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PETITIONER: TRUSTEES OF PORT OF BOMBAY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD.  AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/02/1974

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PALEKAR, D.G. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR  923            1974 SCR  (3) 397  1974 SCC  (4) 710  CITATOR INFO :  F          1975 SC 763  (30)  R          1976 SC1111  (12)  F          1976 SC1935  (30)  R          1977 SC 489  (26)  APL        1991 SC  14  (10)

ACT: Bombay  Port Trust Act 1879--S. 87--If a shorter  period  of limitation  applies  when there is short  delivery  and  the plaintiffs  do  not know if the total bundle of  goods  have actually arrived at the port of delivery.

HEADNOTE: The  first plaintiff became entitled to claim a  consignment of 53 bundles of mild steel plates despatched by a  Japanese exporter  to be delivered at the port of Bombay.  The  goods were  discharged in the docks on 12th September  1959,  into the  custody of the Bombay Port Trust, the  appellant.   The goods were insured and the second plaintiff was the insurer. On September 19, 1959, delivery of the goods was applied for and  was given but only 52 bundles.  A week thereafter,  the first plaintiff demanded the missing bundle but was put  off from  time to time by the appellant assuring that  a  search was  in  progress  to  trace the  goods.   From  the  Indian Maritime Enterprises, the agents of the Japanese vessel, the plaintiff  came to know on November 7, 1959 that all the  53 bundles had been duly unloaded.  The plaintiff enquired from the  appellant again on December 5, 1959 whether the  bundle had  been  landed; but the port authorities  still  informed that the missing bundle was still under search.  Thereafter, on  January  22,  1960, the  appellant  informed  the  first plaintiff  that  the bundle under reference  had  been  out- turned as landed but missing. Within  a week thereafter, the first plaintiff asked  for  a non-delivery  certificate and the certificate was issued  on March  1, 1960 and on May 12, 1960 a statutory notice  under s.  87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, was issued and  a suit was filed for the missing bundle or its value by way of damages.  The defence put forward by the appellant was, that since  the  suit was governed by s. 87 of the  Act  and  the cause  of  action having arisen on September 19,  1959,  the

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claim  is barred by limitation because 6 months had  already passed from the time the first cause of action arose. The second plaintiff, insurer, having paid the value of  the lost  articles to the first plaintiff got itself  subrogated to  the  later’s  right, and they together  filed  the  suit before  the Court of Small Causes.  That Court held  against the  appellant  but the full Court in  appeal  reversed  the judgment  of  the  trial court and held  in  favour  of  the appellant  holding that the claim was barred by  limitation. The High Court, however, held in favour of the plaintiff and hence the appeal to this Court. Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, provides that no  suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against  any person for anything done or purporting to have been done, in pursuance  of this Act without one month’s previous  notice, and not after 6 months from the accrual of the cause of such suit or other proceeding.  The question was whether the suit was  for  anything done or purporting to have been  done  in pursuance  of this Act, when the action is for  non-delivery of one out of 53 bundles. Allowing the appeal, HELD  : (1) Where a statute imposes a duty, the omission  to do  something that ought to be done in order  completely  to perform  the duty, or the continuing to have any  such  duty unperformed,  amounts to an act done or intended to be  done within  the  meaning of a statute which provides  a  special period of limitation for such an act. [403 H--404 A] Halsburys  Laws  of England, 3rd Ed.   Vol. 24  P.  189-190, referred to. Therefore  in  the present case,  the  truncated  limitation prescribed under the Act will apply. [415 E] 13-L 954 SupCI/74 398 (2)Sec. 87 of the Act insists on notice of one months This period  may  legitimately  be tacked on to  the  six  months period mentioned in the section (vide sec. 15(2)  Limitation Act 1963. [422 G-H] (3)  The  starting point of limitation is the  accrual  of the  cause  of action.  Two components of  the  "Cause"  are Important.   The  date when the plaintiff came  to  know  or ought  to know with reasonable diligence that the goods  had been  landed  from  the vessel into  the  port.   Two  clear indications  of when the consignee ought to know  are  :-(1) when the bulk of the goods are delivered, there being  short delivery  leading to a suit, and (2) 7 days after  knowledge of  ,he  landing  of  the  goods  suggested  in  Sec.   6lA. Whichever is the later date ordinarily sets off the  running of limitation. [422 H--423 B] (4)  Utters of assurance cannot enlarge the limitation  once the goods have landedand  the owner has come to know  of it. [423 B-C] (5)  Sec.  87  is  attracted  not  merely  when  an  act  is committed  but also when a omission occurs in the course  of the performance of the official duty. [1423C-D] In the present case, applying the above principles, the case has  to be decided against the plaintiffs and the appeal  is allowed. [423D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 342 of 1972. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated the  16th  September, 1972 of the High Court  of  Bombay  in Civil Revision No. 263 of 1967.

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F.   S.  Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India,  P. C. Bhartari, B.   R. Zaiwala and B. S. Bhesania, for the appellant. Anil B. Divan, K. S. Cooper, Vasant C. Kotwal, S. C. Agarwal and P.    D. Sharma, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA  IYER, J. A small cause involving a petty  claim  of Rs.  1147.42  has sailed slowly into the  Supreme  Court  by special leave.  Both sides-The Bombay Port Trust, appellant, and   the   New   Great  Insurance   Co.   (a   nationalised institution), the contesting respondent-agree before us that while  there  is only a short point of law in  the  case,  a large section of the business community, as well as the Port Trust, are affected by the ambiguity of the legal  situation and  an  early  pronouncement by this Court on  the  law  of limitation  applicable  to  consignee’s  actions  for  short delivery  by the Port Trust is necessary.  Is the period  so brief  as  six months in terms of s. 87 of the  Bombay  Port Trust  Act,  1879 (hereinafter called the Act), and  if  so, does  time begin to run within around a week of the  landing of  the  goods  (suggested  by s. 6lA)  of  the  Act  ?  Or, alternatively,   does  the  longer  spell  allowed  by   the Limitation  Act avail the plaintiff and the terminus  a  quo start only when the owner has been finally refused  delivery ?  Although the Court in this case is enquiring whether  the little  delay alleged legally disentitles the  plaintiff  to claim  the  value  of  the lost  goods,  it  is  a  bathetic sidelight that the judicial process has limped along for  15 years  to  decide  in this  small,  single-point  commercial cause,  whether a little over seven months to come to  court was too late. Pope  Paul in opening the judicial year of the Second  Roman Rota  pontificated that delay in dispensing justice  is  ’in itself  an act of injustice’.  Systemic slow motion in  this area must claim the nation’s 399 immediate   attention  towards  basic  reformation  of   the traditional structure and procedure if the Indian Judicature is  to sustain the litigative credibility of the  community. Indeed,   even   about   British   Justice   Lord   Devlin’s observations serve as warning for our court system : "If our business. methods were as antiquated, as our legal  methods, we would be a bankrupt country." The problem that falls for resolution by this Court turns on the  subtle semantics alternatively spun by counsel on  both sides  out  of the words "any thing done, or  purporting  to have  been ’done, in pursuance of this Act, . . . after  six months  from.  the accrual of the cause of  such  suit...... True  to  Anglo-Indian forensic tradition,  a  profusion  of precedential erudition has been placed for our consideration in  the  able submissions of the learned advocates  on  both sides.   Intricacy and refinement have marked the  arguments and   meticulous  judicial  attention  is  necessitated   to discover  from the tangled skein of case law  the  pertinent principle  that accords with the intendment of the  statute, the  language  used,  the commonsense  and  justice  of  the situation. A  relevant  diary  of  facts  and  dates  will  help  focus attention   on  the  primary  legal  question.   The   first plaintiff  became  entitled  to claim a  consignment  of  53 bundles  of  mild  steel plates  despatched  by  a  Japanese exporter  to be delivered at the port of Bombay.  The  goods were  discharged  in  the docks into the   custody  of  the. Bombay Port Trust (the defendant, and now the appellant)  on September  12,  1959.  The goods had been  insured  and  the

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second plaintiff is the insurer.  Within a week, that is, on September 19,1959, delivery of the goods was applied for and was  given but of only 52 bundles.  A week  thereafter,  the first plaintiff demanded the missing bundle, but was  tenta- lisingly  put  off  from time to time by  the  defendant  by letters  of September 29, October 10, and December  4,  1959 assuring  that a search was in progress to trace the  goods. It is important at this stage to notice that the plaintiff’s letter  of September 26, 1959 sought "information  regarding the  whereabouts of the above bundle so as to enable  us  to clear the same at an early date".  The broad implication  is that at that time the first plaintiff had. no idea where the missing  bundle  was-in the vessel or the port.  It  is  not unreasonable  to infer that he did not then know, for  sure, whether  the undelivered item had been landed from the  ship at all.  None of the three, letters by the defendant  stated firmly that it had been discharged into the port, and it  is quite  on the cards that part of the total  consignment  had not  been discharged into the port, in these any  thing-may- happen  days of expect the unexpected.   Significantly’  the first plaintiff inquired of the Indian Maritime Enterprises, the  agents  of  the Japanese  vessel,  whether  the  entire consignment  of 53 bundles bad been duly landed.  The  reply received  by the first plaintiff is meaningful in  that  the Indian  Maritime Enterprises in there letter dated  November 7,  1959, told the first plaintiff that all the  53  bundles had  been  duly unloaded.  It inevitably  follows  that  the earliest  date when we can attribute to the plaintiff  clear knowledge   of  the  port  authorities  having   come   into possession  of the missing bundle was November 7, 1959.   of course, 400 the  inquiry Section of the Alexandra Dock of the  defendant indifferently informed the first plaintiff even on  December 4, 1959 that the missing bundle was still under search and a definite reply regarding the out-turn of that item could  be given  only  later when loading sheets were  fully  checked. However,  the  first plaintiff by letter dated  December  5, 1959 wrote to the port authorities that he had been informed by   the   agents  of  the  vessel  (The   Indian   Maritime Enterprises) that the entire 53 bundles had been landed  and desired  "to  please  let us know  immediately  whether  the bundle  has  been  landed; if landed  let  the,  information regarding  the whereabouts and, if not, kindly  confirm  the short  landings".   Apparently, this was to  make  assurance doubly sure which could be gained only when the  defendant’s officials  also confirmed it.  Counsel for  the  plaintiffs, with  sweet reasonableness, urges that the  interested  ipse dixit  of  the  agents of the vessel may not  by  itself  be sufficient  to impute clear knowledge of the discharge  from the ship into the port of goods of which the Port Trust dis- claimed  knowledge of whereabouts.  Long later,  on  January 22, 1960, the Port Trust informed the first plaintiff  "that the bundle under reference had been out-turned as landed but missing".   Within  a week thereafter, the  first  plaintiff asked for a non-delivery certificate so that he could  claim from  the  insurers the value of the article lost.   Such  a certificate was issued on March 1, 1960 and-on May 12,  1960 a  statutory  notice  under S. 87 of  the  Act  was  issued, followed on June 18, 1960 by the suit for the missing bundle or  its  value by way of damages.  The  deadly  defence  put forward by the defendant and reiterated before us with great plausibility,  was that the suit being governed by s. 87  of the  Act  and the cause of action having been  born  on  and limitation commenced to run from around September 19,  1959,

