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PETITIONER: TITAGHUR PAPER MILLS CO. LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/04/1983

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:  1983 SCR  (2) 743        1983 SCC  (2) 433  1983 SCALE  (1)437

ACT:      Sales-tax-Central Sales  Tax Act, 1956-Repeated notices for production  of records  issued to assessee-Best judgment assessment  made-Assessee,   if  could  impugn  order  under Article 226 of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE:      It appears  that proceedings  under  r.  12(5)  of  the Central Sales  Tax (Orissa)  Rules 1957 and under sub-s. (4) of s.  12 of  the Orissa  Sales Tax Act, 1947 were initiated against the  petitioners for  the assessment year 1980-81 in relation to  assessment of  tax on  sales in  the course  of inter-state trade  and commerce  under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956  and inside  sales effected  during  the  year  in question under  the Orissa  Sales  Tax  Act,  1947.  Despite repeated opportunities  to  get  themselves  ready  for  the assessment of  tax and  to produce  their account  books and other documents, they sought adjournments on the one pretext or another.  Eventually the  Assistant  Sales  Tax  Officer, Cuttack  II  circle,  Cuttack  before  whom  the  assessment proceedings were  pending,  refused  to  grant  any  further adjournment and  proceeded to  best judgment  assessment and treated the  gross turnover  of  Rs.  7,13,94,903.63  p.  as returned by  the petitioners  for purposes  of  the  Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 to be their taxable turnover. Similarly, he treated  the  gross  turnover  of  Rs.  2,02,07,852.65  p returned by  the petitioners  as representing  inside  sales vis-a-vis the  State of Orissa to be their taxable turnover. After allowing  adjustment of Rs. 27,88,388.47 p paid by the petitioners, the  learned Sales  Tax Officer raised a demand for the  payment of  a sum of Rs. 43,57,101.89 p towards tax on sales  in the  course of  inter-State trade  and commerce payable under  the Central  Sales Tax  Act, 1956  and  after allowing  adjustment  of  Rs.  1,08,480.11  p  paid  by  the petitioners, he  raised the  demand for  payment of a sum of Rs. 13,06,  069.60 p  as tax  payable under the Orissa Sales Tax Act,  1947. Thus the petitioners were faced with a total demand of  Rs. 56,57,171.49  p for the assessment year 1980- 81. The petitioners instead of preferring appeals under sub- s (1)  of s.  23 of  the Act filed petitions before the High Court under  Art. 226  of the  Constitution challenging  the

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validity of the two orders of assessment. The High Court was not satisfied  that this  was a  case of  inherent  lack  of jurisdiction or  any  violation  of  principles  of  natural justice and  accordingly held that they were not entitled to invoke the  extraordinary jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution,      Dismissing the Petitions, ^      HELD: In  the provenance, of tax where the Act provides for a  complete  machinery  which  enables  an  assessee  to effectively raise in the courts the question of the validity of an assessment denied an alternative jurisdiction 744 to the  High Court  to  interfere  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution. The  phrase "made under the Act" describes the provenance of  the assessment;  it does  not relate  to  its accuracy in  point of law. The use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that use, is the test. [748 G- H; 749 A]      Under the  scheme of  the Act,  there is  hierarchy  of authorities before  which the  petitioners can  get adequate redress against  the wrongful  act complained  of. They have the  right   to  prefer  an  appeal  before  the  prescribed authority under  sub-s. (1) of s. 23 of the Act. If they are dissatisfied with  the decision  in  the  appeal,  they  can prefer a  further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-s. (3) of s. 23  of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated on a question of  law for  the opinion of the High Court under s. 24 of  the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can  only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act  and not  by  a  petition  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution. [751 F-H]      Raleigh Investment  Company Limited v. Governor General in Council, 74 IA 50, followed.      K.S. Venkataraman & Co. v. State of Madras [1966] 2 SCR 229 and  State of  Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh [1958] SCR 595; distinguished.      The question  whether a provision is ultra vires or not cannot obviously  be  decided  by  any  of  the  authorities created by  the Act  and therefore  cannot  be  the  subject matter of  a reference  to the  High Court  or a  subsequent appeal to this Court. No such question arises in a case like the present  where the impugned orders of assessment are not challenged on  the ground that they are based on a provision which  is   ultra  vires.  This  is  a  case  in  which  the entrustment of  power to  assess is  not in  dispute and the authority within  the limits  of his  power is a Tribunal of exclusive  jurisdiction.   The  challenge  is  only  to  the regularity of  the proceedings  before the learned Sales Tax Officer as  also his  authority to  treat the gross turnover returned by  the petitioners  to be  the  taxable  turnover. Investment of  authority to  tax involves  authority to take transactions which  in exercise  of his authority the taxing officer regards  as taxable  and not merely authority to tax only those  transactions which  are, on  a true  view of the facts and  the law,  taxable. There  is no justification for extending the  principles laid  down in  Raleigh  Investment Company’s case  or Mohammad  Nooh’s case  to a case like the present where  there is  an assessment  made by  the learned Sales Tax Officer under the Act. [749 E-H; 753 A-B]      The question  whether another  adjournment should  have been granted or not was within the discretion of the learned Sales Tax  Officer and  is a  matter which  can properly  be raised in  an appeal  under sub-s.  (1)  of  s.  23  of  the

