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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1341 of 2005

PETITIONER: Trimukh Maroti Kirkan                            

RESPONDENT: State of Maharashtra                             

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/10/2006

BENCH: G.P. Mathur & R.V.  Raveendran

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

G. P. MATHUR, J.

1.      Trimukh Maroti Kirkan has filed this appeal against the  judgment and order dated 27.7.2005 of Aurangabad Bench of Bombay  High Court by which the appeal filed by State of Maharashtra was  allowed and the order dated 21.4.1997 passed by the learned  Additional Sessions Judge, Nanded was set aside and the appellant  was convicted under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to  imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default to  undergo six months RI.  By the same judgment and order, the appeal  filed by the appellant challenging his conviction under Section 498-A  IPC and the sentence of two years RI and a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in  default to undergo RI for three months was dismissed.

2.      The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased Revata  @ Tai daughter of Dattarao resident of village Umatwadi was married  to the appellant Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (for short ’Trimukh’) nearly  seven years before the incident which took place on 4.11.1996 in  village Kikki.  Maroti Kamaji Kirkan (for short ’Maroti’) is the father  and Nilawatibai Maroti Kirkan (for short ’Nilawati’) is the mother of  the appellant Trimukh and they are residents of village Kikki.   The  appellant who is the husband and Maroti and Nilawati used to ill-treat  the deceased Revata and used to harass her on account of non- payment of Rs.25,000/- by her parents for the purpose of purchasing a  tempo for the appellant.   Whenever, the deceased Revata came to her  parental home, she used to disclose to her family members the ill- treatment and harassment meted out to her.   She came to her parental  home at the time of Panchami festival in the year 1996 and stayed  there for about 15 days.   During this period also she disclosed that on  account of non-fulfilment of demand of Rs.25,000/- by her father, the  appellant and her in-laws (Maroti and Nilawati) used to harass her.   She was often beaten and was not provided food.   After the Panchami  festival, the father of Revata took her to the appellant’s house in  village Kikki and requested the appellant and her in-laws not to ill- treat her.  He, however, told them that he is not in a position to fulfil  their demand of Rs.25,000/- on account of his weak financial  condition.   A few months thereafter, Dattarao received information  from a person of village Kikki that Revata had died due to snake bite.   Information was also given by the Police Patil of the village to P.S.  Nanded (Rural) that Revata had died due to snake bite and on the  basis of this information, a case as A.D. No.42 of 1996 was registered  in accordance with Section 174 Cr.P.C. at the police station.   Devichand, ASI and some police personnel went to the village, held  inquest over the dead body and after preparing the spot panchnama  sent the same for post-mortem examination.  The appellant Trimukh  himself showed the place of incident where the victim had been

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allegedly bitten by snake and had died.  The post-mortem examination  conducted on the body of Revata disclosed that she had died due to  asphyxia as a result of compression of neck.   Dattarao, father of the  deceased then lodged an FIR of the incident at 4.30 p.m. on 5.11.1990  at the police station and a case was then registered under Section 302  IPC.   During the course of investigation, the police recorded  statements of some witnesses.   The appellant was arrested and while  in custody he made a disclosure statement on the basis of which some  recoveries were made.  After completion of investigation, chargesheet  was submitted against three persons, viz., the appellant Trimukh and  his parents, viz., Maroti and Nilawati.   

3.      The  learned Sessions Judge, Nanded framed charges under  Section 498-A IPC against all the three accused and also under  Section 302 IPC against appellant Trimukh.   The accused pleaded not  guilty and claimed to be tried.   In order to establish its case the  prosecution examined 14 witnesses and filed some documentary  evidence.  The accused in their statement denied the prosecution case  and stated that Revata had died on account of snake bite.  The learned  Sessions Judge convicted all the three accused under Section 498-A  read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to two years RI and a  fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default to undergo RI for three months.  The  appellant was, however, acquitted of the charge under Section 302  IPC.   All the three accused preferred Criminal Appeal No.158 of  1997 before the High Court challenging their conviction and sentence  under Section 498-A IPC read with Section 34 IPC while the State of  Maharahstra preferred Criminal Appeal No.220 of 1997 challenging  the acquittal of Trimukh under Section 302 IPC.   The High Court  allowed the appeal preferred by Maroti and Nilawati accused and their  conviction under Section 498-A IPC was set aside and the appeal  preferred by the appellant was dismissed.   The appeal preferred by  the State of Maharashtra was allowed and the appellant was convicted  under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for life  and a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default to further undergo six months  RI.  Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

