IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.685 OF 2005

U.P. Land Development Corporation … Appellants and another

Versus

Mohd. Khursheed Anwar and another … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1. This is an appeal for setting aside the order passed by the Division  

Bench of the Allahabad High Court which allowed the writ petition filed by  

the respondents and directed the appellants to pay salary to the respondents  

in  the  pay-scale  of  Rs.2200-4000  prescribed  for  the  post  of  Assistant  

Engineer, as revised up to date.  

2. Appellant  No.1  -  U.P.  Land  Development  Corporation  (hereinafter  

described as the Corporation) was established for helping the farmers of the  

State in reclaiming their land.  The Corporation executed several schemes,

most  of  which  were  sponsored  and/or  funded  by  the  World  Bank  by  

engaging  staff  on  contract  basis.   Ordinarily,  such  engagement  was  

continued  till  the  completion  of  the  particular  scheme  but,  at  times,  the  

services of the same staff were utilized for execution of other scheme(s).   

3. The respondents, who are graduates in engineering applied for being  

employed  under  the  Corporation  as  Assistant  Engineers.  They  were  

interviewed by the Selection Committee along with other eligible persons  

and were adjudged suitable for employment on contract basis for completion  

of  ‘Million  Wells  Scheme’.   This  is  evident  from  the  contents  of  the  

document titled ‘notes and order’ (Annexure P-1 with the memo of appeal),  

which reads thus:-

“Notes and Order

At 4 districts, the work is being carried out by this Corporation under  the Million Wells  Scheme.   At present  this  work is  going at  full  speed.  At present, there is only one engineer who is looking after  the work and considering the nature of the work, one engineer is not  sufficient and because of lack of engineers, it is not being possible to  complete the work within stipulated time, because of this, works at  Aligarh  and  Raibareilly  are  suffering  from time  to  time.   In  the  headquarters of the Corporation, there is no engineer and we have to  remained depend on the said one engineer only.  Keeping in mind  the need of the work, the applications received in this office have  been examined and degree holder (civil) engineers were called for  interview on 15.2.1991.  Two posts of Asstt. Engineer and one post  of Jr. Engineer are sanctioned in the Corporation but the work is to  be completed under time bound Million Wells Scheme. Therefore,  the  services  of two engineers  may be obtained on a consolidated  

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salary of Rs.2,000/- per month for a period of 3 months.  The salary  of both these engineers would be less than the salary of the regular  appointed engineers.  The engineers would be appointed on contract  basis  and the  original  certificate  of  their  educational  qualification  will remain deposited here.

On the basis of the interview dated 15.2.91, Md. Khursheed  Anwar  and  Shri  Ashok  Kumar  were  found  suitable.   It  is  being  forwarded for necessary approval and signature in this regard.

Sd/-         Illegible         16.2.91.

 Sd/- Managing Director.”

4. As a sequel to the approval accorded by the Managing Director of the  

Corporation, two separate orders dated 18.2.1991 were issued engaging the  

respondents on contract basis for a period of three months on a consolidated  

salary of Rs.2000/- per month with a stipulation that their claim for regular  

appointment will not be entertained.  At that time, pay scale of the post of  

Assistant  Engineer  was  Rs.2200-4000  and  that  of  Junior  Engineer  was  

Rs.1600-2660. The tenure of engagement of the respondents was extended  

by the Managing Director of the Corporation from time to time for short  

periods of three months each.  However, after one year and three months of  

their  initial  engagement,  the  concerned  authority  passed  an  order  dated  

12.5.1992 and extended the services of the respondents till further orders.   

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5. After  completing  three  years’  service,  the  respondents  jointly  filed  

Writ  Petition  No.161  (S/B)  of  1994  for  issue  of  a  mandamus  to  the  

appellants herein to pay them salary in the regular pay scale prescribed for  

the post of Assistant Engineer and also regularize their services on that post  

by asserting that they fulfil  the qualification prescribed for the post;  that  

they were appointed as Assistant Engineers after due selection and that right  

from the date of joining, they were continuously discharging the duties of  

the post  of Assistant  Engineer.   They pleaded that action of the opposite  

parties  in  not  paying  them salary  in  the  prescribed  pay scale  and not  to  

regularize their services was wholly arbitrary and unjustified.   

6. The appellants contested the writ petition.  The thrust of their case  

was that at the time of engagement of the respondents, no sanctioned post of  

Assistant Engineer was available and they were appointed on consolidated  

salary for a fixed period.  The appellants denied the assertions contained in  

the writ petition that the respondents were discharging the duties of the posts  

of Assistant Engineer.  According to the appellants, the respondents were  

engaged on purely contractual basis for a fixed period and they have no right  

to be regularized on the post of Assistant Engineer.  

