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PETITIONER: TRUSTEES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF CALCUTTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHANDRA SEKHAR MALLICK & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/05/1977

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. UNTWALIA, N.L. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 2034            1978 SCR  (1) 136  1977 SCC  (3) 448

ACT: Calcutta  Improvement  Act,  1911-Sec.  78A  to  78G-Whether unconstitutional-If  suffers  from  the  vice  of  excessive delegation-Rules 11 to 21, it ultra vires the Act.

HEADNOTE: The  respondents were the owners of buildings situated in  a street  known  as Fire Lane in the city  of  Calcutta.   The Board  of  Trustees  for  the  Improvement  of  Calcutta  in exercise  of the power conferred under s. 39(c)  passed  the necessary resolution and proceeded to frame a street  scheme for the area which included Fire Lane as also the  buildings belonging  to  the respondents.  The notice  containing  the requisite  particulars  was  published by  the  Board.   The respondents  submitted their objections but the Board  after hearing the respondents rejected the objections and  applied to   the  State  Government  for  sanction  under   s.   47. Ultimately,  the State Government granted sanction under  s. 48.   The Board was of the opinion that as a result  of  the making of the street scheme, lands of the respondents  which were comprised in the street scheme would increase in value. The  scheme,  therefore,  contained  a  declaration  that  a betterment  fee  shall  be payable  by  the  respondents  in respect  of the increases in the value of  their  respective lands.   The Board gave a notice of the proposed  assessment of  the  betterment fee under s. 78B(1) and  then  proceeded under  s. (2) of that section to assess the  betterment  fee payable  by the respondent.  The respondents dissented  from the  assessment  made on them and the matter  was  thereupon referred  for determination by arbitrators  as  contemplated under  section  78(B)(4),  and  an  award  was  made.    The respondents filed writ petitions challenging the validity of the award made by the arbitrators.  Section 39 provides that whenever  the Board is of the opinion that for the  purpose, inter  alia, of creating new or improving existing means  of communication and facilities for traffic, it is expedient to lay  out new streets or to alter existing street, the  Board

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may  pass  a resolution to that effect and then  proceed  to frame  a  street scheme for such area as it may  think  fit. Section  43 requires the Board to give a  notice  mentioning where the map of the area and a statement of the land  which is  proposed  to  be acquired may be  inspected.   The  said notice  is to be published for general public under  s.  45. Individual notice is to be served on every person whose name appears  in  Municipal Assessment Book  as  being  primarily liable  to pay the owner’s share of the  consolidated  rate. Under  s.  45(2), a person dissenting from the  recovery  of betterment  fee has to state his reasons.  Under s.  47  the Board  after hearing all persons making dissent  may  either abandon the scheme or accept it with such modifications  and thereafter  submit  it to the  State  Government  containing reasons  given  for the dissent.  The Board is  required  to publish notice of the fact that a particular scheme has been submitted  to  the Government for its sanction.   The  State Government  may  then  refuse  to  sanction  the  scheme  or sanction   it  with  or  without  any  modifications.    The principal  ground on which the validity of the Award of  the Arbitrators  was impugned in the writ petitioners  was  that section  78A to section 78G of the Act were ultra vires  and void and that Rules 11 to 21 of the Rules were also invalid. The High Court upheld the challenge and struck down  section 78B to s. 786 and Rules 11 to 21, as invalid. Allowing the appeal, HELD (1) The view taken by the High Court on the validity of section  78A  to 78G is clearly erroneous.  The  High  Court thought that the sections suffer from the vice of  excessive delegation of legislative power because for determining what land should bear the burden of betterment fee, arbitrary and ,uncontrolled  power  has been given to the  Trust  and  its Engineers either 137 include or not to include within the scheme lands which  are required  for the execution thereof.  The reasoning  of  the High  Court  is  clearly  based  on  an  erroneous  premise. Section 39 lays down the factors which would guide the Board in deciding which area should be included in the scheme.  It is  only when the Board finds that for carrying out  any  of the four purposes set out in section 39, it is expedient  to lay  out  new street or to alter existing  street  that  the Board can proceed to frame a Scheme.  Again the decision  of the  Board is not final.  It is subject to the  sanction  of the  State Government.  Even after the scheme is  sanctioned by the State Government it is open to the owner of the  land to show that in fact the land would not increase in value by reason of the making of the scheme.  The Board has to decide objectively  whether there is any increase in the  value  of the  land at all and if there is, assess the betterment  fee on  that  basis.  If the assessee does not  agree  with  the betterment  fees assessed, he is entitled to dissent and  to have  a  hearing.   Even  thereafter if  the  owner  is  not satisfied  by  the decision of the Board he  can  have  this question determined by a body of two independent arbitrators who would objectively decide the question.  Therefore, there is no voice of excessive delegation. [142 C-H, 143 A-D] (2)Rule  11  provides  the  machinery  for  appointment   of arbitrators  in a case where the objectors fail to elect  an arbitrator.    Rules  12  to  21  lay  down  the   procedure regulating  the proceedings of arbitrator.  These Rules  are clearly  covered by clause 3(a) of s. 137.  The  High  Court completely erred in observing that the Rules are ultra vires the Act. [141 C, 142 B]

