U.P.POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD Vs BHUPENDRA KUMAR MODI & ANR.
Bench: K.G. BALAKRISHNAN,P. SATHASIVAM, , ,
Case number: Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1660 of 2005
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2019 OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1660 of 2005)
U.P. Pollution Control Board .... Appellant (s)
Versus
Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi & Anr. .... Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is directed against the order dated
29.11.2004 passed in Crl. Misc. Case No. 1347 of 2001 of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
quashing the Complaint Case No. 44 of 1988 filed by the U.P.
Pollution Control Board, Lucknow through its officers against
M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. Raebareli and 12 others under Section
44 of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) pending in the Court of
Special Judicial Magistrate (Pollution), Lucknow.
3) Background facts, in a nutshell, are as follows:
The State Board for Prevention and Control of Water
Pollution was constituted on 03.02.1975 by the Government
of U.P. and it has been named as – U.P. Pollution Control
Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) which is the
appellant herein vide notification No. 2179/9-2-100-74 dated
13.07.1982. On the application submitted by M/s Modi
Carpets Ltd., Raebareli, seeking consent to discharge effluent,
the appellant-Board granted conditional consent to discharge
their trade effluent in the river Sai. Since the conditions of
consent were not being complied with by M/s Modi Carpets
Ltd., a letter dated 30.4.1983 was sent by the appellant-Board
to M/s Modi Carpets Ltd., Raebareli informing that non-
compliance of the consent conditions is an offence under
Section 44 of the Act. On 07.06.1983, the inspection of unit
of M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. was done by the officers of the Board
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wherein it was found that polluted trade effluent was being
discharged into the river Sai through drain without any
treatment and construction of effluent treatment plant was yet
to be started. On 19.01.1984, the Board again sent a letter to
M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. that conditions of the consent order
dated 22.1.1983 were not complied with. Again it was
reiterated that non-compliance of the conditions of consent
would be an offence under Section 44 of the Act. On
13.09.1984, the unit was again inspected by the officers of the
Board and it was found that effluent was being discharged
without any treatment. For this, Modi Carpets Ltd. sent a
reply dated 18.10.1984 to the appellant-Board giving
clarifications for not complying with the consent conditions
and the same was considered and rejected by the Board on
31.10.1984 on the ground that the unit was not complying
with the prescribed standards, consent conditions and also
the application was incomplete in various aspects.
4) Since M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. was not complying with the
provisions of the Act and there was violation of Sections 25 &
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26 of the Act, a complaint under Section 44 was filed by the
Board through its Assistant Environmental Engineer against
respondent No.1 as well as other persons namely, Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, Managing Director, Joint Managing Director,
Directors, General Manager, Commercial Manager and
Company Secretary of M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. before the
C.J.M., Raebareli. It was specifically mentioned in the
complaint that the aforesaid persons are responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company and for their
monetary benefits continued to discharge noxious and
polluting trade effluent of the company without complying
with the conditions of consent and mandatory provisions of
law. A petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code was filed before the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad being Criminal Misc. Petition No. 14119 of 1985 by
M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. & Ors. for quashing the aforesaid
complaint and also for other reliefs. Vide order dated
5.11.1985, the High Court stayed further proceedings in the
complaint case. On the objection of the Board that the
Principal Bench at Allahabad had no territorial jurisdiction to
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decide the petition, the first respondent herein filed a petition
under Section 482 of the Crl.P.C. before Lucknow Bench of
the High Court being Crl. Misc. Case No. 1347 of 2001. In the
said petition, it was alleged that the first respondent, Dr.
Bhupendra Kumar Modi, Joint Managing Director was not
concerned with day-to-day business of the company and
cannot be prosecuted for the offence committed by the
Company, hence, it was prayed that Complaint Case No. 44 of
1988 filed by the appellant-Board be quashed.
5) The appellant-Board filed a counter affidavit before the
High Court wherein it was stated that the complaint could not
be quashed at the initial stage and whether a person is
responsible for conduct of day-to-day business of the
Company or not, is a question which has to be decided by
evidence. In any event it was stated that the complaint
discloses materials to proceed further.
6) By impugned order dated 29.11.2004, the High Court
quashed the complaint so far as it related to respondent No.1
on the main ground that there was no material on record to
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show that respondent No.1 was, at the relevant time, incharge
and responsible to the company for conduct of its business.
Aggrieved by the said judgment of the Lucknow Bench, the
appellant-Board has filed the above appeal by way of special
leave.
