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PETITIONER: TULSIPUR SUGAR COMPANY LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/03/1969

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1970 AIR   70            1970 SCR  (1)  35  1969 SCC  (2) 100

ACT: Industrial  law-Labour  Court, acting under s. 6(6)  of  the U.P.  Industrial  Disputes Act (28  of  1947)-Correction  of accidental  omission  in  award after it  became  final  and enforceable-Validity of.

HEADNOTE: The  Central Wage Board for sugar industry  had  recommended revised  wage  scales,  revised categories  and  fitment  of workmen  into those, scales and categories as from  November 1,   1960.   The  State  Government  had   ’accepted   those recommendations fully including the date of  implementation. The  appellant-company, however, did not implement them  and hence,  its workmen raised a dispute and two questions  were referred  to  the Labour Court namely : (1)  of  fitment  of certain  workmen  in the new grades, and (2) the  date  from which it was to have effect.  By its award, the Labour Court held  that two of the workmen should be fitted into  certain grades  and directed the company to do so within  one  month after the award became enforceable, but, omitted to fix  the date  from  which  such  fitment  should  have  effect.   On December  7.  1963, the ’award was published  in  the  State Gazette and, under s. 6A(1) of the U.P. Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947, it became enforceable on January 7.  1964.   The appellant  fitted  the two workmen in the  two  grades  from February 7, 1964, that is, one month after the -award became enforceable.   The  union thereupon applied  to  the  Labour Court  to amend its award on the ground that it had  omitted to answer the second question referred to it and the  Labour Court  amended its award and directed that the  two  workmen should be placed in their respective grades from November 1, 1960,  as recommended by the Wage Board.  The amendment  was published  in the Gazette on June 20, 1964.   The  appellant filed  a  writ petition in the High Court for  quashing  the order  of  amendment,  but  the  High  Court  dismissed  the petition. In appeal to this Court, on the questions : (1) Whether  the correction  was  of  an error  arising  from  an  accidental omission within the meaning of a. 6 (6) of the Act; and  (2) Whether  the  award  could be, corrected (i)  after  it  was published  in  the Gazette ’and had become final,  and  (ii)

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after it had become ,enforceable. HELD : (1) Section 6(6) enables the Labour Court to  correct an  accidental  omission. in the present  case,  the  Labour Court  omitted  to answer the second question which  it  was bound  to answer.  Since the first question was answered  by it  in accordance with the Wage Board’s recommendations  and the  Government’s notification accepting them fully, if  the attention of the Labour Court had been drawn, it would  have answered  the second question also in consonance with  those recommendations and the notification.  Therefore, there  was an  error in the award due to an accidental omission  within the meaning of s. 6(6) of the Act. [39 G-H; 40A] (2)  (i)  The scheme of ss. 6 and 6A shows that there are  3 different stages before an award becomes enforceable, namely :  (a)  when  the  award  is  signed  by  the   adjudicating authority; (b) when it is published and be, comes final; and (c)  when it becomes enforceable under s. 6A.  Section  6(6) does not lay down expressly any time limit within which  the correctional  jurisdiction  under  the  section  should   be exercised.   To hold by implication that  such  jurisdiction can only be exercised till the date of publica- 36 tion when the award becomes final, would be contrary to  the sub-section which envisages the correction of an award  even after  it is published and has become final. [40 C; 41  G-H: 42 D-E] (ii)There  is  nothing  in  ss. 6, 6A or  6D  to  imply  the limitation  namely,  that  the power to  correct  is  to  be exercised  only before the award becomes  enforceable.   The circumstance that the proceedings before a Labour Court  and a Tribunal are deemed to be concluded under s. 6D when their award  becomes enforceable and they become  functus  officio would be no ground for inferring such a time limit,  because : (a) Since an arbitrator is not mentioned in s. 6D it would lead to the result, which could not have been intended, that there is a time limit only for the Labour Court and Tribunal and  not for an arbitrator; and (b) the power is similar  to that of a civil court under s. 152 C.P.C. or under r. 28  of the   Industrial  Disputes  (Central)  Rules,  1957  of   an adjudicating  ’authority under the Industrial Disputes  Act, and is based upon the principle that no party should  suffer any  detriment  I  on  account of  a  mistake  or  an  error committed  by any adjudicating authority, and no  limitation of  time  for exercising the  correctional  jurisdiction  is implied  even  though  a  civil  court  or  an  adjudicating authority  under  the  Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947  also become functus officio after their judgment or award becomes enforceable.  Also, there is no hardship in holding that the Labour Court could correct an error under s. 6(6) even after the  award had become final as a result of the  publication, or  ’after it had become enforceable under s.  6A,  because, the correction is within a circumscribed field, namely, only in  cases where a mistake, clerical or arithmetical,  or  an error  arising  from -an accidental slip  or  omission,  has occurred. [42 G-H; 43 A-B, C-E, G-H; 44 A-H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 480 of 1967. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  21,  1966 of the Allahabad  High  Court,  Lucknow Bench in Special Appeal No. 16 of 1966. L.   M. Singhvi, B. Datta, D. N. Misra, J. B. Dadachan and O.   C. Mathur, for the appellant.

