http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (civil) 4436-4437  of  1998 Special Leave Petition (civil)  5241-5242        of  1998 Special Leave Petition (civil)  12654    of  1998

PETITIONER: U.P.  POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S.  KANORIA INDUSTRIAL LTD.  AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       24/01/2001

BENCH: S.V.Patil, S.R.Babu

JUDGMENT:

L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

     J U D G M E N T

     Shivaraj V.  Patil, J.

     In  all these cases the controversy raised relates  to the claim of refund of the amount paid by the respondents as water cess under the provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control  of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 (for short the Act). Briefly  stated,  the facts leading to the filing  of  these petitions are:  The respondents are the owners of industrial units  manufacturing sugar from sugarcane and liquor/alcohol from  molasses, a by- product.  On demand made by the  State Government  under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  they  were required  to  pay  water cess.  They protested  against  the demand  principally  contending  that   sugar  industry  and distillery  were not industries covered by Entry No.  15  of Schedule  I  of the Act and consequently they  were  neither liable to submit any return nor to make any payment of water cess;   when their protests were not accepted and the demand persisted for payment of water cess the respondents paid the amount  under  protest.  Some of them filed  writ  petitions Nos.  3558 of 1980, 494 of 1980 and 17646 of 1986.  The writ petitions  came to be dismissed.  Thereafter, special  leave petitions  were filed before this Court, which were disposed by  judgment  in  M/s.  Saraswati Sugar Mills  vs.   Haryana State  Board  and others [(1992) 1 SCC 418],  reversing  the decision  of  the  High  Court and holding  that  the  sugar manufacturing  industries  did not fall within Entry  15  of Schedule I of the Act.  After the said judgment was rendered by this Court representations were made to the Board and the Cess  Officer/Assessing Authority of the Board for refund of the  amounts  illegally  and without the  authority  of  law realized   by   them  as   water  cess.    Despite   several representations there was no response from the Board and its authorities.  Hence the writ petitions were filed consequent upon  law  declared by this Court in Saraswati  Sugar  Mills case (supra) seeking a mandamus to the petitioners to refund

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

the  amount collected from them as cess with interest @  18% per  annum.  In the writ petitions it was contended that the writ  petitioners  themselves have paid the amount as  water   under protest and they had not passed on the liability  to the  customers.  The petitioners contested the claim made by the  respondents  before  the High Court.   They  filed  the counter  affidavit  in the High Court, in short  taking  the stand  that  the respondents were not entitled to refund  of any  amount  from  the  Board for  the  reasons  that  after collection,   the  amount  has  been   paid  to  the   State Government,  which  in  turn  has paid  the  amount  to  the Government  of  India;  referring to the representations  of the respondents it was stated that a reference had been made to  the  State Government in the matter and their reply  was awaited;   after the judgment in M/s.  Saraswati Sugar Mills case  (supra) Entry 15 of Schedule I of the Act was  amended with  effect  from  2.1.1992 covering sugar  industries  and distilleries  and making them liable to pay water cess under the amended provisions of Entry 15 of Schedule I of the Act. In  these  petitions,  we are not concerned  with  the  said amended  Entry  and  the levy and collection  of  cess  from 2.1.1992.   The  High  Court, after  considering  the  rival submissions  and  relying  few   judgments  of  this  Court, disposed  of the writ petitions directing the petitioners to refund  the sums realized from the respondents as water cess after verification of the amount stated to have been paid by them  within  the  given time.  Hence the  petitioners  have filed  these  special  leave petitions.  Shri  Altaf  Ahmed, learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  appearing  for  the petitioners  in special leave petitions 4436- 4437 of  1998, contended  (1) that in the absence of any specific direction given by this Court in Saraswati Sugar Mills case for refund of  the  amount collected under the provisions of  law,  the respondents   were  not  entitled   for  refund;   (2)   the respondents  having  failed  in the earlier  writ  petitions challenging  the very levy of cess before the High Court and having  not  challenged the order of the High Court  further could  not make claim for refund on the basis of  subsequent judgment of this Court;  (3) in view of the decision of this Court  in Orissa Cement vs.  State of Orissa [1991 Supp.   1 SCC  430]  no  direction could be given for  refund  of  the amount;   mere  prayer  for  grant of refund  could  not  be granted  by  issuing a writ of mandamus;  and (4)  the  High Court  could not have entertained the writ petitions of  the respondents  after  inordinate delay of about 4 to  5  years when  their  earlier writ petitions were dismissed in  1987. Shri  Sudhir  Chandra, learned senior counsel and Ms.   Indu Malhotra  and  Shri  H.K.   Puri, learned  counsel  for  the respondents  submitted  that having regard to the facts  and circumstances  of  these cases and in the light of  the  law laid  down  by  this Court as referred to  in  the  impugned judgment, the High Court was quite justified in allowing the claim of the respondents for refund of the amount;  when the collection  of cess was wholly illegal and not authorized as Entry  15  of  Schedule  I of the Act did  not  cover  sugar industry  and  distillery  prior  to the  amendment  of  the Schedule,  the  respondents were entitled for refund of  the amount;   since  the  respondents had paid  the  cess  under protest  the ground of delay could not be put against  them; the  writ  petitions filed by them earlier  challenging  the validity  of collecting cess under Entry 15 of Schedule I of the  Act  were  dismissed by the High  Court  following  the decision  of  the Division Bench of the same High  Court  in Civil  Miscellaneous  Writ  No.  21497 of  1986  (The  Kisan Sahkari  Chini  Mills Ltd.  Badaun vs.  State of  U.P.   and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

