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PETITIONER: U.P.  STATE CO-OPERATIVE LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK LIMITED

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHANDRA BHAN DUBEY AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/12/1998

BENCH: S.Saghir Ahmad, D.P.  Wadhwa.

JUDGMENT:

D.P.Wadhwa, J.

       The three appeals are directed  against  the  common judgment  dated  February  24, 1984 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench)  holding  that  the appellant  is  an  "authority" and an instrumentality of the State and as such amenable to the writ jurisdiction  of  the High  Court  and  setting  aside the dismissal orders passed against the respondents being violative of the Service Rules as applicable to them.

       Respondent - Chandra  Bhan  Dubey  (CA  514/85)  was working as a Branch Accountant in the Nakur Branch, District Saharanpur of  the  appellant.    It  was  alleged  that  he committed various irregularities and  a  charge-sheet  dated June  27,  1080  was  served  upon  him  containing  various charges.   These  included  that  Dubey  locked   the   Bank premisses affecting the very prestige of the Bank as well as of  Branch Manager; that he disclosed confidential letter of the Bank to an unauthorized person; that he did  not  manage properly  to  keep with him the cash and draft receipt books failure of which facilitated  Shri  Birendra  Kumar  Sharma, Assistant Accountant of the Bank (since suspended) to commit embezzlement  and in that he conspired with Sharma; and that he derelicted in the discharge of his  duties.    Dubey  was apprised  of  the  evidence  proposed  to  be  used  in  the disciplinary proceedings.

       In  the  cases  of  Kanta  Prasad  Sharma  (CA   No. 515/855) and  Bhaskara  Chandra Uppadhyaya (CA No.  516/85), Driver  and  Branch  Accountant  of  the  Bank  respectively charges  were that they being the full time employees of the bank participated in the strike which was banned in the Bank by the State Government  and  thus  declared  illegal  which disrupted  the normal working of the Bank; that both of them created an atmosphere of terror along with others  and  also obstructed  other  employees  if  the Bank from working; and thus they instigated them to strike; and that  they  created indiscipline  in  the Bank by participating and organising a meeting illegally in the premises of the Bank during  office hours without prior permission of the competent authority in which   meeting   slogans  were  raised,  exciting  speeches delivered  and  abusive  words  used  against   the   higher officials of the Bank; that with the object of organising an unlawful  strike  they  established  a  "Sangharsh Kosh" and demanded Rs.  10/- from every employee of the Bank  for  the

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purpose;  and  that  they  organised  Employee  Joint Action Committee of the Bank without proper registration under  the Rules  and without prior approval of the competent authority and associated an outsider as convener in that Committee and thus  created  disorder  and  disturbed  the  peace  in  the premises of  the  Bank.   Against Kanta Prasad Sharma it was also a charge that he was suspended by order dated June  19, 1981  but  he  did  not hand over the charge formally and by absenting himself in an unauthorised way  and  further  that after  his  suspension  he  was attached to Regional Office, Bareilly but he did not  join  there  so  far.    Similarly, Bhaskara Chandra Uppadhyaya was further charged that when he was  suspended  on  June 19, 1981 and attached with Regional Officer, Gorakhpur, he did not join there.  The evidence  on which  the charges were framed and which were to be proposed to be used during the  course  of  disciplinary  proceedings were stated in the charge-sheets.

       Respondent  -  Dubey  replied to the charges denying the same.  He said he would like to appear in person  before the Inquiry  Officer  and  put  up  his  version.  He wanted certain documents which he said were not made  available  to him  along  with  the charges and on that account he said he was not in a  position  to  examine  and  cross-examine  the witnesses.   Dubey  was  granted  opportunity to inspect the documents which he did.  He again submitted  his  reply  and ended up by stating as under :-

       "Respected Sir, Regarding  all  the  above         reports  of  embezzlement  I wish to state         that I have done my duty to the best of my         ability and in the best interest  of  Bank         and   the   customers.   I  am  absolutely         innocent.  Therefore,  I  may  kindly   be         exempted  from  the charges framed. If any         error is committed in  letter,  I  may  be         excused.  In  future  on  the  occasion of         personal hearing I will clear may position         after accepting preliminary  and  detailed         reports."

       Dubey  was  then  informed by the Inquiry Officer to present himself before him for hearing and he was  asked  to give  in  writing or orally whatever he wanted to say in his defence.  He did appear before the Inquiry  Officer  on  the date and  time  fixed.  Thereafter he sent further reply and stated that he had nothing to say more in his defence.   The Inquiry  Officer  sent  his  report  holding  charges 2 to 5 proved against him.  A show cause notice was issued to Dubey as to why he be not dismissed from the service of the  Bank. He gave  reply  to  the show cause notice.  After receipt of his  answer  to  the  show  cause  notice  the  disciplinary authority  held the charges established against Dubey and by order dated July 22, 1983 dismissed him from Bank’s service.