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O.   P. Rana, for respondents No. 1. J.   P.   Goyal,  Sobhag  Mal  Jain and  S.  P.  Singh,  for respondent No. 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat,  J.  Two questions arise for determination  in  this appeal,  by  special  leave, against  the  judgment  of  the Appellate Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, namely,  (1) whether  a  correction  in its award by  the  Labour  Court, Lucknow,  was  one of an error arising  from  an  accidental omission  within  the  meaning  of  S.  6(6)  of  the   U.P. Industrial   Disputes  Act,  XXVIII  of  1947   (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and (2) whether, even if it was so, it  could so correct after its award was published  and  had become enforceable. 37 The Central Wage Board for sugar industry, appointed by  the Union Government for determining a wage-structure,  revision of categories of workmen, their fitment into such categories and for fixing the principles governing the grant of  bonus, had    made    certain   recommendations.     Amongst    its recommendations,   the  Wage  Board  recommended  that   its decision  should be brought into effect as from November  1, 1960.   By its notification dated April 27, 1961,  the  U.P. Government accepted those recommendations including the  one that  they  should be brought into force  with  effect  from November  1, 1960.  On a dispute having arisen  between  the appellant-company and its workmen on the company failing  to implement  the  said recommendations, the  State  Government referred  it to the Labour Court for adjudication  under  S. 4(k)  of  the Act.  The dispute involved two  questions  (1) whether  the  company should fit the workmen  named  in  the reference  in  the revised categories and in  the  new  wage scales  and (2) if so, with effect from what date.   By  its award dated November 6, 1963 the Labour Court held that  two of  the  said workmen should be fitted in  Grade  II(B)  and Grade  IV  respectively and directed the company  to  do  so within  one month after the award became  enforceable.   It, however,  omitted  to fix the date from which  such  fitment should have the effect.  On December 7, 1963 the said  award was published in the State Gazette.  The company  thereafter fitted  the two workmen in the said two grades from  a  date one  month hence after the award became enforceable and  not from  November  1,  1960.   The  workmen’s  union  thereupon applied to the Labour Court to amend its award on the ground that  it had omitted to answer the second  question  arising under the reference and the Labour Court accordingly amended its award directing that the two workmen should be placed in the  said  grades with effect from November  1,  1960.   The order amending the said award was gazetted on June 20, 1964. The  company  filed  a  petition  in  the  High  Court   for certiorari  and  for quashing the said order  of  amendment. Nigam, J. who heard the petition in the first instance  dis- missed  it  holding that (1) the Labour Court  had  made  an error arising from an accidental omission to answer the said second  question and therefore had the power to  correct  it under S. 6(6) of the Act, and (2) even if there was no  such error arising from accidental omission, the amendment merely provided  what  was already contained  in  the  notification dated  April  27,  1961,  that once  the  Labour  Court  had directed the company to fit the workmen in the said  grades, such  fitment had, under the force of that notification,  to take  effect from November 1, 1960 and that that result  was arrived at not by reason of the correction of the award  but by   force  of  the  original  award  read  with  the   said

