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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2727 of 2008

PETITIONER: U.P.C.U.E.F. Ltd.

RESPONDENT: Cane Commissioner & R.C.C.S. & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/2008

BENCH: TARUN CHATTERJEE & HARJIT SINGH BEDI

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T REPORTABLE

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2727 OF 2008 ( Arising out of SLP(C) No.16536 of 2005 )

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1.      Leave granted. 2.      This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order  dated 26th of April, 2005 of the High Court of Judicature at  Allahabad in CMWP No. 33014 of 1993 dismissing the writ  petition of the appellant filed against the orders dated 17th of May,  1993 and 14th of July, 1993 passed by the Cane Commissioner and  Registrar Cooperative Cane Societies U.P., Lucknow (respondent  No. 1) and the Special Secretary, Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti  (respondent No.3) respectively. 3.      The relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as under.  The appellant is a registered Trade Union of the workmen  employed by Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd, Shamli, respondent no.  4 herein. Before the High Court, one Late Shri. Niranjan Singh was  the writ petitioner   No. 2 along with the appellant and was a  permanent seasonal clerk of the respondent No. 4 but he expired  during the pendency of the writ petition.  U.P. Cane Cooperative Service Regulations, 1975 (in short "the  Service Regulations, 1975") were framed under section 122 of the  U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 which superseded the Cane  Cooperative Service Rules, 1963. These regulations provide for the  recruitment, emoluments, terms and conditions of service etc. of the  employees, permanent as well as seasonal, of the Cooperative Cane  Development Union or Ganna Sahkari Vikas Samitis established in  the State of UP for purchase of sugar from its sugar growing members  for supply to various sugar factories.  Under the Service Regulations,  1975, "Crushing Season" was defined in Regulation 2(n) as follows: "Crushing season means, the period as defined in U.P.  Sugarcane (Regulation of Supplies and Purchase) Act,  1953, U.P. Act No. XXIV of 1953"

Section 2(i) of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supplies and  Purchase) Act, 1953 in turn defines ’Crushing Season’ as follows: "Crushing Season means the period beginning on the 1st  October in any year and ending on 15th July next  following."  

The Cane Commissioner of Cooperative Cane Societies, Uttar  Pradesh by an order dated 17th of May, 1993 replaced the definition of  "Crushing Season" as provided in the Service Regulations, 1975 with  the following definition: - "Crushing season means the period commencing from

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the date when the crushing of sugarcane in concerned  sugar factories commences till the date when crushing  ends."

It is the case of the appellant that due to this amendment, the length of  the employment of the seasonal workmen and also their wages was  affected. Further, all the seasonal workmen were placed in the same  position as prior to 1975 regulations, which made their employment at  the whims and fancies of the employer exposing the workmen to all  vulnerable tactics of the employer. Since a lot of work is required to  be done before actual crushing starts and comes to an end, like  management of movement of sugarcane, extension of loans to the  cane growers, supply of fertilizers, recovery of loans, etc. hence  employment of seasonal workers could not be made limited to the  crushing period only. On these grounds, the appellant filed a writ  petition before the High Court of Allahabad challenging the order  dated 17th of May, 1993 and the order dated         14th of July, 1993  whereby the services of Late Shri. Niranjan Singh (writ petitioner no.  2 before the High Court) were terminated. The High court, as noted  herein earlier, rejected the writ petition of the appellant. It is this order  of the High Court, which is impugned in this appeal in respect of  which leave has already been granted.  4.      The main questions that need to be decided in this appeal are: - i)      Whether it was mandatory to give notice under Section 4- I of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1956 or Section 9A  of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1956 before passing the  order dated 14th of July, 1993 altering the conditions of  service of the appellant on the basis of the order dated  17th of May, 1993. ii)     Whether the respondent no. 1 is vested with the power to  frame regulations on service conditions and further the  power to amend them under Section 122 of the U.P.  Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. 5.      The learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Brijender Chahar  vehemently argued before us that the change of the definition of  "Crushing Season" without any reasonable and justifiable cause is  not only arbitrary but also amounts to change of service conditions  of the employees to their detriment, which is not permissible under  law and in any case, the same could not be done without observing  the principles of natural justice. The learned senior counsel further  contended before us that the action of the Cane Commissioner was  contrary to the provisions of Section 4-I of the U.P. Industrial  Disputes Act, 1956 inasmuch as no notice of change was given to  the employees. The learned counsel for the respondents on the  other hand contended that mere change in the definition of the term  "Crushing Season" in the Service Regulations, 1975 would not in  any manner adversely affect the appellant because earlier also,  there had been retention in service only during the period for  which the sugar factory had actually operated and in no season  were they retained in service after expiry of the aforesaid period. 6.      While dismissing the writ petition of the appellant, the High Court  made the following findings: - "It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that no  employer can change the service condition applicable to  the workmen as is specified in the Third Schedule. The  Court has perused the Third Schedule and after perusal  of the Third Schedule it is clear that it deals regarding  mode of payment, contribution paid or payable by the  employer, compulsory and other allowances, hours of  work and rest intervals, leave, starting alteration or  discontinuance of shift working, classification by grades,  withdrawal or privilege, introduction of new rules of  discipline, rationalization or improvement of plant, any  increase or reduction in number of persons employed.  The Third Schedule does not talk regarding the change of