7) Heard Mr. Rakesh K. Khanna, learned Senior Counsel,
appearing for the appellant-Board and Mr. L.N. Rao, learned
senior counsel, appearing for the 1st respondent.
8) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether
the complaint of U.P. Pollution Control Board discloses any
material against the first respondent i.e., Dr. Bhupendra
Kumar Modi, Joint Managing Director, particularly, his control
over the decision making process of the Company and whether
the High Court was justified in quashing the same in so far as
Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi in a petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
9) The High Court while accepting the case of Dr.
Bhupendra Kumar Modi perused the complaint of the Board.
According to it, nowhere it is specifically stated in the
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complaint and there is also no material on record to show that
Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi was, at the relevant time, in-
charge and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the
business. The High Court also concluded that there was no
specific allegation that at the relevant time, respondent No.1
was in-charge of the Company or was looking after the day-to-
day affairs of the company or that the offence has been
committed with his consent or connivance. By arriving such
conclusion the High Court quashed the prosecution in so far
as the first respondent herein is concerned. In the same
order, the High Court made it clear that the prosecution is free
to proceed against other persons mentioned in the complaint.
10) In order to answer the questions raised, we verified the
complaint (Annexure – 8) of the Board laid under Section 44 of
the Act. Section 25 (1) of the Act makes it mandatory for every
new industry to obtain consent of the “Board” for bringing into
use any new or altered outlet for the discharge of its trade
effluent into the stream or well or on land as defined in
Section 2 of the Act read with its amending Act [Act No. 44 of
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1978]. The Company and all the persons in-charge of the day-
to-day affairs are required to abide by the mandatory
provisions for operating their industrial establishment. The
complaint further shows that the Company had applied for the
grant of consent of the Board for the discharge of its trade
effluent on 29.09.1982 which was received by the Board on
04.10.1982 and after considering all aspects the conditional
consent order No. 83/170 dated 22.01.1983 was issued in
favour of the Company. According to the Complainant, the
Company had not sent the report for proper compliance of the
condition which was imposed. Accordingly, the site of the
Company at Raebareli had been inspected by the officers of
the Board on 07.06.1983 and on 13.09.1984 in the presence
of representatives of the Company. According to the Board,
the accused persons intentionally failed to comply with the
conditions of consent order dated 22.01.1983 and to construct
proper effluent treatment plant and discharging without
consent of the Board. This has been asserted in para 15 of
the complaint. In para 16, it is stated that the accused
persons, namely, 2-13 are Chairman, Managing
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Director/Joint Managing Director, Directors, Secretaries and
Managers of M/s Modi Carpets Ltd., Raebareli, who are
responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company
and also for not complying the conditions and for not
constructing proper plant for the treatment of their highly
polluting trade effluent so as to conform to the standard laid
down by the Board. In the same paragraph, it is further
asserted that the accused persons are deliberately avoiding
the provisions of Section 25 of the Act for which they are
punishable under Section 44 read with Section 47 of the Act.
In para 17 of the complaint, it is specifically stated that at the
time of commission of offence all the persons were in-charge of
the business of the Company and responsible for the day-to-
day working of the Company and also for conducting of the
business of the Company and continuous commissioning of
offence under Section 44 of the Act and the construction of
effluent treatment plant can be taken up only when these
senior authorities resolved to do so. It is further stated that
the offence mentioned in the complaint is being continuously
committed against the society at large, animals and aquatic
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life in particular because of their personal monetary gains. In
para 21, it is specifically stated that the Chairman, Directors
and Secretaries are the brain and nerve centre of Modi
Carpets and conducting the business of the Company which
has been discharging its trade effluents into stream for which
they are to be punished under Section 44 read with Section 47
of the Act. In para 22, it is asserted that under the provisions
of Section 47 of the Act where an offence has been committed
by a Company every person, who at the time of commission of
the offence was in-charge of and responsible to the Company
for the conduct of the business shall be deemed to be guilty of
the offence and liable to be proceeded and punished
accordingly.
11) Apart from the above specific averments, the Board has
also placed a letter dated 22.01.1983 granting conditional
consent to respondent No.1, copy of the inspection reports,
various letters/communications and their reply as Annexures
P-1 to P-7.
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12) Among the various provisions of the Act, we are more
concerned about Section 47 which speaks about offences by
companies which reads thus:
“47. Offences by companies.- (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of, the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,-
(a) “company” means any body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) “director” in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm.”
