12 December 2008
Supreme Court
Download

U.P.POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD Vs BHUPENDRA KUMAR MODI & ANR.

Bench: K.G. BALAKRISHNAN,P. SATHASIVAM, , ,
Case number: Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1660 of 2005


1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  2019     OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1660 of 2005)

U.P. Pollution Control Board        .... Appellant (s)

Versus

Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi & Anr.             .... Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  order  dated

29.11.2004 passed in Crl. Misc. Case No. 1347 of 2001 of the

High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad,  Lucknow  Bench

quashing the Complaint Case No. 44 of 1988 filed by the U.P.

Pollution Control Board, Lucknow through its officers against

M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. Raebareli and 12 others under Section

2

44 of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) pending in the Court of

Special Judicial Magistrate (Pollution), Lucknow.

3)   Background facts, in a nutshell, are as follows:

The  State  Board  for  Prevention  and  Control  of  Water

Pollution was constituted on 03.02.1975 by the Government

of  U.P.  and it  has  been  named  as –  U.P.  Pollution  Control

Board  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Board”)  which  is  the

appellant herein vide notification No. 2179/9-2-100-74 dated

13.07.1982.   On  the  application  submitted  by  M/s  Modi

Carpets Ltd., Raebareli, seeking consent to discharge effluent,

the appellant-Board granted conditional consent to discharge

their trade effluent in the river Sai.  Since the conditions of

consent were not being complied with by M/s Modi Carpets

Ltd., a letter dated 30.4.1983 was sent by the appellant-Board

to  M/s  Modi  Carpets  Ltd.,  Raebareli  informing  that  non-

compliance  of  the  consent  conditions  is  an  offence  under

Section 44 of the Act.  On 07.06.1983, the inspection of unit

of M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. was done by the officers of the Board

2

3

wherein it was found that polluted trade effluent was being

discharged  into  the  river  Sai  through  drain  without  any

treatment and construction of effluent treatment plant was yet

to be started.  On 19.01.1984, the Board again sent a letter to

M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. that conditions of the consent order

dated  22.1.1983  were  not  complied  with.   Again  it  was

reiterated  that  non-compliance  of  the  conditions  of  consent

would  be  an  offence  under  Section  44  of  the  Act.   On

13.09.1984, the unit was again inspected by the officers of the

Board and it  was found that  effluent  was being  discharged

without  any treatment.   For  this,  Modi  Carpets  Ltd.  sent  a

reply  dated  18.10.1984  to  the  appellant-Board  giving

clarifications  for  not  complying  with the  consent  conditions

and the same was considered and rejected by the Board on

31.10.1984 on the ground that the unit was not complying

with the  prescribed  standards,  consent  conditions  and also

the application was incomplete in various aspects.   

4) Since M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. was not complying with the

provisions of the Act and there was violation of Sections 25 &

3

4

26 of the Act, a complaint under Section 44 was filed by the

Board through its Assistant Environmental Engineer against

respondent No.1 as well as other persons namely, Chairman,

Vice-Chairman, Managing Director, Joint Managing Director,

Directors,  General  Manager,  Commercial  Manager  and

Company  Secretary  of  M/s  Modi  Carpets  Ltd.  before  the

C.J.M.,  Raebareli.   It  was  specifically  mentioned  in  the

complaint that the aforesaid persons are responsible for the

conduct  of  the  business  of  the  company  and  for  their

monetary  benefits  continued  to  discharge  noxious  and

polluting  trade  effluent  of  the  company  without  complying

with the conditions of  consent and mandatory provisions of

law.  A petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code  was  filed  before  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at

Allahabad being Criminal Misc.  Petition No. 14119 of 1985 by

M/s  Modi  Carpets  Ltd.  &  Ors.  for  quashing  the  aforesaid

complaint  and  also  for  other  reliefs.  Vide  order  dated

5.11.1985, the High Court stayed further proceedings in the

complaint  case.   On  the  objection  of  the  Board  that  the

Principal Bench at Allahabad had no territorial jurisdiction to

4

5

decide the petition, the first respondent herein filed a petition

under Section 482 of the Crl.P.C. before  Lucknow Bench of

the High Court being Crl. Misc. Case No. 1347 of 2001.  In the

said  petition,  it  was  alleged  that  the  first  respondent,  Dr.