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appear Nos. 579-580  of 1976. (From the judgment and order dated 1-12-1972 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule Nos. 41 1 0 and 4111 /64) P.K.  Chatterjee, G. S. Chatterjee and D. P. Mukherjee,  for the appellant. P.K.  Mukherjee, for respondents in CA No. 579/76 and  RR  1 (a) to 1 (1), 3 and 4 in CA No. 580/76. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWANTI,  J.,  These appeals by certificate  are  directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta  High Court  striking  down section 78-B to section  78-G  of  the Calcutta  Improvement Act, 1911 as invalid on the ground  of excessive   delegation   of  legislative   power   as   also contravention   of  Article  14  of  the  Constitution   and declaring  rules  11  to  21 of  the  Rules  framed  by  the Government  under sub-section (3a) of section 137  as  ultra vires  the provisions of the Act.  The facts giving rise  to the appeals lie in a very narrow compass and may be  briefly stated as follows. The  respondents  in Civil Appeal No,. 579 of 1976  are  the owners  of  a  building  bearing No.  35  situate  at  Lower Circular  Road,  Calcutta  while the  respondents  in  Civil Appeal No. 580 of 1976 are owners of a building bearing  No. 1 /A situate in Mcleod Street, Calcutta.  There was a street knows as Fire Lane connecting the Lower Circular Road on the cast  to  Mcleod Street on the West.  In or  about  November 1954. the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of  Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the Board) acting in exercise of the power conferred under section 39, clause (c), passed the necessary resolution and proceeded to frame a Street  Scheme for the area which included Fire Lane as also the  buildings belonging  to ’the respondents.  The notice  containing  the requisite  particulars  was published by the Board  on  24th November, 138  1954 as required by section 43.  The respondents  submitted their objections against the Street Scheme on 7th  December, 1954 but tile Board, after nearing the respondents, rejected the  objections  and  applied to the  State  Government  for sanction  under  section  47  and  the  Street  Scheme   was ultimately sanctioned by the State Government under  section 48  on  17th December, 1956.  The board was of  the  opinion that  as a result of the making of the Street Scheme,  lands of the respondents which were comprised in the Street Scheme would  increase in value, and the Street Scheme,  therefore, contained  a  declaration  that a betterment  fee  shall  be payable by the respondents in respect of the increase in the value of their respective lands resulting from the execution of the Street Scheme.  The Board gave notice of the proposed assessment  of the betterment fee to the  respondents  under sub-section  (1) of section 7 8-B and then  proceeded  under subsection (2) of that section to assess the betterment  fee payable by the respondents.  The betterment fee was assessed at  Rs.  2,15,441/- in the case of the Lower  Circular  Road property  and  at Rs. 4,241/- in the case of  Mcleod  Street property  and  notice of this assessment was  given  to  the respondents.   The respondents in each case  dissented  from the  assessment  made on them and the matter  was  thereupon referred  for determination by arbitrators  as  contemplated under sub-section (4) of section 78-B.  The arbitrators were appointed according to the procedure set out in section  78C