       Respondent  -  Sharma  replied  to  the  show  cause notice.  He  did  not  ask  for  any  personal hearing.  The Inquiry Officer submitted his  report  holding  the  charges proved against  Sharma.    He  was  served with a show cause notice as to why he be not dismissed from the service of the Bank.  He gave no reply.  The  disciplinary  authority  held the  charges proved and ordered dismissal of Sharma by order dated July 20/22, 1983.

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       Respondent  Uppadhyaya  submitted  his  reply to the charge-sheet served upon him. He did not desire any personal hearing and only wanted that his explanation as given in his reply be considered  sympathetically.  The  Inquiry  Officer found  the  charges  proved against Uppadhyaya and submitted his report to the  disciplinary  authority.  Uppadhyaya  was served  with  a  show  cause  notice  as  to  why  he be not dismissed from service in view of the charges proved against him. He did not send any reply  to  that.  The  disciplinary authority  accepted the report of the Inquiry Officer and by order dated  July  20/22,  1983  dismissed  Uppadhyaya  from service of the Bank.

       Against  the  dismissal  orders three writ petitions were filed in the High Court which,  as  noted  above,  were allowed by  the impugned judgment.  the High Court negatived the plea of the appellant that it was not amenable  to  writ jurisdiction  being not an "authority" or "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.    On  merit  the High  Court  was  of  the view that relevant Rules regarding holding of inquiry against the delinquent employees were not followed and that the orders of dismissal  did  not  contain any reason.    High Court help that it was not necessary for the  appellant  to  give  any  show  cause  notice  to   the respondents proposing order of dismissal but held that if it was not necessary for the bank to send copy of the report of the inquiry officer then the punishing authority should have either  given  reasons  for  coming to the conclusion of the guilt of the respondents or enclosed the report which it had accepted.   high  Court  was  thus  of  the  view  that  the dismissal  order  were  vitiated  by non-compliance with the rules of natural  justice  and  also  in  violation  of  the statutory  rules  as  applicable  to  the  employees  of the appellant.   High  Court,  however,  left  it  open  to  the appellant,  if  it  so  chose,  to  proceed with the inquiry afresh from the stage after the receipt of the replies  from the respondents to the charge-sheets served upon them.

       The impugned  judgment is assailed before us.  It is submitted that orders of dismissal of the  respondents  were passed with  the prior concurrence of the U.P.  Co-operative Institutional  Services  Board  (for  short,  ’the   Service Board’) as required under Rule 89 of the U.P.  Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Employees Service Rule (for short, ’Service Rules’).   It is stated that appellant is not an "authority" or instrumentality of the State and no writ could be  issued against   it   and  further  that  the  action  against  the respondents had been taken in accordance with the  Rules  as applicable to the employees of the Bank.

       Before  we  consider the rival contentions it may be appropriate at this stage to set out the relevant provisions of law as applicable in these appeals.

       The   appellant   though   a   co-operative  society registered under the U.P.  Co-operative Societies Act,  1965 (for  short, "Societies Act’) is constituted under the Utter Pradesh Co-operative Land Development Bank  Act,  1964  (for short, the  ’Bank  Act’).  It is, therefore, governed by the provisions  of  both  these  Acts  and  the   Rules   framed thereunder.   Section  122  of  the Societies Act prescribes constitution  of  an  authority  to  control  employees   of co-operative societies.    This  Section we may reproduce as under :

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       "122.  Authority  to  control employees of         co-operative  societies:-  (1)  The  State         Government  may constitute an authority or         authorities, in  such  manner  as  may  be         prescribed,  for the recruitment, training         and disciplinary control of the  employees         of  co-operative  societies, or a class of         co-operative societies,  and  may  require         such  authority  or  authorities  to frame         Regulations     regarding     recruitment,         emoluments,   terms   and   conditions  of         service including disciplinary control  of         such   employees   and,   subject  to  the         provisions  contained   in   Section   70,         settlement of disputes between an employee         of a co-operative society and the society.

       (2)   The   Regulations    framed    under         sub-section  (1)  shall  be subject to the         approval  of  the  State  Government   and         shall,  after  such approval, be published         in the Gazette, and take effect  from  the         date   of   such   publication  and  shall         supersede  any  Regulations   made   under         Section 121."

