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PETITIONER: TRIBHOVANDAS HARIBHAI TAMBOLI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/05/1991

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1538            1991 SCR  (2) 802  1991 SCC  (3) 442        JT 1991 (2)   604  1991 SCALE  (1)958

ACT:      The  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  Act,  1948- Section   32(1),  88(1)  (b)-Statutory  right   of   ‘deemed purchaser’-Whether arises.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant  took on lease some  agricultural  lands from one Viswas Rao and by operation of Section 32(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 67 of 1948,  which was  applicable to the lease, he became a  deemed  purchaser from  tillers’  day i.e. 1.4.1957.  Since the  landlord  was insane, the right to purchase was statutorily deferred under section  32-F till date of its cessation or one  year  after death.   Pursuant to the notification issued  under  Section 88(1)(b)  of the Act, certain lands including those  of  the appellant’s  lease-hold lands were reserved  for  industrial purpose;  thereby  making  sections  1  to  87  of  the  Act inapplicable  to the exempted area.  During the  subsistence of  disability of the landlord, his son Vasant Rao sold  the land to the respondent under registered sale deed.   Vishwas Rao  died in September 1965.  The appellant became  entitled to  purchase  the  land on and from  August  19,  1966.   He therefore  filed an application before Mamlatdar to fix  the price.  He fixed on enquiry at Rs.4,95/65 P. which was  paid by the appellant.  In the enquiry, the respondent  contended that  he purchased the property from Vasantrao, son  of  the landlord  and by operation of the second proviso to  Section 88(1)(b),  the lands stood exempted from the   operation  of Section  1  to  87  of the Act.  So  the  Mamlatdar  had  no jurisdiction   to  decide  the  price  of  the  land.    The appellant’s  contention was that Vasantrao had no  right  to sell the lands during the life time of his father, the Karta of the Hindu Joint Family.  The sale was invalid and did not bind  him.   He  had acquired  statutory  right  of  ‘deemed purchaser’ and its exemption under section 88(1)(b) did  not divest  his  statutory right.  The  Mamlatdar  accepted  the appellant’s contention and allowed the petition.  On  appeal to  the Collector and revision to the Revenue Tribunal,  the decision  of Mamlatdar was reversed.  The Division Bench  of the  High  Court dismissed the writ  petition.   Hence  this appeal by the appellant, after obtaining special leave.   On

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the question:-whether the operation of the second proviso to Section 88(1)(b) of the tenancy Act, 1948 has  retrospective effect depriving the appellant of the statutory right?                                                        803      Allowing the appeal, this Court      HELD: Section 88 of the Act empowers the government  to exempt certain other lands from the purview of Sections 1 to 87 of the Act.  The State Governments exercised their  power from  time  to  time  under  Section  88(1)(b)  and   issued notification and punished in the official Gazette specifying certain  areas  as being reserved  for  non-agricultural  or industrial development i.e., urban development. [806C-D]      It   any  land  in  the  newly  added  area  has   been transferred or acquired between the date of the notification issued  under  first  proviso  and  October  9,  1964,  such transfer or acquisition of land shall have the effect as  if it was made in an area to which the main part of the proviso and Section 88(1)(b) would apply.  The necessary consequence would  be that the provisions of Sections 1 to 87 shall  not apply  and  shall be deemed never to have  applied  to  such added   area.   It  is  implicit  that  such   transfer   or acquisition made, to bring within the net of second proviso, must  be  valid  and  bona  fide  one  and  not  colourable, fraudulent, fictitious or nominal. [809G-810B]      In the instant case, since Vasantrao did not obtain any order from the competent court under the Lunacy Act to  have him appointed as Manager of the joint family to alienate the property,  the sale is per se illegal, The sale,  therefore, appears  to  be  to  defeat  the  statutory  right  of   the appellant.   The  rigour of the second  proviso  to  Section 88(1)(b)  is  thus  inapplicable.   Thereby  the  right  and interest  as deemed purchaser acquired by the appellant  has not  been affected by subsequent notification  issued  under section 88(1)(b). [811F-G]      Sukharam @ Bapusaheb Narayan Sanas & Anr. v. Manikchand Motichand Shah & Anr., [196] 2 S.C.R. 59; Mohanlal  Chunilal Kothari  v. Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli, [1963]  S.C.R.  707; Sidram  Narsappa Kamble v. Sholapur Borough  Municipality  & Anr.,  [1966]  1 S.C.R. 618; Parvati & Ors  v.  Fatehsinhrao Pratapsinghrao  Gaekwad, [1986] 3 S.C.R.  793;  Navinchandra Ramanlal  v. Kalidas Bhudarbai & Anr., [1979] 4 S.C.C.   75; P.K.  Gobindan  Nair  & Ors. v. P. Narayanan  Nair  &  Ors., [1912] 23 M.L.J. 706=17 Indian Cases 743; and A.  Ramacharlu v.  Archakan  Ananthacharlu & Anr., A.I.R.  1955  A.P.  261, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2378  of 1977.                                                        804      From   the Judgment dated 3.2.1977 of the Gujarat  High Court in Special Civil Application No. 551 of 1972.      B.  Datta,  L.B.  Kolekar, Ms. Chetna  Anand  and  P.H. Parekh (NP) for the Appellant.      S.K. Kholakia, R.B. Haribhakti and P.C. Kapoor (NP) for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      K. RAMASWAMY, J. The facts relevant to the  controversy are as under:      The  appellant had taken on lease, about 55 years  ago, an  extent  of  2 acres, 6  gunthas  of  agricultural  lands situated  in  Akote village from Vishwas  Rao.   The  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 67 of 1948 for short ‘the

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Act’  applies  to the lease.  By operation of s.  32(1)  the appellant became a deemed purchaser from tillers’ day  i.e., April  1,  1957.  Section 32-G  provides  the  procedure  to determine  purchase price.  Since the landlord  was  insane, the right to purchase was statutorily deferred under section 32-F  till  date of its cessation or one year  after  death. Under  section  88(1)(b) of the Act certain  areas  abutting Baroda Municipality were notified as being reserved for non- agricultural  or industrial purpose with effect from May  2, 1958.   By  another notification published  in  the  Gujarat State  Gazette dated July 2, 1964, certain  lands  including those  situated in Akote and of the appellant’s  lease  hold lands  were reserved for industrial  purpose.   Consequently Ss.  1 to 87 of the Act do not apply to the  exempted  area. While the landlord was continuing under disability, his  son Vasant Rao sold the land to the respondent under  registered sale  deed dated August 19, 1964.  By  another  notification under  Section  88(1)(b)  published  in  the  Gazette  dated October 29, 1964, the Government restricted the operation of the exemption to the area originally notified on May ,  1958 i.e.,  Ss.  1 to 87 do not apply to the lands  in  question. This  notification  was rescinded  by  further  notification published in the Gazette dated August 23, 1976.  The  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands(Gujarat) Amendment Act 36  of 1965, s. 18(1) and 18(2) thereof introduced two provisos  to s. 88(1)(b) of the Act which was published in the Gazette on December  29,  1965 which are relevant for  purpose  of  the case.  Section 88(1)(b) with amendments reads thus:          "(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)                                                        805          nothing  in  the following provisions of  this  Act          shall apply-          (a)  to lands belonging to, or held on  lease  form          the Government;          (aa) to lands held or leased by a local authority;          (b)  to  any area which the State  Government  may,          from  time to time, by notification in th  official          Gazette,   specify  as  being  reserved  for   non-          agricultural or industrial development;          Provided that if after a notification in respect of          any  area specified in the notification  is  issued          under  this  clause, whether before  or  after  the          commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural          Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1965, the limits  of          the  area so specified are enlarged on  account  of          the addition of any other area thereto, then merely          by reason of such addition, the reservation as made          by  the notification so issued shall not apply  and          shall  be deemed never to have applied to the  area          so added, notwithstanding anything to the  contrary          contained  in any judgment, or order of any  court,          Tribunal or any other authority.          Provided  further that if any land in the  area  so          added  has been transferred or acquired  after  the          issue  of  notification referred to  in  the  first          proviso  but before the 9th day of  October,  1964,          such  transfer  or acquisition of land  shall  have          effect as if it were made in an area to which  this          clause applies".      Vishwash  Rao  died in September 1965.   The  appellant became entitled to purchase the land on and from August  19, 1966.   He filed an application before Mamlatdar to fix  the price.   He fixed on enquiry at Rs.4,925.65 paise which  was paid by the appellant.      In  the  enquiry,  the respondent  contended  that  he

