http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER, ANDHRA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SARDAR ALI, BUS OWNER

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/08/1983

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1983 AIR 1225            1983 SCR  (3) 729  1983 SCC  (4) 245        1983 SCALE  (2)206  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1987 SC 628  (5)

ACT:      Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-S. 129-A-Seizure and detention of a  motor vehicle  by a police officer or any other person authorised  by   State  Government-Whether  ultra  vires  as offending Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution ?

HEADNOTE:      Section  129-A   of  the   Motor  Vehicles   Act,  1939 authorises the seizure and detention of a motor vehicle by a police officer  or any  other person authorised by the State Government in  that behalf  if such  officer or  person  has reason to believe that the vehicle has been or is being used without a  certificate of  registration as required under s. 22 or without a permit as required under sub-s. (1) of s. 42 or in  contravention of  any condition  of such  permit. The appeals in  this group  of matters  were directed  against a judgment of  the Andhra  Pradesh High Court striking down s. 129-A as  an unreasonable  restriction  on  the  fundamental right guaranteed  by Art.  19(1) (g) of the Constitution for the reason  that there was no discernible purpose behind the seizure authorised  by the  section, that  the  seizure  was based on  the subjective  satisfaction of the police officer or  the  person  authorised,  that  there  was  neither  any obligation on  him to  produce the  vehicle in the court nor was any  power conferred  on the  court either to confiscate the vehicle  or to  pass any  orders regarding its temporary custody, that  there was  no provision in the Act indicating as to  what should  be done  after seizing and detaining the vehicle and that there was also no provision prescribing any maximum period for the detention of the vehicle or providing for an appeal against seizure.      Upholding the  validity of  s. 129-A  and allowing  the appeals, ^      HELD: There  is no  lacuna  in  regard  to  the  proper custody and  disposal of  the motor  vehicle seized under s. 129-A of  the Motor  Vehicles Act. The provisions of the Act have to  be read  in conjunction  with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [739 A-B]      (i) Section  129-A contemplates  three situations where

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

the police  officer or  the person  authorised may seize and detain  the  vehicle  and  these  are  precisely  the  three situations made  punishable under s. 123(1). The power given to seize  and detain  the vehicle  under s.  129-A has to be exercised by  the police  officer or  the person  authorised when he  has reason  to believe  that an  offence punishable under s.  123(1) has  been  or  is  being  committed.  After detecting the  commission of  an offence punishable under s. 123(1) the  next step  for him  would be to consider whether the offence should be compounded as provided 730 under s.  127-B and thereafter to lay a complaint before the Court competent  to take  cognizance of the offence. Section 4(2) of  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure provides  that all offences under  any law other than the Penal Code shall also be investigated,  inquired into,  tried and  otherwise dealt with in  accordance with  the provisions of the Code subject to any  enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or  place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing  with such  offences. Chapter  XIII of the Code deals  with "Jurisdiction  of the  Criminal  Courts  in inquiries and trials". So, subject to s. 132 of the Act, the Court before  which the  complaint may  be laid  has  to  be determined in  accordance with  Chapter XIII of the Code and after the  complaint is laid before the appropriate court it has to  be tried  in accordance  with the  provisions of the Code subject  to s. 130 of the Act. This is how the offender has to be dealt with. [733 D; H; 734 A-B; G-H; 735 A-B]      (ii) A  pre-condition to the seizure of a vehicle under s. 129-A is that the police officer or the person authorised must have  reason to  believe that  one or  the other of the offences specified in s. 123 has been or is being committed. The seizure  is expected to serve a manifold purpose such as to prevent  repetition of  the offence,  to  use  the  thing seized as  material evidence  in the  prosecution and so on. Section 129-A  itself provides  that the  detention  of  the vehicle by  the  authorised  officer  or  person  is  to  be temporary, and obviously, until appropriate orders regarding its disposal  are made.  The vehicle  may be released if the owner satisfies  the authorised  officer or  person that  no offence such  as that  mentioned in s. 129-A had been or was being committed. Again, since the detention is for temporary safe custody,  the vehicle  may be  released  to  the  owner subject to  suitable security  and an undertaking to produce it when  called upon  to do so. If the offence is compounded under s.  127-B, the vehicle has naturally to be returned to the owner.  If a  complaint is  laid before  the appropriate court, the  court acquires  jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders regarding the custody and the disposal of the vehicle under Chapter  XXXIV and  ss. 451  and 452  of the  Code  of Criminal Procedure.                            [735 H; 736 C-H; 737 A]      2.  The   contention  that  s.  129-A  should  be  held unreasonable as  it does not provide any safeguard in regard to the  several removable  items which  are usually found in tourist vehicles  such as  spare tyres,  spare parts, radio, video, etc.,  has no  substance. Section  100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  which was  referred to  in this  context deals with  searches and not seizures. In the very nature of things when  property is  seized and  not recovered during a search, it  is not possible to comply with the provisions of sub-ss. (4)  and (5)  of s.  100, Cr.  P.C. In the case of a seizure under  the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no provision for preparing  a list  of the things seized in the course of seizure for  the obvious  reason that  all those  things are