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the  claim was stale, being well beyond six months  and  the statutory notice of a month super-added. The second plaintiff, insurer, having paid the value of  the lost  articles to the first plaintiff got itself  subrogated to  the  latter’s  right, and they together  laid  the  suit before  the Court of Small Causes.  That Court held  on  the merits  that the defendant had been negligent  in  bestowing the  basic  care which as statutory bailee it was  bound  to take,  and  on  the preliminary plea of  bar  of  limitation repelled  it,  taking  the  view  that  non-delivery  of   a consignment could not attract the shorter period  prescribed in  s. 87 of the Act.  The decrees passed was, however,  set aside  by the Full Court in appeal which held the  claim  to fall within the ambit of the lesser limitation laid down  by the  Act, and so beyond time.  The teetering course  of  the case  brought  success to the plaintiffs in the  High  Court when  a  single Judge upset the finding  on  limitation  and directed disposal of the appeal on the merits.  The last lap of  the  litigation  has spurred them to  this  Court  where learned counsel have addressed arguments principally on  two facets of the plea of limitation. The primary question is whether the present suit is one ’for any  thing  done,  or  purporting  to  have  been  done,  in pursuance  of this Act’.  The action is for non-delivery  of one  out of 53 bundles. plaintiffs’ counsel argues  that  an omission to do cannot be ’an act done  401 or purporting to have been done’.  Again, the failure to  do what the Act mandates the Port Trust to do, viz., to deliver consignments  to  owners, cannot be ’in  pursuance  of  this Act’.   How can the statute direct non-delivery and how  can the  Port officials reasonably conceive that not  delivering the  goods  committed  to their charge is  in  pursuance  of statutory duty?  The perverse verdict would then be  reached that violation of a law is fulfilment thereof.   Embellished by  numerous rulings, Shri Cooper strove to convince  us  of the  substance of the further link in the chain of his  case that  the cause of action for recovery of the value  of  the lost  article could not spring to life before the  knowledge of  the landing and loss was brought home to the  plaintiff. How  can  a  party, other than one with  uncanny  powers  of extra-sensory perception, sue for recovery from a bailee  of compensation for loss of goods at a time when he is ignorant of the key fact that they have come into the latter’s, hands and  have  been lost?  In short, for a cause of  action  for non-delivery  by  the bailee to materialise,  scienter  that there has been delivery to the bailee and that it has  since become  non-deliverable while in his custody, is a sine  qua non.  Otherwise, suits for loss of goods would be some  sort of a blind man’s buff game. The Additional Solicitor General, armed with many decisions, Indian  and English, parried the thrust by urging the  rival position  that an act includes an omission in  circumstances like  the present, that an official may contravene the  duty laid  under an Act and may yet purport to act under  it,  so much so delivery of 52 out of 53 bundles, impliedly omitting to deliver one item, is in pursuance of the statutory scheme of   accepting  the  cargo  discharged  from   the   vessel, warehousing  them and making them available for delivery  to consignees.   In  his submission, to  dissect  the  integral course  of  statutory performance and to pick  out  a  minor component  of ’commission’ as constituting the  infringement of  the owner’s right which has given rise to the  cause  of action, is to misread the purpose and to re-write the effect of S. 87 and similar provisions in many statutes  calculated

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to  protect  public officer and institutions  on  a  special basis  He  further  contends  that  even  if,  theoretically speaking,  knowledge of the landing of the goods may  be  an ingredient  of the cause of action,  correspondence  between the  bailee  and the owner regarding search for  the  landed goods  is no ground to postpone the accrual of the right  to sue,  and  When  in a large consignment the bulk  of  it  is delivered on a certain date the few undelivered items should also be reasonably presumed as having been landed and  ready to  be handed over, thus bringing into being, on such  short delivery,  the  ’cause’ to sue.  Likewise,  when  the  rules specify a week of the landing (vide S. 61A) within which the owner  is expected to take charge of the goods-and the  Port Trust   is  absolved  from  liability   thereafter-that   is indication  of  the reasonable limit of time  for  delivery. Limitation  begins to run when the goods  should  reasonably have  been  delivered, ignoring operations for  tracing  the missing  goods.  The absurd result would otherwise  be  that the  right to sue would flicker fitfully as the  search  for the  last  bundle  is protracting and  the  Port  Trust  can indefinitely put off a claimant’s suit by persisting in vain searches for the pilfered article and sending soothing 402 letters   that  efforts trace are ’in  progress.’  And  more sinister  is  the  possibility  of  owners  of  considerable consignments, by oblique methods, getting letters of promise of search despatched by Port officials and thus postpone the time  for  taking  delivery,  thereby  saving  immensely  on warehousing charges which are heavy in big cities.Corruption spreads where such legal construction protects. The  proponents of both views have cited rulings in  support but the  sound approach of studying for oneself the sense of s. 87 prompts  us to set it out together with other  cognate sections, get the hang of the statutory scheme and read  the plain meaning of the notice and limitation provisions.               "S. 87.  No suit or other proceeding shall  be               commenced  against  any person for  any  thing               done,  or  purporting to have  been  done,  in               pursuance of this Act, without giving to  such               person one month’s previous notice in  writing               of the intended suit or other proceeding,  and               of  the  cause thereof, nor after  six  months               from the accrual of the cause of such suit  or               other proceeding.. ."               "S. 61A(1).  The Board shall, immediately upon               the landing of any goods, take charge thereof,               except  as  may be otherwise provided  in  the               bye-laws,  and  store such as  are  liable  in               their  opinion to suffer from exposure in  any               shed or warehouse belonging to the Board.               (2)   If any owner, without any default on the               part  of the Board, fails to remove any  goods               other  than  those stored  in  the  warehouses               appointed by the Board for the storage of duty               paid  goods or in warehouses  appointed  under               section  15, or licenced under section  16  of               the  Sea Customs Act, 1878, from the  premises               of the Board within seven clear days from  the               date  on  which  such goods  shall  have  been               landed,   such  goods  shall  remain  on   the               premises  of  the Board at the sole  risk  and               expense  of  the  owner and  the  Board  shall               thereupon  be  discharged from  all  liability               theretofore  incurred by them- in  respect  of               such goods.’

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             "61B.  The responsibility of the Board for the               loss, destruction or deterioration of goods of               which  it has taken charge shall,  subject  to               the  other provisions of this Act and  subject               also  in  the  case  of  goods  received   for               carriage by railways to the provisions of  the               Indian Railways Act, 1890 be that of a  bailee               under  section 151, 152 and 161 of the  Indian               Contract Act, 1872, omitting the words "in the               absence of any special last-mentioned Act." Let us interpret and apply. Non-delivery  of an article is an omission, not an act  and, in  any case. not one in pursuance of the Act,  because  the statute  does ,not direct the Port Trust not to deliver  the goods received from the 403 ships  that  Call at the port.  This view has  found  favour with  the  High Court.  With due difference to  the  learned judge, we think this approach to be too literal, narrow  and impractical." ’For, inaction has a positive side as where  a driver  refuses to move his vehicle from the middle of  tile road  or  even an operator declines to stop an engine  or  a surgeon  omits  to  take out a swab’  of  cotton  after  the operation.    Omission   has  an   activist,   facet   "like commission,  more  so  when there is a  duty  not  to  omit. Again,  where a course of conduct is enjoined by a law,  the whole process pursuant to that obligation is an act done  or purporting to be done under that Act although the components of  that  comprehensive act may consist of  commissions  and omissions.   A  policeman acts or purports to act  not  only when  he uses his lathi but also when he omits to  open  the lock-up  to  set the arrested free or omits to  produce  him before  a  Magistrate.  The ostensible basis of  ’the  whole conduct colours both doings and defaults and the use of  the words’  purporting  to  have been done".  in  their  natural sweep, cover the commission-omission Complex. A, cognate point arises as to whether you can attribute  the neglect to comply with a law as something done in  pursuance of  that law.  Here again the fallacy is  obvious.If   under colour  of  office. clothed with the rules of  authority,  a person  indulges in conduct not falling under the law he  is not acting in accordance with the sanction of the statute or in bona fide execution of authority but ostensibly under the cloak of statute.  It is the apparel that oft proclaims  the man  and whether anything is done under, in pursuance of  or under colour of a law. merely means that the act is done  in apparent,  though not real, cover of the  statute.   Broadly understood,  can the official when challenged fall back,  in justification, on his official trappings?  A revenue officer distraining   goods  wrongfully  or  a   municipal   officer receiving  license fee from a non-licensee is violating  the law  but  purports to act under, it.  On the other  hand,  a police  officer  who  collects water  cess  or  a  municipal officer  who  takes  another into custody,  is  not  by  any stretch  of  language acting in pursuance of  or  under  the relevant Act that gives him power.  And certainly not an act of  taking bribe or committing rape.  Such is the  sense  of the words we are called upon to construe.  The true  meaning of such and similar words used in like statutes has been set out In, Halsbury correctly and concisely :               "An act may be done in Pursuance of or in  the               execution  of the powers granted by a  statue,               although   that  act  is  prohibited  by   the               statute.   A  person  acting  under  statutory               powers  may  erroneously  exceed  the   powers

