 13-B  the specie specie spacifically mentioned happen to be Government servants. But  they also  possess this common characteristic that they  are all  public  servants  enjoying  a  statutory status, and  governed by statutory rules and regulations. If the legislature  intended to  confine the  applicability  of Sec. 13-B  to industrial  undertakings employing  Government servants only  nothing was  easier than to say so instead of referring to  various rules specifically and following it up with a  general expression like the one before us. The words ’rules and  regulations’ have  come  to  acquire  a  special

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meaning when  used in  statutes. They  are used  to describe subordinate legislation  made by  authorities  to  whom  the statute delegates  that function. Te words can have no other meaning in Sec. 1 3-B. Therefore, the expression "workmen .. t whom.. any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this  behalf means,  in the context of Sec. 13-B, workmen enjoying a  statutory status, in respect of whose conditions of, service  the relevant  statute authorities the making of rules or  regulations. The expression cannot be construed so narrowly as  to mean Government servants only; nor can it be construed  so   broadly  as  to  mean  workmen  employed  by whomsoever including  private employers,  so  long  a  their conditions of  service are  notified by the Government under Sec. 13-B.      Shri Garg  relied on certain observations of the Madras High Court in Raman Nambissan v. State Electricity Board(l), and Thiruvenkataswami v. Coimbatore Municipality(). In Raman Nambissan’s case  it was  held that  the mere  fact that the Electricity Board  had adopted  the rules and regulations if the  Government   of  Madras  a  its  transitory  rules  and regulations did not bring the workmen employed in industrial establishments under the Board within the mischief of Sec. 1 3-P. Of  the Industrial Establishment’s (Standing order) ct. In Thiru  Venkataswami’s’. ca it was held that rules made by the Government fl      (1) [1967] I L.L.J. 252.      (2) [1968] I L.L.J. 361 370 under  the   District  Municipalities   Act  could   not  be considered to  he rules  notified  under  Se.  13-B  of  the Standing orders  Act merely  because the  rules were made by the Government  and published  in the Government Gazette. We agree  with   the  conclusion   in.  both   case.  In  Thiru Venkataswami  case  Kailasam  J.,  also  observed  that  the industrial employment (Standing order) Act was a special act relating exclusively  to the  service conditions  of persons employed in  industrial establishments,  and, therefore, its provisions prevailed  over The  provisions of  the  District Municipalities Act.  We entirely  agree.  But,  the  learned judge went  on to  say "S.  13-B cannot  be availed  of  for purposes of  framing rules to govern the relationships in an industrial establishment  under private  management or  in a statutory  Corporation.   This  rule   can  apply   only  to industrial establishments in respect of which the Government is authorised to frame rules and regulations relating to the conditions  of  employment  in  industrial  establishments". There we  disagree. Our  disagreement is  only in  regard to industrial establishment  in statutory  Corporations and not those under private management. Our reasons are mentioned in the previous paragraph.      Shri Garg  suggested that  the rules,  and  regulations specific mention  of which  has been  made in Sec. 13-B were all comprehensive sets of rules., and, therefore, "any other rules  or   regulations"  that  might  be  notified  by  the Government    should    also    satisfy    the    test    of eomprehensiveness.  He   argued  that   a  single   rule  or regulation could not be notified under Sec. 13-B as it would be too  much to say, he said, that the notifying of a single rule or  regulation would  exclude the  applicability of all the provisions  of the  Standing orders Act. We do not think that the notifying of one or many regulations has the effect that Shri Garg apprehends it has. The words ’Nothing in this Act shall  apply’ are not to be interpreted too literally as to lead  to absurd results and to what the legislature never intended. In  our view the only reasonable construction that

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we can  put upon the language of Sec. 13-B is that a rule or regulation, if  notified by the Government, will exclude the applicability of  the Act  to the  extent that  the rule  or regulation corse  the field.  To that  extent  and  to  that extend only  ’nothing in the Act shall apply’. To understand Sec. 13B  in  by  other  manner  will  lead  to  unjust  and uncontemplated results.  For instance,  most of  the Service Rules and Regulations expressly mentioned in Sec. 13-B do no deal with  a large  number of  the matters enumerated in the schedule such  as ’Manner  of intimating  to workman periods and hour  11 of  work, holidays,  pay-days and  wage rates’, ’shift working’,  ’Attendance and  late coming’, ’conditions o, procedure  in applying  for, and  e authority  which  may grant leave and holidays’. ’Closing and 371 reopening of  Sections of  the industrial establishments and temporary   stoppages of work and the rights and liabilities of he  employer  and  workman  arising  therefrom’  etc.  To exclude the applicability of Standing orders relating to all these matters  because  the  Fundamental  Rules,  the  Civil Service Rules  or the Civil Services Control, Classification an  Appeal   Rules  provide   for  a   few.   matters   like ’Classification of  workmen’ or ’suspension or dismissal for misconduct’ would  be to  reverse the  processes of history, apart from  leading to  unjust and untoward results. It will place workmen  once again at the mercy of the employer be he ever so  benign and  it will  certainly  promote  industrial strife. We  have indicated  what according to us is h proper construction of  Sec. 13-B.  That is  the only  construction which gives  meaning and  sense to  Sec. 13-B  and that is a construction which  can legitimately  be said  to conform to the Directive  Principles  of  state  Policy  proclaimed  in Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution.      We, therefore,  hold  that  the  Industrial  Employment (Standing orders)  Act is  a special  law in  regard to  the matters enumerated  in the schedule and the regulations made by the  Electricity Board  with  respect  to  any  of  those matters are  of no effect unless such regulations are either notified by  the Government  under Sec. 13-B or certified by The  Certifying  officer  under  Sec.  5  o  the  Industrial Employment (Standing  orders) Act.  In regard  to matters in respect of which regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor or in respect o which n regulations have been  made by  the  Board,  the  Industrial  Employment (Standing orders)  Act  shall  continue  to  apply.  In  the present case the regulation made by the Board with regard to age o  superannuation  having  been  duly  notified  by  the Government, the regulation shall have effect notwithstanding the fact  hat it  is a  matter which  could be  the  subject matter s)  Standing orders  under the  Industrial Employment (Standing  orders)  Act.  The  respondents  were  therefore, properly retired when they attained the age of is years. the appeal is,  therefore, allowed.  The Writ  Petition field in the Light  Court is  dismissed. The  appellants will pay the costs of  the respondents as directed by this Court on 28-9- 1977. The costs are quantified at Rs. 3,500/-.. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 372