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purchased the property from Vasantrao, son of the  landlord. By  operation  of second proviso to s.  88(1)(b)  the  lands stood exempted from operation of Ss. 1 to 87 of the Act.  So the Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to decide the                                                        806 price of the land.  The appellant raised the contention that Vasantrao  has no right to sell during the life time of  the father,  the Karta of the Hindu Joint Family.  The  sale  is invalid and does not bind him.  He acquired statutory  right of deemed purchaser and its exemption under section 88(1)(b) does not divest his statutory right.  The Mamlatdar accepted the  appellant’s contention and allowed the   petition.   On appeal to the Collector and revision to the Revenue Tribunal the  decision was reversed.  The Division Bench of the  High Court  by  order dated February 3, 1977 dismissed  the  writ petition.   The appellant had  leave of this Court  by  Art. 136. Thus this appeal.      From these admitted facts the question emerges  whether the  operation  of  the second proviso to  s.  88(1)(b)  has retrospective   effect  depriving  the  appellant   of   the statutory  right  of ‘deemed purchaser’. S. 88  of  the  Act empowers  the government to exempt certain other lands  from the purview of Ss. 1 to 87 of the Act.  The State Government exercised  their  power  from time  to  time  under  section 88(1)(b)  and  issued  notification  and  published  in  the official Gazette specifying certain areas as being  reserved for  non-agricultural or industrial development i.e.,  urban development.  Consequently the first proviso gets  attracted which say that notwithstanding any judgment or order of  any court, tribunal or any other authority under the Act to  the contrary, once the notification was issued either before  or after  commencement of the Amendment Act reserving the  area so added for non-agricultural or industrial development i.e. expansion  for  urbanisation,  to the  extent  of  the  area covered under the first proviso, the  provisions of Ss. 1 to 87 were not applied and shall be deemed never to  have  been applied.   The  second  proviso which is  material  for  the purpose of the case further postulates that:          "Provided  further that if any land in the  are  so          added  has been transferred or acquired  after  the          issue of the notification referred to in the  first          proviso  but before the 29th day of October,  1964,          such transfer or acquisition of the land shall have          effect  as if it was made to an area to which  this          clause applies".                                          (emphasis supplied)      What  is the effect of the second proviso to the  facts is  the  question? Mr. Dutta, the learned  counsel  for  the appellant contended that the first proviso has the effect of excluding  Ss. 1 to 87 of the Act only to those areas  which were  initially reserved for non-agricultural or  industrial development  and has no application to the land added to  it by a                                                        807 subsequent notification though it would become part thereof. Any alienation in violation of the Act would not attract the operation  of  the second proviso.  The Act is  an  agrarian reform  which  created  a vested right in the  tenant  as  a deemed purchaser with effect from Tillers’ day which  cannot be   divested  retrospectively.   The  proviso   should   be construed to inhere in the tenant the vested rights  created under  the  Act.  The Withdrawal of the  notification  dated Oct. 29, 1964 renders the right of the appellant uneffected.      It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a  proviso to  a  particular provision of a statute only  embraces  the