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             given,  or inadequately discharge  the  duties               imposed,  by  a statute, vet if he  acts  bona               fide  in  order to execute such powers  Pr  to               discharge  such  duties. he is  considered  as               acting  in pursuance of the statute.  Where  a               statute  imposes a duty, the omissions  to  do               something  that  ought  to be  done  in  order               completely   to  Perform  the  duty,  on   the                             continuing to leave any such duty unpe rformed,               amounts to an act done or               404               intended  to be done, within the meaning of  a               statute  which  provides a special  period  of               limitation  for such an act." (3rd edn.,  vol.               24, pp.189-190). A  selective reference to the rulings cited at the  bar  may now be made. and. although in this blurred area  conflicting pronouncements  have  made  for  confusion,  a  systematised presentation will yield the clear inference we have  reached without reference to the citations. In  one  of the earliest cases under the  Highway  Act,  the defendant.  surveyor of the perish of T., was  charged  with failure  to  remove  the  gravel  from  the  highway   which obstructed and caused nuisance to the public and  overturned the  plaintiff’s carriage.  It was proved that the  defended was guilty of want to care in leaving the gravel there,  and the questions arose whether under s. 109 of the Highway  Act he was entitled to notice.  Lord Denman, C.J., disposed  of- the matter tersely :               "It  is  clear that the defendant  is  charged               with  a  tort committed in the course  of  his               official  duty,; he is charged,  as  surveyor.               with the positive act of leaving the gravel on               ’the  road,  where  it  had  been   improperly               placed,  for,  an unreasonable time-  On  that               simple  ground, I think it clear that  he  was               entitled to notice."               Patterson  J.  considered  the  same  point  a               little more at length taking the, view               "......  that  the charge is not one  of  mere               omissions,  but  of  actually  continuing  the               nuisance.  That is a charge of doing something               wrong,  of keeping the gravel in  an  improper               place. an act continued until the  concurrence               of  the mischief.  Is it then an act  done  in               pursuance  of the statute ? It  is-not  denied               that  the  heap  of gravel was  put  there  in               pursuance  of  the statute-, it could  not  be               spread  at the same moment; the question  then               would arise, whether the length of time during               which it was kept in a heap was reasonable  or               not.   The continuing, therefore, was a  thing               done in pursuance of the statute.’               Wightman  J.  struck  a  similar  note.    The               learned Judge observed               "The defendant is liable only by virtue of his               office.  lie  is charged with’  permitting  an               obstruction to remain, of which permission  he               is  guilty  in  his character  of  an  officer               described  in the Act of Parliament.   He  is,               therefore,  under  sev  109,  entitled  to   a               notice,  in  order  to enable  him  to  tender               amends." This  decision  rendered around 130 years ago has  a  modern

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freshness  and  it is remarkable that the  language  of  the statute construed by the Judges there has a likeness to  the one  we are concerned with here, namely, "anything  done  in pursuance of or under the authority" of statute. 405 Still  earlier  rulings  may be referred  to;  for  instance Palmer  V. Tile Grana Junction Railway Company(1) where  the same point was ruled. but where Baron Parke said :               "If the action was brought against the railway               company for   the omission of some duty imposed               upon  them  by the Act. this notice  would  be               required." In   another   old  decision,  Poulsum  v.   Thirst(2)   the construction of the expression, acts "done or intended to be done  under the powers of the Metropolitan Board  of  Works, and  fell  for  decision.  Byles, J.  relied  on  Newton  v. Ellia(3)  where  also  a  similar set of  words  had  to  be interpreted  and  "omitted to be done" was absent.   In  the case  decided  by Byles, J., the defendant  stopped  up  the sewer,  and neglected to drain it, thereby  causing  injury. ’The  learned Judge belt] that the defendant’s conduct  must be looked at as a whole, and that he was entitled to  notice of action.  The other two Judges took the same view. Newton  v.  Ellis(4)  decided in 1855 under S.  139  of  the Public  Health  Act, 1848, for injury caused  by  digging  a hole-  on the road without placing a light or signal  there, turned on the need for notice before summons.  Earlier cases like Davis v. Curling(5) were referred to and the conclusion reached  that though the gravamen of the charge against  the defendant  was the omission to place a light in the spot  of danger  it attracted the formula "anything done or  intended to  be done under the provisions of this Act" comparable  to the  phraseology  of the Act which came under  the  judicial lens  in.  Davis v. Curling ’things done in pursuance of  or under  the  authority’ of the Act.  Coleridge,  J.  observed with felicitous precisions               "This  is  not  a  case  of  not  doing;  t  e               defendant  does something, omitting to  secure               protection for the public.  He is not sued for               not  putting up a light, but for  the  complex               act."               Erle J. likewise said               ".Here  the cause of action is the making  the               hole,  compounded  with the not putting  up  a               light.  When these are blended, the result  is               no  more  than  if  two  positive  acts   were               committed,  such  as  digging  the  hole   and               throwing  out the dirt; the two would make  up               one act." Are  we  not  concerned  with a  blended  brew  of  act  and omission, a complex act, a compound act of delivery-cum-non- delivery, pursuant to the statute without which the vinculum juris between the Board and the plaintiff did not exist? Jolliffee v. The Wallasey Local Board(6) is a  leading-case, rightly pressed for acceptance of its ratio by the,  learned Solicitor  General.   Kesting,  J., after  finding  for  the plaintiff on negligence, focussed atten- (1)  4 M. & W. 749. (3)  5 E. & B. 115; 24 L. J. (Q.  B.) 337. (5)  8 Q. D. 286. (2)  (1867) 2 L. R. 449. (4)  119 E. R. 424. (6)  (1873) L. R. 62.      406 tion on the nature  of  the Act and the need  for  notice.He

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observed               "As a matter of fact, therefore I come to  the               conclusion that the defendants were guilty               of  the  negligence complained  of,  and  that               negligence was the cause of the accident; and,               as  matter of law, I hold that  negligence  to               give the plaintiffs a cause of action  against               the local board.               But,  assuming that to be so, then  comes  the               further  question, whether the defendants  are               not absolved from liability in this action, by               reason  of the absence of a notice of  action.               For myself, I must express my regret that this               case should be decided upon such a point;  but               my   opinion  is  that  the  defendants   were               entitled  to  notice.  This  question  depends               upon  the construction of the several Acts  of               Parliament which have been placed before us."               "Now   the   local   board   was    originally               constituted under the Public Health Act, 1848;               and  it is not denied that, for anything  done               or  intended to be done under that  Act,  they               would be entitled to a notice of action  under               s. 139."               "That.  however,  does  not  dispose  of   the               matter;  a  further  question  arises,   viz.,               whether  the acts complained of here are  acts               which  could be done by the local board  under               the provisions of the Act of Parliament, so as               to entitle them to a notice of action."               "It has been suggested that protection is  not               intended  to  be  given  by  clauses  of  this               description    in   cases   of    nonfeasance.               so,  is  clear,  from the cases  of  Davis  v.               Curling,  Newton v. Ellis, Wilson v. Mayor,  &               C.,  of Halifax, and Salmes v. Judge,  all  of               which  seem to me to establish that a case  of                             what  appears to be nonfeasance may be   within               the protection of the Act."               Brett,    J,   expressed    himself    equally               unminicingly:               "Now..  two  objections  were  urged  by   Mr.               Aspinnal.   In  the first place, he  says  the               thing   complained   of   here   is   a   mere               nonfeasance, and therefore not "an act  done."               If  I  rightly  understand  the  judgments  in               former cases, the rule is this,where a man  is               sued  in tort for the breach of some  positive               duty imposed upon him by an Act of Parliament,               or for the omission to perform some such duty,               either  may be an act done or intended  to  be               done under the authority of the Act, and if so               done or intended to; be done, the defendant is               entitled to a notice of action."               "In  Wilson  v.  Mayor, &  c.  of  Halifax(1),               Kelly,  C.B., states the proposition in  those               terms:  It has been urged on the part  of  the               plaintiff   that   the  charge   against   the               defendants is not of any act done or  intended               to  be  done, but of an omission to  erect  or               cause to be erected a fence between the  foot-               path and the goit, and that the omission to do               an act is not               (1)   Law Rep. 3 Ex. 114.

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              407               an  act  done or intended to be  (lone,’  Some               authorities have been cited on both sides: but               we   think   that,  whatever    may   be   the               construction which might be put upon the words               of  the statute if the question arose in  this               case for the first time, it is now settled  by               authority  that  an omission to  do  something               that ought to be done in order to the complete               performance  of a duty imposed upon  a  public               body  under  an Act of.   Parliament,  or  the               continuing to leave any such duty unperformed,               amounts to an act done or intended to be done,               within the meaning of these clauses  requiring               notice of action for the protection of  public               bodies  acting  in  the  discharge  of  public               duties under Acts of Parliament."               "It  would seem from these  authorities  that,               where   the  plaintiff  is  suing   in   tort,               nonfeasance  is to be considered as "  an  act               done," within. such clauses as these." Mr. Cooper tried to distinguish Jolliffee’s case but  having given  our  close  attention to the  matter  we  decline  to jettison this weighty judgment. Jolliffee’s case was followed by the Privy Council in  Queen v.  Williams(1).  The Judicial Committee took the view  that "an omission to do something which ought to be done in order to the complete performance of a duty imposed upon a  public body under an Act of Parliament, or the continuing to  leave any  such  duty  unperformed, amounts to  "an  act  done  or intended  to  be’  done"  within the  meaning  of  a  clause requiring a notice of action." A  case which went up to the Privy Council from India  under the Calcutta Port Act, 1890, was decided on similar lines by the  Judicial  Committee  in Commissioner for  the  Port  of Calcutta   v.  Corporation  of  Calcutta(2).   Lord   Alness observed               "Reliance was placed by the respondents on the               case  of  the Bradford  Corporation  v.  Myers               [(1916)  I. A.C. 242].  Now, inasmuch as  that               case related to the construction of the Public               Authorities   Protection  Act  (1893),   which               contains  language  not  to be  found  in  the               Indian statute, and which omits language to be               found  in the latter, manifestly the  decision               falls   to   be  handled  with  c   are.    In               particular,  the English Act does not  contain               the word is "purporting or professing" to  act               in pursuance of the statute.  Their  Lordships               regard  these words as of pivotal  importance.               Their  presence  in  the  statute  appears  to               postulate  that  work  which is  not  done  in               pursuance  of the statute may nevertheless  be               accorded its protection if the work  professes               or  purports to’ be done in pursuance  of  the               statute.  The English Act was properly treated               by the, House in the Bradford case as one from               which  the  words "profession  or  purporting"               were  omitted,  and the  observations  of  the               House  must, of course, be construed  secundum               subjectam materiem." (2) [1937] 64IA 363; 371. (1) (1884)  9 L. R. 41 8. 408 In a different context though, the Privy Council had to deal