       The  State  Government  constituted  Uttar   Pradesh Co-operative   Institutional   Service  Board  (the  Service Board).   This  Service  Board  with  the  approval  of  the Governor   of   the   State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  promulgated Regulations called U.P.  Co-operative  Societies  Employees’ Service  Regulations,  1975  (for  short, the ’Regulations’) which were published in the U.P.  Gazette dated 6th  January 1976.   The Regulations were applicable with effect from the date of their publication in the U.P.  Gazette.  Clause (xi) of Regulation 2 defines ’employee’ which means a  person  in whole-time  service  of a co-operative society, but does not include a casual worker employed on daily wages or a  person in part-time  service  of  a  society.    Under Regulation 5 recruitment for all appointments in a  co-operative  society shall  be  made  through  the  Board  which  means  the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board.

       Under  Regulation  102  a  co-operative  society  is empowered  to  frame  service  rules for its employees which however,  are  to  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the Regulations.   Under  Regulations 103, the Regulations shall be  deemed  to  be  inoperative  to  the  extent  they   are inconsistent  with  any  of  the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,  U.P.    Dookan  Aur  Vanijya  Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962.    Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and any other labour laws for the time being in force.   Regulations 102 and 103 may be set out as under:

       "102.   (1)  Subject  to the provisions of         these regulations, a co-operative  society         shall within three months from the date of         coming  into  force  of  these regulations         (unless an extension of time is allowed by         the Board in writing frame  service  rules         for its employees.

       (ii)   The   service  rules  framed  under

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       sub-section (i) shall be submitted to  the         Board  for approval and shall be operative         only after the approval.

       (iii) Notwithstanding  anything  contained         in    these   Regulations   the   existing         employees shall have an option to continue         to be governed  by  the  existing  service         rules,  if  any,  in  the  society only in         respect of their emoluments  and  benefits         or  to  opt the new service rules on these         matters.

       Explanations :- (1) Provisions relating to         pay, increments and allowances (other than         travelling allowance), provident fund  and         gratuity  shall  be  deemed as included in         the term "emoluments and benefits".

       (2) In case of any  doubt  or  dispute  in         interpretation  in  respect  of the matter         mentioned in (1) above, reference shall be         made to the Board whose decision shall  be         final.

       (3) Existing service rules means authentic         service  rules  framed  by  and  with  the         approval of the competent authority.

       103.  The provisions of these  regulations         to the extent of their inconsistency, with         any  of  the  provisions of the Industrial         Disputes Act, 1947.    U.P.    Dookan  Aur         Vanijya    Adhisthan    Adhiniyam,   1962,         Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923  and  any         other  labour  laws  for the time being in         force, if applicable to  any  co-operative         society    or    class   of   co-operative         societies,   shall   be   deemed   to   be         inoperative.

       Chapter  VII  of the Regulations contains provisions for penalties, disciplinary proceedings and appeals.   Under Regulation  84,  an employee can be removed from service and he is  to  be  provided  with  the  copy  of  the  order  of punishment.   The  penalty of removal from service cannot be imposed without recourse to disciplinary  proceedings.    An employee  cannot  be  removed  or  dismissed by an authority other than by which he was appointed unless  the  appointing authority  has  made  prior  delegation of such authority to such other person or authority in writing.    Regulation  85 provides in detail as to how disciplinary proceedings are to be conducted.    Any  order of removal or dismissal from the service or reduction in rank or grade held substantively  by the   employee  cannot  be  passed  except  with  the  prior concurrence  of  the  Service  Board   as   required   under Regulation 87.

Under  Regulation  85  disciplinary  proceedings  against an employee shall be conducted by the Inquiry Officer with  due observance of the principles of natural justice for which it shall be necessary that -

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       "(a)  the  employee shall be served with a         charge-sheet containing  specific  charges         and mention of evidence in support of each         charge  and he shall be required to submit         explanation  in  respect  of  the  charges         within  reasonable time which shall not be         less than fifteen days;

       (b)  such  an employee shall also be given         an opportunity to produce at his own  cost         or   to  cross-examine  witnesses  in  his         defence  and  shall  also  be   given   an         opportunity  of  being heard in person, if         he so desires;

       (c)   if  no  explanation  in  respect  of         charge-sheet   is    received    or    the         explanation  submitted  is  unsatisfactory         the  competent  authority  may  award  him         appropriate      punishment     considered         necessary."