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notification.  On a letters patent appeal having been  filed against  the said judgment, the Appellate Bench of the  High Court agreed with Nigam, 38 J.   that the correction amounted to one of an error arising from  the  accidental  omission to answer  the  said  second question  within  the  scope of S. 6(6)  of  the  Act.   The Appellate  Bench, however, proceeded to examine the  various provisions  and the scheme of the Act and held (1) that  the jurisdiction  of  the Labour Court under the Act  was  of  a limited character, (2) that it gets seisen of an  industrial dispute only when its jurisdiction is invoked by a reference under  S.  4(k) or by a voluntary reference  to  arbitration under S. 5B, (3) that under s. 4D proceedings before it  are deemed to commence from the date of such reference and  are, deemed  to be completed on the date when its  award  becomes enforceable,  (4) that its jurisdiction which emanates  from the  reference  gets  exhausted on  the  completion  of  the proceedings  before it and the Labour Court  itself  becomes functus officio on the date when its award becomes final and enforceable,  (5)  that it  cannot  thereafter  reconstitute itself  or  take seisen of a dispute, which it  has  already adjudicated  and  proceedings  relating to  it  have  become concluded,   without  a  fresh  reference  and   (6)   that, therefore,  its  correctional jurisdiction  under  s.  6(6), unlike  that  of a civil court under S. 152 of the  Code  of Civil  Procedure, is not unlimited.  The Appellate Bench  on this  reasoning  held that the two  extreme  -points  during which the Labour Court could correct its award were the date of its signing it and the date when the award becomes  final and enforceable.  Consequently, the Labour   Court  had   no jurisdiction to correct the award after it became final  and enforceable,  i.e.,  after January 7, 1964, on  expiry  of30 days  from  December  7,  1963 when  it  was  published  and the correction, therefore, was in excess of its jurisdiction and  invalid.   The Appellate Bench,  however,  declined  to issue the writ on the ground that the correction did no more than doing justice to the workmen by ordering implementation of  the  said notification of April 27, 1961  and  observing that equity was on the side of the two workmen dismissed the appeal as also the said petition. Dr.  Singhvi,  who, on behalf of the company,  disputed  the correctness of the judgment, contended that (a) no  clerical or  arithmetical  error  through  any  accidental  slip   or omission had arisen, that S. 6(6), therefore, did not  apply to  the facts of this case, and if at all,  the  application ought  to have been under S. 11B, which however,  was  never invoked;  (b)  that power under S. 6(6) could  be  exercised only  until  the  date  on  which  the  said  award   became enforceable  and  not  thereafter,  that  the   correctional jurisdiction  under S. 6 (6) is not without any limit as  to time  within  which  it could be invoked  or  exercised  and expired or exhausted itself when the award became final; (c) that the principles of industrial law postulate the finality of an award made under it and that subject to exceptions  as in S. 6A, once the award had become 39 final  it  did  not contemplate any  disturbance  of  it  by amendment  or otherwise, and (d) that the High Court was  in error  in  refusing remedy on a  supposed  consideration  of equity  once  it found lack of jurisdiction  in  the  Labour Court as it in fact did and, therefore, ought to have issued the  remedial  writ  and  quashed  the  impugned  order   of correction. As  already stated, the Wage Board had  recommended  revised

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wage  scales, revised categories and fitment of  workmen  in their  respective categories on the revised wage  scales  as from  November 1, 1960.  The State Government  had  accepted those  recommendations  fully including the  date  of  their implementation  and  the consequent fitment  of  workmen  in appropriate  categories,  and  revised  wage  scales.    Its notification made it clear that such fitment on the  revised wage  scales should be as recommended by the Wage  Board  as from  November  1, 1960.  In the belief, perhaps,  that  the said recommendations and their acceptance by the  Government were  not binding on it, the company did not implement  them and hence the union raised the dispute which was  ultimately referred  to the Labour Court.  The terms of that  reference leave  no doubt that it comprised of two questions,  (1)  of fitment  and (2) the date from which it was to have  effect. The award of the Labour Court that the company was liable to fit the two workmen in grades 11 and IV respectively and pay them at the revised scales in respect of these grades was  ’ binding  and therefore the company was liable to  carry  out the  fitment and pay the revised scales in  accordance  with such fitment.  But the award did not decide or fix the  date from which the said fitment, when made, was to have  effect. As  rightly  held by the High Court, the Labour  Court  thus omitted to answer the second question as it was bound to  do and the reference remained partly unadjudicated.  The Labour Court,  no  doubt,  did  direct that  the  award  should  be implemented  within  one month after it  became  enforceable under  the  Act, i.e., on or before February 7,  1964.   But that  direction meant only that the company should  fit  the two workmen in the two grades it had ordered and still  left the question, as to the date from which such fitment was  to have  effect,  unanswered.  Thus, the fact that  the  Labour Court  failed  to answer the second question  admits  of  no doubt.   There  can also be no doubt that  since  the  first question  was  answered by it in accordance  with  the  Wage Board’s  recommendations and the  Government’s  notification accepting  them  fully, if its attention had been  drawn  it would  in all probability have answered the second  question also  in consonance with those recommendations and the  said notification.   There is, therefore, no question that  there was  an error in the award due to an accidental omission  on the part of the Labour Court, which error it undoubtedly had the  jurisdiction to correct under S. 6(6).  The  error  was that 40 there  was  no direction in the award as to  the  date  from which ,the fitment of the two workmen in the said grades and the  revised  scales  should take effect,  arising  from  an accidental omission to answer that part of the reference. The next question is whether there is under the Act any time limit within which the correction of the award can be  made. The  impugned correction, no doubt, was made by  the  Labour Court after its award had become final and enforceable.  The principal  premise in the High Court’s reasoning as also  in that of counsel for the company was that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to correct the award ceased when the  award became  final  and enforceable.  It may be observed  at  the very outset that no time limit within which such  correction can be made has been laid down in any express terms in s:  6 (6).   The  question, therefore, is whether  any  such  time limit  can  be inferred either from S. 6 or from  the  other provisions  of  the Act.  Section 4 (k) enables  the,  State Government  to  refer  an industrial  dispute  which  either exists  or is apprehended to the Labour Court if the  matter of  the industrial dispute is one of those contained in  the