4.      Since the present appeal has been filed under Section 2(a) of the  Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,  1970 and the High Court has reversed the order of acquittal and has  convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, it will be appropriate  to briefly consider the evidence on record.  PW1. Dattarao is the  father and PW.2 Rukmabai is the mother of the deceased Revata and  they are residents of village Umatwadi.  Both of them have deposed  that the marriage of the deceased with the appellant took place nearly  7 years back in which they had given Rs.20,000/- in cash besides  clothes and utensils.  Whenever deceased came to her parental home,  she used to complain that she was being harassed and ill-treated on  account of demand of money.  They have further deposed that last  time the deceased came to their house on the occasion of Panchami  festival when she told them that the appellant wanted to purchase a  tempo and, therefore, her in-laws and also the appellant were asking  her to get Rs.25,000/- from her parents.   The deceased also informed  that occasionally she was not provided food and was beaten on  account of non-fulfillment of the demand of Rs.25,000/-.   They have  further deposed that the deceased stayed with them for about 15 days  and thereafter PW.1 Dattarao escorted her to her matrimonial home  and informed her in-laws that he was not in a position to give  Rs.25,000/- and further requested them not to ill-treat her.  A few days  before the Diwali festival a person came from village Kikki and  informed that Revata had died on account of snake bite.   Thereafter,  PW.1, PW.2 and their sons and two daughters-in-law went to village  Kikki which is about 25 kilometers from their village Umatwadi.  On  reaching there they saw that the body of Revata had been placed in a  sitting posture with her back resting on the wall and a strip of cloth  had been tied along her mouth.   PW.1 has further deposed that

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subsequently he lodged an FIR on 5.11.1996 at the police station.   Though a suggestion was given to both the witnesses that the marriage  of the deceased had taken place about 10 years back, but both of them  specifically denied and stated that the marriage had taken place 5-6  years back.   PW.1 has further deposed that he removed the cloth  which was tied along the mouth of the deceased and noticed marks of  injury around the neck and cheek and there were no bangles on her  hands. PW.3 Balasaheb, who is cousin of PW.1 and is resident of  village Umatwadi, has deposed that whenever Revata came to her  parental home, she always came to his house as well.   She used to  narrate about the ill-treatment meted out to her by the appellant and  her in-laws as they were demanding an amount of Rs.25,000/- for  purchasing a tempo for the appellant.  He has further deposed that in  the evening of 4.11.1996 two persons from village Kikki came to his  village and informed PW.1 and others that Revata had died on account  of snake bite.   The witness has further deposed that next day in the  morning he went to village Kikki along with several other persons of  his village and saw the body of the deceased.  There were injury  marks around the neck, cheek, hand and other parts of the body.    PW.4 Chander is another cousin of PW.1 and is resident of the same  village Umatwadi.   His statement is almost similar to that of PW.3  Balasaheb.  PW.5 Girjabai is a resident of village Kikki and her house  is very close to the house of the accused in the same village.   She has  deposed that the deceased Revata used to visit her and she had often  told her that on account of non-fulfilment of demand of money by her  parents, she was being ill-treated by her in-laws and husband  (appellant).   She has further deposed that she used to console the  deceased and tell her that the ill-treatment being meted out to her  would gradually stop.  She has further stated that at about 3-3.15 p.m.  on the date of the incident she was informed that Maroti’s daughter- in-law had died due to snake bite.  She immediately rushed to the  house of Maroti and saw the body of the deceased.   There were marks  of injury on the neck and cheek and there were no bangles on her  hands. This witness is no doubt distantly related to the deceased as her  husband’s mother is sister of PW.2 but nothing material has come out  in her cross-examination which may discredit her testimony regarding  the demand of Rs.25,000/- by the appellant and his parents and also  the ill-treatment being meted out to the deceased.   It was suggested to  her in her cross-examination that the deceased was suffering from  T.B. and asthma and also that she used to have occasional chest pain  but it was emphatically denied by her.    