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and  after hearing the parties, the arbitrators  made  their award on 23rd September, 1964 determining the betterment fee payable  in the case of Lower Circular Road property at  Rs. 1,25,000/- and in the case of Mcleod Street property at  Rs. 4,241/-.  The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in each case challenging the validity of the award made by  the arbitrators. The  principal ground on which the validity of the award  of the arbitrators was impugned in the writ petitions was  that section  78A to section 78G of the Act were ultra vires  and void  and  rules 1 1 to 21 of the Rules were  also  invalid. There  were also certain other subsidiary grounds  taken  in the  writ  petitions but they have not formed  the  subject- matter  of debate before us and hence we need not  refer  to them.   Though the writ petitions were filed as far back  as 1964   immediately  after  making  of  the  Award   by   the Arbitrators,  they  unfortunately could  not  reach  hearing before  the  High Court until July 1971 and then  also,  the hearing took considerable time and it concluded only on 17th August,,  1971.. It appears that during the bearing  of  the writ  petitions,  it was brought to the notice of  the  High Court that the question as to the constitutional validity of section  78A  of the Act was also raised  in  another  case, namely,  Civil  Rules  No. 2156 of 1969 and  that  case  bad already  been  heard by another Division Bench of  the  High Court  and  was  pending  for  judgment.   The  High  Court, therefore, decided to bold back the preparation of the judg- ment in the writ petitions and to await the judgment of  the other Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 2156 of 1969.  We. do not  know when the judgment was delivered in Civil Rule  No. 2156  of 1969 but it appears that the Division  Bench  which beard  that case did not pronounce upon  the  constitutional validity of section 78A and disposed of that case on  other grounds.  The result was that the High Court 139 had  to  decide the question of constitutional  validity  of section 78A to section 78G in the present writ petitions and it  proceeded to deliver its judgment in 1st December,  1972 striking down section 78-B to section 78G and rules 11 to 21 as invalid.  We are constrained to observe that the judgment to the High Court visibly bears marks of superficiality  and lack  of  proper consideration which are inevitable  When  a judgment  is delivered. fifteen months after the  conclusion of  the  arguments.   The correctness of  this  judgment  is impugned  in the present appeals preferred by  the  trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta after obtaining  certificate from the High Court. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court with the due care and attention which every judgment of a High  Court demands  of us but despite our utmost anxiety and effort  we have not been able to appreciate the reasoning which led the High  Court to strike down section 78-B to section  786  and rules 1 1 to 21 as invalid.  Section 78A to section 78G were not  in  the  Act  as  originally  enacted  but  they   were introduced  in the Act by the Calcutta  Improvement  (Amend- ment)  Act,  1931.  These sections contain a  fasciculus  of provisions relating to betterment fee, where, by the  making of any improvement scheme, any land in the area comprised in the scheme which is not required for the execution  thereof, is  increased  in value.  Chapter In of the Act  deals  with improvement  schemes  and  section  35-D  provides  that  an improvement  scheme may be of one of four types,  namely,  a general  improvement  scheme,  a street  scheme,  a  housing accommodation  scheme  and  a  re-housing  scheme.   We  are concerned in these appeals with a Street Scheme and hence we