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First  Schedule  to the Act or to a Tribunal if  it  is  one contained in the first or the second Schedule.  Even if  the dispute relates to a matter in the second Schedule, if it is not  likely to affect more than 100 workmen, the  Government can, if it so thinks fit, refer such a dispute to the Labour Court.   Under S. 5B where any industrial dispute exists  or is apprehended and the employer and the workmen agree,  they may  refer  the  dispute to arbitration of  such  person  or persons including the presiding officer of a Labour Court or a   Tribunal  -as  may  be  specified  in  the   arbitration agreement.   Section 6(1) enjoins upon the Labour Court  and the Tribunal to which an industrial dispute is referred  for adjudication  to  hold  its  proceedings  expeditiously  and submit  its award to the State Government as soon as  it  is practicable  on the conclusion thereof.  Subsec. 3  provides that subject to the provisions of sub-s. 4 every arbitration award  and the award of a Labour Court or a Tribunal  shall, within  30  days from the date of its receipt by  the  State Government, be published in such manner as the State Govern- ment  thinks  fit.   Sub-s. 4, to which  sub-s.  3  is  made subject, authorises the State Government before  publication of an award of a Labour Court or a Tribunal to remit it  for its   reconsideration   and   provides   that   after   such reconsideration it shall submit its award to the  Government and the State Government, shall thereupon publish it in  the manner provided in sub-s. 3. Sub-s. 5 provides that  subject to the provisions of s. 6A an award published under sub-s. 3 shall  be final and shall not be called in question  in  any court in any manner whatsoever Section 6A, to the provisions of  which  S. 6(5) is made subject, provides by  its  sub-s. that an award, including an arbitration award, shall  become en- 41 forceable  on  the expiry of 30 days from the  date  of  its publication.   The first proviso thereof empowers the  State Government,  if it is of the opinion that it is  inexpedient on  public  grounds affecting national or State  economy  or social  justice to give effect to the whole or any  part  of the  award,  to  declare by  notification  in  the  official gazette  that it shall not become enforceable on the  expiry of  the  said period of 30 days.  The, second  proviso  pro- vides,   that   an  arbitration  award  shall   not   become enforceable if the State Government is satisfied that it was given    or   obtained.   through   collusion,   fraud    or misrepresentation.   Thus,  even though an  award  has  been published  under  s.  6(3) and has become  final  and  would ordinarily become enforceable on expiry of 30 days from such publication,  the , State Government can make a  declaration under  the  first proviso and under sub-s. 2 can  within  90 days from its publication make an order either rejecting  or modifying it, in which event it has to lay the award and its said order before the State Legislature.  Sub-s. 3  provides that  if an award is rejected or modified by an order  under sub-s. 2 and is laid before the Legislature, it shall become enforceable within 15 days from the date it is so laid.  But where  no such order under sub-s. 2 has been made, it  shall become  enforceable on the expiry of 90 days referred to  in sub-s.  2. Sub-s. 4 provides that subject to sub-sections  1 and 3, an award shall come into; operation with effect  from such  date  as may be specified therein but  where  no  such date, is specified it shall come into operations on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-s.  1 or sub-s. 3,  as the case may be.  The provisions of s. 6, and  s.  6A thus make it clear that whereas the former provides for  the award   becoming   final,  the  latter  provides   for   its