       Under  Regulation  102  of the Regulations appellant has framed Service Rules for its employees called  the  U.P. Rajya  Sahakari  Bhumi  Vikas  Bank  Employees Service Rules 1976.  These Rules have been duly approved by the  authority under Section  122  of the U.P.  Co-operative Societies Act, 1965.  For the purpose of the appellant these Service  Rules are to   be   in  conformity  with  the  Regulations.    The requirement  for  disciplinary  proceedings  in  case  where penalty  of  dismissal  is imposed are that (1) disciplinary proceedings shall be taken against the employee on a  report made  to  this  effect  by  the  inspecting  authority or an officer of the Bank under  whose  control  the  employee  is working.    (2)   the   disciplinary  proceedings  shall  be conducted by Inquiry Officer shall observe the principles of natural justice for which it shall  be  necessary  that  the employee  shall  be  served  with  a charge sheer containing specific charges, the evidence in support of each charge and the employee shall be  required  to  submit  explanation  in respect  of  the charge within a reasonable time which shall be not less than 15 days.  The employee shall also be  given an  opportunity  to cross examine or to produce witnesses in his defence at his own cost  and  shall  also  be  given  an opportunity of  being heard in person, if he so desires.  If no explanation in respect of charge sheet is received or the explanation in respect of charge sheet is  received  or  the explanation   submitted   is  unsatisfactory  the  competent authority may award  him  punishment  considered  necessary. Order  imposing  penalty or dismissal from service shall not be  passed  against  the  employee  except  with  the  prior concurrence of  the  Service  Board.  A copy of the order of punishment shall be given to the  employee  concerned.    No penalty  or dismissal from service shall be imposed unless a show cause notice has been given to the employee and he  has either  failed  to  reply  within  the specified time or his reply found to be unsatisfactory by the competent authority.

       It  will  be  seen that all the requirements for the initiation and conclusion of  the  disciplinary  proceedings have  been followed in the present case and rules of natural justice observed.  Proceedings against the respondents  were initiated  on  the  reports  of the officers under whom they were working and these reports formed part of  the  evidence in the  proceedings.   An inquiry proceedings is not held as

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if it is a trial in a criminal case or as if it is  a  civil suit.  Rules of natural justice require that a party against whom  an allegation is being inquired into should be given a hearing and not condemned unheard.  As to what are the rules of natural justice to be followed in a particular case would depend upon the circumstances in each  case  and  mist  also depend  on the provisions of law under which the charges are being inquired into in the  disciplinary  proceedings.    in Nagendra Nath Bora  &  Anr.    vs.    Commissioner  of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Ors.   (AIR  1958  SC  398  at p.409)  this  Court  held that "the rules of natural justice very with the varying constitution of statutory  bodies  and the  rules  prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had  been  contravened  should  be  decided  not  under  any pre-conceived  notions,  but  in  the light of the statutory rules and provisions." The respondents were apprised of  the evidence against each of them and given opportunity of being heard  in  person  and  also to produce evidence in defence. Nothing more  was  required  on  the  part  of  the  Inquiry Officer.   procedure  after  the  receipts  of  the  Inquiry Officer was followed as prescribed.  in our view,  the  High Court,  therefore, fell in error in returning a finding that rules of natural justice  or  the  Regulations  and  Service Rules which are statutory in nature have not been followed.

       We  now  consider  the  question if the appellant is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the  High  Court  under Article 226 of the Constitution.

       Article 226, in relevant part, is as under :

       "226.   Power  of  High  Courts  to  issue         certain writs.    -  (1)   Notwithstanding         anything  in  Article  32 every High Court         shall   have   power,    throughout    the         territories   in   relation  to  which  it         exercises jurisdiction, to  issue  to  any         person    or   authority,   including   in         appropriate cases, any Government,  within         those  territories  directions,  orders or         writs, including writs in  the  nature  of         habeas  corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo         warranto and certiorari, or any  of  them,         for  the  enforcement of any of the rights         conferred by Part III and  for  any  other         purpose."

       We have seen above that the appellant is functioning as a co-operative society under the Societies Act but it has been constituted  under  the  provision of the Bank Act.  In exercise of power  conferred  on  the  State  Government  by Section  30  of  the Bank Act, Rules have been framed called "the U.P.  Cooperative Land Development Banks Rules,  1971". For the service condition of the employees of the appellant, we  have  to  refer to the Societies Act and the Regulations framed by the U.P.  Cooperative Institutional Service  Board constituted  under  Section 122 of the Societies Act as well as to the  Service  Rules  framed  by  the  appellant  under Regulation 102  of  the  Service Regulations.  Service Rules framed by the appellant shall be operative only after  their approval by  the  Institutional Service Board.  Any order of dismissal by the appellant can  be  issued  only  after  its