Bhupendra  Kumar  Modi,  Joint  Managing  Director  was  not

concerned  with  day-to-day  business  of  the  company  and

cannot  be  prosecuted  for  the  offence  committed  by  the

Company, hence, it was prayed that Complaint Case No. 44 of

1988 filed by the appellant-Board be quashed.

5) The appellant-Board filed a counter affidavit  before the

High Court wherein it was stated that the complaint could not

be  quashed  at  the  initial  stage  and  whether  a  person  is

responsible  for  conduct  of  day-to-day  business  of  the

Company or not,  is  a question which has to be  decided by

evidence.  In  any  event  it  was  stated  that  the  complaint

discloses materials to proceed further.

6)  By impugned order dated 29.11.2004, the High Court

quashed the complaint so far as it related to respondent No.1

on the main ground that there was no material on record to

5

6

show that respondent No.1 was, at the relevant time, incharge

and responsible to the company for conduct of its business.

Aggrieved by the said judgment of  the Lucknow Bench, the

appellant-Board has filed the above appeal by way of special

leave.

7) Heard Mr. Rakesh K. Khanna, learned Senior Counsel,

appearing for the appellant-Board and Mr. L.N. Rao, learned

senior counsel, appearing for the 1st respondent.

8) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether

the complaint of  U.P.  Pollution Control  Board discloses any

material  against  the  first  respondent  i.e.,  Dr.  Bhupendra

Kumar Modi, Joint Managing Director, particularly, his control

over the decision making process of the Company and whether

the High Court was justified in quashing the same in so far as

Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi in a petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C.      

9) The  High  Court  while  accepting  the  case  of  Dr.

Bhupendra Kumar Modi perused the complaint of the Board.

According  to  it,  nowhere  it  is  specifically  stated  in  the

6

7

complaint and there is also no material on record to show that

Dr.  Bhupendra  Kumar  Modi  was,  at  the  relevant  time,  in-

charge and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the

business.  The High Court also concluded that there was no

specific allegation that at the relevant time, respondent No.1

was in-charge of the Company or was looking after the day-to-

day  affairs  of  the  company  or  that  the  offence  has  been

committed with his consent or connivance.  By arriving such

conclusion the High Court quashed the prosecution in so far

as  the  first  respondent  herein  is  concerned.   In  the  same

order, the High Court made it clear that the prosecution is free

to proceed against other persons mentioned in the complaint.