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service condition. Therefore, in my view, the only  contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is not  applicable. The order of the respondent in any way is not  covered under the provisions of 4-I and the Third  Schedule. As no further point has been argued and the  amendment does not call for any change in the service  conditions of the petitioner therefore, I am of the view as  submitted by the petitioner that no notice was required."

7.      Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after  examining the judgment of the High Court and other materials on  record including the relevant provisions, as mentioned herein  earlier, we are of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed  and the order of the High court set aside for the reasons stated  hereinafter.  8.      Let us deal with the first question, as noted herein earlier, for our  consideration. Section 4-I of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act  provides for Notice of Change’ and reads as under: - "4-I Notice of Change \026 No employer who proposes to  effect any change in the conditions of service applicable  to any workmen in respect of any matter specified in the  Third Schedule, shall effect such change \026  a)      without giving to the workmen likely to be  affected by such change a notice in the prescribed  manner of the nature of the change proposed to be  effected; or

b)      within twenty-one days of giving such  notice."

The Third Schedule provides as under: -

"The Third Schedule (See Section 4-I)

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE FOR CHANGE OF  WHICH NOTICE IS TO BE GIVEN 1.      Wages including the period and mode of payment. 2.      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005. 3.      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005.. 4.      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005. 5.      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005.. 6.      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005.. 7.      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005... 8.      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005... 9.      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005 10.     \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005.. 11.     \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005.Omitted (because not required  in this case)."

9.      We have examined Section 4-I of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act,  1956 which provides for ’Notice of Change’ and the ’Third  Schedule’. From their careful examination, we are unable to agree  with the High Court that the Third Schedule does not speak about  the change of service conditions of the workmen. It is clear from  Section 4-I that if any change is required to be made in the  conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any  matter specified in the Third Schedule, the same can only be done  by notice to the workman who would be affected by such change.  The Third Schedule clearly deals with Conditions of Service for  change of which notice is to be given. Clause 1 of these Conditions  in the Third Schedule would clearly indicate that if any change is  required to be made in the Wages including the period and mode of  payment of workmen, the same can only be done after service of  notice to the workmen. Therefore, from a plain reading of the

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Third Schedule, it is clear that it enumerates the conditions of  service for change of which notice has to be served upon the  workmen. In this view of the matter, the finding of the High court  that the Third Schedule does not talk about the change of service  conditions is unfounded and not acceptable. For this reason, a  notice ought to have been served upon the employees before  effecting any change in their conditions of service. Let us now  examine if the change effected by the Cane Commissioner in the  definition of "Crushing Season" would have any impact on the  conditions of service of the appellant. Admittedly, as per the earlier  definition, as noted herein earlier, "Crushing Season" meant the  period beginning on the 1st of October in any year and ending on  15th of July next following. By virtue of the amended definition,  "Crushing Season" means the period commencing from the date  when the crushing of sugarcane in the concerned sugar factories  commences till the date when crushing ends. In our view, this  change in the definition of "Crushing Season" would affect the  period for which the employees are to be paid the wages and this  change is squarely covered by Clause 1 of the Third Schedule as  noted herein earlier. Therefore, in our view, it was incumbent upon  the Cane Commissioner to serve a notice upon the appellant before  effecting any change in the definition of "Crushing Season". 10.     In view of our discussions made hereinabove, we, therefore, hold  that the orders dated 17th of May, 1993 and 14th of July, 1993 could  not have been passed without giving any notice in compliance with  Section 4-I read with the Third Schedule of the U.P. Industrial  Disputes Act, 1956, as mentioned herein earlier. In view of our  finding made hereinabove, it is, therefore, not necessary to deal  with Question No. 2 regarding power of respondent No. 1 to frame  and amend regulations under Section 122 of the U.P. Cooperative  Societies Act, 1965.  11.     For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment of the High  Court is set aside. The writ petition filed by the appellant is  allowed to the extent indicated above. The appeal is thus allowed  without any order as to costs. However, it would be open to the  respondent to amend the definition of "Crushing Season" in  accordance with law.