5.      PW.8 Madhvrao is the real brother of accused Maroti and the  appellant is his nephew.   In his examination-in-chief he stated that he  did not know how Revata had died and he had not witnessed any  incident. The witness was declared as hostile and in his cross- examination by State counsel he admitted that the appellant Trimukh  used to ply a tempo. PW.6 Maroti son of Ramrao Telange and PW.7  Venkat, both residents of village Kikki, have deposed that while in the  custody of the police the appellant said that he would show the spot  where the incident had taken place.  Thereafter he had taken the police  party and the witnesses to the field of his father Maroti and on his  pointing out a pair of ladies chappal, broken pieces of bangles and a  sickle lying there were recovered and the appellant had further said  that the ladies chappal belonged to his wife.  The aforesaid articles  were taken into possession by the Police Inspector and a panchnama  was prepared which was signed by them.   PW.7 has further deposed  that on the pointing out of the appellant his shoe was recovered which  was taken in possession by the police and panchnama was drawn on  which he has put his signature.  PW.9 Digamber who was a witness of  inquest turned hostile, but in his cross-examination he stated that he  went to the house of accused Maroti at about 9.00 a.m. and had seen  the body of the deceased with a piece of cloth tied around her mouth.   He further admitted that when the police was recording the  panchnama, he had said that there was no mark of snake bite on the

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body of the deceased and that he had put his signature on the inquest  panchnama.   PW.11 Vilas and PW.12 Nilawati whose agricultural  land is situate near the agricultural land of Maroti accused turned  hostile.  PW.13 Digamber son of Madhavrao who is also a resident of  village Kikki, also turned hostile.  However, he admitted that he had  heard that Revata had died due to snake bite and further that a tempo  is owned by Maroti which is plied by the appellant Trimukh.   

6.      PW.14 Devichand, Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, P.S.  Nanded (Rural) has deposed that on the basis of the information given  by the Police Patil, an Accidental Death Case was registered at 12.30  p.m. on 5.11.1996 at the police station and he was entrusted with the  inquiry of the same.  He came to the village Kikki, held inquest on the  body of the deceased and sent the same for post-mortem examination.   He had prepared the panchnama which was signed by the witnesses.    After the report of the post-mortem examination had been received  and the FIR had been lodged by PW.1 Dattarao at 4.30 p.m. on  5.1.1996, a case was registered under Section 302 IPC.  He had  arrested the appellant and while he was in custody some recoveries  were made regarding which a panchnama was prepared and was  signed by the witnesses.   He has further deposed that he asked the  appellant Trimukh as to how the incident took place and then he had  shown the scene of offence in a field and on his pointing out he had  recovered a pair of ladies chappal, pieces of bangles and a sickle from  the spot.   In his cross-examination PW.14 has stated that when he had  reached the hose of accused Maroti in village Kikki after registration  of an Accidental Death Case, he had found the body of the deceased  inside a room in a sitting posture with her back taking support from  the wall.  

7.      PW.10 Dr. Hanumant Vasantrao Godbole conducted post- mortem examination on the body of the deceased Revata between  2.00 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. on 5.11.1996 and found the following ante  mortem injuries on her person :- 1.      Swelling of left cheek seen (contusion).  Abrasion of  about 1.5 c.m. diameter seen over left cheek, lower  aspect near angle of mandible,  reddish.  

2.      Abrasion of 1.5 x 1 c.m. over right zygomatic region of  face reddish.    

3.      Five abrasions over left shoulder over superior and  middle aspect, size ranging from 0.5 x 1.5 x .5-1 c.m.  reddish.

4.      Contusion over chin, inferior aspect, 4 x 3 c.m. reddish- bluish.  

5.      Abrasion over right shoulder, medial most aspect, 2 x 1  c.m. reddish.

6.      Contusion over cheek (left) lateral to chin, 2 x 2 c.m.,  reddish bluish.

7.      Abrasion over left side of neck, upper most aspect, 3 c.m.  medial and just above in relation with injury no.1 in this  column, reddish, 1 x 0.5 c.m.