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filed,  which is covered by the main provision.   It  carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has  been enacted by the proviso and to no other.  The proper function of  a proviso is to except and deal with a case which  would otherwise  fall  within  the general language  of  the  main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case.  Where the   language  of  the  main  enactment  is  explicit   and unambiguous,  the  proviso can have no repercussion  on  the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude  from it,  by  implication what clearly falls within  its  express terms.  The scope of the proviso, therefore, it to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule.  It has  to operate  in the same field and it the language of  the  main enactment  is clear, the proviso cannot be torn  apart  from the  main  enactment  nor  can it  be  used  to  nullify  by implication  what  the  enactment clearly says  nor  set  at naught  the  real object of the main enactment,  unless  the words  of  the  proviso are such that it  is  its  necessary effect.      The  effect  of the notification issued  under  section 88(1)(b)  was  the  subject  of  consideration  in   several decisions  of this Court.  In Sukharam @  Bapusaheb  Narayan Sanas  & Anr. v. Manikchand Motichand Shah and  Anr.,  [196] SCR  59  Sinha, CJ., held that the provisions of s.  88  are entirely  prospective  and  apply  to  such  lands  as   are described in clauses (a) to (d) of s. 88(1) from  which  the Act  came into operation, namely, December 28, 1948 and  are not  a confiscatory  in nature so as to take away  from  the tenant  the status of a protected tenant already accrued  to him.   In  Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v.  Tribhovan  Haribhai Tamboli,  [1963]  2 SCR 707 a  Constitution  Bench  speaking through Sinha, CJ. held that Clauses (a) to (c) of s.  88(1) applies  to  things  as  they  were  on  the  date  of   the commencement   of  the  Act  of  1948  whereas  clause   (d) authorised the State Govt. to specify certain areas as being reserved   for   urban   non-agricultural   or    industrial development, by notification in the official Gazette, from                                                        808 time  to time.  It was specifically provided in clauses  (a) to  (c)  that the Act, from its inception, did  not  certain areas  then identified, whereas clause (d) has reference  to the future.  The State Govt, could take out of the operation of  the Act such areas as in its opinion should be  reserved for urban non-agricultural or industrial development. Clause (d) would come into operation only upon such a  notification being  issued  by the State Govt.  In Sukhram’s  case,  this Court  never  intended to lay down that  the  provisions  of clause  (d) are only prospective and have  no  retrospective operation.   Unlike  clauses (a) to (c)  which  are  clearly prospective,  clause (d) has retrospective operation in  the sense that it would apply to land which would be covered  by the notification to be issued by the government from time to time so as to take that land out of the operation of the Act of 1948, granting the protection.                                          (emphasis supplied) So far as clauses (a) to (c) are concerned, the Act of  1948 would  not apply at all to lands covered by them,  but  that would  not take away the rights covered by the Act  of  1939 which  was repealed by the Act of 1948.  Therefore,  it  was held that by operation of s. 89(2) the rights acquired under the Act of 1939 would be available to the tenant.      When  a doubt was expressed of the correctness  of  the above  views  on reference, another  Constitution  Bench  in Sidram  Narsappa Kamble v. Sholapur Borough  Municipality  &

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Anr., [1966] 1 SCR. 618, held at p. 65 thus:          "New there is no doubt that s. 88 when it lays down          inter alia that nothing in the foregoing provisions          of the 1948-Act shall apply to lands held on  lease          from a local authority, it is an express  provision          which  takes  out such leases from the  purview  of          sections  1  to  87 of the  1948-Act.  One  of  the          provisions therefore which must be treated as  non-          existent  where  lands given on lease  by  a  local          authority  is  in s. 31.....but the effect  of  the          express provision contained in s. 88(1)(a)  clearly          is  that s. 31 must be treated as  non-existent  so          far  as lands held on lease from a local  authority          are  concerned and in effect therefore s.  88(1)(a)          must  be  held  to  say  that  there  will  be   no          protection under the 1948-Act for protected tenants          under  the 1939-Act so far as lands held  on  lease          from a local authority are concerned .......                                                        