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7. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by him, Mohd. Khursheed Anwar not  

only reiterated the averments contained in the writ petition but also placed  

on record documents marked as Annexures R/1 to R/7 to show that at the  

time  of  their  engagement,  sanctioned  posts  of  Assistant  Engineer  were  

available.

8. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Division Bench of the  

High Court directed the Managing Director of the Corporation to file his  

own affidavit.  Thereupon, Shri D.K. Mittal, the then Managing Director of  

the Corporation filed affidavit dated 6.12.1994 stating therein that the post  

of  Assistant  Engineer  (Civil)  never  existed  in  the  Corporation  and  the  

respondents were not appointed as Assistant Engineer or against the post of  

Assistant  Engineer.   He,  however,  admitted  that  the  respondents  were  

employed  on  a  consolidated  salary  of  Rs.2000/-  per  month  after  being  

subjected to interview.

9. The  Division  Bench  of  the  High Court  negatived  the  respondents’  

claim for  regularization  of  service  by  observing  that  they  had  not  made  

specific prayer to that effect but accepted their plea for issue of a mandamus  

to the appellants herein to pay them salary in the pay scale prescribed for the  

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post  of  Assistant  Engineer.   The  Division  Bench  opined  that  the  writ  

petitioners were qualified to be appointed as Assistant Engineer and there  

was enough material on record to show that they were appointed as such on  

ad hoc basis.  The Division Bench then referred to letter dated 22.2.1993 and  

observed:

“If there are posts of Assistant Engineers or equivalent thereto,  payment of their wages should be equal to the said post on the  ground of the principle of pay parity.  The reasoning that while  creating new posts, the Government did not sanction any post  of Assistant Engineer will not help the opposite parties as by  the letter dated 22.2.1993 (Annexure A-3), by virtue of which,  new posts were created,  the old post  numbering 260 in total  lying vacant were not abolished,  although, they were kept in  abeyance.  As the petitioners have been appointed long before  issuance of the said letter dated 22.2.1993, it would be deemed  that the two posts of Assistant Engineers had been filed up with  the  ad hoc appointment of  the petitioners.   It  was,  however,  different  rather  meaningless  if  the  said  two  posts  were  not  shown to have been occupied by the petitioners on account of  some implications. One of such implications is obvious that if  the  two  posts  had  been  indicated  to  be  occupied  by  the  petitioners, their salary in the prescribed scale was required to  be paid to them.  The Management of the Corporation some  how did not wish to keep the things clean and clear and it is a  matter  of  common  experience  that  very  often  a  motivated  ambiguity  is  left  with  a  view  to  leave  scope  for  suitable  interpretation.   If  there  was  no  post  of  an  Engineer  in  the  Corporation,  why  in  the  initial  appointment  letters  of  the  petitioners,  they  were  referred  to  as  simply  Engineers.   The  opposite parties have not proved from any document that there  was  no  post  of  engineer  existing  in  the  Corporation.   As  is  evident from the list of 260 sanctioned posts, there were posts  of  either  Assistant  Engineers  or  Junior  Engineers.   If  the  Corporation had in mind to appoint the two petitioners on any  terms and conditions, their designation should have been clearly  

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indicated.   In the absence of clarity coupled with subsequent  reference to their designation as Assistant Engineers, it would  be presumed that they were appointed as Assistant Engineers  and therefore, they would be entitled to get their salary in the  pay-scale of Rs.2200-4000 as revised up to date.”

10. Shri M.S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants  

took us through the documents produced by his clients to show that at the  

time  of  engagement  of  the  respondents,  sanctioned  posts  of  Assistant  

Engineer (Civil) were not available in the services of the Corporation and  

argued  that  the  High  Court  committed  serious  error  in  directing  the  

appellants to pay salary to the respondents in the regular pay scale of the  

post  of  Assistant  Engineer  ignoring  that  they  were  engaged  for  a  fixed  

period on a consolidated salary.  Learned senior counsel emphasized that the  

Corporation is  primarily engaged in execution of  schemes sponsored and  

funded by the World Bank and argued that in the absence of availability of  

sanctioned posts of Assistant Engineer, the appellants cannot be compelled  

to pay to the respondents salary in the pay scale of that post by applying the  

principle of equal pay for equal work.  