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with  a  similar provision, namely, s. 197 of  the  Criminal Procedure  Code,  in  the well-known case  of  Gill  v.  The King(1).   Lord Simonds, speaking for the  Board,  explained the position of law thus :               "A  public servant can only be said to act  or               to  purport  to act in the  discharge  of  his               official  duty, if his act is such as  to  lie               within the scope of his official duty.   Thus,               a judge neither acts nor purports to act as  a               judge   in  receiving  a  bribe,  though   the               judgment which he delivers may be such an act:               nor  does a Government medical officer act  or               purport to act as a public servant in  picking               the pocket of a patient whom he is  examining,               though  the examination itself may be such  an               act.  The test may well be whether the  public               servant,  if challenged, can reasonably  claim                             that,  what he does, he does in virtue   of  his               office." It  may be mentioned even here that the  Judicial  Committee had distinguished Bradford Corporation v. Myers(2) on  which considerable reliance was placed by Shri Cooper and also  in several decisions which took the opposite point of view.  We need make no comments on that decision except to state  that for exceedingly excellent reasons the Judicial Committee has put that ruling out of the way. Shri  Cooper  brought to our notice  the  circumstance  that Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, brought in ’neglect and  default’, which became necessary only because "any  act done  in pursuance.... of any Act of Parliament." would  not otherwise  comprehend  omissions and defaults.  We  are  not impressed with this submission and decline to speculate  why a  change of language was made if the law packed  "omission" into "act". Gill  v.  The King (supra), just referred  to,  affirms  the careful analysis of the authorities by Varadachariar, J., in Hori  Ram  Singh  v.  The Crown(3) and  also  the  ratio  in Huntley’s  (4) case.  In Hori Ram’s case, which  related  to the  construction of S. 197 of the Criminal  Procedure  Code and s. 270(1) of the Government of India Act, Varadachariar, J.,  brought out the true meaning of the words "act done  or purporting  to be done in the execution of his  duty".   The learned Judge observed :               "Apart  from  the  principle  that,  for   the               purposes of the criminal law, acts and illegal               omissions stand very much on the same footing,               the  conduct of the appellant  in  maintaining               the  accounts, which it was his duty to  keep,               has  to  be  dealt with as  a  whole  and  the               particular   omission  cannot  of  itself   be               treated as an offence except as a step in  the               appellant’s   conduct  in  relation   to   the               maintenance  of the register which it was  his               duty correctly to maintain." Stress  was  laid  rightly  by  the  learned  Judge  on  the relevance of public interest in protecting a public  servant and  in  restrictions being placed on an  aggrieved  citizen seeking redress in a court of law, to point out (1)  [1948] 75 I. A. 41; 59-60. (3)  [1939] F. C. R. 159. (2) [1916] 1 A. C. 242. (4) [1944] F. C. R. 252.  409 that  acts which have no reference to official  duty  should

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not  come within the protective umbrella of these  statutory provisions.  The learned Judge insisted that "an act is  not less  one  done or purporting to be done in execution  of  a duty because the officer concerned does it negligently." The true  test, if we may say so with great respect, is  whether the conduct of the public servant or public body, viewed  as a whole, including as it may ’omissions’ also, be attributed to the exercise of office. Sri  Cooper reinforced his contrary argument by reliance  on the  case  of Revati Mohan Das v.  Jatindra  Mohan  Ghosh(1) which  dealt with s. 80 of the Civil Procedure  Code.   That decision,  however,  is distinguishable and  relates  to  an optional act or omission of a public officer where it  could not  be  designated that the failure to pay the  debt  by  a manager  was  an ’illegal omission’  constituting  an  ’act’ under s. 3 of the General Clauses Act. A decision of the Calcutta High Court (Commissioner for  the Court of Calcutta v. Abdul Rahim Osman & Co.(2), turning  on the  construction  of  a similar provision (s.  142  of  the Calcutta Port Act) covers the various decisions, Indian  and English,  and after pointed reference to Amrik Singh’s  case reaches the conclusion :               "There must be a reasonable connection between               the  act and the discharge of  official  duty;               the  act must bear such relation to  the  duty               that  the accused could lay a reasonable,  but               not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did               it  in  the course of the performance  of  his               duty."               The  Bench proceeded to set out the  following               propositions which meet with our approval:               (a)   I order to apply the bar under sec.  142               of  the Calcutta Port Act, it is first  to  be               determined whether the act which is complained               of in the suit in question can be said to come               within  the scope of the official duty of  the               person  or persons who are sought to  be  made               liable.  This question can be answered in  the               affirmative   where  there  is  a   reasonable               connection  between the act and the  discharge               of the official duty.               (b)   Once  the scope of the official duty  is               determined,   sec.   142  will   protect   the               defendants  not  only from a  claim  based  on               breach of the duty but also from a claim based               upon an omission to perform such duty.               (c)   The  protection  of sec. 142  cannot  be               held  to  be  confined to  acts  done  in  the               exercise of a statutory power but also extends               to acts done within the scope, of an  official               duty." The  case  dealt  with was also one of  short  delivery  and consequent  loss  of a part of the goods, and the  suit  was dismissed  for being beyond the short period  of  limitation prescribed under the special Act. Again, in District Board of Manbhum v. Shyamapada  Sarkar(3) the  Bihar Local Self-Government Act containing a  provision analogous to (1) [1934] 61 I. A. 171.  (2) 68 Cal.  Weekly Notes 814. (3) A. I. R. 1955 Pat. 432. 410 what we are, concerned with here was construed by a bench of that Court reading the words "anything done under this  Act" to include "anything Omitted to be done under the Act",  and further that anything done tinder this Act’ necessarily  and

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logically  embraces anything wrongfully done  or  wrongfully omitted to be done. In  Gorakh Fulji Mahala v. State(1), Chandrachud, J., as  he then was, made an elaborate study of a comparable  provision in  the Bombay Police Act (s. 161) and followed the  Federal Court  decisions already referred to by us, as well as  this Court’s decision in Shreekantiah Ramayya kunipalli v.  State of Bombay(2).  The learned Judge summed up the law thus               "The  decisions  cited  above  have  uniformly               taken  the view that in an act cannot be  said               to  be  done under colour of office  or  under               colour  of duty or in the Purported  execution               of   official   duties  unless  there   is   a               reasonable connection between the act and  the               office.   A view has also been taken in  these               decisions   that   one  of   the   tests   for               determining  whether an act has been  done  in               the purported discharge of official duties  is               whether the public servant can defend his  act               by  reference, to the nature of the duties  of               his office if he is challenged while doing the               act." A  few  more  decisions, apart from what  has  already  been referred to by us, specifically dealing with similar  causes of  action under similar statutes, viz., the  Calcutta  Port Act  and  the  Madras Port Trust  Act,  have  discussed  the problem  before  us.  In Madras Port v. Home  Insurance  Co. (3),  a Division Bench of the Madras High Court adopted  the wider view and held               "The  services which the Board has to  perform               and   could  perform  statutorily  under   the               statutory   powers   and  duties   cannot   be               dissociated from its omissions and failures in               relation  to the goods.  Any action  Which  is               called  for  will properly be covered  by  the               Words ’anything done or purporting to be  done               in  pursuance of this Act.  Under  the  Madras               General  Clauses Act, 1891 words  which  refer               to.  the  acts  done extend  also  to  illegal               omissions." Natesan,  J.,  relied  on  Calcutta  Port  Commissioner   v. Corporation of Calcutta(4), where the Judicial Committee had stressed  the ampler sense of ’purporting or  professing  to act in pursuance of the statute’ and observed               "Their  Lordships  regard these  words  as  of               pivotal  importance.   Their presence  in  the               statute  appears to postulate that work  which               it  hot done in pursuance, of the statute  may               nevertheless  be accorded its  protection,  if                             the  work professes or purports to be  done  in               pursuance of the statute." (1)  I. L. R. [1965] Bom. 61. (3) A. I. R. 1970 Mad. 48;  57-58. (2)  [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1177. (4) A. I. R. 1937 P. C. 306.  411 The  whole  issue  is  clinched in our  view  by  the  final pronouncement of this Court in Public Prosecutor Madras ;v.- R.  Raju(1). the, interpretation of s.40(2) of  the  Central Excis’ and Salt Act, 1944 and the antithesis argued  between ’act’  and  ’omission’ provoked a panoramic  survey  of  the Indian  statute book.  Reference was made to Pritam  Singh’s (2)  case  where absence from duty at the time of  the  roll call  was held to be something done under the provisions  of

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the  Police Act.  Maulad Ahmadabad’S(3), case Was relied  an as fortifying this view, for there too a Head Constable  who made false entries in a General Diary of the Police  Station *as held entitled to.invoke the 3 months limitation under s. 42  of  the Police Act since the act complained of  was  the non-discharge  of   duty in keeping a regular  diary.   Even filing  false  returns by a sales tax assessee was  held  in Sitaram  v. State of Madhya Pradesh(4) as an act done  under the  Berar Sales Tax Act whereunder a prosecution  for  such an.  act  had  to be brought in  three  months.   The  ratio decidendi is set out by Ray, J. (as he then was) thus :               "25.   These  decisions in the  light  of  the               definition  of the word ’act’ in  the  General               Clauses Act establish that non-compliance with               the  provisions of the statute by omitting  to               do *hat the act enjoins will be anything  done               or  ordered  to be, done under the  Act.   The               complaint  against  the respondents  was  that               they wanted to evade payment of duty.  Evasion               was  by  using  and  affixing  cut  and   torn               banderols.    Books  of  accounts   were   not               correctly  maintained  There was  shortage  of               banderol  in  stock.   Unbanderolled  matche’s               were  found.  These are all infraction of  the               provisions  in  respect  of  things  done   or               ordered to be done under the Act.               26.   In   Amalgamated  Electricity   Co.   v.               Municipal  Committee, Ajmer [(1969)  1  S.C.R.               430] the meaning of ’omission’ of a  statutory               duty was explained by this Court.  Hegde,  J.,               speaking  for the Court said "The omission  in               question  must have a positive content in  it.               In other words, the non-discharge of that duty               must  amount to An illegality".  The  positive               aspect  of  omission in the  present  case  in               evasion of payment of duty.  The provisions of               the Act require proper affixing of  banderols.               Cut  or  turn  banderols  were  used.   Unban-                             dderolled   match  boxes  were  found.     These               proisions  about  use  of  banderols  are  for               collection  and payment of excise  duty.   The               respondents did not pay the lawful dues  which               are  acts  to be done or ordered  to  be  done               under the Act." We  readily  concede that it is oversimplfication  to  state that  no  court  has taken the contrary view,  both  on  the question  of  act  not  including  an  omission  and  action contrary  to  the  behest  of the  statute  not  being  done pursuant   to   or  under  the   statute.    An   exhaustive consideration  of these twin propositions is found  in  Zila Parishad v. Shanti Devi(5). (1) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2504.  (2) [1971] 1 S.C.C 653. (3)  [1963] Supp, 2 S. C. A. 38.  (4)  [1962] Supp. 3 S.  C. R. 21. (5)  [1969] 1 S. C. R. 430. 412 Seemingly  substantial support for Shri Cooper’s  contention is derived from observations in State-of Gujarat v.  Kansara Manilal  Bhikhala(1), where, rejecting a plea of  protection under S. 117 of the Factories Act, 1948, by an occupier of a factory   who   had  violated  the  duties  cast   on   him, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed               "But the critical words are "any thing done or               intended  to  he  done" under  the  Act.   The