10) In order to answer the questions raised, we verified the

complaint (Annexure – 8) of the Board laid under Section 44 of

the Act.  Section 25 (1) of the Act makes it mandatory for every

new industry to obtain consent of the “Board” for bringing into

use any new or altered outlet  for the discharge of its trade

effluent  into  the  stream  or  well  or  on  land  as  defined  in

Section 2 of the Act read with its amending Act [Act No. 44 of

7

8

1978].  The Company and all the persons in-charge of the day-

to-day  affairs  are  required  to  abide  by  the  mandatory

provisions for operating their  industrial  establishment.   The

complaint further shows that the Company had applied for the

grant of  consent of the Board for the discharge of  its trade

effluent on 29.09.1982 which was received by the Board on

04.10.1982 and after considering all  aspects the conditional

consent  order  No.  83/170  dated  22.01.1983  was  issued  in

favour of the Company.  According to the Complainant,  the

Company had not sent the report for proper compliance of the

condition  which  was  imposed.   Accordingly,  the  site  of  the

Company at Raebareli  had been inspected by the officers of

the Board on 07.06.1983 and on 13.09.1984 in the presence

of representatives of the Company.  According to the Board,

the  accused  persons intentionally  failed  to  comply  with the

conditions of consent order dated 22.01.1983 and to construct

proper  effluent  treatment  plant  and  discharging  without

consent of the Board.  This has been asserted in para 15 of

the  complaint.   In  para  16,  it  is  stated  that  the  accused

persons,  namely,  2-13  are  Chairman,  Managing

8

9

Director/Joint Managing Director, Directors, Secretaries and

Managers  of  M/s  Modi  Carpets  Ltd.,  Raebareli,  who  are

responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company

and  also  for  not  complying  the  conditions  and  for  not

constructing  proper  plant  for  the  treatment  of  their  highly

polluting trade effluent so as to conform to the standard laid

down  by  the  Board.   In  the  same  paragraph,  it  is  further

asserted  that  the  accused  persons  are  deliberately  avoiding

the  provisions  of  Section  25  of  the  Act  for  which  they  are

punishable under Section 44 read with Section 47 of the Act.

In para 17 of the complaint, it is specifically stated that at the

time of commission of offence all the persons were in-charge of

the business of the Company and responsible for the day-to-

day working of the Company and also for conducting of the

business of  the Company and continuous commissioning of

offence under Section 44 of the Act and the construction of

effluent  treatment  plant  can  be  taken  up  only  when  these

senior authorities resolved to do so.  It is further stated that

the offence mentioned in the complaint is being continuously

committed against the society at large, animals and aquatic

9

10

life in particular because of their personal monetary gains.  In

para 21, it is specifically stated that the Chairman, Directors

and  Secretaries  are  the  brain  and  nerve  centre  of  Modi

Carpets and conducting the business of the Company which

has been discharging its trade effluents into stream for which

they are to be punished under Section 44 read with Section 47

of the Act.  In para 22, it is asserted that under the provisions

of Section 47 of the Act where an offence has been committed

by a Company every person, who at the time of commission of

the offence was in-charge of and responsible to the Company

for the conduct of the business shall be deemed to be guilty of

the  offence  and  liable  to  be  proceeded  and  punished

accordingly.  

11) Apart from the above specific averments, the Board has

also  placed  a  letter  dated  22.01.1983  granting  conditional

consent  to respondent  No.1,  copy of  the  inspection reports,

various letters/communications and their reply as Annexures

P-1 to P-7.  

1 0

11

12) Among the various  provisions of  the Act,  we  are  more

concerned about Section 47 which speaks about offences by

companies which reads thus:

“47.  Offences by companies.- (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company,  every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of, the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided  that  nothing  contained  in  this  sub-section shall  render  any  such  person  liable  to  any  punishment provided  in  this  Act  if  he  proves  that  the  offence  was committed without  his  knowledge or  that he  exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company  and  it  is  proved  that  the  offence  has  been committed  with  the  consent  or  connivance  of,  or  is attributable  to  any  neglect  on  the  part  of,  any  director, manager,  secretary  or  other  officer  of  the  company,  such director,  manager,  secretary  or  other  officer  shall  also  be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.  

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,-

(a) “company”  means any body  corporate,  and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and  

(b) “director”  in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm.”

Section 25 speaks about restrictions on new outlets and new

discharges  and  Section  26  relates  to  provision  regarding

existing  discharge  of  sewage  or  trade  effluent.   Section  44

1 1

12

speaks  about  penalty  for  contravention  of  Section  25  or

Section 26.   

13) It is not in dispute that the first respondent before letting

out trade effluent into a stream or a river has to satisfy certain

conditions in terms of the provisions of the Act and the order

of  the  authorities  concerned.  It  is  also  not  in  dispute  that

without a consent order by the Board the Company cannot let

out untreated effluent into a land or stream or river.  Though

a  consent  order  was  issued  by  the  Board  it  has  been

specifically stated in the complaint that those conditions have

not been fulfilled by the Company.  In those circumstances, in

the interest of the public health, the appellant-Board through

its officers laid a complaint against the persons, who are in

charge of the day-to-day affairs and in the decision making

process.   There  is no need to place all  the materials  at the

threshold.   However,  on  perusal  of  the  complaint  and  the

relevant  materials  in  the  form  of  documents,  the  learned

Special  Judicial  Magistrate  (Pollution)  entertained  the  same

and issued summons to the named persons in the complaint.