11. Shri Anil  Kumar Sangal, learned counsel for the respondents fairly  

stated  that  his  clients  were  not  appointed  after  following  the  procedure  

prescribed for regular appointment but argued that the direction given by the  

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High Court for payment of salary to them in the regular pay scale prescribed  

for  the  post  of  Assistant  Engineer  cannot  be  faulted  because  they  were  

employed against the existing posts of Assistant Engineer and discharged the  

duties  and  functions  of  that  post.   Learned  counsel  submitted  that  the  

respondents had continuously discharged the duties of the post of Assistant  

Engineers and as such their entitlement to get salary in the scale prescribed  

for that post cannot be questioned.   

12. The question whether the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ can  

be read as part of the doctrine of equality has been considered by this Court  

in large number of cases.  In Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India,  

AIR 1962 SC 1139, this Court observed that the principle of ‘equal pay for  

equal work’ as an abstract doctrine had nothing to do with Article 14.  This  

view  has  not  been  followed  in  most  of  the  subsequent  judgments.   In  

Randhir  Singh  v.  Union  of  India (1982)  1  SCC  618,  the  Court  

distinguished  the  three  earlier  judgments  including  Kishori  Mohanlal  

Bakshi v. Union of India (supra) and observed:   

“Our attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukerjee v.  Union  of India and Makhan Singh v. Union of India, where reference  was made to the observations of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal   Bakshi v. Union of India describing the principle of “equal pay  for equal work” as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do  

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with Article 14. We shall presently point out how the principle,  “equal pay for equal work”, is not an abstract doctrine but one  of substance. Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of lndia is not  itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there  was  that  there  could  be  different  scales  of  pay  for  different  grades of a service. It is well known that there can be and there  are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for  entry  into  a  particular  grade,  the  higher  grade  often  being  a  promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher  qualifications  for  the  higher  grade,  which  may  be  either  academic  qualifications  or  experience  based  on  length  of  service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into  two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of “equal  pay for equal work” would be an abstract doctrine not attracting  Article 14 if sought to be applied to them.

It is true that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” is not  expressly  declared  by  our  Constitution  to  be  a  fundamental  right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of  the Constitution proclaims “equal pay for equal work for both  men  and  women”  as  a  directive  principle  of  State  Policy.  “Equal pay for equal work for both men and women” means  equal  pay  for  equal  work  for  everyone  and  as  between  the  sexes. Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of  the  judgments  of  this  Court  have  to  be  read  into  the  fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of  the  Constitution  enjoins  the  State  not  to  deny  any  person  equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and  Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity  for  all  citizens  in  matters  relating  to  employment  or  appointment  to  any  office  under  the  State.  These  equality  clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone.  To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the  Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with  the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality  clauses will  have some substance if  equal  work means equal  pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for  trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing  with  tax  evaders  is  discriminatory,  whether  a  particular  

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governmental  policy  in  the  matter  of  grant  of  licences  or  permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether  the take-over of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary  and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature,  leave  the  millions  of  people  of  this  country  untouched.  Questions  concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet  matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the  equality  clauses  of  the  Constitution  have  any significance  to  them.  The  Preamble  to  the  Constitution  declares  the  solemn  resolution  of  the  people  of  India  to  constitute  India  into  a  Sovereign  Socialist  Democratic  Republic.  Again  the  word  “socialist” must mean something. Even if it does not mean ‘to  each according to his need’, it must at least mean “equal pay for  equal work”. “The principle of “equal pay for equal work” is  expressly  recognized  by  all  socialist  systems  of  law,  e.g.,  Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of Section  111 of  the  Czechoslovak  Code,  Section  67  of  the  Bulgarian  Code,  Section  40  of  the  Code  of  the  German  Democratic  Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code. Indeed  this principle has been incorporated in several western Labour  Codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I  of the French Code du Travail,  and according to Argentinian  law,  this  principle  must  be  applied  to  female  workers  in  all  collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3  of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and Clause  7,  Section  123  of  the  Mexican  Constitution,  the  principle  is  given universal significance” (vide  International  Labour Law  by Istvan Szaszy, p. 265). The Preamble to the Constitution of  the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle  of ‘equal remuneration for work of equal value’ as constituting  one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions  “involving  such  injustice,  hardship  and  privation  to  large  numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace  and harmony of the world are imperilled”. Construing Articles  14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39 (d), we are  of  the view that  the  principle  “equal  pay for  equal  work” is  deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to  cases  of  unequal  scales  of  pay based on no classification  or  irrational  classification  though  those  drawing  the  different  scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.”