809          the  appellant cannot claim the benefit of  s.  31;          nor  can it be said that his interest as  protected          tenant  is  saved  by s.  89(2)(b).   This  in  our          opinion  is  a  plain  effect  of  the   provisions          contained  in s. 31, s. 88 and s. 89(2)(b)  of  the          1948-Act".      In   Parvati  &  Ors.  v.  Fatehsinhrao   Pratapsinhrao Gaekwad,  [1986]  3  SCR  793.  the  facts  were  that   the Government  issued  a  notification on May  21,  1958  under section  88(1)(b) of the 1948 Act reserving the land  within the  municipal  limits  of  the  city  of  Baroda  for  non- agricultural  and industrial development.   The  appellant’s husband  had taken possession of certain lands  situated  in the  city  of Baroda on lease from  the  respondent-trustee. The  respondent  laid  the suit against  the  appellant  for recovery of arrears of rent.  The defence was that the  suit was  not  maintainable.   Dealing with  the  effect  of  the notification issued under section 88(1)(b), this Court  held that  the  notification  had  retrospective  operation   and subject to certain exceptions provided in sub-section (2) of s.  88  all  rights,  title,  obligations  etc.  Accrued  or acquired under the said Act ceased to exist.  Therefore,  s. 89(2)(b)  was inapplicable to protect such right,  title  or interest, acquired under the Act except as provided in s 89A owing  to  express  provision  made in s.  88  of  the  Act. Accordingly  it  was held that the Civil Court  was  legally competent  to determine the reasonable rent payable  by  the tenant.   In  Navinchandra Ramanlal v. Kalidas  Bhudarbai  & Anr., [1979] 4 SCC 75 this court was to consider a case that the  notification under section 88(1)(b) was issued  on  May 30,  1959  by which date the tenant acquired  the  statutory right of a deemed purchaser with effect from April 1,  1957. This  Court held that the tenant cannot be divested  of  his deemed   purchase  by  a  subsequent   notification   issued thereunder.  It would be seen that the effect of the  second proviso was not considered therein.      The  above  interpretation would equally apply  to  the interpretation of the notification issued under the  proviso to  s.  88(1)(b)  adding  to  the  area  reserved  for  non- agricultural or industrial development.  Its effect is  that notwithstanding  any  judgment  or order  of  any  court  or Tribunal or any other authority, the provisions of Ss. 1  to 87 shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have applied to such added area as well.  If any land in the newly  added area  has been transferred or acquired between the  date  of the  notification issued under first proviso and October  9,

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1964,  such transfer or acquisition of land shall  have  the effect  as if it was made in an area to which the main  part of  the proviso and s. 88(1)(b) would apply.  The  necessary consequence  would  be that the provisions of ss.  1  to  87 shall not apply and shall be                                                        810 deemed  never  to have applied to such added  area.   It  is implicit  that such transfer or acquisition made,  to  bring within  the  net of second proviso, must be valid  and  bona fide  one  and  not colourable,  fraudulent,  fictitious  or nominal.  The Legislature appears to relieve hardship to the bona  fide purchasers.  The title acquired by such  transfer is  not  effected  by  the  provisions  of  the  Act.    The Legislature   advisedly   used  the   words   ‘acquired   or transferred’.      The  respondent’s own case is that Vishwesh Rao,  Karta of  the  Hindu  Joint Family was  under  disability  due  to lunacy.   The  tenant  acquired statutory  right  as  deemed purchaser  under s. 32.  The Act, by necessary  implication, divests the landlord of his right to alienate the land  held by  the  tenant.  The statutory right  topurchase  the  land under  s. 32 as deemed purchaser was postponed by  operation of  s. 32-F of the Act till the cessation of the  disability or  one  year  after the death of  the  landlord.   In  such situation  can the son during the life time of  the  father, has right to sell the same property to the respondents,  and whether  such  a  sale  made  on  August  19,  1964  to  the respondents was valid and binds the appellant.      