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PETITIONER: U.P. AVAS EVAM VIKAS PARISHAD & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: FRIENDS COOP. HOUSING SOCIETYLTD. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/04/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  114            1995 SCC  Supl.  (3) 456  1995 SCALE  (3)604

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:           O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have  heard learned  counsel on  both  sides.  Since there is  a conflict of decisions rendered by the High Court of Allahabad on interpretation of exception (iii) to s.59(1) (a) of  the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniya 1965 (for short,  ’Adhiniyam’),   we  are   inclined  to  resolve  the conflict.      Declaration under  s.3 was  published on  September  3, 1977. Notification under s.28 of the Adhiniyam was published on June  7, 1982.  Immediately the  appellant had sought for the approval of the Government through the letter dated July 27, 1982.  The Government  approved the  schem on August 24, 1982. The  declaration under  s. 32  of  the  Adhiniyam  was published on  February 28, 1987. The respondents  filed writ Petition No.  14708/84. The  Division  Bench  following  the ratio in  writ Petition  No. 17372/87  dated March  18, 1993 titled Narinder  Mohan  Foundation  Trust  v.  Special  Land Acquisition  Officer,  Meerut,  allowed  the  writ  petition declaring that  since prior  approval of  the Government was not obtained  under exception  (iii) to  s. 59(1) (a) of the Adhiniyam, the notification under s. 28, which is equivalant to  s.4(1)  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1890  and  the declaration  under   s.32,  which   is  equivalent   to  s.6 declaration, are  invalid and  inoperative. Thus this appeal by special leave.      Relevant part of s.59(1) (a) reads thus:      "The  Uttar   Pradesh  Avas  Evam  Vikas      Parishad  Adhiniyam   1965  (Except   in      relation to those housing or improvement      schemes which  have either been notified      under s.32  of Uttar  Pradesh Avas  Evam      Vikas Parishad  Adhiniyam,  1965  before      the declaration  of the  area  comprised      therein as  development  area  or  which

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    having been  notified under  s.28 of the      said   Adhiniyam    before   the    said      declarations are  thereafter  ‘approved’      by   the    State   Government       for      constinuance under the said Adhiniyam or      which   are    initiated   after    such      declaration "with  the approval"  of the      State  Government  hereinafter  in  this      section referred  to as the Special Avas      Parishad Schemes  shall in  respect of a      development area remain suspended...." A reading thereof would indicate that for the development of the  area  the  provision  of  the  Adhiniyam  shall  remain suspended except  in relation  to three  categories  of  the housing scheme  or improvement  schemes enumerated under the Act, namely, : (i) Schemes which have been notified under s. 32 of  the Adhiniyam before the declaration under s.3 of the Act; (ii)  Schemes for  which notification under s.28 of the Adhiniyam has  been issued before the notification under s.3 of the  Act and  are thereafter  approved by the State Govt. for continuance; and (iii) Schemes which are initiated after the declaration  under s.3  of the  Act with the approval of the State Government.      It is  to be seen that the language employed therein is that the  approval of  the State  Government  is  necessary. Question is  whether it  would be prior approval or approval given  subsequent   to  the   notification  under   s.28  or declaration under  s.32 is  valid in  law. If prior approval would have  been a  pre-condition for further steps, the Act would have  said so.  This not having been done, it seems to us what  is material  is to  obtain approval  of  the  State Government. The  reason appears  to be that when the schemes have been  framed, the  land suitably required for effective implementation of  the scheme  alone should  be acquired and not in excess in the guise of framing the schemes.      This Court in Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Escorts Ltd. &  Ors, 1986  (1) SCC  264, considering the distinction between "special  permission"  and    "general  permission", "previous approval" or "prior approval" in paragraph 63 held that "we  are conscious  that the word "prior" or "previous" may be implied if the contextual situation or the object and design of  the legislation  demands  it,  we  find  no  such compelling  circumstances   justifying  reading   any   such implication  into  s.29(1)  of  the  Act".  Ordinarily,  the difference between  approval and  permission is  that in the first case  the action  holds good  until it is disapproved, while in  the other  case it does not become effective until permission is  obtained. But permission subsequently granted may validate  the previous act. As to the word "approval" in s. 33(2)  (b) of  the Industrial Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord  Krishna Textiles  Mills Ltd.  v.  Workmen,  1961(1) L.L.J. 211 at 215-16 that the management need not obtain the previous consent  before taking  any action. The requirement that the  managment must  obtain the previous consent before taking any  action. The  requirement that the managment must obtain approval  was distinguished from the requirement that it must  obtain permission,  of which  mention  is  made  in s.33(1).      It is  seen that the approval envisaged under exception (iii) of  s.59(1) (a),  is to enable the Parishad to proceed further in implementation of the scheme framed by the Board. Until approval is given by the Government, the Board may not effectively implement  the scheme.  Nevertheless,  once  the approval is  given, all  the previous  acts done  or actions taken in anticipation of the approval gets validated and the

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publications made under the Act thereby becomes valid.      The question  then is whether present is a fit case for our interference  under Art.136.  On similar  facts when the appellant itself  has compromised  with others  and the same has not  been extended  to the respondents, we think that it is not  a fit  case for  our interference.  The respondents’ society also  consist of  the members  who  need  sites  for construction  of   their  houses.  Right  to  shelter  is  a fundamental right, which springs from the right to residence assured in  Art.19(1) (e)  and right to life under Art.21 of the Constitution. No doubt their construction has also to be in accordance with lay out and building rules but that would not be  a ground  to refuse  permission to  them  when  they approached  the   authorities  to   sanction  the   same  in accordance with law.      The law  is declared  accordingly, but  the  appeal  is dismissed.