others),  taken in appeal to this Court and was heard  along with  Saraswati  Sugar Mills case;  since the  appeal  filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court was   reversed   in   the   Saraswati   Sugar   Mills   case aforementioned,  the argument that the earlier orders passed in  some writ petitions had become final was only technical. Shri  Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for  respondents in  special leave petitions 5241-5242 of 1998 supporting the submissions  made  by  the   learned  Additional   Solicitor General,  added that writ petitions seeking writ of mandamus only  for refund of the amount were not at all maintainable. He  cited few decisions in support of this submission.   The arguments  of  the learned counsel for the  respondents  are already  noticed above in special leave petitions  4436-4437 of 1998.  The learned counsel for the respondents in special leave  petition  12654  of  1998  submitted  that  when  the petitioners  did  not  make  refund   in  spite  of  several representations  a writ petition was filed and the same  was disposed  of  on  8.1.1998  following  the  common  judgment impugned  in  special leave petitions 4436-4437 of 1998  and 5241-5242  of  1998.  He submitted that the respondents  had also  paid  the  amount under protest and in the  matter  of refund  the respondents stand on the similar footing as  the respondents   in  other  petitions.    We   have   carefully considered  the submissions made by the learned counsel  for@@                                         JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ the parties.  On the question of maintainability of the writ@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ petitions  we may notice few decisions of this Court on  the very  point  as  to  claim for refund of  money  in  a  writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  In HMM  Limited and another vs.  Administrator, Bangalore  City Corporation and another [(1989) 4 SCC 640] it is held that a tax  or money realized without authority of law is bad under Article 265 of the Constitution and that the money or tax so collected  are  refundable.  In that case octroi was  levied and  collected  in respect of goods on their  mere  physical entry  into the city limits, which were not used or consumed or  sold  within the municipal limits.  This Court,  dealing with  the  refund in para 12 of the judgment, held thus:   - We  see no ground as to why amount should not be  refunded. Realisation  of tax or money without the authority of law is bad under Article 265 of the Constitution.  Octroi cannot be levied  or collected in respect of goods which are not  used or  consumed or sold within the municipal limits.  So  these amounts become collection without the authority of law.  The respondent is a statutory authority in the present case.  It has  no  right  to retain the amount, so far  and  so  much. These are refundable within the period of limitation.  There is no question of limitation.  There is no dispute as to the amount.   There  is no scope of any possible dispute on  the plea  of  undue  enrichment  of the  petitioners.   We  are, therefore,  of  the opinion that the Division Bench  was  in error  in  the view it took.  Where there is no question  of undue enrichment, in respect of money collected or retained, refund,  to  which a citizen is entitled, must be made in  a situation like this.