In   Raghavachariar’s   Hindu   Law   Principles    and Precedents, Eighth Ed., 1987 in s. 275 at p. 39 stated thus:          "So long as the joint family remains undivided, the          senior  member of the family is entitled to  manage          the  family properties, and the father, and in  his          absence,  the next senior-most male member  of  the          family,   as  its  manager  provided  he   is   not          incapacitated  from  acting as such by  illness  or          other  sufficient cause.  The father’s right to  be          the  manager  of the family is a  survival  of  the          patria potastas and he is in all cases,  naturally,          and  in  the  case of minor  sons  necessarily  the          manager  of  the  joint family  property.   In  the          absence  of  the  father, or  if  he  resigns,  the          management of the family property devolves upon the          eldest male member of the family provided he is not          wanting in the necessary capacity to manage it".      Regarding  the management of the Joint Family  Property or business or other interests in a Hindu Joint Family,  the Karta of the Hindu Joint Family is a prima inter pares.  The managership  of the Joint Family Property goes to  a  person by birth and is regulated by seniority and the Karta or  the Manager  occupies a position superior to that of  the  other members.   A junior member cannot, therefore, deal with  the joint  family  property as Manager so long as the  Karta  is available  except  where the Karta  relinquishes  his  right expressly or by necessary impli-                                                        811 cation  or in the absence of the Manager in exceptional  and extra-ordinary  circumstances such as distress  or  calamity effecting the whole family and for supporting the family  or in  the  absence of the father whose  whereabouts  were  not known  or  who was away in remote place  due  to  compelling circumstances and that is return within the reasonable  time was  unlikely or not anticipated. No such circumstances  are available here to attract the facts of the case.      Vasantrao,  the vendor, son of the Karta of  the  Hindu

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Joint  Family  per se has no right to sell the  property  in question  as Manager so long as the father was alive.   When father  was under disability due to lunancy, an  order  from the  Court  under Indian Lunancy Act IV of 1912  was  to  be obtained   to  manager  the  joint  family   property.    No proceedings were taken under ss. 39, 43 and 45 of the Indian Lunacy  Act  to  have the inquisition made  by  a  competent District  Court  to declare him as insane and  to  have  him appointed as Manager of the Joint Family.  In P.K.  Gobindan Nair  & Ors. v. P. Narayanan Nair & Ors., [1912]  23  M.L.J. 706=17 Indian Cases 473 a division Bench of the Madras  High Court  held that a guardian cannot be appointed  as  Manager under  the  Guardian  and Wards Act on  an  adjudication  of Karnavan of an undivided Malabar Tarwad as a lunacy.  In  A. Ramacharlu  v.  Archakan Ananthacharlu & Anr.,  A.I.R.  1955 A.P. 261 a division Bench consisting of Subba Rao, C.J.  and Satyanarayana  Raju,  J.  (as  they  were)  considered   the question  of  appointment  of a son as the  Manager  of  the Mitakshara family whose father was alleged to be a  lunatic. Subba Rao, C.J. speaking for the Bench, held that in view of the  finding that the Karta, though was mentally not  sound, but was capable to manage the property, the application  for appointment of a son as manager of the joint family property was  not  be ordered.  Since Vasantrao did  not  obtain  any order from the competent court under the Lunacy Act to  have him appointed as Manager of the joint family to alienate the property, the sale is per se illegal.  The sale,  therefore, appears  to  be  to  defeat  the  statutory  right  of   the appellant.  The rigour of the second proviso to s.  88(1)(b) is  thus inapplicable.  Thereby the right and interest as  a deemed  purchaser  acquired by the appellant  has  not  been effected  by  a  subsequent  notification  issued  under  s. 88(1)(b).   The  High Court, therefore,  committed  manifest error  in holding that the appellant is not entitled to  the relief.  The appeal is accordingly allowed and the orders of the High court, The Tribunal and District Collector are  set aside  and  that of the Mamlatdar is confirmed, but  in  the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs. Y.Lal.                                        Appeal Allowed.                                                        812