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PETITIONER: TULSHI RABIDAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/01/1975

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GOSWAMI, P.K. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1975 AIR  638            1975 SCR  (3) 401  1975 SCC  (3) 845

ACT: Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act,  Sec.  3--Subjective satisfaction,  meaning  of--Some  evidence  gathered  during investigation  which in some manner roped in the detenu,  if sufficient.

HEADNOTE: In pursuance of the order of detention made by the  District Magistrate, West Dinajpur, on March 19, 1973, the petitioner was taken into custody.  The order of detention was intended to   prevent  the  petitioner  from  acting  in   a   manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to  the community.   The first ground related to the arrest  of  the petitioner  and his associates while they were smuggling  65 KGs. of paddy from West Dinajpur District to Malda District. On being challenged by the patrol party he could not produce any valid document in support of his carrying paddy at  West Dinajpur-Malda districts border.  The second ground  related to  the  smuggling  of paddy on 11/12-3-73  mid-night  in  6 bullock carts by the petitioner and his associates from West Dinajpur District to Malda District.  On being challenged by the  Resistance  Group  Members,  the  petitioner  and   his associates threatened to kill them and therefore, being thus terrorised, they dared not apprehend the petitioner and  his associates. Dismissing  the  Writ  Petition  challenging  the  order  of detention, HELD  : (i) The counter affidavit disclosed that a  criminal case  had  been instituted against the  petitioner  and  his associates  for offences of illegal transport of paddy,  for resistance to the police, officers taking them into  custody and for escape from lawful custody.  It further stated  that ’due to dangerous and desperate nature of the detenu and his associates’  the witness declined to give evidence  in  open court for fear of their lives and that the final report  was submitted  in  the said case.  This means that  the  charge- sheet  disclosed sufficient evidence to go before the  Court and  it was not a case of absence of reasonable  grounds  of suspicion. [403H-404B] (ii) So  far as the second ground is concerned, the  absence of material to show that a case has been charge-sheeted,  in

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court  is  not destructive of the detention  order  provided there  is some material for subjective satisfaction  of  the authority   concerned.    Whether  the   investigation   was conducted  properly or not, whether the District  Magistrate should have pinned his faith on the- result of investigation and  like questions are not for the court to consider.   But the  minimum which must be placed before the court  is  that there was some evidence gathered during investigation which, in  some  manner, roped in the petitioner.  In  the  present case, there is some evidence for the District Magistrate  to act. [404E-H] (iii)     Rhetorical   assertions  that   the   Presidential proclamation of emergency has outlived its- reality and must be annulled. cannot be transformed into proof.  The  reasons given  by this Court in Bhuth Nath’s case A.I.R.  1974  S.C. 806, holds good here too. [405E-F] Samsher Singh’s case, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2192, referred to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 349 of 1974. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. H. S. Marwah, for the petitioner. Sukumar Ghosh and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. 402 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA  IYFR,  J.-The case of the petitioner, a  detenu  in West Bengal, has been presented at persistent length by  Sri Marwah,  appearing  as amicus curiae, but some of  the  many contentions pressed by ’him merit serious notice which alone we propose to deal with. Now,  the  facts  to the extent  relevant.   The  order  for detention  was  made  by  the,  District  Magistrate,   West Dinajpur,  on March 19, 1973 pursuant to which he was  taken into custody nine- days later.  The calendar of  ’statutory’ events discloses no infirmity but the content of the grounds given  by the District Magistrate and the order of  approval made  by the State Government have been the focal points  of attack.  Straightaway we proceed to set out the two criminal involvements of the petitioner which allegedly persuaded the authority  to  direct detention with a view,  hereafter,  to inhibit this activities prejudicial to supplies essential to the community.  They are :               "(1)  That on 6-3-73 at about 01.30 hours  you               along  with  your associate  Mangal  Soran  of               Gopalpur,  P.  S.  Bangshihari,  Dist.    West               Dinajpur  were arrested with 65 kgs. of  paddy               in gunny bags within 1 K.M. of West  Dinajpur-               Malda  Border at Kandarpur, P. S.  Banshihari,               Dist.   West Dinajpur, by the patrol party  of               Bagduar  A/S  Camp, P. S.  Bangshihari,  Dist.               Dinajpur  while you and your  said  associates               were smuggling the said quantity of paddy from               West  Dinajpur  district  to  Malda  district.               Being challenged by the patrol party you could               not  produce any valid document in support  of               your  carrying  paddy at  West  Dinajpur-Malda               districts  border.   This  activity  of  yours               created  scarcity of paddy within  the  juris-               diction  of Bangshihari P. S.. Elaka  of  West               Dinajpur district and the price index of paddy               soared  high  and high beyond  the  purchasing               capacity  of the common people of  that  area.               Thus you acted in a manner prejudicial to  the