     [emphasis supplied]

     This  case  fully  supports the  submissions  made  on behalf  of the respondents.  Similar view was taken by  this Court   in  Salonah  Tea  Company   Ltd.   Etc.,  vs.    The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong and others, etc.  [AIR 1990 SC  772].   Para 6 of the said judgment reads:  -  6.   The only  question that falls for consideration here is  whether in  an application under Article 226 of the Constitution the Court  should  have directed refund.  It is the case of  the appellant  that  it  was after the judgment in the  case  of Loong  Soong  Tea  Estate the cause of action  arose.   That judgment  was passed in July 1973.  It appears thus that the High  Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that it was possible for the appellant to know about the legality of the  tax sought to be imposed as early as 1963, when the Act in   question   was  declared   ultra  vires  as   mentioned hereinbefore.   Thereafter  the  taxes were  paid  in  1968. Therefore  the claim in November, 1973 was belated.  We  are unable   to  agree  with   this  conclusion.   As  mentioned hereinbefore  the  question  that  arises in  this  case  is whether  the  Court  should direct refund of the  amount  in question.   Courts  have  made a distinction  between  those cases  where  a  claimant approaches a  High  Court  seeking relief of obtaining refund only and those refund were sought as  a consequential relief after striking down of the  order of  assessment etc.  Normally speaking in a society governed by  rule of law taxes should be paid by citizens as soon  as they  are  due  in  accordance  with  law.   Equally,  as  a corollary of the said statement of law it follows that taxes collected  without the authority of law as in this case from a  citizen should be refunded because no State has the right to  receive  or  to  retain taxes or  monies  realized  from citizens without the authority of law.

     [emphnasis supplied]

     In the para extracted above, in a similar situation as@@                                                           II arising  in the present cases relating to the very  question of  refund, while answering the said question affirmatively, this Court pointed out that the courts have made distinction between those cases where a claimant approached a High Court seeking  relief  of  obtaining refund only and  those  where refund  was sought as a consequential relief after  striking down  of  the order of assessment etc.  In these cases  also the  claims  made  for  refund in the  writ  petitions  were consequent  upon  declaration  of law made  by  this  Court. Hence,  High  Court committed no error in  entertaining  the writ  petitions.   This  Court  again  in  Shree  Baidyanath Ayurved  Bhawan  Pvt.  Ltd.  Vs.  State of Bihar and  others [(1996)  6  SCC 86], held that such a writ petition even  if assumed  to be only for money was maintainable under Article 226  of  the Constitution observing thus in para 10  of  the judgment:   -  10.   The writ petition was  not  a  run-of- the-mill case.  It was a case where the respondent-State had not  acted as this Court had expected a high  constitutional authority to act, in furtherance of the order of this Court. That  is  something  that  this Court  cannot  accept.   The respondent-State was obliged by this Courts order to refund to  the  writ  petitioners, including  the  appellants,  the amounts collected from them in the form of the levy that was held  to  be illegal.  If there was good reason in  law  for rejecting the refund claim, it should have been stated.  Not to  have  responded to the appellants refund claim  for  11 years  and then to have turned it down without reason is  to have  acted  disrespectfully to this Court.  Even  assuming, therefore, that this was a writ petition only for money, the writ  petition  fell  outside the ordinary  stream  of  writ petitions  and,  acting upon it, the High Court should  have

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

ordered the refund.

     This  Court  in  Orissa Cement Ltd..   vs.   State  of Orissa  and  others.  [(1991) Supp.  1 SCC 430], in para  71 has stated thus:  - Once the principle that the court has a discretion  to  grant or decline refund is  recognized,  the ground  on  which such discretion should be exercised  is  a matter  of consideration for the court having regard to  all the circumstances of the case.