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approval by  the  aforesaid  Board.  If we refer to the Bank Act, it will be seen that under Section 3 there shall not be more than one State Land Development Bank for the  whole  of the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  and  that  sole  Bank is the appellant.  It has thus exclusive jurisdiction for whole  of the State  of  Uttar  Pradesh.  It can admit as members Land Development Banks whose number can be  as  many  as  may  be deemed necessary by the Registrar of the Cooperative Society for the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh.  Appellant is also vested with various powers under the Bank Act which powers are  not available  to  a cooperative society registered merely under the Societies Act.  If we refer to some of the provisions of the Bank Act it will be  seen  that  the  Registrar  of  the cooperative  societies  for the State of Uttar Pradesh shall be the Trustee for the purpose of securing  the  fulfillment of the obligations of the State Land Development Bank to the holders of debentures issued by the Board of Directors.  The powers and functions of the Trustee shall be governed by the provisions  of  the  Bank Act and by the instrument of Trust executed between the appellant and the Trustee  as  modified or  substituted  from time to time by their mutual agreement and with the approval of the State Government.   Trustee  is to be  a  corporation  sole.   The Board of Directors of the appellant may from time to time issue debentures of  various denominations  with  the  previous  sanction  of  the  State Government and the Trustee and subject  to  such  terms  and conditions  as  the  State Government may impose against the unconditional  guarantee  by  the   State   Government   for repayment  in  full of the principal and payment of interest thereon  or  on  the  security  of  mortgages,  charges   or hypothecations etc.    Under  Section 9 of the Bank Act, the State Government constitutes a Guarantee Fund on such  terms and  conditions  as  it  may  deem  fir,  for the purpose of meeting losses that might arise on account of loans advanced by the Land Development Banks on the security  of  mortgages not  being  fully recovered due to such circumstances as may be prescribed.  The appellant and the Land Development Banks shall contribute to such  fund  at  such  rates  as  may  be prescribed.   Under  Rule  6 of the Bank Rules the Guarantee Fund shall be maintained by the Finance Department of  State Government  in  the  Public  Accounts  Section  of the State Accounts and all contributions  to  the  Fund  and  interest earned  on  investment  made from the fund shall be credited direct to the Fund.  It is not necessary  for  us  to  quote various  other  sections  and  rules by all these provisions unmistakably show that the  affairs  of  the  appellant  are controlled  by the State Government though it functions as a cooperative society and it is certainly an extended  arm  of the  State  and  thus  an  instrumentality  of  the State or authority as mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution.

       We  also  find  from  the  Service  Rules  that  the Managing Director and Chief General Manager of the appellant are  officials  of  the  State  sent  on  deputation  to the appellant.  These two  officers  are  at  the  helm  of  the affairs of  the  appellant.    It  is difficult to imagine a situation where a Government sends one of its  employees  on deputation  to  head a body or institution not controlled by that Government even though the employee may be paid out  of the  funds  of  that  body  or  institutions unless there is specific provision of law so entitling the Government.    We also  find  that  Service  Rules  have been framed under the statute and those Rules have the  approval  of  a  statutory body.   Exercise  of power of dismissal by the appellant has to be in accordance with the statutory regulations and  with

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the approval  of  the  statutory body.  In Sukhdev Singh and others vs.  Bhagatram Sardar Singh Reghuvanshi  and  another [1975  1  SCC  421], a Constitution Bench of this Court held that Regulations being  framed  under  statutory  provisions would have the force of law.

       The language of Article 226 does not  admit  of  any limitation  on  the powers of High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder though by various decisions of  this Court with varying and divergent views it has been held that jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised only when or authority,  decision  of which is complained, was exercising its power in the discharge of public duty and that writ is a public law remedy.  in Rohtas Industries Ltd., & Anr.    vs. Rohtas Industries  Staff  Union & Ors.  [(1976) 2 SCC 82] it was submitted before the Constitution Bench  that  an  award under  Section  10A  of  the  Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 savours of a privates arbitration and was  not  amenable  to correction under Article 226 of the Constitution.  The Court said as under :

       "The  expansive and extraordinary power of         the High Courts under Article  226  is  as         wide as the amplitude of the language used         indicates  and  so  can  affect any person         even  a  private  individual  -   and   be         available  for  any (other) purpose - even         one for which another  remedy  may  exist.         The  amendment  to  Article  226  in  1963         inserting Article 226 (1A) reiterates  the         targets  of the writ power as inclusive of         any person by the expressive reference  to         any  person by the expressive reference to         one  thing  to  affirm  the  jurisdiction,         another  to  authorise  its  free exercise         like a bull in a china shop".  This  Court         has  spelt  out  wise extraordinary remedy         and High Courts will not go  beyond  those         monstrosity  of  the  situation  or  other         exceptional circumstances cry  for  timely         judicial interdict or mandate.  The mentor         of law is justice and a potent Speaking in         critical    retrospect    and   portentous         prospect,  the  writ  power  has,  by  and         large,  been  the people’s sentinel on the         qui vive and to cut back on  or  liquidate         that  power  may  cast  a  peril  to human         rights.  We hold that the  award  here  is         not beyond the legal reach of Article 226,         although   this  power  must  be  kept  in         severely judicious leash.