8.      Abrasion over right shoulder, 1.5 c.m. posterior to injury  no.5, 3 x 2 c.m. reddish.

9.      Irregular large abrasion over neck, anteriorly involving  upper and lower aspect, and extending to right side,  reddish graze-type, on lower aspect involving

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sternoclavicular joints, upper aspect anteriorly (in the  middle) from above thyrid cartilage.  Dimension 7 c.m.  near thyrid cartilage, about 4.5 c.m. below thyrid  cartilage, maximum width over lower most aspect of  neck, near sternoclavicular joints.  At few places  abrasion, dark brown colour, intermingled with reddish  areas. (Suggestive of multiple irregular abrasion  intermingling with each other).  

The internal examination revealed the following injuries :- (1)   Contusion under scalp left temporal area, 4 x 4 c.m.  reddish, swollen, (2) mid occipital areas 7 x 5 c.m.,  reddish swollen.  On dissection of neck, about whole of  the anterior and lateral aspect of neck (structures i.e.  subcutaneous tissue muscles) showed infiltration of  blood   (ecchymosed). Ecchymoses also seen at  sternoclavicular joint, upper part of sternum.  No  evidence of fracture of hyoid bone/thyrid cartilage or  ribs.  Lymps nodes in neck region-congested.  Thyroid  cartilage and trachea showed reddish patches of  haemorrhage externally and on opening.           

       The witness has opined that the death was caused due to   asphyxia as a result of compression of neck.  He deposed that the  general and specific chemical testing did not reveal any poison and  had there been a snake bite then poison would have appeared in the  blood.  He further deposed that the injuries present on the neck of the  deceased could be caused if the throat is pressed with a shoe with  force and the victim is pulled at the opposite direction by holding her  hands.    

8.      The accused did not examine any witness in their defence.   Maroti accused admitted in reply to question no.14 that the dead body  was kept resting in sitting position and a strip of cloth was tied to the  mouth.    

9.      From the evidence adduced by the prosecution the following  circumstances are clearly established.  I.      The marriage of Revata with the appellant Trimukh had taken  place about 5-6 years back.   

II.     The appellant Trimukh used to ply a tempo.

III.    There was a demand of Rs.25,000/- by the appellant and his  parents from the parents of the deceased.  The deceased was  being ill-treated and was occasionally not given food on  account of the fact that the demand of money had not been met.

IV.     The deceased had told her parents about the fact that she was  being ill-treated and occasionally she was not given food,  whenever she visited her parental home and last time on the  occasion of Panchami festival.  She had also told about the said  fact to her neighbour PW.5 Girjabai of village Kikki.

V.      After the death of Revata the appellant and his parents informed  some persons in the village as also the family members of the  deceased that she had died on account of snake bite.

VI.     When PW.1, PW.2, PW.3 and PW.4 reached the house of the  accused in village Kikki, they found the body of the deceased in  a sitting posture with her back taking support from the wall.    PW.14 Devichand, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police also found  the body in the same position.   

VII.    The post-mortem examination revealed that Revata had died  

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due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account  of snake bite.  

VIII.   Certain recoveries like chappal of the deceased, broken pieces  of bangles were made at the pointing out of the appellant.  A  shoe was also recovered at his pointing out.  

10.     In the case in hand there is no eye-witness of the occurrence  and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence.   The  normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the  circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn  must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances  should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt  of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form  a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that  within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused  and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other  than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his  innocence.  

11.     The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride  has shown a phenomenal increase in last few years.  Cases are  frequently coming before the Courts, where the husband or in-laws  have gone to the extent of killing the bride if the demand is not met.   These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the  house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead  evidence.  No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the  crime, would come forward to depose against another family member.    The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are  generally reluctant to depose in Court as they want to keep aloof and  do not want to antagonize a neighbourhood family.   The parents or  other family members of the bride being away from the scene of  commission of crime are not in a position to give direct evidence  which may inculpate the real accused except regarding the demand of  money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride.   But, it does not  mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should go  unpunished.    