    The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly relied on  a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Mafatlal@@     JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ Industries Ltd. and others vs. Union of India and others [(1997) 5 SCC 536].  That was a case where refund was claimed on the ground that tax/duty had been collected by misinterpreting or misapplying the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 read with Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 or Customs Act, 1962 and the Rules and Regulations or the notifications issued under such enactments.  In such cases claims for refund had to be preferred under and in accordance with the provisions of the respective enactments before the authorities specified and within the period of limitation prescribed therein.  Hence it was held that petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could not be entertained having regard to the legislative intention evidenced by the provisions of the said Act and the writ petition, if any, would be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-B of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 stating that power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not to abrogate it.  In the present cases there is no corresponding section to Section 11-B of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 for making claim for refund of money and, therefore, the respondents could maintain the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution.  Further in para 108(ii) of the judgment it is held that where, however, a refund is claimed on the ground that the provisions of the Act under which it was levied is or has been held to be unconstitutional, such a claim, being a claim outside the purview of the enactment, can be made either by way of suit or by way of writ petition.

     In  support  of  the submission that a  writ  petition seeking   mandamus  for  mere  refund   of  money  was   not maintainable,  the decision in Suganmal vs.  State of Madhya Pradesh  and others [AIR 1965 SC 1740] was cited.  In para 6 of  the  said  judgment, it is stated that we  are  of  the opinion  that though the High Courts have power to pass  any appropriate  order  in the exercise of the powers  conferred under  Article  226  of the Constitution,  such  a  petition solely praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State to refund the money is not ordinarily maintainable for  the  simple reason that a claim for such a  refund  can always  be  made in a suit against the authority  which  had illegally  collected  the money as a tax. Again in para  9, the  Court  held  :-  We,  therefore,  hold  that  normally petitions solely praying for the refund of money against the State  by a writ of mandamus are not to be entertained.  The aggrieved  party  has the right of going to the civil  court for claiming the amount and it is open to the State to raise all  possible defences to the claim, defences which  cannot, in  most cases be appropriately raised and considered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.

     This  judgment  cannot be read as laying down the  law that  no writ petition at all can be entertained where claim

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

is made for only refund of money consequent upon declaration of  law  that  levy  and  collection   of  tax  /  cess   as unconstitutional or without the authority of law.  It is one thing  to say that the High Court has no power under Article 226  of  the  Constitution to issue a writ of  mandamus  for making  refund of the money illegally collected.  It is  yet another  thing  to  say  that such power  can  be  exercised sparingly depending on facts and circumstances of each case. For  instance,  in the cases on hand where facts are not  in dispute,  collection of money as cess was itself without the authority  of law;  no case of undue enrichment was made out and  the  amount of cess was paid under protest;   the  writ petitions  were filed within a reasonable time from the date of  the  declaration that the law under which  tax/cess  was collected  was unconstitutional.  There is no good reason to deny a relief of refund to the citizens in such cases on the principles of public interest and equity in the light of the cases  cited above.  However, it must not be understood that in  all cases where collection of cess, levy or tax is  held to  be  unconstitutional  or   invalid,  the  refund  should necessarily follow.  We wish to add that even in cases where collection   of   cess,   levy  or   tax  is  held   to   be unconstitutional  or  invalid,  refund is not  an  automatic consequence  but may be refused on several grounds depending on facts and circumstances of a given case.

     Another  reason  to  defeat the claim for  refund  put forth  is  that  the respondents have filed  writ  petitions challenging  unsuccessfully the validity of levy in question and  those  orders have become final inasmuch as  no  appeal against  the  same  has been filed.  The contention  is  put forth  either on the basis of res judica or estoppel.  It is no doubt true that these principles would be applicable when a  decision  of  a court has become final.  But  in  matters arising  under public law when the validity of a  particular provision  or  levy  is  under  challenge,  this  Court  has explained  the  legal position in M/s.  Shenoy and Co.   vs. Commercial  Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore & Ors.,  [1985 (2)  SCC 512] that when the Supreme Court declares a law and holds  either  a particular levy as valid or invalid  it  is idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that judgment  would  bind only those parties who are before  the Court  and not others in respect of whom appeal had not been filed.   To  do  so  is to ignore the binding  nature  of  a judgment   of   this  Court  under   article  141   of   the Constitution.   To  contend that the conclusion  reached  in such a case as to the validity of a levy would apply only to the  parties before the court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141  illusory.  When the main judgment of the High Court has been  rendered  ineffective, it would be applicable even  in other  cases,  for  exercise  to bring  those  decisions  in conformity  with the decisions of the Supreme Court will  be absolutely  necessary.  Viewed from that angle, we find this contention  to  be futile and deserves to be rejected.   The next  case  relied  on  by   the  petitioners  is  Municipal Corporation   of   Greater   Bombay    vs.    Bombay   Tyres International  Ltd.  & others [(1998) 4 SCC 100] to  support the  contention that the claim for refund could be made only within  the period of limitation prescribed for filing suits for  recovery of the amount due.  S.  Rajendra Babu J., (one of  us) speaking for the Bench in para 9 of the judgment has@@                                JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ stated  thus:- Attacking this finding, the learned  counsel@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