1 2

13

Inasmuch as the High Court quashed the complaint against

the first respondent herein who is a Joint Managing Director

of  the  Company,  we  are  concerned  about  the

averments/allegations against him in respect of his concern in

the day-to-day affairs and in the decision making process.  We

have  already  referred  to  the  relevant  averments/materials

adverted to in the complaint.  Before going into the reasoning

and conclusion of the High Court for quashing the complaint

against  the  first  respondent  herein,  let  us  consider  various

decisions  of  this  Court  with  reference  to  the  very  same

provisions, namely, Sections 44 and 47 of the Act as well as

the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.PC.

14) It  is  settled  legal  position  that  at  the  stage  of  issuing

process,  the  Magistrate  is  mainly  concerned  with  the

allegations  made  in  the  complaint  or  the  evidence  led  in

support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied

whether  there  are  sufficient  grounds  for  proceeding  against

the  accused.  In  Smt.  Nagawwa vs.  Veeranna

Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 736, this

1 3

14

Court has held that it is not the province of the Magistrate to

enter into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of

the case.  It was further held that whether a process should be

issued,  the  Magistrate  can  take  into  consideration

improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in

the  evidence  led  by  the  complainant  in  support  of  the

allegations.  The  Magistrate  has  been  given  an  undoubted

discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially

exercised by him. It was further held that once the Magistrate

has exercised his discretion, it is not for the High Court or

even this Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the

Magistrate or to examine their case on merits with a view to

find out  whether  or  not  the  allegations  in the  complaint,  if

proved,  would  ultimately  end  in  conviction  of  the  accused.

This Court has held that in the following cases, an order of the

Magistrate  issuing  process  against  the  accused  can  be

quashed:

“(1) where  the  allegations  made in  the  complaint  or  the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients  of  an  offence  which  is  alleged  against  the accused;

1 4

15

(2) where  the  allegations  made  in  the  complaint  are patently  absurd  and  inherently  improbable  so  that  no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that  there  is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) where  the  discretion  exercised  by  the  Magistrate  in issuing  process  is  capricious  and  arbitrary  having  been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and  

(4) where  the  complaint  suffers  from fundamental  legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.”

No doubt the grounds mentioned above are purely illustrative

and it provides only guidelines to indicate contingencies where

the High Court can quash the proceedings.  Though argument

was advanced based on the decision in State of Karnataka

vs.  Pratap  Chand and Others,  (1981)  2  SCC 335,  it  was

decided  in  a  case  relating  to  conviction  under  Drugs  and

Cosmetics Act, 1940 and not quashing of a complaint based

merely on a petition or an affidavit.  Hence, the said decision

is not applicable to the case on hand.  

15) Though reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in

Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs.  Ram Kishan Rohtagi

and Others, (1983) 1 SCC 1, a perusal of the said decision

makes it clear that the complaint in that case was vague as

1 5

16

regards the Directors and the Court has concluded that no

offence  revealed  against  them,  hence  the  High  Court  was

justified in quashing the proceedings against the Directors.  

16) The  next  decision  pressed  into  service  by  the  first

respondent  is  State  of  Haryana vs.  Brij  Lal  Mittal  and

Others, (1998) 5 SCC 343.  In the said decision, after finding

that  except  a  bald  statement  in  the  complaint  that  the

respondents  therein  were  Directors  of  the  manufacturers,

there is no other allegation to indicate, even prima facie, that

they were in charge of the Company and also responsible to

the  Company  for  the  conduct  of  its  business.   This  Court

agreed  with  the  High  Court  in  quashing  the  prosecution

against the three Directors.  

17) Reliance  was  also  placed  on  the  decision  in  Nalin

Thakor and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2003)

12  SCC  461.   This  Court,  after  finding  that  there  is  no

allegation  as  regards  the  requirement  of  sub-section  (2)  of

Section  47  and  the  learned  Judicial  Magistrate  issued

1 6

17

summons without application of mind, allowed the appeal and

set aside the summons issued against the appellants therein.  