12.     If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in  such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to  plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their  choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead  evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of  circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the  Courts.  A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see  that no innocent man is punished.  A Judge also presides to see that a  guilty man does not escape.  Both are public duties. (See Stirland v.  Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315 \026 quoted with approval  by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh (2003) 11  SCC 271).  The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead  evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at  any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to  lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the  facts and circumstances of the case.  Here it is necessary to keep in  mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact  is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of  proving that fact is upon him.  Illustration (b) appended to this section  throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it  reads: (b)     A is charged with traveling on a railway without  ticket.  The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on  him."  

       Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a  house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be  

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upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led  by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is  required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would  be of a comparatively lighter character.   In view of Section 106 of the  Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of  the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was  committed.   The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply  keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise  that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution  and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.    

13.     A somewhat similar question was examined by this Court in  connection with Section 167 and 178-A of the Sea Customs Act in  Collector of Customs, Madras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormull AIR 1974 SC  859 and it will be apt to reproduce paras 30 to 32 of the reports which  are as under : 30. It cannot be disputed that in proceedings for imposing  penalties under Clause (8) of Section 167 to which  Section 178-A does not apply, the burden of proving that  the goods are smuggled goods, is on the Department.  This is a fundamental rule relating to proof in all criminal  or quasi-criminal proceedings, where there is no statutory  provision to the contrary. But in appreciating its scope  and the nature of the onus cast by it, we must pay due  regard to other kindred principles, no less fundamental,  of universal application. One of them is that the  prosecution or the Department is not required to prove its  case with mathematical precision to a demonstrable  degree; for, in all human affairs absolute certainty is a  myth, and as Prof. Brett felicitously puts it - ’’all  exactness is a fake". El Dorado of absolute proof being  unattainable, the law, accepts for it, probability as a  working substitute in this work-a-day world. The law  does not require the prosecution to prove the impossible.  All that it requires is the establishment of such a degree  of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis,  believe in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus, legal  proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing  more than a prudent man’s estimate as to the probabilities  of the case. 31.  The other cardinal principle having an important  bearing on the incidence of burden of proof is that  sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be  considered - to use the words of Lord Mansfield in  Blatch v. Archer (1774) 1 Cowp. 63 at p.65 "according to  the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove,  and in the power of the other to have contradicted". Since  it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for  the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within  the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not  obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. 32.  Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to  avoid legal duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering  guards, it is impossible for the Preventive Department to  unravel every link of the process. Many facts relating to  this illicit business remain in the special or peculiar  knowledge of the person concerned in it. On the principle  underlying Section 106, Evidence Act, the burden to  establish those facts is cast on the person concerned; and  if he falls to establish or explain those facts, an adverse  inference of facts may arise against him, which coupled  with the presumptive evidence adduced by the  prosecution or the Department would rebut the initial  presumption of innocence in favour of that person, and in  the result prove him guilty. As pointed out by Best in

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’Law of Evidence’, (12th Edn. Article 320, page 291), the  "presumption of innocence is, no doubt, presumptio juris;  but every day’s practice shows that it may be successfully  encountered by the presumption of guilt arising from the  recent (unexplained) possession of stolen property",  though the latter is only a presumption of fact. Thus the  burden on the prosecution or the Department may be  considerably lightened even by such presumption of fact  arising in their favour. However, this does not mean that  the special or peculiar knowledge of the person  proceeded against will relieve the prosecution or the  Department altogether of the burden of producing some  evidence in respect of that fact in issue.  It will only  alleviate that burden to discharge which very slight  evidence may suffice. (Emphasis supplied)         The aforesaid principle has been approved and followed in  Balram Prasad Agrawal v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1830  where a married woman had committed suicide on account of ill- treatment meted out to her by her husband and in-laws on account of  demand of dowry and being issueless.   

14.     The question of burden of proof where some facts are within  the personal knowledge of the accused was examined in State of West  Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 382.   In this  case the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased Mahesh from the  house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the  accused and took him away at about 2.30 in the night.  Next day in the  morning his mangled body was found lying in the hospital.   The trial  Court convicted the accused under Section 364 read with Section 34  IPC and sentenced them to 10 years RI.  The accused preferred an  appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State  also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for  murder charge.  The accused had not given any explanation as to what  happened to Mahesh after he was abducted by them.  The learned  Sessions Judge after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence  had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence  after the deceased was last seen together with the accused persons and  the discovery of the dead body in the hospital and had concluded that  the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder against  the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt.  This Court took  note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and laid  down the following principle in paras 31 to 34 of the reports : "31.   The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the  prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not  be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no  process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of  presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it  impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the  traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the  prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic  coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the  major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32.  In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in  establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court  has to presume the existence of certain facts.  Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the  court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33.  Presumption of fact is an inference as to the  existence of one fact from the existence of some other  facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved.  Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact  otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other  proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from  other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of