Section 25 speaks about restrictions on new outlets and new
discharges and Section 26 relates to provision regarding
existing discharge of sewage or trade effluent. Section 44
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speaks about penalty for contravention of Section 25 or
Section 26.
13) It is not in dispute that the first respondent before letting
out trade effluent into a stream or a river has to satisfy certain
conditions in terms of the provisions of the Act and the order
of the authorities concerned. It is also not in dispute that
without a consent order by the Board the Company cannot let
out untreated effluent into a land or stream or river. Though
a consent order was issued by the Board it has been
specifically stated in the complaint that those conditions have
not been fulfilled by the Company. In those circumstances, in
the interest of the public health, the appellant-Board through
its officers laid a complaint against the persons, who are in
charge of the day-to-day affairs and in the decision making
process. There is no need to place all the materials at the
threshold. However, on perusal of the complaint and the
relevant materials in the form of documents, the learned
Special Judicial Magistrate (Pollution) entertained the same
and issued summons to the named persons in the complaint.
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Inasmuch as the High Court quashed the complaint against
the first respondent herein who is a Joint Managing Director
of the Company, we are concerned about the
averments/allegations against him in respect of his concern in
the day-to-day affairs and in the decision making process. We
have already referred to the relevant averments/materials
adverted to in the complaint. Before going into the reasoning
and conclusion of the High Court for quashing the complaint
against the first respondent herein, let us consider various
decisions of this Court with reference to the very same
provisions, namely, Sections 44 and 47 of the Act as well as
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.PC.
14) It is settled legal position that at the stage of issuing
process, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the
allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in
support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied
whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against
the accused. In Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna
Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 736, this
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Court has held that it is not the province of the Magistrate to
enter into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of
the case. It was further held that whether a process should be
issued, the Magistrate can take into consideration
improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in
the evidence led by the complainant in support of the
allegations. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted
discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially
exercised by him. It was further held that once the Magistrate
has exercised his discretion, it is not for the High Court or
even this Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the
Magistrate or to examine their case on merits with a view to
find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if
proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused.
This Court has held that in the following cases, an order of the
Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be
quashed:
“(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
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(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.”
No doubt the grounds mentioned above are purely illustrative
and it provides only guidelines to indicate contingencies where
the High Court can quash the proceedings. Though argument
was advanced based on the decision in State of Karnataka
vs. Pratap Chand and Others, (1981) 2 SCC 335, it was
decided in a case relating to conviction under Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940 and not quashing of a complaint based
merely on a petition or an affidavit. Hence, the said decision
is not applicable to the case on hand.
15) Though reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in
Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi
and Others, (1983) 1 SCC 1, a perusal of the said decision
makes it clear that the complaint in that case was vague as
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regards the Directors and the Court has concluded that no
offence revealed against them, hence the High Court was
justified in quashing the proceedings against the Directors.
16) The next decision pressed into service by the first
respondent is State of Haryana vs. Brij Lal Mittal and
Others, (1998) 5 SCC 343. In the said decision, after finding
that except a bald statement in the complaint that the
respondents therein were Directors of the manufacturers,
there is no other allegation to indicate, even prima facie, that
they were in charge of the Company and also responsible to
the Company for the conduct of its business. This Court
agreed with the High Court in quashing the prosecution
against the three Directors.
17) Reliance was also placed on the decision in Nalin
Thakor and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2003)
12 SCC 461. This Court, after finding that there is no
allegation as regards the requirement of sub-section (2) of
Section 47 and the learned Judicial Magistrate issued
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summons without application of mind, allowed the appeal and
set aside the summons issued against the appellants therein.