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shall  refer  only  to those provisions which  relate  to  a street scheme.  Section 39 provides that whenever the  Board is  of opinion that for the purpose inter alia  of  creating new  or  unproving  existing,  means  of  communication  and facilities  for  traffic,  it is expedient to  lay  out  new streets or to alter, existing streets, the Board may pass  a resolution to that effect and shall then proceed to frame  a street  scheme  for such area as may think  fit.   When  any street  scheme has been framed, section 43,  subsection  (1) requires  that the Board shall prepare a notice stating  the fact that the scheme has been framed, the boundaries of  the area  comprised  in the scheme and the place  at  which  the particulars  of the scheme, a map of the area  comprised  in the scheme and a statement of the land which is proposed  to be  acquired and the land in regard to which it is  proposed to recover a betterment fee may be seen at reasonable hours. Sub-section  (2) of section 43 provide-, for publication  of this  notice  with a statement of the  period  within  which objections  may be received.  The Board is also required  by section 45, subsection (1) to serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the Municipal assessment book as being primarily liable to pay the owners share of the consolidated rate or the rate on the annual value of holdings, in respect of  any  land  in regard to which the  Board  pro  poses  to recover  a  betterment fee.  Sub-section (2) of  section  45 provides  that such notice shall require such person  if  he dissents  from the recovery of betterment fee, to state  his reasons  in writing within a period of sixty days.   Section 47,  sub-section  (1)  then provides that  the  Bonrd  shall consider any statement of dissent received under sec- 10-722SCI/77 140 tion  45,  sub-section  (2) and after  hearing  all  persons making suc-dissent who may desire to be heard, the Board may either  abandon the scheme or apply to the State  Government for  sanction to the scheme with such modification, if  any, as the Board may consider necessary.  When the Board applies for  sanction  of the scheme to the  State  Government,  the Board  is  required under sub-section (2) of section  47  to send inter alia a list of the names of all persons who  have dissented under section 45 from the proposed recovery of the betterment fee and a statement of the reasons given for such dissent.   Sub-section (3) of section 47 provides that  when any  application has been submitted to the State  Government for sanction, the Board shall cause notice of the fact to be published for two consecutive weeks in the official  Gazette and in the local newspapers.  The State Government may  then under section 48 either sanction the scheme with or  without modification or refuse to sanction the same. It  will be seen from these provisions that a  detailed  and elaborate  machinery is provided by the Legislature for  the purpose of framing a street scheme.  When a street scheme is framed,  the  area  comprised in  the  street  scheme  would include  lands  of two categories, one  category,  being  of landswhich.  are  necessary  to  be  acquired  for  the purpose of execution of  the street scheme and           the other being category of landswhich are not required for the execution  of the street scheme but which would increase  in value as a result of the making of the street scheme.  Since the latter category of land would increase in value and  the owners of such lands would be benefited by the making of the street  scheme, section 78A empowers the Board,  in  framing the street scheme, to declare that a betterment fee shall be payable  by  the  owners of such lands "in  respect  of  the increase  in  the  value  of the  land  resulting  from  the

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execution of the schemes".  What shall be the quantum of the betterment  fee is laid down in sub-section (2)  of  section 78A which says that it shall be "an amount equal to one-half of the increase in the value of the land resulting from  the execution  of  the scheme’ to be calculated  in  the  manner there  provided.   Section 78-B provides for  assessment  of betterment  fee by the Board after giving an opportunity  to the  person  concerned  to  be  beard  and  if  such  person dissent,; from the assessment made by the Board, the  matter is  required  to  be determined by the  arbitrators  in  the manner  provided by section 78C.  That section lays down  in meticulous   detail   the  machinery   for   selection   and appointment  of  arbitrators and the making of an  award  by them determining the amount of betterment fee.  The fees  to be paid to the arbitrators arc provided in section 78-D  and section 78E declares that the proceedings of the arbitrators shall  be governed by rules to be made in this behalf  under section  137, provided that every party to such  proceedings shall be entitled to appear before the arbitrators either in person  or by his authorised agent.  Section  78F  provider, for  giving of notice by the Board to persons liable to  pay the   betterment  fee  determined  by  the  Board   or   the arbitrators,  as  the  case may be, and  section  78G  Takes provision in regard to payment of betterment fee.  The ques- tion is whether sections 78A to 78G are ultra vires and void as  suffering  from  the vice of  excessive  delegation  of. legislative  power,  or contravention of Article 14  of  the Constitution. 141 We will first examine  the validity of rules 11 to 21. These rules  form part of the Rules made by the  State  Government claiming  to  act in exercise of the power  conferred  under clause  (3a)  of  section 137.  This  clause  was  added  in section  137  by the Amending Act of 1931 at the  same  time when  section  78A  to  section  78G  were  enacted  and  it empowered the State Government to make rules inter alia  for determining the qualifications and disqualifications of, the conditions  and mode of election, selection  or  appointment of,  an  arbitrator and for regulating  the  proceedings  of arbitrators under section 78C.  This power was conferred  on the  State Government in addition to that given to it  under section 86.  Now, Rule 1 contains definitions, while 2 to 11 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an($ the   conditions  and  mode  of  election,   selection   and appointment, of arbitrators.  It is indeed difficult to  see how  Rule  11  could be struck down by  the  High  Court  as invalid.   It  provides  the machinary  for  appointment  of arbitrators  in a case where the objectors fail to elect  an arbitrator. That  would fall fairly and  squarely  within the terms of clause (3a)of section 137.  Rules 12 to 21 lay down the procedure regulating the proceedings of arbitrators and  they are clearly covered by the latter part  of  clause (3a)  of section 137, which speaks of Rules "far  regulating the proceedings of arbitrators under section 78C".  With the great  respect to the learned judges of the High  Court,  we think impossible to contend that Rules 11 to 21 are  outside the  rule making power of the State Government under  clause (3a)  of  section 137.  The High Court to have relied  on  a passage from the Calcutta Improvement Trust Manual published under  the  authority of the State Government  which  states that "the rules were framed by the Government under  section 137  of  the Calcutta Improvement Act,  1911  regarding  the nominations of arbitrators for settlement of betterment  fee in  the Local Self Government Department  Notification-dated 5th May, 1934.  That indicates that the rules for regulating