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

seized not separately but as part of the vehicle itself. But it is in the interests of the very officer or person seizing the vehicle to prepare a list of detachable things which are ordinarily not  part of  the vehicle  and give a copy of the list to  the person  in charge of the vehicle at the time of the seizure. [739 A-D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No.  2546- 2547 of 1983. 731      From the  judgment and  order dated  the 13th February, 1981 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 5458 and 5459 of 1980.                             WITH      Writ Petition  Nos. 6051-64, 8226-28, 8284-97, 8321-37, 3952, 7569, 7572, 7574 and 7577 of 1983.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)      T. V. S. N. Chari for the Appellant.      D. R.  Gupta, B.  R. Kapoor, S. R. Srivastava and N. N. Sharma for the Petitioners.      K  G.  Bhagat,  Additional  Solicitor  General,  Shanti Bhushan, P.  R. Mridul,  Dr. Y. S. Chitale, K N. Bhatt, P. K Pillai, R.  N. Poddar, R. B. Datar, A. Subba Rao, N. Nettar, V. G. Mehta and Mrs. H. Wahi, for the appearing Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J. The  Andhra Pradesh High Court has declared   sec.    129-A   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act unconstitutional and  void as  offending Art.  19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. We may straight away say that the judgment of the High Court suffers from serious infirmities, not the  least of  which is  the total failure to notice and consider the  applicability of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the situation.      On an  oral application  by the  Advocate General,  the High Court  granted leave  to appeal  to the  Supreme Court. Presumably, by ’leave’ the High Court meant a certificate as provided under the Constitution. The order of the High Court regarding the grant of ’leave’ to appeal to this Court is in the following  terms: "An  oral  application  for  leave  to appeal to  the Supreme  Court has  been made  by the Learned Advocate General.  The question  whether 129-A  of the Motor Vehicles Act  is ultra-vires  the Constitution on the ground that it  infringes Art.  19  (1)  (g)  of  the  Constitution relates to  the interpretation  of the  Constitution and  is also a  substantial question  of law  of general importance, which  requires   to  be   decided  by  the  Supreme  Court. Therefore, we grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court". 732      The order  of the  High  Court  states,  (i)  that  the question relates  to the interpretation of the Constitution; and (ii)  the question is also a substantial question of law of general  importance which  requires to  be decided by the Supreme Court. The order of the High Court while saying that the  question   relates  to   the  interpretation   of   the Constitution  refrained   from  certifying   that  the  case involved  a   substantial  question   of  law   as  to   the interpretation of  the Constitution.  We  cannot  therefore, treat  the   certificate  as  one  under  Art.  132  of  the Constitution. On the other hand the High Court has certified that the  case involves  a substantial  question of  law  of general importance  and it  requires to  be decided  by  the Supreme  Court,  employing  the  precise  language  used  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