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             maintenance  of  supplies  essential  to   the               community. -               (2)   That  on 11/12/3-73 mid-night you  along               with  your  associates  were  found  smuggling               paddy  in  6 bullock carts  from  Rakhalpukur,               P.S. Banshihari, Dist.  West Dinajpur to Malda               district   by  some  members  of   the   local               Resistance group, namely Kamal Chandra Roy  of               Deogaon,  Narayan Chandra Sarkar of  Mirshati,               both of P.S. Banshihari, Dist.  West  Dinajpur               and  others.   Being challenged  by  the  Said               Resistance   Group  Members,  you   and   your               associates  threatened to kill them and  being               thus  terrorised the Resistance Group  Members               dared  not apprehend you and  your  associates               These   activities   of   yours   are   mainly               responsible for the rise in price of paddy and               rice  within Banshihari P.S.  jurisdiction  of               West  Dinajpur district.  By such illegal  act               of smuggling of paddy you and your  associates               created   scarcity  of  paddy  and   rice   in               Banshihari  P.S.  jurisdiction,  Dist.    West               Dinajpur   and  thereby  acted  in  a   manner               prejudicial  to  the maintenance  of  supplies               essential to the community.               4 03               From the above facts it is clear that you  and               your   associates  are  acting  in  a   manner               prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and               services essential to the community- The  past is the precursor and predictor of the  future  and this  commonsense canon is usually-and in this  case-applied by the authority to foretell the danger to the services  and supplies  essential to the community by repetitive  criminal activity  of  the  prospective  detenu.   Once  the  officer entrusted with the power reads the omens with due care,  the court  cannot reread for its own satisfaction.  But  if  the authority  puts forward grounds so grotesque that  he  goofs the  law, as it were, the Court will invalidate,  the  order for  the well-worn reason that no rational being would  have formed  the  satisfaction which is a sine qua  non  for  the detention.  Supra-rational hunch or infra-rational  instinct are  not legal processes in this humdrum world and we  have, as  sentinels, the duty to scan the basis of the  subjective satisfaction  of  the authority to check  upon  his  minimal aspect of, rational belief. The  grounds, as already set out, have to be  considered  to appraise the claim of rational belief as against the  charge of  a  ’cyclostyled’ satisfaction.  The crime  of  March  6, 1973,  committed  past mid-night by the petitioner  and  his associates, is tell-tale in ’certain aspects.  It relates to removal of paddy in gunny bags.  The smugglers were arrested by  the patrol party of Bagduar anti-,smuggling  camp.   The culprits  could not produce any permit in support  of  their transport  of  the paddy.  We have no doubt  that  smugglers _disrupt  supplies and services essential to  the  community and  a smuggler of today who gets away with it is likely  to be  a smuggler of tomorrow, the habit of getting rich  quick dying hard.  In this context, we have the  counter-affidavit which runs thus:               "It appears from the report submitted by  I.O.               of the case that the petitioner was intimately               connected with the incidents mentioned in  the               grounds of detention.  I deny that the grounds               of  detention are false and detention  of  the

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             petitioner  is  illegal.  It  further  appears               from  the  report of the said I.O.  that  with               reference  to the first incident a  Cr.   Case               being  Banshihari P. case No. 6  dated  6.3.73               was instituted against the petitioner and  his               associates   under  Section  7  (1)   of   the               Essential Commodities Act and Section  224/225               of   I.P.C.  but  as  due  to  dangerous   and               desperate   nature  of  the  detenu  and   his               associates the witnesses declined to give evi-               dence  against-them in open court for fear  of               their lives and final report was submitted  in               the said case." The inevitable inference from this statement, understood  in the background of the ’grounds,’ is that a criminal case had been  instituted against the petitioner and  his  associates for  offences of illegal transport of paddy, for  resistance to  the  police officers taking them into  custody  and  for escape  from  lawful custody.  Sections 224 and  225  I.P.C. clearly  indicate this development.  What follows is  signi- ficant.   The Deputy Secretary in the Home  Department  (who has  sworn  to the counter-affidavit), by a perusal  of  the papers, states on 404 oath  that  ’due to dangerous and desperate  nature  of  the detenu  and his associates’ the witnesses declined  to  give evidence in open court for fear of their lives and the final report was submitted in the said case. The  price  that subjective satisfaction, as  validating  an order  and  excluding  judicial scrutiny, has to  pay  in  a court,  is  that  if one of many grounds relied  on  by  the authority  goes,  undeniably  the whole  order  falls,  even though if it were a case of objective satisfaction the court might  have attempted to sustain the order on the  surviving grounds.   It is argued that for this reason, the  detention order in the present case must fail. We  have to be very careful where economic offenders  injure the  soft  underside  of the  community’s  distribution  and consumption  system  in respect  of  essential  commodities. Viewed with meticulous care, we see from the affidavit filed on  behalf  of  the  State that a  criminal  case  had  been actually  instituted against the petitioner under s.7(1)  of the Essential Commodities Act.  This means that the  charge- sheet disclosed sufficient evidence to go before a court and it  was  lot  a case of absence  of  reasonable  grounds  of suspicion.   The  possible argument that the  affidavit  had left  vague the likelihood of a report under S. 169  Cr.P.C. based  on  no evidence is thus repelled.  The order  is  not vulnerable on this score. So  far as the second episode is concerned, the attack  made by  counsel is that the counter-affidavit omits  to  mention anything  about the criminal case that must  have  followed. True,  there  should have been a better affidavit,  but  the absence  of  material to show that a case has  been  charge- sheeted  in court is not destructive of the detention  order provided   there  is  some  material  for   the   subjective satisfaction  of  the authority concerned.  In  the  present case,  on the police report regarding the  second  incident, which  is a serious one, the authority might well have  come to  an inference of prejudicial activity.  We  must  express our  surprise at the silence in the counter-affidavit  about the action taken in court having regard to the fact that the offence itself is one of transport by a ’caravan’ of bullock carts.   Even so, we are unable- to void the order  on  this score,  especially because the District Magistrate may  well