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the  proceeding  of an arbitrator under section 78C are  not within  the purview of these rules, Yet Rules 11  to  23  in the  Rules framed under section 137 cover a field  which  is much  beyond  the subject of nomination of  arbitrators  for settlement  of  betterment  fee" and on the  basis  of  this statement, held that "Rules 11 to 21 are outside the  region of the purpose for which the State Government has  exercised its power under section 137".  This is indeed strange  logic for striking down Rules 11 to 21 as ultra vires clause  (3a) of  section  137.   The validity of these rules  has  to  be judged by reference to the question as to whether they  fall within,  the scope of the rule making power conferred  under clause  (3a)  of section 137 and not on the  basis  of  some opinion expressed by the author of the Calcutta  Improvement Trust  Manual.   When it is clear beyond doubt  that  clause (3a)  of section 137 empowers the State Government  to  make rules  for regulating the proceedings of  arbitrators  under section  78C  and Rules 11 to 21 are plainly  rules  falling within  this category, we fail to see how they can  possibly be  condemned as outside the rule making power conferred  on the State Government.  The State Government has deliberately and  avowedly exercised its rule making power  under  clause (3a)  of section 137 and made Rules 11 to 21 for  regulating the proceedings of arbitrators.  The High Court has 142 also  made reference to Section 86 and struck down Rules  11 to  21 as invalid on the ground that they do not purport  to have been made under section 86 under which alone, according to the High Court, rules could be made for carrying out  the purposes of section 78A to Section 78G.  But the  reference, to  section 86 seems to be clearly misconceived, since  that section confers power on the State Government to make  rules for carrying out "the purposes of this Chapter" and  section 86  being  in Chapter V, the words "this Chapter"  can  have reference  only  to Chapter V and not to  Chapter  IV  which contains  sections  78A to 78G.   Obviously,  therefore,  no rules  could be made under section 86 for carrying  out  the purposes of section 78A to section 78G.  The High Court was, in  the circumstances, clearly in error in taking  the  view that  Rules 1 1 to 21 were ultra vires the Act.  This was  a wholly  indefensible  view  and  even  the  learned  counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents found it difficult to support it. That takes us to the question of the constitutional validity of  section 78A to section 78G.  The view taken by the  High Court  on this point also is difficult to  understand.   The High Court appears to have though that these sections suffer from the voice of excessive delegation of legislative  power because "for determining what land shall bear the burden  of that   fee?’  (that  is  betterment  fee)   "arbitrary   and uncontrolled  power  has  been given to  the  Trust  or  its engineers  either  to include or not to include  within  the scheme  lands  which  are not  required  for  the  execution thereof"  and "it leaves to the Trust and/ or its  employees to  determine  arbitrarily what shall be the extent  of  the area  comprised in the’: Scheme by enabling them to  include in the scheme lands which are not required for execution  of the scheme." This reasoning is clearly based on an erroneous premise.   It is not correct to say that it is left  to  the unfettered  and unregulated discretion of the  Board  and/or its employees to decide what lands to include in the scheme, apart  from those required for the execution of the  scheme. Section 39, to which we have already referred, lays down the factors  which would guide the Board in deciding  what  area should be included in the scheme.  It is only when the Board