clauses (a)  and (b)  respectively of  Art. 133  (1) of  the Constitution. The  certificate, therefore,  was clearly  one under Art.  133 of the Constitution. We are mentioning these circumstances  because   at  the   very  commencement,   our attention was  invited to  Art. 145  (3) of the Constitution which provides  that the minimum number of judges who are to sit for  the  purpose  of  deciding  any  case  involving  a substantial question  of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution or  for the  purpose of  hearing any  reference under Art.  143 shall  be  five.  The  High  Court  had  not certified that  the cases involved a substantial question of law as  to the interpretation of the Constitution and we are also satisfied  that the  cases do not involve a substantial question  of   law  as   to  the   interpretation   of   the Constitution. We  proceeded to  hear the  appeals  and  writ petitions after  the position  was clarified  when the cases were opened by the learned counsel.      Section  129  A  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act  may  be extracted here. It is as follows:-           "129-A Power  to detain vehicles used without      certificate of registration or permit.- Any police      officer authorized  in this behalf or other person      authorized in  this behalf by the State Government      may, if  he has  reason to  believe that  a  motor      vehicle has been or is being used in contravention      of the provisions of Sec. 22 or without the permit      required by  sub-section (1)  of  Sec.  42  or  in      contravention of  any  condition  of  such  permit      relating to  the route  on which  or the  area  in      which or  the purpose for which the vehicle may be      used, seize  and detain  the vehicle, and for this      purpose take or cause to be taken any steps he may      consider proper for the temporary safe 733           custody of  the vehicle.  Provided that where      any such  officer or  person has reason to believe      that a  motor vehicle  has been  or is  being used      without the  permit required  by subsection (1) of      Section.  42,  he  may,  instead  of  seizing  the      vehicle, seize  the certificate of registration of      the vehicle  and shall issue an acknowledgement in      respect thereof.  Provided further  that  where  a      motor vehicle  has been  seized and detained under      this section  for contravention  of the provisions      of Section  22, such vehicle shall not be released      to the  owner unless and until he produces a valid      certificate of  registration  under  this  Act  in      respect of that vehicle."      It  is  seen  that  Section  129-A  contemplates  three situations where the police officer or authorized person may seize and  detain the vehicle. The three situations are, (i) where he  has reason  to believe  that the motor vehicle has been or  is being used in contravention of the provisions of Sec. 22,  (ii) where he has reason to believe that the motor vehicle has  been  or  is  being  used  without  the  permit required by  sec. 42  (1), and  (iii) where he has reason to believe that  the motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of  any condition  of such  permit relating to the route  on which  or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used. These are precisely the three situations  contemplated  by  Sec.  123  (1)  of  the  Motor Vehicles Act  and  made  punishable  under  that  provision. Section  123  (1),  which  may  also  be  extracted,  is  as follows:-           "S 123. Using vehicle without registration or