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             protection conferred can only be claimed by  a               person  who can plead that he was required  to               do  or omit to do something under the  Act  or               that  he  intended to comply with any  of  its               provisions,  It  cannot  confer  immunity   in               respect  of actions which are not  done  under               the  Act  but are done contrary to  it.   Even               assuming  that an act includes an omission  as               stated   in  the  General  Clauses  Act,   the               omission also must be one which is enjoined by               the Act.  It is not sufficient to say that the               act  was  honest.  That would  bring  it  only               within   the  words  "good  faith".    It   is               necessary  further to establish that  what  is               complained  of  is  something  which  the  Act               requires  should be done or should be  omitted               to be done.  There must be a compliance or  an               intended  compliance with a provision  of  the               Act,  before  the protection can  be  claimed.               The section cannot cover a case of a breach or               an  intended breach of the Act however  honest               the conduct otherwise.  In this connection  it               is necessary to point out, as was done in  the               Nagpur  case  above  referred  to,  that   the               occupier   and  manager  are   exempted   from               liability  in  certain cases mentioned  in  S.               101.   Where  an  occupier  or  a  manager  is               charged with an offence he is entitled to make               a complaint in his own turn against any person               When acctual the actual offender and on  proof               of  the  commission  of the  offence  by  such                             person the occupier or the manager is  absolved               from  liability.  This shows  that  compliance               with  the peremptory provisions of the Act  is               essential  and  unless  the  occupier  or  the               manager  brings the real offender to  book  he               must   bear   the  responsibility.    Such   a               provision largely excludes the operation of S.               117 in respect of per-sons guilty of a  breach               of  the  provisions  of the Act.   It  is  not               necessary   that  mens  rea  must  always   be               established  as has been said in some  of  the               cases  above referred to.  The  responsibility               exists  without  a guilty mind.   An  adequate               safeguard,  however,  exists  in  S.  1  0   1               analysed  above and the occupier  and  manager               can  save themselves if they prove  that  they               are  not the real offenders but who,  in  fact               is". It  is  obvious that this ruling can hardly  help,  once  we understand  the setting and the scheme, of the  statute  and the purpose ’of protection of workers ensured by casting  an absolute   obligation  on  occupiers  to   observe   certain conditions.   The  context  is  the  thing  and  not  verbal similitude. In  a  recent ruling of this Court in Khandu Sonu  Dhobi  v. State of Maharashtra(2), Khanna, J., while repelling a  plea of immunity from (1) [1965] 1 I. L. R. All. 783. (2) [1972] 3 S. C. R. 510.  413 prosecution  put  forward  by the accused on  the  score  of limitation  and the case being "in respect of anything  done or  intended  to be done under this Act"  (The  Bombay  Land

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Improvement Scheme Act, 1942) said:               "This contention, in our opinion, is devoid of               force.   Subsection  (2)  refers  to  suit  or               prosecution against a public servant or person               duly  authorised under the Act in  respect  of               anything done or intended to be done under the               Bombay  Land  Improvement  Schemes  Act.    It               cannot  be said that the acts of the  accused-               appellants in preparing false documents and in               committing criminal breach of trust in respect               of the amount of Rs. 309.07 as also their  act               of  criminal  misconduct were done  under  the               Bombay  Land  Improvement Schemes  Act.   Sub-               section (2) of section 23 deals with  anything               done  or intended to be done under. the  above               mentioned Act by a public servant or a  person               duly  authorised  under the Act.   It  has  no               application where something is done not  under               the  Act  even though it has been  done  by  a               public  servant  who has been  entrusted  with               duties  of  carrying out  improvement  schemes                             under  the above mentioned Act.   The  impugned               acts  of  the appellants in the  present  case               were  not in discharge of their  duties  under               the above mentioned Act but in obvious  breach               and  flagrant disregard of their duties.   Not               only  they did no rectification work  for  the               Bundh  which  was a part  of  the  improvement               scheme,  they also misappropriated the  amount               which  had  been  entrusted to  them  for  the               purpose of rectification." How  slippery and specious law and logic can be  unless  the Court is vigilant is evident from this kind of defence  Here is  a  case  not of performing or  omitting  to  perform  an official act in the course of which an offence is committed. On  the contrary, an independent excursion into crime  using the  opportunity of office without any nexus with  discharge of  official  function is what we have, in that  case.   The Court significantly highlights the fact that ’not only  they did   no  rectification  work  for  the  Bundh   they   also misappropriated the amount entrusted to them for the purpose of rectification.’ We hope no policeman can shelter  himself after  a  rape of an arrested *Oman or shooting of  his  own wife  on  the  pretext  of  acting  under  the  Police  Act. Immunity cannot be confused with toxicity-disastrous in  law as in medicine.  Nor can functions of office be equated with opportunities of office, without being guilty of obtuseness. This chapter of our discussion yields the conclusion that an act includes an omission (regardless of the General  Clauses Act, which does not apply to antecedent statutes)-not  under all  circumstances but in legislations like the Act  we  are construing.  Again, what is done under purported exercise of statutory functions, even if in excess of or contrary to its provisions, is done pursuant to or under the Act so long  as there is a legitimate link between the offending act and the official  role.  Judged thus the defence by the Board  fills the bill. The Scheme of the statute is simple.  When cargo ships  call at the port, the Board constituted under the Act shall  take charge  of the goods landed from the vessel and  store  them properly (S. 61 (A)( 1) ). The 14-L954SupCI/74 414 Board  cannot keep goods indefinitely, hard-pressed  as  any

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modern  port is for space and facing as it does  intractable problems of protection of goods.  When the goods have landed the  owner  has to be on the alert and get ready  to  remove them  within 7 days, after which the statutory  bailee,  the Board,  is discharged from liability-subject, of course,  to any default on the part of the Board in the matter of making the  goods deliverable (s. 61A(2)).  The span  of  statutory custody  of  the  Board is short but during  that  time  its obligations are those of a bailee under ss. 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, omitting the words "in the absence  of any special contract" in S. 152 of the  Contract Act (S. 61B). If  the  person entitled to the goods defaults  in  removing them  within  one month of the Board  coming  into  custody, special powers of disposal by public auction are given by S. 64A.  The Act charges, the Port authorities with a wealth of functions  and  duties  and  necessarily  legal  proceedings follow upon the defects, defaults and other consequences  of abuse of power.  Even so, a public body undertaking work  of the  sort  which a Port carries out will be  exposed  to  an explosive amount of litigation and the Board as well as  its officers will be burdened by suits, and prosecutions on  top of  the  pressure  of handling  goods  worth  crores  daily. Public bodies and officers will suffer irremediably in  such vulnerable  circumstances  unless actions are  brought  when evidence  is fresh and before delinquency fades; and  so  it makes  sense  to provide, as in many other cases  of  public institutions and servants, a reasonably short period of time within  which the legal proceedings should be started.  This is nothing unusual in the jurisprudence of India or  England and  is constitutionally sound.  Section 87 is illumined  by the  protective  purpose  which will be  ill-served  if  the shield   of  a  short  limitation  operates  in   cases   of misfeasance  and  malfeasance  but  not  nonfeasance.    The object, stripped of legalese and viewed through the  glasses of  simple sense, is that remedial process against  official action showing up as wrong doing or non-doing which inflicts injury  on  a  citizen should not be  delayed  too  long  to obliterate  the probative material for honest defence.   The dichotomy  between  act and omission,  however,  logical  or legal, has no relevance in this context.  So the  intendment of  the  statute certainly takes in its  broad  embrace  all official  action,  positive  and  negative,  which  is   the operative cause of the grievance.  Although the Act, in  the present case, uses only the expression ’act’ and omits ’neg- lect or default or omission, the meaning does not suffer and if  other statutes have used all these words it is more  the draftsman’s  anxiety to avoid taking risks in court, not  an addition  to  the  semantic scope of  the  word  ’act’.   Of course, this is the compulsion of the statutory context  and it may well be that other enactments, dealing with different subject-matter,  may  exclude from an ’act’  an  ’omission’. This  possibility is reduced a great deal by the  definition of  ’act’ in the various General Clauses Acts, as  including ’illegal omissions’.  The leading ,case of Jolliffee v.  The Wallesey  Local  Board(1) decided nearly a century  ago  has stood the test of time and still cunent coin, and (1)  (1873) 9 L. R. 62. 415 Stroud (Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary; 3rd edn.  Vol. 1; page 877) has extracted its ratio thus :               "An omission to do something which ought to be               done  in  order to complete performance  of  a               duty  imposed upon a public body under an  Act               of Parliament, or the continuing to leave  any