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reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most  probable position. The above principle has gained  legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is  incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court  to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely  to have happened. In that process the court shall have  regard to the common course of natural events, human  conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. 34.   When it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that  Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him  out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened  to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered  within a short time after the abduction the permitted  reasoning process would enable the court to draw the  presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such  inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the  court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was  in their custody."         Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court while maintaining  the conviction under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC reversed  the order of acquittal under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and  convicted the accused under the said provision and sentenced them to  imprisonment for life.    15.     In Ram Gulam Chaudhary & Ors. v. Sate of Bihar (2001) 8  SCC 311, the accused after brutally assaulting a boy carried him away  and thereafter the boy was not seen alive nor his body was found.  The  accused, however, offered no explanation as to what they did after  they took away the boy. It was held that for the absence of any  explanation from the side of the accused about the boy, there was  every justification for drawing an inference that they have murdered  the boy.   It was further observed that even though Section 106 of the  Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its   burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but  the section would apply to cases like the present, where the  prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable  inference can be drawn regarding death.   The accused by virtue of  their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead  the Court to draw a different inference.   

16.     In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye- witness account is available, there is another principle of law which  must be kept in mind.   The principle is that when an incriminating  circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers  no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue,  then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of  circumstances to make it complete.   This view has been taken in a  catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v.  Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra  Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40);  State of Maharashtra v.  Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan  (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995)  3 SCC 574 (para 4)].    

17.     Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of  his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that  shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the  offence takes placed in the dwelling home where the husband also  normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does  not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an  explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance  which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime.  In  Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 2077 it was  observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the  house when she was murdered there with ’khokhri’ and the fact that

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the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the  absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt.   In  Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant  was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his  house.  It was observed that when the death had occurred in his  custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible  explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section  313 Cr.P.C.  The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with  absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the  innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the  appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife.   In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the  medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during  late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after  sprinkling kerosene.  The defence of the husband was that wife had  committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at  that time.  The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that  the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further  the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night.  It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was  the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation  and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court  acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC.   In  State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 the wife was  found dead in a hut which had caught fire.   The evidence showed that  the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00  p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when  the hut had caught fire.  His explanation was that it was a case of  accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter.    The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a  result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries. It was held  that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it  was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime.   

18.     In the earlier part of the judgment we  have given a resume of  the evidence which is available on record. The appellant was plying a  tempo in order to earn his livelihood.  It is fully established that the  deceased Revata was being ill-treated and harassed on account of non- fulfilment of demand of Rs.25,000/- which the appellant wanted for  purchasing a tempo.   The deceased Revata was often beaten and was  sometimes not given food.  After Revata had been murdered,  information was sent to her parents that she had died on account of  snake bite, which was reiterated when they reached the house of the  appellant in village Kikki. In fact, everyone in the village had been  told that Revata had died on account of snake bite and the Police Patil,  believing the said information to be true, had lodged an Accidental  Death Report at the police station.   The medical evidence, however,  showed that she had  died on account of asphyxia due to strangulation.   The body of the deceased was purposely placed in a sitting posture  with her back taking support of the wall so that no one may suspect  that she had actually been killed as a result of strangulation and may  believe the version of snake bite given by the appellant and his  parents.   The appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. did  not offer any explanation as to how she received the injuries which  were found on her body.  Recovery of some articles of the deceased  was made at the pointing out of the appellant. The circumstances  enumerated above unerringly point to the guilt of the accused and they  are inconsistent with his innocence.    

19.     The High Court was, therefore, perfectly right in allowing the  appeal filed by the State and in convicting the appellant under Section  302 IPC and sentencing him thereunder. We, therefore, do not find  any merit in the appeal, which is hereby dismissed.