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

    permit. (1)  Whoever drives  a  motor  vehicle  or      causes or  allows a  motor vehicle  to be  used in      contravention of  the provisions  of Section 22 or      without the  permit required by sub section (1) of      Section 42 or in contravention of any condition of      such permit  relating to the route on which or the      area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle      may be used or to the maximum number of passengers      and maximum  weight of luggage that may be carried      on the  vehicle shall  be punishable  for a  first      offence with fine which may extent to two thousand      rupees and  for any  second or  subsequent offence      with imprisonment. It is,  therefore, clear  that the  power given to seize and detain the  vehicle under sec. 129-(A) is to be exercised by the police officer or 734 the authorised  person when he has reason to believe that an offence punishable  under sec.  123 (1) has been or is being committed. Now, after detecting the commission of an offence punishable under sec. 123 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the next  appropriate   step  for  the  police  officer  or  the authorised person  would be to consider the question whether the offence should be compounded as provided by Section 127- (B) of the Motor Vehicles Act and any notification issued by the Government  in that  behalf. Section  127-B may  also be extracted here and it is as follows .-           "127-B (1)  Any  offence  (whether  committed      before or  after the commencement of section 26 of      the   Motor   vehicles   (Amendment   Act,   1982)      punishable under section 112, section 113, section      113A, section  113B, section  114, sub-section (1)      and (2)  or section 115, section 116, section 118,      section 120 section 122, Section 123, section 124,      section 125  or section  127 may, either before or      after  the  institution  of  the  prosecution,  be      compounded by such officers or authorities and for      such amount  as  the  State.  Government  may,  by      notification in  the official  Gazette, specify in      this behalf.           (2) Where  an  offence  has  been  compounded      under  sub-section   (1),  the   offender,  if  in      custody,  shall   be  discharged  and  no  further      proceedings shall  be taken against him in respect      of such offence." Thereafter the  next logical  and appropriate  step for  the police officer  or the  authorised person  would be to lay a complaint before  the Court competent to take congnizance of the offence, subject to the over-riding provision of Section 132 of  the Motor  Vehicles Act which provides that no Court inferior  to   that  of   a  Metropolitan  Magistrate  or  a Magistrate  of  the  second  class  shall  try  any  offence punishable under  the Motor  Vehicles Act  or any  rule made thereunder. Section  4 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that  all offences  under any  law other  than  the Penal Code shall also be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise  dealt with  according to  the same provisions that is,  the provisions  of the  Criminal  Procedure  Code, subject to  any  enactment  for  the  time  being  in  force regulating the  manner or  place of investigating, inquiring into,  trying  or  otherwise  dealing  with  such  offences. Chapter XIII  of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure deals with "Jurisdiction  of  the  Criminal  Courts  in  inquiries  and trials". So,  subject to  section 132  of the Motor Vehicles Act,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

735 the Court  before which  the complaint may be laid has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of chapter XIII of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure.  After the complaint is laid the  case has  to  be  tried  in  accordance  with  the provisions of  the Code of Criminal Procedure. This again is subject to  one special provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, namely Section 130. Sec. 130 is in the following terms:-           "The court  taking cognizance  of an  offence      under this  Act,-(i) may,  if the  offence  is  an      offence punishable  with imprisonment  under  this      Act and  (ii) shall, in any other case, state upon      the summons  to be  served on  the accused  person      that he-(a)  may appear  by  pleader  and  not  in      person, or  (b) may  by a  specified date prior to      the hearing  of the  charge plead  guilty  to  the      charge by registered letter and remit to the court      such sum  (not exceeding the maximum fine that may      be imposed  for the  offence)  as  the  court  may      specify:           Provided that  nothing  in  this  sub-section      shall apply  to any offence specified in Part A of      the Fifth Schedule.           Where the  offence dealt  with in  accordance with      sub-section (1)  is an offence specified in Part of the      Fifth Schedule,  the accused person shall, if he pleads      guilty to  the charge, forward his licence to the Court      with the  letter containing  his plea in order that the      conviction may be endorsed on the licence.           Where an accused person pleads guilty and remits 1      the sum  specified and has complied with the provisions      of sub-section  (2), no  further proceedings in respect      of the offence shall be taken against him, nor shall he      be liable to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a      licence by reason of his having pleaded guilty." That is how the offender is dealt with.      But, what  happens to  the  vehicle  seized  under  the provisions of  S. 129-A  ? To  begin with,  we notice that a pre-condition to the seizure and detention of the vehicle is that the  police officer  or  authorised  person  must  have reason to  believe that  one or  the other  of the  offences specified, punishable as we have seen under S. 123, 736 has been  or is  being committed. Whenever property involved in the  commission of  an offence  is seized, the seizure is generally expected  to serve  a manifold  purpose such as to prevent repetition  of the  offence, to use the thing seized as material  evidence in  the prosecution,  to preserve  the property so  as to  enable the  court  to  pass  appropriate orders for its disposal by way of destruction, confiscation, or delivery  to  any  person  claiming  to  be  entitled  to possession thereof  or otherwise.  There  ii  no  reason  to assume that  the seizure under S. 129-A is any different and is not to serve any of these purposes or any purpose at all. We then  notice that  the police  officer or  the authorised person may  "Seize and  detain the  vehicle-, and  for  this purpose take  or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for  the temporary  safe  custody  of  the  vehicle". Clearly, therefore,  the detention by the authorised officer or person  is to be temporary. For how long then ? obviously until appropriate  orders regarding  its disposal  are made. Quite obviously  the vehicle may be released if the owner of the vehicle satisfies the authorised officer or person, that no offence  such as  that mentioned  in S. 129-A had been or was being  committed. This  is subject to tho second proviso