          May rulings of the High Courts, pro and         con, were cited before us to show that  an         award  under  Section  10A  of  the Act is         insulated from interference under  Article         226  but  we  respectfully  agree with the         observations of Gajendragadkar, J. (as  he         then  was)  in  Engineering  Mazdoor Sabha         [1963 Supp.(1) SCR 625,  640]  which  nail         the  argument  against  the  existence  of         jurisdiction. The learned Judge  clarified         at p.640 :

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          "Article  226  under  which a writ of            certiorari  can   be   used   in   an            appropriate  case,  is,  in  a sense,            wider than Article 136,  because  the            power conferred on the High Courts to            issue    certain    writs    is   not            conditioned   or   limited   by   the            requirement  that  the said writs can            be issued courts or tribunals.  Under            Article  226(1),  an appropriate writ            can  be  issued  to  any  person   or            authority,  including  in appropriate            cases  any  Government,  within   the            territories   prescribed.  Therefore,            even  if  the  arbitrator   appointed            under  Section  10A is not a tribunal            under Article 136 in a proper cases.’            a writ may  lie  against  his  award’            under Article 226".

       In Life  Insurance Corporation of India vs.  Escorts Ltd., And other [(1986)  1  SCC  264]  another  Constitution Bench had to say as under :

       "It  was,  however,  urged  by the learned         counsel for  the  company  that  the  Life         Insurance      Corporation      was     an         instrumentality  of  the  State  and  was,         therefore,  debarred  by  Article  14 from         acting arbitrarily.   It  was,  therefore,         under  an obligation to state to the court         its reasons for the resolution once a rule         nisi was issued to it.  If  it  failed  to         disclose  its  reasons  to  the court, the         court would presume that it had  no  valid         reasons   to  give  and  its  action  was,         therefore, arbitrary.  The learned counsel         relied on the decisions of this  Court  in         Sukhdev      Singh,     Maneka     Gandhi,         International Airport Authority  and  Ajay         Hasia.   The  learned Attorney General, on         the other hand, contended that actions  of         the  State  or  an  instrumentality of the         State or an instrumentality of  the  State         which  do not properly belong to the field         of public law but belong to the  field  of         private law are not liable to be subjected         to judicial  review.    He  relied  on  Of         Reilly v.  Mackman, Davy v.  Spelthone,  I         congress del Partido, R.V.  East, Bershire         Health Authority and Redbakrishna Aggarwal         v.  State  of  Bihar.    While  we do find         considerable force in  the  contention  of         the learned Attorney General it may not be         necessary for us to enter into any lengthy         discussion  of  the  topic,  as  we  shall         presently see.  We  also  desire  to  warn         ourselves  against  readily  referring  to         English    cases    on    questions     of         Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and         Public  Law  as  the law in India in these         branches has forged ahead of  the  law  in

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       England, guided as we are by the technical         rules  which have hampered the development         of the English law".

       In Andi Mukta  S.M.V.S.V.J.M.S.    Trust  & Ors.  v. V.R.  Rudani & Ors.  [(1989) 2 SCC 691] a two Judge Bench of this Court was considering the question of "issue of a  writ of  mandamus  or writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate  writ  or  direction  or  order  directing   the appellant  trust  and its trustees to pay to the respondents their due salary and allowances etc.  in accordance with the Rules framed by the University and to pay them  compensation under certain  Ordinance of the University".  The High Court before which the issue was raised  held  in  favour  of  the respondents.   This  Court  noted  that  the  essence of the attack on the maintainability of  the  writ  petition  under Article  226  by  the  appellant  was  that it being a trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust  Act  was  managing the  college  where  the  respondents  were employed was not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court.   In  other words,  the  contention  was  that  trust  being  a  private institution against which  no  writ  of  mandamus  could  be issued.    In  support  of  the  contention,  the  appellant referred two decisions of this Court :  Executive  Committee of Vaish Degree  College Shamli & Ors.  v.  Lakshmi Narain & Ors.   [(1976)  2  SCC  58]  and  Deepak  Kumar  Biswas  vs. Director of  Public  Instruction  [(1987)  2 SCC 252].  This Court, however distinguished those two  decisions  and  said that  the  facts before it were different and that there was no plea for specific performance of contractual  service  by the respondents now in the case before it.  Respondents were not  seeking a declaration that they be continued in service and they were not asking for mandamus to put them back  into the college.    But  they  were  claiming  only the terminal benefits and  arrears  of  salary  payable  to  them.    The question  thus  was  whether the trust could be compelled to pay by writ of mandamus?  The Court noted  the  observations of Subba Rao, J.    in Dwarkanath, H.U.E.  vs.  ITO, Special Circle Kappur & Anr.  [(1965) 3 SCR 5536] as under :