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finds that for carrying out any of the four purposes set out in  section 39, it is expedient to lay out new street or  to alter existing street, that the Board can proceed to frame a scheme  for such area as it thinks fit and the selection  of the  area  by the Board would, therefore, be guided  by  the purpose  for which the scheme is to be framed.  Then  again, the  decision  of  the Board in regard to the  lands  to  be included  in the scheme is not final.  Where, by  reason  of the making of the scheme, the value of any land included  in the  scheme has, in the opinion of the Board,  increased  in value  and  a betterment fee is, therefore, payable  by  the owner  of  the  land, an opportunity is  given  to  ’him  to dissent  from  the recovery of such betterment  fee  and  to state  his reasons why be so dissents and the Board is  then required  to  give him a hearing and ultimately,  if  proper case  is  made  out,  the Board may  modify  the  scheme  by excluding such land and even if the Board is not inclined to make  any  such modification, the  State  Government,  while giving its sanction, may still take into account the dissent made by the owner of the land and consider the reasons given by him, and if satisfied, exclude such land from the  scheme at the time of giving sanction.  It will, 143 therefore,  be seen that not only is guidance given  to  the Board  in selecting the lands to be included in the  scheme, but  there  are  also safeguards provided  with  a  view  to ensuring  that  lands are not  arbitrarily  or  capriciously included in the scheme.  Even after the scheme is sanctioned by  the  State Government, it is, open to the owner  of  the land  to  show that in fact the land would not  increase  in value by reason of the making of the scheme.  The betterment fee  being  co-related to the increase in the value  of  the land,  the,  Board assessing the amount  of  betterment  fee under  section  78-B  would have  to  determine  objectively whether  there is any increase in the value of the land  and if  so, assess the amount of betterment fee on  that  basis. If  the owner of the land dissents from the assessment  made by the Board, he can have the matter referred to arbitrators and  the  arbitrators  would then determine  the  amount  of betterment fee and while doing so, they would naturally have to  find out whether there is any increase in the  value  of the land at all and if there is, then what is the quantum of such increase.      The  owner  of  the  land  is  given  an opportunity under the scheme of    section  78A  to  section 78G to have this question determined by a body    of     two independent  arbitrators  who  would  objectively  determine whether  there is any increase in the value of the  land  on account  of  the  making of the  scheme.   These  being  the relevant provisions, it is difficult to see how section 78-B to section 78-G could be regarded as suffering from the vice of  excessive delegation of legislative power.   The  attack against  the  validity  of these sections on  the  basis  of infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution must also  fail since  the challenge under Article 14 is only another  facet of  the challenge on the ground of excessive  delegation  of legislative  power.   We are, therefore, of  the  view  that section 78-B to section 78G are valid and the High Court was wrong in striking them down as ultra vires and void. We  cannot  part  with this case without  making  one  final observation.    The  unarguably  small  dimension   of   the constitutional question raised here is apparent from what we have  said.   This  Court has  dual  responsibility  to  the country.   It  has  to decide the cases  brought  before  it justly  and satisfactorily and at the same  time,  liquidate arrears of pending cases.  Both bear upon the credibility of

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the judicial system.  But because of article 144A brought in by  the  Forty Second Amendment Act, seven  judges  of  this Court   have   to  sit  and  hear  every  case   where   the constitutionality  of an Act, rule, bye-law or even a  small notification  is challenged.  Processual pragmatism  in  the light  of  actual experience of the working of  this  Court, will  easily  convince any one that, in the context  of  the current  docket  explosion and long pendency of  cases,  the insistence  on  this inconvenient plurality  which  requires more than half the full strength of the Court to sit to hear such  cases,, is a decisive step in the negative  direction. Many  questions  of constitutional importance  have  already been  covered  by the rulings of this Court so that  he  who runs and reads may resolve them.  To require seven judges to perform  such  jobs is surely supererogatory.   The  present appeal  itself  is a striking  illustration.   Where  really important issues arise for consideration, any bench of  this Court  would certainly refer, where necessary, such  matters for  consideration or reconsideration by a large  bench-less or more than seven, according to the requirement 144 of the situation.  To prescribe arithmetically is to petrify unimaginatively.  We do not say anything about the  validity of  Article 144A one way or the other but  merely  highlight the paralysing impact on the highest court and the long-term cause of justice, flowing from the numerical rigidity  newly inserted by the Forty Second Constitution Amendment Act.  We hope  and  trust  that  this  matter  will  receive   urgent attention of Parliament. We  accordingly  allow  the appeals  and  dismiss  the  writ petitions of the respondents.  The respondents will pay  the costs of the appellant throughout. P.H.P.                           Appeals allowed. 145