18) In  the  earlier  part  of  our  order,  we  have  extensively

adverted to the specific averments/assertions in the complaint

of  the  Board  with  reference  to  all  the  officers  i.e.  named

persons in the complaint including the first respondent who is

Joint  Managing  Director  of  the  Company.   In  those

circumstances, we are of the view that the above-mentioned

decisions relied on by the first respondent are not helpful to

the stand taken by him.  It is useful to refer the decision in

the case  of  U.P.  Pollution Control  Board vs  Messrs Modi

Distillery and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 684.  The said case, by

special leave, was directed against the judgment and order of

the High Court of Allahabad dated 16.05.1984 setting aside,

in  its  revisional  jurisdiction,  order  of  the  CJM,  Ghaziabad

dated  03.11.1983  directing  issue  of  process  against  the

respondents  therein  on  a  complaint  filed  by  the  appellant

Pollution Control Board under Section 44 of Water (Prevention

and  Control  of  Pollution)  Act,  1974.   The  issue  involved

therein was whether the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Managing

1 7

18

Director and Members of the Board of Directors of M/s Modi

Industries  Limited,  the  company owning the  industrial  unit

called  M/s Modi  Distillery  could be proceeded  against on a

complaint  against  the  said  industrial  unit.   Learned  Single

Judge of the High Court found that there was no sufficient

ground against  the respondent inasmuch as the allegations

made in the complaint do not constitute an offence punishable

under Section 44 for the admitted contravention of Sections

25(1)  and  26  read  with  Section  47  of  the  Act.   The  facts

narrated above clearly show that the same is identical to the

case  on  hand.   This  Court  taking  note  of  the  provisions

particularly, Sections 25 (1) (2) and 26 as well as Sections 44

and 47 and the averments in the complaint after finding that

prima facie  materials are available  and all  the issues to be

dealt with by the Judicial Magistrate at the time of trial, set

aside the order of the High Court interfering with the order of

CJM  directing  issue  of  process  to  the  respondents  and

directed  the  learned  Magistrate  to  proceed  with the  trial  in

accordance  with law.  No doubt,  it  is true that the learned

Single Judge of the High Court quashed the proceedings on

1 8

19

the ground that there could be no vicarious liability saddled

on  the  Chairman,  Vice-chairman,  Managing  Director  and

other  members  of  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  Company

under Section 47 of the Act unless there was a prosecution of

the Company i.e.  M/s Modi  Industries  Ltd.  In the case on

hand, it is not in dispute that the Company has been shown

as  first  accused  in  the  complaint  apart  from  including

Chairman, Managing Director, Jt. Managing Director, General

Manager,  Directors,  General  Manager,  Commercial  Manager

and Company Secretary as well  as their specific  role in the

day-to-day affairs and decision making process.      

19) U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Mohan Meakins Ltd.

and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 745 is a case filed by the very same