       "This article is couched in  comprehensive         phraseology  and it exfacie confers a wide         power  on  the  High   Courts   to   reach         injustice wherever   it  is  found.    The         Constitution  designedly   used   a   wide         language  in  describing the nature of the         power,  the  purpose  for  which  and  the         person or authority against whom it can be         exercised.   It  can  issue  writs  in the         nature of prerogative writs as  understood         in  England;  but the scope of those writs         also  is  widened  by  the  use   of   the         expression    "nature",   for   the   said         expression does not equate the writs  that         can  be  issued  in  India  with  those in         England, but only draws  an  analogy  from         them.   That  apart,  High Courts can also         issue directions, orders  or  writs  other         than the  prerogative  writs.   It enables         the High Courts to mould  the  reliefs  to         meet    the   peculiar   and   complicated         requirements of this country.  Any attempt         to equate the scope of the  power  of  the

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       High   Court  under  Article  226  of  the         Constitution  with  that  of  the  English         courts  to  issue  prerogative writs is to         introduce   the   unnecessary   procedural         restrictions  grown  over  the  years in a         comparatively small country  like  England         with  a  unitary form of Government into a         vast country like India functioning  under         a federal  structure.  Such a construction         defeats  the  purpose   of   the   article         itself."

The Court also noted the observations of this Court in Praga Tools Corporation vs.  Sh.  C.A.  Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585} as under :

       "It  is,  however,  not necessary that the         person  or  the  authority  on  whom   the         statutory duty is imposed need be a public         official or  an official body.  A mandamus         can issue, for instance, to an official of         a society to compel him to carry  out  the         terms  of  the  statutes under or by which         the society is constituted or governed and         also to companies or corporations to carry         out duties placed on them by the  statutes         authorising their    undertakings.       A         mandamus would also lie against a  company         constituted  by  a statute for the purpose         of  fulfilling  public   responsibilities.         (Cf.   Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England,  3rd         Edn., Vol.  II, p.  52 and onwards).

       The Court then said :

       "The term "authority" used in Article 226,         in  the  context,  must  receive a liberal         meaning unlike the  term  in  Article  12.         Article   12  is  relevant  only  for  the         purpose  of  enforcement  of   fundamental         rights  as well as non-fundamental rights.         The words "any person or authority used in         Article  226  are,  therefore,   used   in         Article  226  are,  therefore,  not  to be         confined only to statutory authorities and         instrumentalities of the State.  They  may         cover  any other person or body performing         public duty.    The  form  of   the   body         concerned is not very much relevant.  What         is  relevant  is  the  nature  of the duty         imposed on the body.   The  duty  must  be         judged in the light of positive obligation         owned  by  the  person or authority to the         affected party.  No matter by  what  means         the   duty   is  imposed,  if  a  positive         obligation  exists  mandamus   cannot   be         denied."

       And finally it said as under :

       "Here again we may point out that mandamus         cannot  be  denied  on the ground that the         duty to be enforce is not imposed  by  the

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       statute.  Commenting on the development of         this law, Professor De Smith states :  "To         be  enforceable  by mandamus a public duty         does  not  necessarily  have  to  be   one         imposed by  statute.  It may be sufficient         for the  duty  to  have  been  imposed  by         charter,   common   law,  custom  or  even         contract." We  share  this  view.      The         judicial  control  over the fast expanding         maze of bodies affecting the rights of the         people should not be put  into  watertight         compartment.  It should remain flexible to         meet    the   requirements   of   variable         circumstances.  Mandamus is  a  very  wide         remedy  which must be easily available ’to         reach injustice  wherever  it  is  found".         Technicalities  should not come in the way         of granting that relief under Article 226.         We, therefore, reject the contention urged         for the appellants on the  maintainability         of the writ petition."

In  Air  India  Statutory  Corporation and others vs. United Labour Union and  others  (1997  (9)  SCC  377)  this  Court Speaking through a Bench of three Judges said :

       "The public law remedy  given  by  Article         226  of  the  Constitution is to issue not         only  the   prerogative   writs   provided         therein but also any order or direction to         enforce  any of the fundamental rights and         "for any other purpose".  The  distinction         between  public law and private law remedy         by   judicial    adjudication    gradually         marginalised and  became  obliterated.  In         LIC vs.  Escorts Ltd.  [(1986) 1SCC 264 at         344], this  Court  in  paragraph  102  had         pointed  out  that the difficulty will lie         in demarcating the  frontier  between  the         public  law  domain  and  the  private law         field.  The question must  be  decided  in         each case with reference to the particular         action, the activity in which the State is         engaged  when  performing  the action, the         public law or private law character of the         question and the host  of  other  relevant         circumstances.   Therein, the question was         whether the for accepting the purchase  of         the shares?  It was in that fact situation         that  this  Court  held  that there was no         need to state reasons when the  management         of  the shareholders by resolution reached         the decision.  This Court equally  pointed         out  in  other cases that when the State’s         power   as   economic   entrepreneur   and         allocator  of economic benefits is subject         to the limitations of fundamental  rights,         a private Corporation under the functional         control   of   the  state  engaged  in  an         activity  hazardous  to  the  health   and         safety  of  the  community, is imbued with