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             such duty unperformed, amounts to "an act done               or intended to be done" within the meaning  of               a clause requiring a notice of action (Joliffe               v. Wallesey, L.R. 9 C.P. 62)." We   regret  the  prolixity  of  the  judgment  because   we appreciate  brevity but it is the judicial price or  tribute to  the  learning and length of the arguments  presenting  a panoramic view of Anglo-Indian judicial thought for which we are  obliged  to  both counsel.   Indeed,  the  plethora  of rulings  cited has been skipped here and there by a  process of  calculated ricochet, without omitting the  more  salient cases.  And we are re-assured, at the end of this pilgrimage through  precedents, that the soundness of the view we  have taken is attested by pronouncements of vigorous judges twice three  score and ten years ago, in words which  ’age  cannot wither nor custom stale’.  Law is a practical instrument,  a working  tool  in a workaday world and where, as  here,  the effected  fraction of the community is the common  official. the  commercial  man and ordinary folk, the  wiser  rule  of construction  follows commonsense, not  casuistry,  context, not strictness and not subtle nuance but plain sense. The logical conclusion of the legal study is that the  short delivery  of one bundle or rather the act of  under-delivery in  purported discharge of the bailee’s obligation under  S. 61B  of  the  Act  is covered by s.  87  and  the  truncated limitation prescribed thereunder will apply.  Of course, the statutory  notice under S. 83 is a condition  precedent  to, although not a constituent of, the cause of action And there is  some authority for the position that the period  of  one month may also be tacked on under s. 15(2) of the Limitation Act.   In  the  view  we take on  the  ultimate  issue  this question is immaterial.  Even so, the decisive date on which the  decree  turns and time runs has to be settled.  if  the Limitation  Act applies, the suit, by any reckoning, is  not barred but since it does not apply the critical issue is  as to  when time begins to run.  Brushing aside  technicalities and guided by the analogy of art. 120 of the Limitation Act, we  think  it night to ]told that the cause  of  action  for short  delivery  comes into being only  when  the  consignee comes  to  know that the bailment has come  into  existence. You  cannot claim delivery from a statutory bailee till  you know of the bailment, which under the Act arises only on the vessel  discharging  the goods into the  port-certainly  not before.   In  this  species of actions,  the  right  to  sue postulates  knowledge  of  the  right.   Till  then  it   is embryonic, unborn. A vital point, then, is as to when the first plaintiff  came to  know  of  the  goods in  question  having  landed.   The defendant  says  that when the bulk of  the  consignment  is delivered ’on a Particular date, it must be presumed, unless a  contrary inference on special circumstances is made  out, that the undelivered Dart was deliverable on that date so 416 much  so  that limitation began to run from  then  on.   Any further  representation by the bailee that he was trying  to trace  the  missing  bundle would not affect  the  cause  of action and therefore the commencement of limitation. How  can a claim be barred without being born ?’When,  then, did  the right to sue arise ? It depends on what  right  was infringed  or duty breached.  Which leads us to the  enquiry as to what is the statutory responsibility cast on the Board and  what is the violation alleged to create the ’cause’  of action.   The bundle of facts constitutive of the  right  to sue  certainly  includes  the  breach  of  bailee’s  duties. Section  61B  of  the  Act  saddles  the  Board  with   the,

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obligations  of a bailee under ss. 151, 152 and 161  of  the Contract Act in regard to loss, destruction or deterioration of  goods of which it takes charge.  The degree of  care  is fixed by s. 151 the absolvatory circumstances are  indicated by s. 152 and the responsibility for loss is fastened by  S. 162  if,  by  the fault of the bailee,  the  goods  are  not delivered or tendered at the proper time to the bailor.  The proper  time for delivery is as soon as the time  for  which the  goods  were bailed has expired or the  purpose  of  the bailment  has  been accomplished-Sec. 160, although  not  in terms   woven  into  the  Port  Trust  Act,   is   impliedly incorporated, because s. 161 inevitably brings it into play. Even  so, when does the time for which the goods are  bailed expire ? The answer is, according to the Solicitor  General, when  the  week  after landing of the goods  expires  if  s. 61A(2) betokens anything on this point.  He urges that  when the  bulk  of a consignment is delivered by the  bailee  the time  for  delivery  of the  short-delivered  part  must  be reasonably held to have come.  Finally, he submits that  the time consumed by search for the landedgoods cannot be  added for  fixing the terminus a quo of limitation.  Assuming  for arguments  sake  all these in favour of the  appellant,  one critical  issue claims precedence over them.  When does  the statutory bailment take place and can the time for  delivery to the owner of the goods arise before he knows or at  least has  good grounds to know that the bailment has in law  come into being ? The  owner  must ordinarily take delivery in a  week’s  time after  landing since thereafter the Board will cease  to  be liable  for  loss, etc., save, of course,  when  the  latter defaults  in giving delivery as for instance the  goods  are irremovably  located or, physical obstruction to removal  is offered by striking workers or natural calamities.  Here the 7  days ended on September 19, 1959 when actually 52 out  of the  53  bundles were delivered.  And if the  due  date  for delivery  of the missing bundle had arisen then the suit  is admittedly time-barred. However, the learned Solicitor General rightly agrees that 7 days  of  unloading  is no rigid,  wooden  event  to  ignite limitation  and it depends on other factors which  condition the  reasonable time when delivery ought to be made.   If  a tidal bore has inhibited approach to the port it is a futile law  which  insists  on delivery  date  having  arrived  and therefore  limitation  having been set in motion.   The  key question is, according to counsel, when ought the goods have been  put in a deliverable state by the Board ?. If,  having regard to reasonable circum-  417 stances,  the Port Trust did not tender delivery, the  right of  action  for non-delivery, subject to  statutory  notice, arose  and the calendar would begin to count the six  months in S. 87.  We are inclined to assent to this stand for legal and pragmatic reasons. In Madras Port Trust case where action for loss of goods was laid, two extreme contentions competed for acceptance.   The Board argued that the goods once landed, time ran inflexibly and  an  absolute span of one month  having  expired  before statutory  notice was given the suit was barred.   This  was over-ruled by the Court (M/s.  Swastik Agency v. Madras Port Trust)  (1).   But the opposite plea,  equally  extravagant, commended itself to the Court, erroneously in our view.  The plea  was  that  till  the  plaintiff  knew  of  the   loss, destruction  or deterioration time stood still even if  many months might have rolled on after the vessel had  discharged the  goods.  It is true that s. 87 speaks of ’6 months  from

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the  accrual of the cause of such suit’.  What is  cause  of the  suit?  Loss, destruction or deterioration ? If  so,  as Ramamurti, J., has held :               "It  stands  to common sense  that  the  owner               cannot be expected to file a suit before he is               given   access  to  the  goods  and  also   an               effective opportunity to examine the goods and               he  becomes aware of the loss or damage  which               had  occurred to the goods.  To hold that  the               period  of  one  month  specified  in  s.40(2)               would,  commence to run even before the  owner               of  the  goods became aware, of  the  loss  or               damage  would result in absurd  and  startling               results." The legal confusion issues from the clubbing together of the triple   categories   of  damage.   Cause  of   suit   being destruction  or  deterioration while the goods  are  in  the custody  of the bailee it is correct to read as  this  Court did in a different situation under the Land Acquisition  Act in  Harish  Chandra v. Deputy Land  Acquisition  Officer(2), knowledge  of  the  damage  by  the  affected  party  as  an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice.  The error  stems from visualising loss as the ’cause’  of  suit. The  bailee  is bound to return, deliver or tender.   If  he defaults  in this duty the ,cause’ of action arises.   While destruction  or  deterioration may need  inspection  by  the owner,  it may be proper to import scienter as  integral  to the  ’cause’ or grievance.  But loss flows from  sheer  non- delivery,  with  nothing super-added. _Loss  is  the  direct result. viewed through the owner’s eyes, of non-return, non- delivery or non-tender by the bailee-the act/omission  which completes  the ’cause, (vide ;. 161 Contract Act).  What  is complained of is the nondelivery, the resultant damage being the loss of goods.  We must keel)’ the breach of duty  which is  the  cause distinct from the loss which  is  the  conse- quence.   The judicial interpretation cannot take  liberties with  the  language of the law beyond the  strict  needs  of natural justice.  So we hold that awareness of the factum of loss of goods is not a sine qua non of the ’cause’. (1) A. I. R. 1966 Mad. 130.  (2) A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500. 418 In  a stroke of skilful advocacy it was urged that when  the bailee  fails  to  return the goods it is like  a  suit  for wrongful  detention and the cause of action is a  continuing one.   This  is  an action in detention and  its  impact  on limitation  must be recognised, was the  contention,  stren- gthened by Dhian Singh Sabha Singh v. Union of India(1)  and certain  passages  from  Clerk &  Lindsell  on  Torts  (11th Edition,  pages 441 and 442; paras 720 & 721).  The flaw  in the  argument  is  that we are concerned  with  a  statutory bailment, statutory action for loss due to non-delivery  and not a contractual breach and suit in damages or for value of the goods bailed. Another   fascinating,line  of  thought  was  suggested   to extricate the plaintiff from the coils of brief  limitation. When the defendant holds goods as bailee, the plaintiff  may found  his  cause of action on a breach of  the  defendant’s duty as bailee of the goods by refusal to deliver them  upon request.  Gopal Chandra Bose v. Surendra Nath Dutt(2), Laddo Begam v. Jamal-ud-din(3) and Kupruswami Mudaliar v. Pannalal Sawcar(4)  were cited in support.  Other rulings striking  a similar  note were also relied on.  But we need not  express any  opinion on the soundness of that position for  here  we are  dealing  with a statutory liability where  the  plenary liabilities of a bailee cannot be imported.

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Counsel  for the respondents also urged that the analogy  of art.  120 of the Limitation Act entitles him to reckon  time from  when he came to know of the facts making up the  right to sue.  In Annamalai Chettiar v. Muthukarappan Chattiar(5), the Judicial Committee had observed:               "In their Lordships’ View the case falls under               art.  120, under which the time begins to  run               when  the right to sue accrues.  In  a  recent               decision of their Lordship’s Board,  delivered               by   Sir  Binod  Mitter,  it  is  stated,   in               reference to art. 120 : There can be no ’right               to sue’ until there is an accrual of the right               asserted  in the suit and its infringement  or               at  least  a clear and unequivocal  threat  to               infringe  that right by the defendant  against               whom  the  suit  is  instituted"  :  Bala   v.               Koklan(6).    Counsel   for   the   appellants               admitted  that  he was unable to  specify  any               date at which the claim to an account here  in               suit  was denied by the  appellants.   Accord-               ingly this contention fails." The reference to Sir Binod Mitter’s observations relates. to the ruling in Bala v. Koklan.  The proposition is impeccable but is inapplicable if it is urged that the knowledge of the loss  marks  the relevant date.  On the other hand,  if  the right to sue or the accrual of the cause of action is  based on  the infringement by non-delivery the knowledge  must  be the knowledge of the factum of bailment which takes place on the unloading from the vessel and the taking charge by (1) [1958] S.C.R. 781.   (2) 12 C.W.N. 1010. (3) [1920] I.L.R. 42 All 45.  (4) (1942) Mad. 303. (5) 58 I.A. 18.     (6) (1930) L.R. 57 I.A. 325.  419 the Board.  That is to say, it is preposterous to  postulate the  running of limitation from a date anterior to when  the plaintiff has come to know that his missing goods have  been landed  on  the port.  Mohammad Yunus v. Syed  Unnisa(1)  is authority  for  the rule that there can be no right  to  sue (under  art.  120) until there is an accrual  of  the  right asserted-which  as we have shown, involves awareness of  the bailment.   It meets with reason and justice to  state  that the  cause in S. 87 cannot arise until the  consignee  gains knowledge  that  his goods have come into the hands  of  the Board. The  Railways Act has spanned cases where courts  have  laid down  legal  tests  for  determining  the  commencement   of limitation.   Views  ran on rival lines till  in  Bootamal’s case(2) this Court settled the conflict and gave the correct lead  which  has  been heavily relied on  by  the  Solicitor General.   Sri  Cooper  contested  the  application  of  the principle in Bootamal on the score that art. 31,  Limitation Act, 1908, which fell for construction there, used the words ’when  the  goods  ought to be delivered"  and  covers  both delayed delivery and nondelivery, which were absent in s.87, and argued that even otherwise it did not run counter to the contention of the respondent.  Anyway, the Court held  there as follows:               "Reading the words in their plain  grammatical               meaning,  they are in our opinion  capable  of               only  one  interpretation, namely,  that  they               contemplate  that the time would begin to  run               after  a reasonable period has elapsed on  the               expiry  of  which the delivery ought  to  have               been made.  The words "when the goods ought to               be  delivered"  can only mean  the  reasonable