appellant-  U.P.  Pollution  Control  Board  and  in  similar

circumstances this Court interfered with the order of the High

Court as well as the order of the Sessions Court quashing the

similar  complaint.  In  the  said  case,  the  Board  initiated

proceedings  for  prosecuting  Mohan  Meakins  Ltd  and  its

Directors  for  discharging  trade  effluents  in  the  river  Gomti

which is a tributary of the Ganga.  The learned trial Judge on

1 9

20

satisfying the averments in the complaint of the Board issued

process  against  the  accused  at  the  first  instance.   The

respondents/Company  and  its  Directors  desired  the  trial

Court  to  discharge  them  without  even  making  their  first

appearance in the Court.   When the attempt made for that

failed,  they  moved  for  exemption  from  appearance  in  the

Court.   In  the  meanwhile,  the  Sessions  Judge,  Lucknow

entertained a revision moved by the accused against the order

issuing  process  to  them  and  quashed  it  on  the  erroneous

ground that the Magistrate did not pass a speaking order for

issuing such summons.  The CJM before whom the complaint

was filed thereafter passed a detailed order on 25.04.1984 and

again issued  process  to the accused.   The  order  was again

challenged  by  the  accused  in  revision  before  the  Sessions

Court and the same Sessions Judge again quashed it by order

dated 25.08.1984.  The Board moved before the High Court in

a revision against the said order.   Though the revision was

moved in 1984 itself  it took 15 years for the High Court to

dismiss  the  revision  petition  as  per  the  order  passed  by  a

learned Single Judge on 27.07.1999.  Questioning the same,

2 0

21

the  Board  filed  special  leave  petition before  this  Court  and

ultimately leave was granted by this Court.  It is useful to refer

the facts and other details stated in the complaint as noted by

this  Court.   Thomas,  J.  (as  he  then was)  speaking  for  the

Bench in paras 10 and 11 observed thus:-

10. … … … In the complaint filed by the appellant before the Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  the  Company  (M/s  Mohan Meakins Ltd.) has been arrayed as the first accused and the other persons who were arrayed as Accused 2 to 10 were described as the Directors of the said Company. The 11th person arrayed in the complaint as accused is described as the  Manager  of  the  Company.  The  averments  in  the complaint show that the Distillery Unit of the Company at Daliganj,  Lucknow,  has  been  discharging  noxious  trade effluents into River Gomti and causing continuous pollution of the river. It was further averred in the complaint that on 19-9-1982, samples of trade effluents were collected by the officers  empowered  in  this  behalf,  from  the  drain  “just outside the plant inside the factory”, and from the irrigation plant out of which the effluents were pumped into the river. When the samples were analysed in the Industrial Toxicology Research Centre, Lucknow, it was revealed that the quality of  effluents  was  beyond  the  standard  laid  down  for  the purpose.  Therefore,  it  is  alleged  that  the  Company  has violated Section 24 of the Act* and thereby the Company is guilty of the offence under Section 43 of the Act.

11. Where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company  every  person  who  was  in  charge  of  and  was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of  the company is  also  made guilty  of  the  offence  by the statutory creation. Any director, manager or other officer of the  company,  who  has  consented  to  or  connived  in  the commission  of  the  said  offence,  is  made  liable  for  the punishment of the offence.”

This Court has also noted further allegations in the complaint

against Managers or Directors of the Company which are as

under:-   

2 1

22

“12. In the above context what is to be looked at during the stage of issuing process is whether there are allegations in the complaint  by  which the  Managers  or  Directors  of  the Company can also be proceeded against, when the Company is alleged to be guilty of the offence. Para 12 of the complaint reads thus:

“That the accused persons from 2 to 11 are Directors/ Managers/  Partners  of  M/s  Mohan  Meakins  Distillery, Daliganj,  Lucknow, as mentioned in this complaint are responsible for constructing the proper works and plant for the treatment of their highly polluting trade effluent so as to conform to the standard laid down by the Board. Aforesaid  accused  persons  are  deliberately  avoiding  to abide  by  the  provisions  of  Sections  24  and  26  of  the aforesaid  Act  which  are  punishable  respectively  under Sections 43 and 44 of  the aforesaid Act,  for which not only the Company but its Directors, Managers, Secretary and  all  other  responsible  officers  of  the  accused Company, responsible for the conduct of its business are also liable in accordance with the provision of Section 47 of the Act.”

The appellant has further stated in para 23 of the complaint that “the Chairman, Managing Directors and Directors of the Company  are  the  persons  responsible  for  the  act  and therefore, they are liable to be proceeded against according to the law”.

Taking  note  of  the  averments  in  the  complaint  against  the

Directors, Managers and the ingredients of Section 47 of the

Act, this Court declined to accept the reasoning of the High

Court and Sessions Court for quashing the complaint thereby

set  aside  both  the  orders  and  directed  the  trial  Court  to

proceed with the case in accordance with law.  