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

to S. 129-A which bars the release of a vehicle seized for a contravention of the provisions of S. 22 unless the owner of the vehicle  produces a  valid certificate  of  registration under the  Act in respect of the vehicle. Conversely, in the contest,  it   implies  15  that  a  vehicle  seized  for  a contravention of  S. 22 is to be released if the certificate of registration  is produced.  Again, since the detention is for ’temporary  safe custody,  until appropriate  orders are made, the  police officer  or authorised  person seizing the vehicle may  arrange for the ’temporary safe custody’ of the vehicle with  the owner  of the  vehicle  by  releasing  the vehicle to  him  subject  to  suitable  security  J  and  so undertaking to  produce the  vehicle when  called upon to do so. We  have indicated  that the next step in the process of dealing with tho offender is to consider whether the offence may not  be compounded.  If the  offence is  compounded, the vehicle has  naturally to be returned to the owner. If it is not compounded,  a complaint has to be laid before the Court empowered to  take cognizance  of  the  case  and  the  case proceeded with.  As soon as the complaint is laid, the Court acquires jurisdiction  to pass  appropriate orders regarding ’the custody’ and the ’the disposal’ of the vehicle. We have already noticed  how Section  4  (2)  of  the  Code  of  the Criminal Procedure stipulates that offences under laws other than the  Penal Code  also are  to be investigated, inquired into, tried  and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 737 The provisions  of Chapter  XXXIV of  the Code  relating  to ’Disposal of  Property’  are  also  therefore  attracted  in dealing with  offences under the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 452 of  the Code  enables the Court, at the conclusion of an inquiry or  trial to  "make such  order as it thinks fit for the disposal,  by destruction,  confiscation or  delivery to any person  claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or document produced before it or in its  custody, or  regarding which  any offence appears to have  been  committed,  or  which  has  been  used  for  the commission of  any offence". The Court thus has the power at the conclusion  of  the  case  to  make  appropriate  orders regarding the  disposal of the motor vehicle regarding which an offence  appears to  have been  committed. So  far as the custody of the vehicle pending the conclusion of the case is concerned, the  Court may  either treat the arrangement made by the officer or person acting under S. 129-A as sufficient or may  itself make  further or other orders. Section 451 of the Code  of Criminal Procedure empowers the Court, when any property is  produced before it during any inquiry or trial, to make  such order  as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such  property pending  the conclusion  of the inquiry or trial.  We  think  that  a  motor  vehicle  regarding  whose temporary custody  arrangements have  been made  under  sec. 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act by the police officer or the authorised person  seizing the vehicle must be considered to have been  produced before  the Criminal  Court as soon as a complaint is  filed before the Court alleging the commission of an offence under sec. 123 regarding  the vehicle.  In any case, the  Court has  ample power  under Chapter  VII of the Code, Section  91 in particular, to compel the production of the vehicle  before the Court. Thus if the provisions of the Motor  Vehicles   Act  are  read  in  conjunction  with  the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no getting away from the provisions of both the laws-it is seen that there  is no  lacuna whatsoever in regard to the proper custody and  disposal of the motor vehicle seized under sec.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