for  the petitioner relied upon the decisions of this  Court in  Salonah Tea Co.  Ltd.  Vs.  Supdt.  Of Taxes [ (1998)  1 SCC 401 ] and Mahabir Kishore vs.  State of M.P.  [ (1989) 4 SCC  1  ]  and submitted that levy of water  charges  itself being   illegal,  the  recoveries   made  pursuant  to  that provision  could not be retained but refunded in which event the  principles  of  limitation or laches would  not  apply. This  is  not a case where the provisions of the rule  which enabled  the  levy of water charges was struck down  on  the ground  that  it was incompetent but on a ground  that  such rule  had  been  framed  inarticulately and  was  not  clear enough.   Payments made by the petitioner should be  treated as having been made by mistake but once a declaration of law had  been made by the Bombay High Court on 16.9.1987, it was open  to the petitioner to claim for recoveries and the same should  have been made within a reasonable time  thereafter. In  ascertaining  what is the reasonable time  for  claiming refund,  the  courts have often taken note of the period  of limitation  prescribed  under the general Law of  Limitation for  filing of suits for recovery of amount due to them.  In the  present  case  also that standard adopted by  the  High Court  is  the same in ascertaining whether there  has  been laches on the part of the appellant in seeking relief in due time  or  not.   The finding clearly recorded is  that  long after the charges had been paid and law had been declared by the  Court, the writ petition has been filed and, therefore, such a refund should not be allowed.  We do not think such a view  taken  by the High Court calls for interference  under Article  136  of  the Constitution.  Hence  we  dismiss  the petition.

     It is clear from the said paragraph that a distinction is  made between the claims made for refund where collection of  tax  was illegal and not authorized and the cases  where rule  had  been struck down on the ground that it  had  been framed  inarticulately and was not clear enough.  Further it is  only  noticed  that in ascertaining as to  what  is  the reasonable  time for claiming refund, the courts have  often taken  note of the period of limitation prescribed under the general  Law of Limitation for filing suits for recovery  of the  amount due to them.  In exercise of writ  jurisdiction, facts  and circumstances of each case are to be kept in mind in  ascertaining whether there have been laches on the  part of  the parties seeking relief in due time or not.  In these cases  having regard to the facts and circumstances  already stated  above,  it cannot be said that there were laches  on the part of the respondents or that they had abandoned their claim for refund.  In Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi vs.  East India  Hotels  Ltd.   And  another [(1998) 9  SCC  662]  the appellant  authority charged sales tax on the sales  thereof prior  to  the  judgment  of this Court  in  Northern  India Caterers  (India) Ltd.  Vs.  Lt.  Governor, Delhi [(1978)  4 SCC  36].  A fresh assessment order was passed thereafter on the  basis  of  the  revised   return  filed  by  the  first respondent.  Ultimately an order was passed holding that the first  respondent  had  made application for refund  of  the excess  amount paid within the permissible period.  When  no action  was taken for long period, a writ petition was filed praying  for  writ  of mandamus directing the  authority  to refund  the  amount with interest thereon.  The  High  Court allowed   the   writ  petition   finding  that  no   further consideration  was  required and that the defence of  unjust enrichment  was not maintainable.  On the facts of the case, this  Court  allowed the appeal and directed the  Sales  Tax authorities  to  hear  the first respondent  on  the  refund