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             time taken (in the absence of any term in  the               contract  from which the time can be  inferred               expressly or impliedly) in the carriage of the               goods from the place of despatch to the  place               of  destination.   Take the  case,  where  the               cause   of  action  is  based  on   delay   in               delivering  the  goods.  In such  a  case  the               goods  have  been delivered and the  claim  is               based  on  the delay caused in  the  delivery.               Obviously  the question of delay can  only  be               decided  on  the basis of what  would  be  the               reasonable time for the arriage of goods  from               the   place  of  despatch  to  the  place   of               destination.   Any time taken over  and  above               that  would  be a else of  delay.   Therefore,               when  we consider the interpretation of  these               words in the third column with respect to  the               case of non-delivery, they must mean the  same               thing,  namely, the reasonable time taken  for               the  carriage  of  goods  from  the  place  of               despatch  to  the place of  destination.   The               view  therefore  taken  by some  of  the  High               Courts that the time begins from the date when               the railway finally refuses to deliver  cannot               be correct, for the words in the third  column               of art. 31 are incapable of being  interpreted               as meaning the final refusal of the carrier to               deliver." (1) A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 808.   (2) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 70, 76, 79. 420               "With  respect,  it  is  rather  difficult  to               understand  how the subsequent  correspondence               between  the railway and the consignor or  the               consignee  can  make  any  difference  to  the               starting   point  of  limitation,  when   that               correspondence  only showed that  the  railway               was  trying  to trace the goods.   The  period               that  might be taken in tracing the goods  can               have   no   relevance   in   determining   the               reasonable  time  that is  required  for  the,               carriage  of  the,  goods from  the  place  of               despatch to the place of destinations." The ratio is twofold, viz. (1) not when the final refusal to deliver  but  when  the reasonable  time  for  delivery  has elapsed  does limitation start; (2)  correspondence  stating that  efforts  are  being made to  trace  the  goods  cannot postpone   the   triggering  of  limitation.    Of   course, ’reasonable’ time is a relative factor and representation by the Railway inducing the plaintiff not to sue may amount  to estoppel  or  waiver  in  special  circumstances.   We   are inclined to confine, Bootamal to the specific words of  art. 39.  The discussion discloses the influence of the words  in columns  1  and 3 on the conclusion, rendering it  risky  to expand its operation.  Section 87 speaks only of the accrual of the cause.  The cause is the grievance which is generated by nondelivery.  But can it be said that it is  unreasonable not  to be aggrieved by non-delivery if the  Board  credibly holds  out that delivery will shortly be made  and  vigorous search  for  the  goods is being made  amidst  the  enormous miscellany of consignments lying pell mell within the  Port? Do  you  put  yourself  in peril of  losing  your  right  by behaving  reasonably  and  believing  the  Board  to  be   a responsible  body ?  We think not.  We are not impressed  by the  argument based on Bootamal and the train  of  decisions following  it, under the Railways Act.  The rulings of  this

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Court in Union of India v. Amar Singh,(1), Governor  General in  Council  v. Musaddi Lal(2) and Jetumull Bhojrai  v.  The Darjeeling Himalayan Railway Co.(3) relate to the Limitation Act  and the Railways Act;’ and, while public  carriers  and Port   authorities  may  in  many  respect    bear   similar responsibility, the limitation law applicable is  different. May  be,-some uniformity is desirable in this area  of  law. But  we  have  to go by the language of S.  87  and  not  be deflected  by  analogy  drawn  from  the  Railways  Act   or Limitation Act with noticeable variations.   Never-the-less, one of the legal lines harshly but neatly drawn in  Bootamal lends  some certainty to the ’from when’ of  limitation,  by eliminating  an impertinence letters informing  that  search for  the  goods is under way.  The snag is in  linking  this proffer of search to the vital ingredient in the ’accrual of the cause’.  If, as Bootamal has correctly highlighted,  the tracing  process  is  after the ’cause’ is  complete  it  is irrelevant  to procrastinate limitation.  This is the  wider contribution of that- decision to this blurred branch of the law.  So much so, sheafs of letters from the Port  officials that the landed goods are being tracted out or searched  for are  impotent to alter the date from when the  crucial  six- months’  race  with time be-gins.  Once  limitation  starts, nothing-not  the most tragic events- can interrupt  it;  for ’the moving hand writes, and having writ (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 75.       (2) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 647.  (3) [1963] 2 S.C.E. 832.  421 moves  on; not all thy tears nor piety can lure it  back  to cancel  half a line’.  This implacable start is  after  ’the accrual  of the cause’, which is when non-delivery  or  non- tender  takes place.  That event is fixed with reference  to reasonable  lapse of time after the unloading of the  goods. Thus,  if the search is to find out whether the  goods  have landed at all, it is integral and anterior, to the  ’cause’; but  if it be to trace what has definitely  been  discharged into  the  port  it  is  de-linked  from  the,  ’cause’a  la Bootamal. Such  an approach reduces the variables and stops the  evils of  fluctuation of limitation.  It is easy to fix  when  the vessel  has discharged the goods into the port  by,  looking into the tally sheet or other relevant documents  prescribed in the bye-laws.  This part of the tracing cannot take  long although it is regrettable and negligent for the Bombay Port officials  to have taken undue time to give  the  plaintiffs even  this  information.  On the contrary,  search  for  the missing  but  landed goods in the warehouses and  sheds  and open spaces can be a wild goose chase honestly or as long as the   consignee   or  port   officials   with   dishonestly. Reasonable   diligence  will  readily  give  the   consignee information of landing, of his goods. In   the  major  port  cities  warehousing  facilities   are expensive  and difficult to procure so that a  consignee  of considerable goods may manage to get free warehousing  space within  the  port for as long as he wants by  inducing,  for illicit  consideration, the port officials to issue  letters that  the goods are being traced out.  This is a vice  which adds to the sinister uncertainty of the terminus a quo if we accept the plea that every letter from the port  authorities that  the missing goods are being traced out has the  effect of postponing limitation. We  wish  to make it clear however that the event  which  is relevant being the discharge of the goods from the ship into the port, the bailment begins when the Board takes charge of the goods and a necessary component of the "cause" in S.  87

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of the Act is the knowledge of the owner that the goods have landed. One small but significant argument of the Solicitor  General remains  to  be  noticed.  In the search for  what  ’is  the reasonable  time for delivery by the bailee a  pragmatic  or working  rules  is suggested by him which  we  think  merits consideration.   When a large consignment is entrusted  with the  Board and the bulk of it is delivered on  a  particular date  it ordinarily follows that the reasonble time for  the delivery of the missing part of the consignment also fell on that  date.  There may be exceptional circumstances  whereby some  items in the consignment might not have been  unloaded from  the ship by mistake or might be stored by error  in  a wrong  shed mixed up with other goods so that they  are  not deliverable readily, or a substantial part of the goods  has been taken delivery of and by the time the balance is sought to   be  removed  a  bandh  or  strike  or  other   physical obstruction  prevents  taking delivery.   Apart  from  these recondite possibilities which require to be specially proved by  him  who claims that limitation has not started,  it  is safe to conclude that the date for delivery of the 422 non-delivered  part of the consignment is the same  as  that when a good part of it was actually delivered. The  ruling in Trustees of the Port of Mad?-as v.  Union  of India,  cited  by Shri Cooper in this context,  is  good  in parts.   The  learned  judges were dealing  with  the  short delivery by the Madras Port Trust.  While pointing out  that attempts made by the Port Trust to locate the goods would be no  answer to the claim for delivery made by the  consignee, the Court held that the date when limitation starts in  such cases  is when a certificate that the missing  packages  are not  available  (Shedmaster’s certificate  ’C’)  is  issued. While it is correct to say that alleged attempts by the Port officials  to locate the goods which have definitely  landed has  no bearing on the "cause", it is equally  incorrect  to hold  that  till  the  certificate  that  the  non-delivered package  is not forthcoming limitation does not begin.   The true  test, as we have earlier pointed out, is to  find  out when  delivery should have been made in the  normal  course, subject  to the fact of discharge from the ship to the  port of  the relevant goods and the knowledge about that fact  by the  consignee.  In Union of India v. Jutharam(1)  a  single Judge of that High Court took the view that when part of the goods sent in one consignment was not delivered it is  right to hold that it should have reasonably been delivered on the same  day  the delivery of the other part took  place.   The date  of delivery of part of the consignment must be  deemed to  be the starting point of limitation.  This approach  has our broad approval. In  Union  of India v. Vithalsa Kisansa &  Co.(2)  a  single Judge  of Bombay High Court, while emphasizing that what  is reasonable   time   for  delivery  may   depend   upon   the circumstances  of  each  case, the point  was  made  if  the correspondence   between  the  bailee  and   the   consignee disclosed anything which may amount to an acknowledgment  of the  liability  of  the  carrier that  would  give  a  fresh starting point of limitation. even as. if the correspondence discloses material which may throw light on the question  of determining the reasonable time for delivery, the Court  may take  into  account that correspondence but  not  subsequent letters  relating  only to the tracing of the  goods.   This statement  of law although made in the context of  a  public carrier’s  liability  applies also to the  Port  Trust.   In short, there is force in the plea that normally the date for