129-A of  the Motor Vehicles Act. The custody of the vehicle in the  hands the police officer or the authorised person is but temporary  and he  is therefore, obliged to act and take all further  steps in  the matter with all expedition. If he releases the  vehicle on being satisfied that no offence has been committed  or if he releases the vehicle on the offence being compounded,  no further  question arises. If, instead, he lays  a complaint  before the  Court, the  court acquires instant jurisdiction  over  the  vehicle  to  pass  suitable orders. In  the remote  event of  the police  officer or the authorised person not taking any further action after 738 seizing and  detaining the vehicle, the owner of the vehicle is not  without remedy. Art. 226 is always available but one does not  have to  presume that  the police  officer or  the authorised person may not act according to law.      The Andhra  Pradesh High  Court appeared  to think that sec. 129-A of  the Motor  Vehicles Act  was an  unreasonable restriction on  the fundamental  right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g)  of  the  Constitution  because  (i)  there  was  no provision in  the Act  providing  for  confiscation  of  the vehicle, (ii)  there was  no provision in the Act indicating what should be done after seizing and detaining the vehicle, (iii) the  seizure by  the police  officer or the authorised person was  based on his subjective satisfaction, (iv) there was no discernible purpose behind the seizure, (v) there was no obligation  on  the  seizing  authority  to  produce  the vehicle in  court, (vi)  Nor was  there any  purpose  to  be served by  producing the  vehicle before  the court  as  the court did not possess the power to confiscate the vehicle or to pass  any orders regarding its temporary custody,(vii) no appeal was  provided against  the  seizure,  and  (viii)  no maximum period  was prescribed  for  the  detention  of  the vehicle.      None of  these reasons  bears any scrutiny, if properly examined in  the light  of the  provisions of both the Motor Vehicles Act  and the  Code of Criminal Procedure, as we are bound to. Indeed, whenever an offence under a law other than the Penal  Code is  committed and  that law  does not itself regulate the  procedure to  be followed,  there is no option but to look to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code for further  action and  to weave  into a single texture the provisions of  the code  and the special law. The High Court has totally ignored the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and  the judgment  stands vitiated  on that account. It has therefore,  to be  set  aside.  We  have  explained  the context of Sec. 129-A in the scheme emerging from the inter- lacing of  the provisions  of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Criminal Procedure  Code.  We  do  not  have  the  slightest hesitation in  rejecting the  contention that  there is  any infringement of  the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g)  of the  Constitution and  in upholding the vires of Sec. 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.      One of  the  Learned  Counsel  submitted  that  when  a tourist motor  vehicle was  seized under  Sec. 129-A,  there should be  some safeguard in regard to the several removable items which are usually 739 found in  tourist vehicles such as spare tyres, spare parts, radio, video  etc. It was suggested that in the absence of a provision similar  to that  found in  the Criminal Procedure Code, Sec. 129-A Should be held to be unreasonable. There is no substance  in this  contention. Sec.  100 of the Criminal Procedure Code  to which  reference was  made by the Counsel deals with  searches and not seizures. In the very nature of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

things when  property is  seized and  not recovered during a search, it  is not possible to comply with the provisions of Sub-Sections (4)  and  (5)  of  Sec.  100  of  the  Criminal Procedure Code.  In the  case of  a seizure  under the Motor Vehicles Act,  there is no provision for preparing a list of the things  seized in  the course  of the  seizure  for  the obvious  reason   that  all  those  things  are  seized  not separately but  as part  of the vehicle itself. But it is in the interests  of the  very officer  or person  seizing  the vehicle, so  that they  may not  be open to any charge being laid against  them later,  that such officer or person takes care to  prepare a  list  of  detachable  things  which  are ordinarily not  part of  the vehicle  and give a copy of the list to  the person  in-charge of the vehicle at the time of the seizure.      In view of the discussion, the appeals are allowed with cost  and  the  writ  petitions  filed  in  High  Court  are dismissed. Some  of the  operators have  directly approached this Court  under Art.  32 of  the Constitution.  Their writ petitions have  been heard  along with the civil appeals and for the same reasons they are dismissed with costs. H.L.C.                                      Appeals allowed. 740