18) In the earlier part of our order, we have extensively
adverted to the specific averments/assertions in the complaint
of the Board with reference to all the officers i.e. named
persons in the complaint including the first respondent who is
Joint Managing Director of the Company. In those
circumstances, we are of the view that the above-mentioned
decisions relied on by the first respondent are not helpful to
the stand taken by him. It is useful to refer the decision in
the case of U.P. Pollution Control Board vs Messrs Modi
Distillery and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 684. The said case, by
special leave, was directed against the judgment and order of
the High Court of Allahabad dated 16.05.1984 setting aside,
in its revisional jurisdiction, order of the CJM, Ghaziabad
dated 03.11.1983 directing issue of process against the
respondents therein on a complaint filed by the appellant
Pollution Control Board under Section 44 of Water (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. The issue involved
therein was whether the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Managing
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Director and Members of the Board of Directors of M/s Modi
Industries Limited, the company owning the industrial unit
called M/s Modi Distillery could be proceeded against on a
complaint against the said industrial unit. Learned Single
Judge of the High Court found that there was no sufficient
ground against the respondent inasmuch as the allegations
made in the complaint do not constitute an offence punishable
under Section 44 for the admitted contravention of Sections
25(1) and 26 read with Section 47 of the Act. The facts
narrated above clearly show that the same is identical to the
case on hand. This Court taking note of the provisions
particularly, Sections 25 (1) (2) and 26 as well as Sections 44
and 47 and the averments in the complaint after finding that
prima facie materials are available and all the issues to be
dealt with by the Judicial Magistrate at the time of trial, set
aside the order of the High Court interfering with the order of
CJM directing issue of process to the respondents and
directed the learned Magistrate to proceed with the trial in
accordance with law. No doubt, it is true that the learned
Single Judge of the High Court quashed the proceedings on
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the ground that there could be no vicarious liability saddled
on the Chairman, Vice-chairman, Managing Director and
other members of the Board of Directors of the Company
under Section 47 of the Act unless there was a prosecution of
the Company i.e. M/s Modi Industries Ltd. In the case on
hand, it is not in dispute that the Company has been shown
as first accused in the complaint apart from including
Chairman, Managing Director, Jt. Managing Director, General
Manager, Directors, General Manager, Commercial Manager
and Company Secretary as well as their specific role in the
day-to-day affairs and decision making process.
19) U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Mohan Meakins Ltd.
and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 745 is a case filed by the very same
appellant- U.P. Pollution Control Board and in similar
circumstances this Court interfered with the order of the High
Court as well as the order of the Sessions Court quashing the
similar complaint. In the said case, the Board initiated
proceedings for prosecuting Mohan Meakins Ltd and its
Directors for discharging trade effluents in the river Gomti
which is a tributary of the Ganga. The learned trial Judge on
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satisfying the averments in the complaint of the Board issued
process against the accused at the first instance. The
respondents/Company and its Directors desired the trial
Court to discharge them without even making their first
appearance in the Court. When the attempt made for that
failed, they moved for exemption from appearance in the
Court. In the meanwhile, the Sessions Judge, Lucknow
entertained a revision moved by the accused against the order
issuing process to them and quashed it on the erroneous
ground that the Magistrate did not pass a speaking order for
issuing such summons. The CJM before whom the complaint
was filed thereafter passed a detailed order on 25.04.1984 and
again issued process to the accused. The order was again
challenged by the accused in revision before the Sessions
Court and the same Sessions Judge again quashed it by order
dated 25.08.1984. The Board moved before the High Court in
a revision against the said order. Though the revision was
moved in 1984 itself it took 15 years for the High Court to
dismiss the revision petition as per the order passed by a
learned Single Judge on 27.07.1999. Questioning the same,
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the Board filed special leave petition before this Court and
ultimately leave was granted by this Court. It is useful to refer
the facts and other details stated in the complaint as noted by
this Court. Thomas, J. (as he then was) speaking for the
Bench in paras 10 and 11 observed thus:-
10. … … … In the complaint filed by the appellant before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the Company (M/s Mohan Meakins Ltd.) has been arrayed as the first accused and the other persons who were arrayed as Accused 2 to 10 were described as the Directors of the said Company. The 11th person arrayed in the complaint as accused is described as the Manager of the Company. The averments in the complaint show that the Distillery Unit of the Company at Daliganj, Lucknow, has been discharging noxious trade effluents into River Gomti and causing continuous pollution of the river. It was further averred in the complaint that on 19-9-1982, samples of trade effluents were collected by the officers empowered in this behalf, from the drain “just outside the plant inside the factory”, and from the irrigation plant out of which the effluents were pumped into the river. When the samples were analysed in the Industrial Toxicology Research Centre, Lucknow, it was revealed that the quality of effluents was beyond the standard laid down for the purpose. Therefore, it is alleged that the Company has violated Section 24 of the Act* and thereby the Company is guilty of the offence under Section 43 of the Act.
11. Where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company every person who was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company is also made guilty of the offence by the statutory creation. Any director, manager or other officer of the company, who has consented to or connived in the commission of the said offence, is made liable for the punishment of the offence.”