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delivery of the missing packages should be deemed to be  the same  as the date when another part of the  consignment  was actually delivered. We  thus come to the end of the case and may  formulate  our conclusions, as clearly as the complex of facts permits. (1)  Section 87 of the Acts insists on notice of one  month. This period    may  legitimately  be tacked on  to  the  six month period mentioned   in  the  section (vide  Sec.  15(2) Limitation Act, 1963). (2)  The starting point of limitation is the accrual of  the cause  of  action.   Two  components  of  the  "cause"   are important.  The date (1) A.I.R. 1968 Pat. 35. (2) A.I.R. 1971 Bom. 172.  423 when  the  plaintiff  came to know or  ought  to  know  with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel  into  the port.  Two clear,  though  not  conclusive indications of when the consignee ought to know are (1) when the  bulk  of  the goods are delivered,  there  being  short delivery  leading to a suit (ii) 7 days after  knowledge  of the  landing of the goods suggested in Sec. 61A.   Whichever is  the  later  date  ordinarily sets  off  the  running  of Limitation. (3)  Letters  or  assurances that the missing  packages  are being searched for cannot enlarge limitation, once the goods have  landed and the owner has come to know of it.  To  rely on such an unstable date as the termination of the search by the bailee is apt to make the law uncertain, the  limitation liable  to  manipulation and abuses of other types  to  seep into the system. (4)  Section  87  is  attracted not merely when  an  act  is committed: but also when an omission occurs in the course of the  performance  of the official  duty.   The  act-omission complex, if it has a nexus to the official functions of  the Board and its officers, attracts limitation under s. 87. Judged  by these working rules, the present case has  to  be decided  against the plaintiffs.  For one thing,  the  short delivery  of one bundle of steel plates is an integral  part of  the delivery of the consignment by the port  authorities to  the  consignee  in  the  discharge  of  their   official functions  as  statutory  bailee.  Section 87  of  the  Act, therefore,  applies.   The  delivery  of  the  bulk  of  the consignment  took place on September 19, 1959 and more  than seven months had passed after that before the institution of the suit.  Of course, a later date, namely, November 7, 1959 (Ext.   ’A’) clearly brings to the ken of the plaintiff  the fact  that  the missing bundle has been duly landed  in  the port.   It  is true that the enquiry section of  the  Bombay Port Trust Docks did not even, as late as December 4,  1959, give a definite reply about the "outturn" for this item.  On December 5, 1959, the first plaintiff brought to the  notice of  the  Board  "that the above mentioned  bundle  has  been landed and they (agents of the vessel) hold receipt from you (the  Board)".  The plaintiffs made an enquiry "Whether  the bundle  has  been  landed, if landed,  let  the  information regarding  the whereabouts and, if not, confirm  the  short- landings."  Further  reminders  by  the  plaintiffs   proved fruitless  till  ;It  last on January 22.  1960,,  the  port officer concerned wrote : "I  beg  to inform you that the bundle under  reference  has been outturned as "Landed but missing." It  was contended that the plaintiffs, for certain, came  to know  of the landing of the missing bundle only  on  January 22,  1960.   We are unable to accept this plea  because  the

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first plaintiff had already got the information, as early as November 7,’1959, about the due landing of the missing  item from  the  Indian Maritime Enterprises.   Nothing  has  been suggested  before  us  as  to  why  this  knowledge  of  the plaintiff    should    be   discarded.     The    subsequent correspondence between the port officers and the  plaintiffs was more for getting requisite documents. 424 to  follow up legal proceedings against the insurer  by  the consignee.   In this view, the starting point of  limitation arose  on  November 7, 1959 and the suit was  instituted  on June  18, 1960, a little over 10 days beyond the  period  of limitation.   The  plaintiffs  thus missed the  bus  and  we regret  to decide on this technical point that the  suit  is liable to be dismissed but we must. A faint plea that the Board is not a ’person’ falling  with- in s. 87 was suggested by Sri Cooper but its fate, if urged, is what overtook a similar contention before a Bench of  the Madras High Court in Trustees of the Port of Madras v.  Home Insurance Co.(1)-dismissal without a second thought. It  is  surprising that a public body like  the  Port  Trust should  have  shown  remissne  in  handling  the  goods   of consignees  and in taking effective action for  tracing  the goods.   It  is seen that while there is ,a  special  police station  inside  the  port, called the  Yellow  Gate  Police Station,  with six or seven officers and 200  policemen  for duty by day and with about 400 policemen for duty by  night, the  port authorities ,did not care to report to the  police till December 16, 1959.  Three months is far too  inordinate and inexcusable a delay for reporting about the pilferage of a vital and valuable item, namely, a bundle of ,steel plates imported from Japan by an automobile manufacturing  company. While  we dismiss this suit, we feel that it is  not  enough that  the State instal police stations inside the ports;  it must  ensure diligent action by the officials, and if  there is  delinquency  or  default  in  discharging  their  duties promptly  and smartly, disciplinary action should  be  taken against those concerned.  In this country our major harbours are   acquiring  a  different  reputation   for   harbouring smugglers  :and  pilferers  and  an  impression  has  gained currency  that port officials ,connive at  these  operations for  consideration.   Every case is an event and  an  index, projects a conflict of rights between two entities but has a social  facet,  being the symptom of a  social  legion.   We consider that the Government and the public must be  alerted about  the unsatisfactory functioning of the ports so  ’that delinquent  officials may be proceeded against  for  dubious default in the discharge of their duties.  It is not  enough that  diligence is shown in pleading limitation when  honest citizens  aggrieved  by- loss’ of their goods  entrusted  to public    bodies come to court.  The responsibility of these institutions to do  their  utmost  to prevent  pilferage  is implied in the legislative policy  of  prescribing  a  short period of’ limitation. Another important circumstance we wish to emphasize is  that ambiguity in language leading to possibilities of  different constructions  should not be left to the painfully long  and expensive  process  of being ,settled decades later  by  the highest  court  in the land.  The  alternative  and  quicker process  in  a  democracy of  rectification  by  legislative amendment should be resorted to so that private citizens are not  subjected to inordinate expense and delay  because  the legalese in a legislation reads abstruse or ambiguous.   The very  length  of this judgment, and of this  litigation,  is eloquent testimony to the need

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(1)  A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 48.  425 for  prompt corrective legislation on such small matters  as have  cropped  up  in  the  present  case.   Moreover,  some uniformity     in    regard    to.    statutory     bailee’s responsibilities,  whether they be public carriers like  the Railways,  or strategic institutions like Ports,  will  give the  community a sense of certainty and clarity about  their rights  and the duties. of public bodies in charge of  their goods. Counsel  had  drawn  attention to the  difficulties  of  the community  where  conflicting  judicial  currents  aided  by tricky  words  have made law chancy, and the need  for  this Court to clear the ground and give. the lead.  We are aware, with  justice Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court,  that  ’the judicial decree, however, broadly worded, actually binds  in most  instances,  only  the  parties to  the  case.   As  to others,.  it is merely a weather vane showing which way  the judicial  wind is blowing’.  The direction of the  wind.  in this branch of law, is as we have projected. We are of the view, in reiteration of earlier expression  on the  same  lines,  that  public  bodies  should  resist  the temptation  to take technical pleas or defeat honest  claims by  legally permissible but marginally  unjust  contentions, including  narrow  limitation.  In this and  similar  cases, where a public carrier dissuades private parties from  suing by  its  promises of search for lost  articles  and  finally pleads  helplessness,, it is doubtful morality  to  non-suit solely on grounds of limitation, a plaintiff who is taken in by seemingly responsible representation only to find himself fooled  by  his credibility.   Public  institutions  convict themselves  of untrustworthiness out of their own  mouth  by resorting to such defences. What  should be the proper direction for. costs ?  Both  the parties  arc public sector bodies.  But the principle  which must  guide us has to be of general application.  Here is  a small claim which is usually associated with the little  man and  when, as in this test action, the litigation  escalates to  the final court wafted by a legal nicety, his  financial back is broken in a bona-fide endeavour to secure a declara- tion of the law that binds all courts in the country for the obvious  benefit of the whole community.  The fact that  the case has gained special leave under art. 136 is prima  facie proof  of the general public importance of the legal  issue. The  course  of  this litigation proves that  the  fine  but decisive  point of law enmeshed in a conflict of  precedents found  each  court reversing the one next below  it,  almost hopefully  appetising  the  losing party to  appeal  to  the higher   forum.   The  real  beneficiary  is  the   business community  which  now knows finally the norm  of  limitation they must obey.  Is it fair in these circumstances that  one party, albeit the vanquished one, should bear the burden  of costs    throughout   for   providing   the    occasion--not provocation-for   laying   down  the  correct   law   in   a controversial situation.  Faced with, a similar  moral-legal issue, Lord Reid observed :               "I think we must consider separately costs  in               this  House and costs in the Court of  Appeal.               Cases  can  only come before this  House  with               leave,  and leave is generally  given  because               some general question of law is involved.   In               this               426               case it enabled the whole vexed matter of  non               est  factum to be re-examined.  This seems  to

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             me  a  typical  case where the  costs  of  the               successful  respondent  should  come  out   of               public funds."(1).                "The  Evershed  Committee  on  Supreme  Court               Practice   and  Procedure  had  suggested   in               England  that the Attorney-General  should  be               empowered  to issue a certificate for the  use               of  public  funds in appeals to the  House  of               Lords  where  issues  of  outstanding   public               importance are involved."(2). Maybe,  a scheme for a suitor’s fund to indemnify for  costs as recommended by a Sub-Committee of Justice is the  answer, but   these  are  matters  for  the  consideration  of   the Legislature and the Executive.  We mention them to show that the  law in this branch cannot be rigid.  We have to make  a compromise  between  pragmatism and equity  and  modify  the loser-pays-all   doctrine   by  exercise   of   a   flexible discretion.   The  respondent  in this case need  not  be  a martyr for the cause of the, certainty of law under S. 87 of the Act, particularly when the appellant wins on a point  of limitation.  (The  trial court had even held  the  appellant guilty  of  negligence).  In these circumstances  we  direct that  the parties do, bear their costs throughout.   Subject to this, we allow the appeal. S.C. Appeal allowed. (1)  Gallie v. Lee. (2)  [1971] A.C. 1039,1048. 427