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13. The ratio of the judgment in Randhir Singh’s case was invoked and  

applied  in  Dhirendra  Chamoli  v.  State  of  U.P. (1986)  1  SCC  637,  

Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD (1986) 1 SCC 639 and other  

cases for extending the benefit of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’  

to different types of employees including daily wagers but the same was  

distinguished  in  Federation  of  All  India  Customs and Central  Excise  

Stenographers (Recognized) v. Union of India (1988) 3 SCC 91, State of  

U.P.  v.  J.P.  Chaurasia (1989) 1 SCC 121,  Mewa Ram Kanojia v.  All  

India  Institute  of  Medical  Sciences (1989)  2  SCC  235,  Ghaziabad  

Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhry (1995) 5 SCC 210, State of  

Haryana  v.  Jasmer  Singh (1996)  11  SCC  77,  Orissa  University  of  

Agriculture and Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty (2003) 5 SCC 188,  

State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj (2003) 6 SCC 123,  Government of West  

Bengal  v.  Tarun  K.  Roy (2004)  1  SCC  347,  State  of  Haryana  v.  

Charanjit (2006) 9 SCC 321, S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand (2007)  

8 SCC 279, Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and others (2008) 10 SCC 1  

and very recently in State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh (2009) 9 SCC 514.

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14. In  Jawaharlal  Nehru Technological  University  v.  T.  Sumalatha  

(2003) 10 SCC 405, a two-Judge Bench set aside the direction given by the  

High Court to the appellant to absorb the respondents in accordance with the  

policy contained in G.O. No.212 dated 22.4.1994, but made some significant  

observations on the issue of payment of higher salary to them.  The same are  

extracted below:

“Though the plea of regularisation in respect of any of the fifth  respondents cannot be countenanced, the respondent employees  should have a fair deal consistent with the guarantee enshrined  in Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution. They should not be  made to work on a meagre salary for years together. It would be  unfair  and unreasonable  to  extract  work from the employees  who have been associated with the nodal centre almost from its  inception by paying them remuneration which, by any objective  standards,  is  grossly  low.  The Central  Government  itself  has  rightly realised the need to revise the consolidated salary and  accordingly  enhanced  the  grant  on  that  account  on  two  occasions. That revision was made more than six years back. It  is  high  time  that  another  revision  is  made.  It  is  therefore  imperative that the Ministry concerned of the Union of India  should  take  expeditious  steps  to  increase  the  salary  of  the  investigators  viz.  Respondents  1  to  4  working  in  the  nodal  centre  in  Hyderabad.  In  the  absence  of  details  regarding the  nature  of  work  done  by  the  said  respondents  and  the  equivalence  of  the  job  done  by  them  to  the  other  posts  prevailing  in  the  University  or  the  Central  Government  institutions, we are not in a position to give any direction based  on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. However, we  consider it just and expedient to direct Respondent 7 or 8, as the  case  may be,  to take an expeditious  decision  to  increase the  consolidated salary that is being paid to Respondents 1 to 4 to a  reasonable  level  commensurate  with  the  work  done  by  them  and keeping in view the minimum salary that is being paid to  the personnel doing a more or less similar job. As far as the  

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fifth respondent is  concerned, though we refrain from giving  similar  directions  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  post  is  not  specifically  sanctioned  under  the  Scheme,  we  would  like  to  observe that the Central Government may consider increasing  the  quantum  of  office  expenditure  suitably  so  that  the  University  will  be able  to  disburse  higher  salary  to  the  fifth  respondent.”    

15. In  Dayanand’s  case,  the Court observed that the ratio of  Randhir  

Singh’s case  has  not  been  followed  in  later  judgments  and  held  that  

similarity in the designation or quantum of work are not determinative of  

equality  in  the  matter  of  pay  scales  and  that  before  entertaining  and  

accepting the claim based on the principle of equal pay for equal work, the  

Court  must  consider  the  factors  like  the  source  and  mode  of  

recruitment/appointment,  the qualifications,  the nature of  work,  the  value  

judgment, responsibilities, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional  

need etc.   

16. In  Surjit Singh’s case, the Court reviewed large number of judicial  

precedents and observed:    

“Undoubtedly, the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not  an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a court  of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value.  The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has no mechanical  application  in  every  case.  Article  14  permits  reasonable  classification  based  on  qualities  or  characteristics  of  persons  recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left  