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       public interest which the State ultimately         proposes to regulate  exclusively  on  its         industrial policy.     It  would  also  be         subject to the same limitations as held in         M.C.  Mehta & Ors.  vs.  Union of India  &         Ors.  [(1987) 1 SCC 395]".

       A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Konaseema  Co-operative  Central  Bank  Ltd., Amalapuram and another vs.  N.  Seetharama Raju [AIR 1990 A.P.    171]  was considering the question whether a writ petition lay against a  cooperative society and if it does, in what circumstance. After examining  various  decisions  and  treatises  on  the subject  it  was  stated that even if a society could not be characterised as a ’State’ within the meaning of Article  12 even  so  a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty which an employee is entitled to enforce against the society.  In such a case, it is unnecessary to  go  into the  question  whether  the  society  is  being treated as a ’person’, or an ’authority’, within the meaning  of  Article 226 of  the Constitution.  What is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon  it,  and  the  Court  is  to enforce such statutory public duty.

       In view of  the  fact  that  control  of  the  State Government  on  the  appellant  is  all  pervasive  and  the employees  had  statutory  protection  and   therefore   the appellant  being an authority or even instrumentality of the State would be amenable to writ  jurisdiction  of  the  High Court under  Article 226 of the Constitution.  It may not be necessary to examine any further the question if Article 226 makes a divide between public law and private  law.    Prima facie  from  the  language of the Article 226 there does not appear to exist such a divide.  To understand  the  explicit language  of  the Article it is not necessary for us to rely on the decision of English Courts as  rightly  cautioned  by the earlier  Benches  of  this  Court.  It does appear to us that Article 226 while empowering the High Court  for  issue of  orders or directions to any authority or person does not make  any  such  difference  between  public  functions  and private functions.   It is not necessary for us in this case to go into this question as to what is the nature, scope and amplitude  of  the  writs  of   habeas   corpus,   mandamus, prohibition, quo   warranto   and   certiorari.    They  are certainly founded on the English  system  of  jurisprudence. Article  226  of  the Constitution also speaks of directions and orders which can be issued to any  person  or  authority including, in  appropriate  cases,  any  Government.   Under clause (1) of  Article  367  unless  the  context  otherwise requires,  the  General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be  made  therein under  Article  372  apply  for  the  interpretation  of the Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an  Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India.  "Person" under Section  2(42)  of the General Clauses Act shall include any company, or association  or  body  of  individuals,  whether incorporation or not.  Constitution in not a statute.  It is a fountain  head  of all the statutes.  When the language of Article 226 is clear, we cannot put  shackles  on  the  High Courts   to   limit   their   jurisdiction   by  putting  an interpretation  on  the  words  which  would   limit   their jurisdiction.   When  any  citizen or person is wronged, the High Court will step in to protect him,  be  that  wrong  be

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done  by  the  State,  an  instrumentality  of  the State, a company or a cooperative society or association or  body  of individuals   whether   incorporated  or  not,  or  even  an individual.  Right that is infringed may be under  Part  III of the Constitution or any other right which the law validly made might  confer  upon  him.  But then the power conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 of  the  Constitution is  so vast, this court has laid down certain guidelines and self-imposed limitations have  been  put  there  subject  to which  High  Courts  would  exercise jurisdiction, but those guidelines cannot be mandatory in all circumstances.    High Court   does  not  interfere  when  an  equally  efficacious alternative remedy is available or when there is established procedure to remedy a wrong or enforce a right.  A party may not be allowed to by-pass the normal channel  of  civil  and criminal litigation.    High  Court  does  not  act  like  a proverbial ’bull in china  shop’  in  the  exercise  of  its jurisdiction under Article 226.

       We, therefore, hold that appellant is  an  authority controlled by the State Government and the service condition of  the  employees of the appellant particularly with regard to disciplinary proceedings against them  are  statutory  in nature  and  thus writ petition was maintainable against the appellant.  To this extent, we agree with  the  High  Court. However,  disciplinary  proceedings  were  held  against the respondents in accordance with law with  due  observance  of the rules  of  natural  justice.    The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, not correct to that extent.

       The  appeals  are,   therefore,   allowed   impugned judgment of the High Court holding that the dismissal of the respondents  was  not  legal  is  set  aside  and  the  writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed.