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CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (crl.) 3978  of  1999

PETITIONER: U.P. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S MOHAN MEAKINS LTD. AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       27/03/2000

BENCH: K.T. THOMAS & M.B. Shah

JUDGMENT:

THOMAS, J. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

   River  "Gomti"  is a tributary of Ganga.  It is  a  bane that  almost  all  rivers in India are  now  saturated  with pollutants  and  the  holy  river is not  spared  from  that malady.   What  causes  greater concern to  those  for  whom rivers  flowed  sanctified  waters, and to those,  for  whom rivers  supplied potable water, is the frightening gallop of pollution  level in recent decades.  The measures evolved by the  Parliament  to control the escalating poisoning of  our streams  have  not  yielded  the desired results  due  to  a variety of causes.  The present is a case in which the trade effluents  discharged  by  an industrial unit of  a  premier liquor  processing  company  made the water  in  Gomti  more polluted  to  impermissible levels.  So the State  Pollution Control  Board (‘the Board’ for short) initiated proceedings for  prosecuting M/s Mohan Meakins Limited and its Directors way  back in 1983.  Alas, the canoe remains at the  starting point  itself in spite of lapse of long seventeen years till now.

   Though  the  trial  court  issued  process  against  the accused  at the first instance, they desired the trial court to discharge them without even making their first appearance in the court.  When the attempt made for that purpose failed they  moved for exemption from appearance in the court.   In the  meanwhile  the  Sessions Judge, Lucknow  (Shri  Prahlad Narain)  entertained a revision moved by the accused against the  order  issuing process to them and, quashed it  on  the erroneous  ground  that  the  magistrate  did  not  pass  "a speaking order" for issuing such summons.

   The   Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,   (before  whom   the complaint  was filed) thereafter passed a detailed order  on 25.4.1984  and  again issued process to the  accused.   That order was again challenged by the accused in revision before the Sessions Court and the same Sessions Judge (Shri Prahlad Narain) again quashed it by order dated 25.8.1984.

   The Board moved the High Court in a revision against the

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said  order.   Though the motion was made in 1984 itself  it took  fifteen  years  for  the High Court  to  dismiss  that revision  petition  as  per the order passed  by  a  learned Single  Judge  on 27.7.1999.  The special leave petition  to appeal  is  filed in challenge of the said  order.   Special leave granted.

   We  may  point out at the very outset that the  Sessions judge  was  in error for quashing the process at  the  first round  merely  on  the  ground   that  the  Chief   Judicial Magistrate  had not passed a speaking order.  In fact it was contended before the Sessions judge, on behalf of the Board, that  there  is no legal requirement in Section 204  of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure (For short the ‘Code’) to record reasons  for  issuing process.  But the said contention  was spurned down in the following words:

   "My  attention has been drawn to Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it has been argued that no reasons for summoning an accused persons need be given.  I feel that under  Section  204 aforesaid, a Magistrate has to  form  an opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding and, if  an opinion had to be formed judicially, the only mode of doing  so  is to find out express reasons for coming to  the conclusions.   In the impugned order, the learned Magistrate has  neither specified any reasons nor has he even formed an opinion  much  less about there being sufficient ground  for not proceeding with the case."

   In  a  recent decision of the Supreme Court it has  been pointed  out  that the legislature has stressed the need  to record  reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint  without issuing process.  There is no such  legal requirement  imposed  on a magistrate for  passing  detailed order  while  issuing  summons vide Kanti  Bhadra  Shah  vs. State  of  West  Bengal [2000(1) SCC  722].   The  following passage will be apposite in this context:

   "If  there is no legal requirement that the trial  court should  write  an  order showing the reasons for  framing  a charge,  why  should  the already burdened trial  courts  be further  burdened  with  such an extra work.  The  time  has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing  avoidable  delays.   If a Magistrate  is  to  write detailed  orders  at  different   stages,  the   snail-paced progress  of  proceedings in trial courts would  further  be slowed  down.  We are coming across interlocutory orders  of Magistrates  and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We  can appreciate if such a detailed order has been  passed for  culminating  the  proceedings before them.  But  it  is quite  unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such  as issuing process, remanding the accused to  custody, framing  of  charges,  passing over to next  stages  in  the trial."

(Emphasis supplied)

   It  was unfortunate that the Sessions judge himself  did not  look  into the complaint at that stage to form his  own opinion  whether process could have been issued by the Chief Judicial  Magistrate on the basis of the averments contained in  the complaint.  Instead the sessions judge relegated the work  to  the trial magistrate for doing the  exercise  over

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again.   After  the  Chief Judicial  Magistrate  passed  the second order issuing process, the Sessions judge quashed the said  order  on  the second occasion also and  stated  thus: "Having  scrutinized  the array of accused persons  in  this complaint,  I  have felt that since no specific role in  the flowing  of the polluted effluents into the river Gomti  has been assigned to any of the present applicant Nos., 2 to 11, the  law  laid down in the Delhi Municipal Corporation  case referred to above requires that the impugned order summoning the  present  applicant  Nos.   2 to 11  must  be  quashed." Learned  Sessions judge relied on the decision of this court in  Municipal  Corporation of Delhi vs.  Ram Kishan  Rohtagi [1983  (1)  SCC 1].  Though an attempt was made  before  the Sessions  judge to offset the impact of the said decision by citing  a  later  decision  of   this  Court  in   Municipal Corporation  of  Delhi vs.  Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala  [AIR 1983  (1)  SCC 9] it did not deter the Sessions  judge  from quashing  the order passed by the magistrate issuing summons on  the  second occasion.  Learned single judge of the  High Court who heard the revision confirmed the said order as per the  impugned  judgment in which it is stated,  inter  alia, thus:

   "In  the present case the revisionist has not been  able to  show that the directors (opp.  parties Nos.5 to 13) were in  charge of or responsible to the company for the  conduct of  the business of the company.  No effort was made at  the hearing before this Court to show that such allegations were contained in the complaint filed by the revisionist."

   In  Municipal  Corporation  of  Delhi  vs.   Ram  Kishan Rohtagi  &  ors.   {1983 (1) SCC 1} cited  by  the  Sessions judge,  and sought to be relied on here also by the  learned counsel for the respondents, a two Judge Bench of this Court considered  the  validity of prosecution  proceedings  taken under  the  Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.  The  Delhi High  Court had quashed the complaint filed by the Municipal Corporation  of  Delhi against a company and its manager  as well  as  the  directors,  against whom  the  offence  under Section  7 read with Section 16 of the FPA Act was  alleged. On  the factual position this Court noticed that "so far  as the Directors are concerned, there is not even a whisper nor a  shred  of evidence nor anything to show, apart  from  the presumption  drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed  by the Directors from which reasonable  inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable." It was  only  on the said fact situation that the complaint  as against the Directors was quashed.  In Municipal Corporation of  Delhi vs.  Purshottam Dass (supra) the same Bench of two Judges  pointed  out the different factual position  therein that  "a  clear averment has been made regarding the  active role  played  by  the  respondents  (the  Directors  of  the company)  of  the extent of their liability," and hence  the court declined to quash the complaint.

   Neither  of  the above decisions has laid down  a  legal position  which can be of any use to the respondents in this case  for contending that the Directors cannot be prosecuted for  the  offence  alleged.  In the complaint filed  by  the appellant  before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the company (M/s.  Mohan Meakins Ltd.) has been arrayed as first accused and  the  other persons who were arrayed as accused 2 to  10 were  described  as the Directors of the said company.   The 11th person arrayed in the complaint as accused is described as  the  Manager  of  the Company.   The  averments  in  the

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complaint  show  that the Distillery unit of the company  at Daltonganj,  Lucknow,  has  been discharging  noxious  trade effluents  into  the  river  Gomti  and  causing  continuous pollution  of  the  river.  It was further  averred  in  the complaint that on 19-9-1982, samples of trade effluents were collected by the officers empowered in this behalf, from the drain  "just outside the plant inside the factory", and from the  irrigation plant out of which the effluents were pumped into  the  river.   When the samples were  analysed  in  the Industrial  Toxicology  Research  Center,  Lucknow,  it  was revealed  that  the  quality  of effluents  was  beyond  the standard  laid  down  for  the purpose.   Therefore,  it  is alleged  that the company has violated Section 24 of the Act and  thereby  the  company is guilty of  the  offence  under Section 43 of the Act.

   Where  an offence under the Act has been committed by  a company   every  person  who  was  in  charge  of  and   was responsible  to the company for the conduct of the  business of  the  company is also made guilty of the offence  by  the statutory  creation.  Any Director, Manager or other officer of  the  company,  who has consented to or connived  in  the commission  of  the  said offence, is made  liable  for  the punishment of the offence.  This is clearly discernible from Section 47 of the Act.

   "47.   Offences  by companies.- Where an  offence  under this Act has been committed by a company every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible  to the company for the conduct of the  business of  the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed  to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

   Provided  that  nothing contained in this  sub-  section shall  render  any  such  person liable  to  any  punishment provided  in  this  Act if he proves that  the  offence  was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

   (2)  Notwithstanding  anything contained in  sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or, is attributable to any neglect  on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other  officer  of  the  company,  such  director,  manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of  that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly."

   In  the above context what is to be looked at during the stage of issuing process is whether there are allegations in the  complaint  by  which the Managers or Directors  of  the company  can also be proceeded against, when the company  is alleged  to  be guilty of the offence.  Paragraph 12 of  the complaint reads thus:

   "That   the   accused  persons  from   2   to   11   are directors/managers/partners   of    M/s.     Mohan   Meakins Distillery,   Daliganj,  Lucknow,  as   mentioned  in   this complaint  are responsible for constructing the proper works and  plant for the treatment of their highly polluting trade effluent  so  as  to conform the standard laid down  by  the Board.   Aforesaid accused persons are deliberately avoiding

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to  abide  the  provisions  of sections 24  and  26  of  the aforesaid  Act  which  are   punishable  respectively  under Sections  43 and 44 of the aforesaid Act, for which not only the  company but its directors, managers, secretary and  all other   responsible  officers  of   the   accused   company, responsible  for the conduct of its business are also liable in  accordance  with the provision of the Section 47 of  the Act."

   The  appellant has further stated in paragraph 23 of the complaint  that  "the  Chairman,   Managing  Directors   and Directors of the company are the persons responsible for the act  and therefore, they are liable to be proceeded  against according to the law."

   Shri  P.Chidambaram,  learned senior counsel who  argued for  respondents made a fervent plea to rescue the Directors of  the  company on the ground of lapse of a long  time  now since  the institution of the complaint.  Lapse of seventeen years  is  no doubt considerable, but the Board is  not  the least  to be blamed for it.  Since it is not a pleasant task to  probe into the causes which contributed for such a  long delay  we  choose  to  refrain  from  doing  that  exercise. Nonetheless, lapse of such long period cannot be a reason to absolve  the respondents from the trial.  It must reach  its logical  culmination.  Courts cannot afford to lightly  deal with  cases  involving  pollution  of air  and  water.   The message must go to all concerned.  The courts will share the parliamentary  concern on the escalating pollution level  of our  environment.   Those  who discharge  noxious  polluting effluents  to streams may be unconcerned about the  enormity of  the  injury  which it inflicts on the public  health  at large,  the irreparable impairment it causes on the  aquatic organisms,  the  deleteriousness it imposes on the life  and health  of animals.  So the courts should not deal with  the prosecution  for  offences  under  the Act in  a  casual  or routine  manner.   Parliamentary  concern in the  matter  is adequately   reflected   in   strengthening   the   measures prescribed  by the statute.  The court has no  justification for ignoring the seriousness of the subject.

   We  are,  therefore, not inclined to accede to the  plea made  by  Shri  Chidambaram on the ground of lapse  of  long period  now.  Of course this lapse of long period is a  good reason  for expediting the trial.  Now the deck is clear and hence  the  trial  court can proceed with  faster  pace  and accelerated velocity.

   If  any  of the accused applies for dispensing with  his personal  presence  in  the court, after  making  the  first appearance,  the trial court can exempt him from  continuing to  appear in the court by imposing any condition which  the court  deems fit.  Such conditions can include, inter  alia, that  a counsel on his behalf would be present when the case is  called,  that he would not dispute his identity  as  the particular accused in the case, and that he would be present in court when such presence is imperatively needed.

   Subject  to  the  above observations, we set  aside  the impugned  judgment of the High Court as well as the order of the  Sessions  Court.  We direct the trial court to  proceed with  the  case in accordance with law and dispose it of  as expeditiously as possible.

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