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have acted on the police, report.  Whether the investigation was   conducted  properly  or  not,  whether  the   District Magistrate should have pinned his faith on the result of the investigation  and like questions, are not for the Court  to consider.   But the minimum which must be placed before  the Court  is  that  there was  some  evidence  gathered  during investigation   which,   in  some  manner,  roped   in   the petitioner.   We  are prepared to hold that  there  is  some evidence  for  the District Magistrate to act and  there  we pause. We  must  frankly  admit that the  nature  of  the  economic offence  has  had some impact on our mind in  examining  the order  and  the source material sedulously.  The  facts  are peculiar  and  other  facts might have led  to  an  opposite inference.    The  caution  that  absentminded   orders   of detention unwittingly suffer electrocution in court 405 should  however   not  be  forgotten,  notwithstanding   the survival of the order in this case. The country which faces food scarcity has resorted to arming the  government and its officers with special  powers  under the  MISA.   They  are intended  to  be  exercised  whenever occasion  arises, but exercised with care.  In  the  present case we have had to make up for deficiencies in the counter- affidavit by a closer examination of materials, for  reasons already set out. We should impress upon government and its- lesser officials, armed  with  extraordinary  powers,  to  use  them  for  the salutary  purpose of the protection of the community in  its sensitive  area  of food and like  essential  articles.   If there is failure in this area, the officers must be taken to task, for the victim is the country and the community.   The release  of  a  detenu because the  order  has  been  passed recklessly,  is a matter which should be of concern  to  the State.   If the detenu is a dangerous criminal who  disrupts supplies   and  services  essential  to  the  life  of   the community, release of the man caused by absence of nexus for which the real though invisible responsibility falls on  the officer,  must be looked into at higher levels, so that  the purposes  of  the MISA are not defeated by  the  neglect  of legality or indifference in operation from within.  Official vigilance  is  the price of social security and MISA  is  no talisman.  In the present case, for the special reasons  set out above, the order survives judicial scrutiny. Shri  Marwah opened vigorously with the submission that  the Presidential  proclamation  of emergency  has  outlived  its reality  and must be annulled by this Court.  He  marshalled what he variously called ’ notorious and ’historical’  facts to  establish  that normalcy has prevailed in the  land  for some  time  and  the  impenetrable  secrecy  of   subjective satisfaction’  no longer remained a sustainable  proposition after  Samsher  Singh’s  Case(1).   If  the  Emergency   was extinguished  judicially and retroactively, the  Defence  of India  Act  would  have expired and the  maximum  period  of detention itself would have ended, resulting in a release of the petitioner.  For lovers of civil liberties a penumbra of Emergency  is  anathema but the preliminary  question  in  a Court  is whether the basic facts and necessary parties  are on   record  at  all.   Rhetorical  assertions   cannot   be transformed  into  proof and absent  affected  parties,  the Court’s   jurisdiction   cannot  be   activated.    Further, adjournment  for  this  purpose at  this  late  stage  being impermissible, we have to negative the plea.  Moreover,  the reasons  given  by this Court in Bhut Nath’s Case  (2)  hold good here too.  We reject the belated

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(1) AIR 1974 SC 2192;      (2) A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 806. 406 plea,  hopeful that in the event of a future ruling of  this Court  pronouncing the, state of emergency long ago  legally dead the petitioner will have the benefit of it at the hands of the State.  Observing silence for the nonce on the merits of  Shri  Marwah’s  undocumented contention,  we  reach  the conclusion that the petition is liable to be dismissed.   We however  record appreciation of the painstaking services  of Mr.  Marwah with a sense of involvement in the case,  though appearing as amicus curiae. The petition is and the rule discharged. V.M.K.                   Petition dismissed. 407