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out.  Of  course,  the  qualities  or  characteristics  must  have  a  reasonable  relation  to  the  object  sought  to  be  achieved.  In  service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for  classification  for  the  purposes  of  pay  in  order  to  promote  efficiency  in  administration.  A  higher  pay  scale  to  avoid  stagnation  or  resultant  frustration  for  lack  of  promotional  avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The  very fact that the person has not gone through the process of  recruitment may itself,  in certain cases, make a difference. If  the  educational  qualifications  are  different,  then  also  the  doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do  the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons  are  selected by a Selection Committee  on the  basis  of  merit  with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such  persons who are evaluated by the competent authority cannot be  challenged. A classification based on difference in educational  qualifications  justifies  a  difference  in  pay  scales.  A  mere  nomenclature  designating  a  person  as  say  a  carpenter  or  a  craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is  doing  the  same  work  as  another  carpenter  or  craftsman  in  regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be  different and even the nature of work assigned may be different.  It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application  of  the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’  requires  consideration  of  various  dimensions  of  a  given  job.  The  accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may  differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume  of  work.  There  may  be  qualitative  difference  as  regards  reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the  responsibilities  make  a  difference.  Thus  normally  the  applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and  determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a  writ court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal  pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this  regard. In any event, the party who claims equal pay for equal  work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things  are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a court,  the court must first see that there are necessary averments and  there is a proof. If the High Court is, on basis of material placed  before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality  

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and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment  of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective writ  petition.  In  all  these  cases,  we find that  the  High Court  has  blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for  equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.”

17. In the light of the above stated legal position, we shall now consider  

whether the direction given by the Division Bench of the High Court to the  

appellants  to  pay  salary  to  the  respondents  in  the  regular  pay  scale  

prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer is legally correct.  Here it is  

apposite to note that the High Court granted relief  to the respondents by  

presuming that two posts of Assistant Engineer were utilized for appointing  

them.   This  assumption  is  ex  facie  fallacious  because  the  documents  

produced before the High Court and this Court show that the respondents  

were engaged for a fixed period on a consolidated salary.  There is nothing  

in the language of orders dated 18.2.1991 from which it can be inferred that  

the  respondents  were  appointed against  the  sanctioned posts  of  Assistant  

Engineer  (Civil).   The  correspondence  exchanged  between  the  State  

Government and the Corporation after 18.2.1991 cannot be relied upon for  

recording  a  finding  that  the  respondents  were  appointed  against  the  

sanctioned posts of Assistant Engineer.  Therefore, the direction given by the  

High Court for payment of salary to the respondents in the regular pay scale  

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prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer cannot be sustained.  But, at the  

same  time,  we  are  convinced  that  the  appellants  were  not  justified  in  

continuing the respondents on a consolidated salary of Rs.2000/- per month  

despite the fact that at the time of their selection, two sanctioned posts of  

Assistant Engineer and one post of Junior Engineer were lying vacant and  

proposal for appointing the respondents without any nomenclature was made  

with the sole object of taking work of the particular post from them without  

paying salary in the regular pay-scale of any post.   To say the least,  the  

decision of the Corporation to effect economy by depriving the respondents’  

even minimum of the pay-scale was totally arbitrary and unjustified.  The  

very  fact  that  the  respondents  were  engaged on a  consolidated  salary  of  

Rs.2,000/- per month and the prescribed pay-scale of the post of Assistant  

Engineer  in  other  branches  was  Rs.2200-4000/-  and  that  of  the  Junior  

Engineer was Rs.1,600 – 2,660/-  gives a clear indication that  they were  

engaged to do the work of Assistant Engineer. The  appellants  had  

neither pleaded before the High Court nor it has been shown to this Court  

that the respondents were not qualified for the post of Assistant Engineer.  It  

is also not the case of the appellants that the respondents suffered from any  

other  disability  which  could  impede  their  appointment  on  the  post  of  

Assistant Engineer.  In the written statement filed before the High Court, the  

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appellants did make a statement that the respondents were not discharging  

the duties of Assistant Engineer but no material was produced either before  

the High Court or before this Court to show any difference in the nature of  

duties being performed by the respondents and those which were required to  

be performed by an Assistant Engineer.  It is, therefore, reasonable to take  

the  view  that  the  respondents  had  been  arbitrarily  deprived  of  their  

legitimate right to get minimum of the pay-scale prescribed for the post of  

Assistant Engineer.

18. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.  The impugned order is set  

aside.   However,  the  appellants  are  directed  to  pay  to  the  respondents  

minimum of the pay-scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer (as  

revised  from time  to  time)  from the  date  of  their  appointment  till  they  

continued in the employment of the Corporation.

19. During  the  course  of  hearing,  we  were  informed  by  the  learned  

counsel for the parties that the respondents’ engagement was discontinued in  

2007  and  they  were  offered  fresh  employment  on  the  post  of  Junior  

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Engineer.  On this issue we do not want to make any observation and leave it  

to the respondents to accept or decline the offer made by the appellants.   

………………….…….…J. [G.S. Singhvi]

……………….…………J. [C.K. Prasad]

New Delhi July 05, 2010.

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