12 December 1995
Supreme Court
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U O I Vs MURUGAN TALKIES

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: C.A. No.-009407-009407 / 1995
Diary number: 8684 / 1995
Advocates: C. V. SUBBA RAO Vs K. V. MOHAN


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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S. MURUGAN TALKIES

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/12/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (1) 504        JT 1995 (9)   633  1995 SCALE  (7)309

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  Division Bench  of the  Madras High  Court  in  W.P. No.12533/86 dated  November 24,  1994.  The  respondent  and others challenged the validity of Sections 24 and 25 of Cone Workers  and   Cinema   Theatre   Workers   (Regulation   of Employment) Act  (50 of  1981) (for short ’the Act’) and the notification of  Government of India bearing No.35016 issued by Ministry  of Labour on April 30, 1986. The Division Bench while upholding  the validity of the Act has given relief to the respondent to pay their share of the contribution w.e.f. the date of judgment dated November 24, 1994.      The  Union   of  India   has  filed  this  appeal.  The controversy is no longer res integra. This Court in District Exhibitors Association  Muzaffarnagar &  Ors.  v.  Union  of India &  Ors. [(1991) 3 SCC 119] upwells the validity of the provisions and  the rules.  However, it  was held  that  the employer’s contribution  should be  made effective  from the date of  the order setting aside the retrospective operation of the  notification. It can thus be concluded that from the date of  the notification  the owners  of the Cinema Theatre are liable  to contribute  their share  and also  entitle to deduct from  the wages of the workmen towards their share of provident fund  and to  have  it  credited  to  the  account maintained by the appropriate authority in that behalf.      It is contended for the respondents that the High Court has granted  the relief  taking into consideration that some workmen had  retired and  it would  be inequitable to deduct from  the   meagre  wages   of   existing   employees   with retrospective period.  Therefore, the  High  Court  directed deduction of  their share  from the date of the judgment. It is needless  to mention  that since some of the workmen have already retired  and from  some existing  workmen  deduction from date  of enforcement  of the  notification would  cause great hardship  to them,  so it  cannot be  made to bear the

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burden of  their contribution with retrospective effect from the  date   of  the  notification  towards  their  share  of contribution.      To that  extent, the order of the High Court is upheld. As regards  the liability  of the owners of the theaters who approached the High Court, the operation of the notification had stayed  at their  instance. We  find that the High Court was wholly  unjustified in granting the same relief to these owners/licencees. After their writ petitions were dismissed, they were  to bear  the  liability  from  the  date  of  the enforcement of  the notification  as held  by this Court. It is, therefore,  necessary that  from the  date on  which the respective owners  of the theaters or the licencees, who had filed the  writ petition  in the High Court, are made liable to deposit  their share  of contribution  towards  provident fund account under the scheme.      We are  issuing the  order under  Article  142  of  the Constitution. The  order of the High Court to that extent is set aside.  The respondent  and all  the theaters owners are directed to  deposit their  share  of  contribution  to  the provident fund  account from  the respective  dates on which they filed  the  writ  petitions  in  the  High  Court.  The appellants should  intimate all  of them  the date  on which they had  filed the writ petitions and call upon them to pay their share of contribution.      The appeal  is accordingly  allowed to above extent. No costs.