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

application and dispose of the same within a given time.  It appears  that other cases referred to above were not brought to  the  notice of this Court.  Thus we find that  the  said case governs its own facts.  Hence we reject the contentions advanced   on   behalf  of  the   petitioner   as   to   the maintainability  of the writ petitions.  This Court in  M/s. Dehri  Rohtas  Light  Railway Company  Ltd.   Vs.   District@@                                               JJJJJJJJJJJJJJ Board, Bhojpur and others [(1992) 2 SCC 598], dealing with a@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ case  where  demand was made for refund in somewhat  similar circumstances  on the question of delay and laches, in  para 13,  has stated thus:  - The rule which says that the Court may  not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a  rule of  law  but  a rule of practice based on sound  and  proper exercise  of discretion.  Each case must depend upon its own facts.   It  will  all  depend on what  the  breach  of  the fundamental  right and the remedy claimed are and how  delay arose.   The  principle on which the relief to the party  on the  grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which  have  accrued  to others by reason of  the  delay  in filing  the  petition should not be allowed to be  disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay.  The real  test  to  determine delay in such cases  is  that  the petitioner  should come to the writ court before a  parallel right  is  created  and  that  the  lapse  of  time  is  not attributable  to any laches or negligence.  The test is  not to  physical  running  of  time.   Where  the  circumstances justifying  the  conduct  exists, the  illegality  which  is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches.

     The  argument that the relief should be denied to  the respondents on the ground of delay and laches in approaching the  High Court by filing writ petitions claiming refund  is equally  unsustainable.  The claims for refund were made  by the  respondents within a reasonable time after the judgment was  rendered  by  this Court in Saraswati Sugar  Mill  case aforementioned.   The respondents have paid water cess under protest.   The collection of water cess in view of law  laid down by this court was clearly illegal and without authority of  law.  It is also not the case that where the rights  are created  in  third parties on account of delay, if  any,  in approaching  the  court  and that by entertaining  the  writ petitions  rights of third parties are prejudiced.  In  this view  there was no question of delay and laches on the  part of  the  respondents  on the facts found  and  circumstances stated.   The respondents had specifically pleaded that they did  not  pass on the liability of the water cess  on  their customers;  it appears this contention was not denied by the petitioners  before  the High Court.  On the other hand  the only  plea taken by the petitioners was that money had  been passed to the Central Government under Section 8 of the Act. It was brought to the notice of the Court by the respondents that  65%  of the sugar was sold by the respondents  through public  distribution system under the Essential  Commodities Act.   Hence there was no question of unjust enrichment also in  these  cases.   The stand of the  petitioners  that  the respondents  were not entitled for refund on the ground that@@                       JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ the  amount  of  cess collected was passed on to  the  State@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ Government,  which in turn gave it to the Central Government and  the  Central  Government has appropriated the  same  by passing  on  money back to various State  Pollution  Control Boards does not help them.  Before the High Court, they only

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

stated  that they made reference to the Government in regard to  the  claim made by the respondents for refund  and  they were  waiting for response.  It was also not made out by the petitioners  as  to how they had difficulties in making  the refund to the respondents.  It may also be kept in view that immediately  after  the notices were issued demanding  water cess  they  were  challenged.  Even in  some  cases  interim orders  were  also passed in the High court;  the amount  of water  cess  was paid under protest.  So, in this  situation when  finally  this Court held that the very  collection  of water  cess  was without the authority of law, the claim  of the  respondents  for refund cannot be denied merely on  the ground that the petitioners passed on the money to the State Government  and  in turn the money was sent to  the  Central Government  and  later the Central Govt.   appropriated  the same  by  passing  it back to the  various  State  Pollution Control Boards.  The High Court in our view having taken all aspects  into consideration was right in allowing the claims of  the  respondents made for refund in the writ  petitions. We  do not see any good ground or valid reason to  interfere with  the judgments and orders of the High Court impugned in these  petitions.   Hence  the special leave  petitions  are dismissed.  The parties shall bear their own costs.