20) In  the  case  on  hand  which  is  also  similar  to  Mohan

Meakins Ltd.  had commenced its journey in the year 1985,

2 2

23

nonetheless lapse of such long period cannot be a reason to

absolve  the respondents from the trial.   In a matter of this

nature,  particularly,  when  it  affects  public  health  if  it  is

ultimately  proved,  courts  cannot  afford  to  deal  lightly  with

cases involving pollution of air and water.  The message must

go  to  all  concerned  persons  whether  small  or  big  that  the

courts  will  share  the  parliamentary  concern  and  legislative

intent of the Act to check the escalating pollution level  and

restore the balance of our environment.  Those who discharge

noxious polluting effluents into streams, rivers or any other

water  bodies  which  inflicts  on  the  public  health  at  large,

should  be  dealt  with  strictly  de  hors to  the  technical

objections.  Since escalating pollution level of our environment

affects  on  the  life  and  health  of  human  beings  as  well  as

animals, the courts should not deal with the prosecution for

offences  under  the  pollution  and  environmental  Acts  in  a

causal or routine manner.   

21) It is our endeavour to point out that the High Court has

quashed the complaint arising in an environmental matter in

2 3

24

a casual manner by exercising power under Section 482 of the

Cr.P.C.  This Court has held exercise of power under Section

482 of the Code is the exception and under the rule there are

three  circumstances  under  which  the  inherent  jurisdiction

may be exercised i.e. (a) to give effect to an order of the Court;

(b)  to  prevent  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  Court;  (c)  to

otherwise  secure  the  ends  of  justice.   It  is  true  that  it  is

neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule

which  would  govern  the  exercise  of  inherent  jurisdiction.

While  exercising  inherent  powers  either  on civil  or  criminal

jurisdiction, the Court does not function as a Court of Appeal

or Revision.  The inherent jurisdiction though wide has to be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. It  should be

exercised to do real and substantial justice and if any attempt

is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the

Court  has  power  to  prevent  abuse.   When  no  offence  is

disclosed  by  the  complaint,  the  Court  may  examine  the

question of fact.  When complaint is sought to be quashed, it

is permissible  to look into the materials  to assess what the

complainant had alleged and whether any offence is made out

2 4

25

even if the allegations are accepted in toto.  When exercising

jurisdiction under Section 482 of  the Code,  the High Court

could  not  ordinarily  embark  upon  an  enquiry  whether  the

evidence  in  question  is  reliable  or  not  or  whether  on  a

reasonable  appreciation  of  it  accusation  would  not  be

sustained.  To put it clear, it is the function of the trial Judge

to do so.  The Court must be careful to see that its decision in

exercise  of  its  power  is  based  on  sound  principles.   The

inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate

prosecution.  If the allegations set out in the complaint do not

constitute offence of which cognizance has been taken by the

Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in

exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Crl.

Procedure  Code.   However,  it  is  not  necessary  that  there

should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to

find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.

22) In the light of the above discussion and in view of the

specific averments in the complaint as referred to by us in the

earlier  paragraphs  coupled  with  the  statutory  provisions,

2 5

26

namely, Sections 25, 26, 44 and 47 of the Act, we are unable

to share the view expressed by the High Court in quashing the

complaint insofar as the first respondent herein.  Accordingly,

we  set  aside  the  same.   The  Special  Judicial  Magistrate

(Pollution)  is  directed  to  proceed  with  the  complaint  and

dispose  of  the  same  in  accordance  with  law.   If  the  first

respondent  herein  applies  for  dispensing  with  his  personal

presence in the Court, after making the first appearance, the

Special Court can exempt him from continuing to appear in

the Court by imposing any condition which the Court deems

fit.   Subject  to  the  above  observation,  we  set  aside  the

impugned judgment of the High Court and direct the Special

Judicial  Magistrate  (Pollution)  to  proceed  with  the  case  in

accordance with law and dispose of the same as expeditiously

as  possible.   We make  it  clear  that we have  not expressed

anything on the merits of the contents of the complaint and it

is for the Special Court to decide the same in accordance with

law.  The Criminal appeal is allowed.             

.…………………………………CJI.

2 6

27

                                               (K.G. Balakrishnan)

…..…………………………………J.                         (P. Sathasivam)                                  

New Delhi; December 12, 2008.    

2 7