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enforceability  and  the  time  from  which  it  has  to  be implemented.   The two characteristics of the  award,  i.e., its finality on publication and its enforceability under  s. 6A,  are  distinct,  having different points  of’  time  and should not, therefore, be mixed up, for, though an award has become  final on its publication under s. 6 it  becomes  en- forceable   in   accordance   with  and   subject   to   the eventualities  provided  in  s. 6A.  There  are  thus  three different  stages  in the case of an award; (1) when  it  is signed  by  the  adjudicating  authority,  (2)  when  it  is published by the St-ate Government in the prescribed  manner and  (3) when it becomes enforceable.  Even though an  award may  have  become final on its being published,  it  becomes enforceable  subject to the expiry of the different  periods and the events prescribed in s. 6A. The scheme of ss. 6 and 6A is to retain a certain amount  of control  over awards, including an arbitration  award,  with the State Government.  An award, therefore, does not  become final  as  it  ordinarily would  be  when  the  adjudicating authority signs M 12 Sup.CI/69-4 42 it  but  becomes final when it is published  in  the  manner prescried by the State Government.  Before such  publication the  Government  is  given  the power to  remit  it  to  the adjudicating  authority  for reconsideration and  the  State Government has to publish it on its being resubmitted to it. In  spite  of  its becoming final on  -such  publication  it becomes enforceable only on the expiry of 30 ,days after  it has become final as laid down by sub-s.  1 of S. 6A.  But it does  not  so become enforceable if the Government  were  to make  a  declaration under the first proviso  and  an  order under sub-s. 2 or the award specifies a date which is  later than  30 days after its publication.  Therefore,  the  words "subject  to the provisions of S. 6A" in sub-s. 5’ of  S.  6 must mean that though an award has become final on its being published it does not immediately or automatically begin  to be  operative as that finality is subject to the  expiry  of periods and the powers of the State Government under S. 6A. Having seen the effect of the provisions of ss. 6 and 6A, we have  next  to  consider  the  scope  of  the   correctional jurisdiction  conferred on the adjudicating authority  under sub-s. 6 of S. 6. As already observed, the sub-section  does not  lay  down in any express terms any  time  limit  within which such jurisdiction is to be exercised.  It contemplates a  correction both before and after the publication  of  the award, i.e. after it has become final.  If it ,is  corrected before  its publication the correction would be carried  out without  anything further having to be done.  But if  it  is corrected  after  its publication and after  it  has  become final,  a copy of the order of correction has to be sent  to the State Government and the provisions as to publication of an award under S. 6(3) are mutatis mutandis applicable.  The correctional  jurisdiction  is limited only to  cases  where clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from  an accidental slip or omission have occurred.  ’Though s.  6(6) does  not  expressly provide for any time  limit,  the  High Court  -appears to have been much impressed by S.  6D  which lays  down  the two points as to the  commencement  and  the completion  of  proceedings  before a  labour  court  and  a tribunal.   From these two limits it came to the  conclusion that  though no time limit is expressly provided in S.  6(6) it must be inferred that the correctional jurisdiction under s.  6(6) can only be exercised upto the time that the  award becomes  final  and enforceable.  It will be  observed  that