This Court has also noted further allegations in the complaint
against Managers or Directors of the Company which are as
under:-
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“12. In the above context what is to be looked at during the stage of issuing process is whether there are allegations in the complaint by which the Managers or Directors of the Company can also be proceeded against, when the Company is alleged to be guilty of the offence. Para 12 of the complaint reads thus:
“That the accused persons from 2 to 11 are Directors/ Managers/ Partners of M/s Mohan Meakins Distillery, Daliganj, Lucknow, as mentioned in this complaint are responsible for constructing the proper works and plant for the treatment of their highly polluting trade effluent so as to conform to the standard laid down by the Board. Aforesaid accused persons are deliberately avoiding to abide by the provisions of Sections 24 and 26 of the aforesaid Act which are punishable respectively under Sections 43 and 44 of the aforesaid Act, for which not only the Company but its Directors, Managers, Secretary and all other responsible officers of the accused Company, responsible for the conduct of its business are also liable in accordance with the provision of Section 47 of the Act.”
The appellant has further stated in para 23 of the complaint that “the Chairman, Managing Directors and Directors of the Company are the persons responsible for the act and therefore, they are liable to be proceeded against according to the law”.
Taking note of the averments in the complaint against the
Directors, Managers and the ingredients of Section 47 of the
Act, this Court declined to accept the reasoning of the High
Court and Sessions Court for quashing the complaint thereby
set aside both the orders and directed the trial Court to
proceed with the case in accordance with law.
20) In the case on hand which is also similar to Mohan
Meakins Ltd. had commenced its journey in the year 1985,
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nonetheless lapse of such long period cannot be a reason to
absolve the respondents from the trial. In a matter of this
nature, particularly, when it affects public health if it is
ultimately proved, courts cannot afford to deal lightly with
cases involving pollution of air and water. The message must
go to all concerned persons whether small or big that the
courts will share the parliamentary concern and legislative
intent of the Act to check the escalating pollution level and
restore the balance of our environment. Those who discharge
noxious polluting effluents into streams, rivers or any other
water bodies which inflicts on the public health at large,
should be dealt with strictly de hors to the technical
objections. Since escalating pollution level of our environment
affects on the life and health of human beings as well as
animals, the courts should not deal with the prosecution for
offences under the pollution and environmental Acts in a
causal or routine manner.
21) It is our endeavour to point out that the High Court has
quashed the complaint arising in an environmental matter in
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a casual manner by exercising power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. This Court has held exercise of power under Section
482 of the Code is the exception and under the rule there are
three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction
may be exercised i.e. (a) to give effect to an order of the Court;
(b) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court; (c) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is true that it is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule
which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
While exercising inherent powers either on civil or criminal
jurisdiction, the Court does not function as a Court of Appeal
or Revision. The inherent jurisdiction though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. It should be
exercised to do real and substantial justice and if any attempt
is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
Court has power to prevent abuse. When no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the
question of fact. When complaint is sought to be quashed, it
is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
complainant had alleged and whether any offence is made out
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even if the allegations are accepted in toto. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
could not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the
evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. To put it clear, it is the function of the trial Judge
to do so. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in
exercise of its power is based on sound principles. The
inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not
constitute offence of which cognizance has been taken by the
Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in
exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Crl.
Procedure Code. However, it is not necessary that there
should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to
find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.
22) In the light of the above discussion and in view of the
specific averments in the complaint as referred to by us in the
earlier paragraphs coupled with the statutory provisions,
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namely, Sections 25, 26, 44 and 47 of the Act, we are unable
to share the view expressed by the High Court in quashing the
complaint insofar as the first respondent herein. Accordingly,
we set aside the same. The Special Judicial Magistrate
(Pollution) is directed to proceed with the complaint and
dispose of the same in accordance with law. If the first
respondent herein applies for dispensing with his personal
presence in the Court, after making the first appearance, the
Special Court can exempt him from continuing to appear in
the Court by imposing any condition which the Court deems
fit. Subject to the above observation, we set aside the
impugned judgment of the High Court and direct the Special
Judicial Magistrate (Pollution) to proceed with the case in
accordance with law and dispose of the same as expeditiously
as possible. We make it clear that we have not expressed
anything on the merits of the contents of the complaint and it
is for the Special Court to decide the same in accordance with
law. The Criminal appeal is allowed.
.…………………………………CJI.
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(K.G. Balakrishnan)
…..…………………………………J. (P. Sathasivam)
New Delhi; December 12, 2008.
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