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though   S.  6(6)  empowers  all  the   three   adjudicating authorities,  namely,  a  labour court, a  tribunal  and  an arbitrator,  to correct the award, S. 6D lays down  the  two points of commencement and completion of proceedings only in the  case  of a labour court and a  tribunal.   Section  6D, therefore,  does not furnish an indication or a  ground  for inferring  a time-limit in S. 6 (6) in the case of an  award by an arbitrator.  Would that mean that though, according to the High Court, 43 there is a period within which a labour court and a tribunal can  exercise the correctional jurisdiction, there would  be no such limit in the case of an award by an arbitrator?   In our  view no such result could have been  contemplated.   It would thus, appear that the two extremeties of time provided in  s.  6D cannot be used as a ground for inferring  a  time limit for the correctional jurisdiction under S. 6(6). Acceptance of the High Court’s reasoning becomes still  more difficult  when we examine the premises of  that  reasoning. The High Court does not appear to be sure whether the  limit as to time is to be the date of finality of the award or its enforceability,   for,  it  states  that  the   correctional jurisdiction  can  be exercised until the award  has  become final  and enforceable.  As already stated, the concepts  of finality  and  enforceability of an award are  distinct  and have been dealt with by the Legislature separately in ss.  6 and  6A.   If  it is to be reasoned  that  the  correctional Jurisdiction  can-be exercised till the date when the  award is  published and becomes final, such a reasoning  would  be contrary  to  the  provisions of S.  6(6)  themselves  which envisages correction of an award even after it is  published and has become final.  Sub-s. 6 expressly provides that when so corrected, the order correcting it has to be published in the manner prescribed under and within the time provided  in s.  6(3).  It is, therefore, manifest that the date when  an award  becomes  final cannot be the date  within  which  the power  under S. 6 (6) has to be exercised.  If, it is to  be held, on the other hand, that the power to correct is to  be exercised  until  the  award has  become  enforceable,,  the difficulty would be that there is nothing either in s. 6  or S.  6A  or  s.  6D  which  warrants  such  a  limitation  by implication.   Is it that an award is really final  when  it becomes  enforceable?  Such a conclusion would, firstly,  be contrary  to the clear language of S. 6 and, secondly  would lead to a curious result that though it has become final  on publication,  it  is  not really so,  as  that  finality  is subject to the provisions of S. 6A.  In that case, an  award can be challenged in a court during the interval between its publication and the date when it becomes enforceable.   That would  be so, despite the clear language of S. 6(5) that  an award  becoming  final  on  publication  cannot  thence   be challenged   in  any  court  whatsoever.   Laying  down   by implication  the  time limit during which  the  correctional jurisdiction under s. 6(6) can be exercised upto the time of the  award  becoming  final  under  S.  6  (5)  or  becoming enforceable  under S. 6A creates difficulties,  besides,  it would appear, being contrary to the provisions of these  two sections and is therefore not commendable.  The correctional jurisdiction  conferred on the adjudicating authority  under S. 6 (6) is in terms identical with the one conferred  under s.  152  of the Code of Civil Procedure and rule 28  of  the Industrial Disputes 44 (Central) Rules 1957 and is in consonance with the first and foremost principle that no party should suffer any detriment

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on  account  of  a  mistake or  an  error  committed  by  an adjudicating   authority.    The   circumstance   that   the proceedings before a labour court and a tribunal are  deemed to  be  concluded  under  s. 6D  when  their  award  becomes enforceable  or that thereupon they become  functus  officio would also be no ground for inferring any limitation of time in S. 6 (6), for, that would also be the case in the case of a  civil  court  or  an  adjudicating  authority  under  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 even without a provision  like s. 6D and yet the legislature has not chosen in the case  of either  of  them  to lay down any limitation  of  ’time  for exercising  its  correctional jurisdiction.   In  our  view, there  are  no compelling reasons to read into S.  6(6)  any such limitation by implication. We are also not impressed with the difficulty which the High Court  supposed would result in case s. 6(6) is  interpreted as  not  having by implication any time limit  within  which the, correctional power can be exercised by any of the three adjudicating authorities.  The High Court felt that if there is  no  such time limit an award, even after it  has  become enforceable  and  in some cases even implemented,  would  be rendered  unsettled.  But as already stated, the power is  a limited  one  which can be exercised only in cases  where  a mistake,  clerical or arithmetical or an error arising  from an accidental slip or omission has occurred.  The award thus would  have to be corrected only within  this  circumscribed field.  It may be that the correction of an award might to a certain extent have an unsettling effect to what has already become  settled, but the correction is made not due  to  any fault of the parties but of the adjudicating authority whose accidental  slip or omission cannot be allowed to  prejudice the  interests  of  the parties.  We do  not  visualise  any substantial  hardship  resulting from the exercise  of  this power  which the High Court thought might arise if an  award is   allowed  to  be  amended  even  after  it  has   become enforceable  or  even if it has been  enforced.   A  similar difficulty can also be imagined when a civil court exercises a similar power under s. 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But  no  one  has  so far suggested  that  because  of  that difficulty a limitation must be inferred in that section.  A similar  difficulty  would  also arise under r.  28  of  the Industrial  Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957.  But so  far  no one has read a similar limitation in the correctional  power provided by that rule. In  our  view  the error which the  Labour  Court  corrected clearly  fell  within s. 6(6) and could  be  corrected  even after  the award had become final as a result of its  having been  published and had become enforceable under s. 6A.   In this  view it is not necessary to consider s - 1 1 B or  its effect especially as it is nobody’s case 45 that  it  was at any stage invoked or resorted to.   In  the view  that  we have taken it was s. 6 (6) and not  s.  1  1B which  could on the facts of this case be resorted to.   The appeal, therefore, is dismissed though for reasons different from  those given by the High Court.  The  appellant-company will pay the costs of this appeal to the respondents. V.P.S.       Appeal dismissed. 46