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Act.[751 D]      The rule  laid  down  in  Mohammad  Nooh’s  case  which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and  discretion, rather than a rule of law. [751 E] 745      The Act  provides for  an adequate safeguard against an arbitrary or  unjust assessment. The petitioner have a right to prefer  an appeal  under sub-s.  (1) of  s. 23 of the Act subject to  their payment  of an  admitted amount  of tax as enjoined by  the proviso  thereto. As  regards the  disputed amount of  tax, they have the remedy of applying for stay of recovery to  the Commissioner  of Sales Tax under cl. (a) of the second  proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act. It is for the  Commissioner to  decide whether or not there should be such  stay on such terms and conditions as he thinks fit, looking to  the nature of the demand raised in the facts and circumstances of the present case. [752 E-F; 753B-C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition Nos. 4513-14 of 1983.      From the  Judgment and Order dated the 10th March, 1983 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 590 of 1983.                             WITH             Writ Petition Nos. 3363-64 of 1983.            (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      S.R. Banerjee  and Vinoo  Bhagat for the Petitioners in S.L.P.      Vinoo Bhagat for the Petitioner in Writ Petition.      F.S. Nariman,  V.S. Desai,  and  R.K.  Mehta:  for  the Respondent in S.L.P.      S,K. Mehta, for the Respondent in Writ Petition.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J.  These two special leave petitions are directed against an  order of  the Orissa  High Court dated March 18, 1983 dismissing  the Writ Petitions flied by the petitioners in limine challenging the two orders of assessment passed by the Assistant  Sales Tax Officer, Cuttack II Circle, Cuttack dated February  16, 1983. The connected petitions under Act. 32 of  the Constitution  are by  an Officer  of the  Company challenging the two orders of assessment.      By  one   of  the   Writ  Petitions,   the  petitioners challenged the validity of the order of assessment under the Central Sales  Tax Act, 1956 for the assessment year 1980-81 passed by  the  Assistant  Sales  Tax  Officer,  Cuttack  II Circle, Cuttack  dated February  16, 1983  under r.15 of the Central Sales  Tax (Orissa)  Rules, 1957  treating the gross turnover of Rs. 7, 13, 94, 903. 63p. as returned by the 746 petitioners to be their taxable turnover and the tax payable thereon at  10% at  Rs. 71,39,490.36p.  By  the  other,  the petitioners  challenged   the  validity   of  an   order  of assessment under  the Orissa  Sales Tax  Act. 1947  for  the assessment year  1980-81 passed  by the  Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Cuttack  II Circle, Cuttack dated February 16, 1983 under sub-s.  (4) of  s.12 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 treating the  gross  turnover  of  Rs.  2,02,07,852.65p.  as returned by the petitioners to be their taxable turnover and the tax payable thereon at 7% at Rs. 14,14,549.71p.      It appears  from the impugned orders of assessment that proceedings under r.12 (5) of the Central Sales Tax (Orissa) Rules, 1957 ("Rules" for short) and under sub-s. (4) of s.12

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of the  Orissa Sales  Tax Act,  1947 ("Act"  for short) were initiated against  the petitioners  for the  assessment year 1980-81 in  relation to  assessment of  tax on  sales in the course of  inter-state trade  and commerce under the Central Sales Tax  Act, 1956  and inside  sales effected  during the year in  question under  the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. The provisions contained in r. 12 (5) of the Rules and in sub-s. (4) of  s.12 of  the Act  enjoin the affording of reasonable opportunity to  the dealer for completion of assessment. The learned Sales  Tax Officer  observes that  he gave  repeated opportunities to the petitioners to get themselves ready for the assessment of tax and to produce their account books and other documents  but they sought adjournments on one pretext or another. Eventually on February 16,1983 the learned Sales Tax Officer refused to grant any further adjournment holding that  the   petitioners  had   sufficient  opportunity   and accordingly proceeded  to best  judgment under  r.15 of  the Rules and  sub-s. (4)  of s.12 of the Act. In the absence of any  material,   the  learned  Sales  Tax  Officer  made  an assessment under  r.15  of  the  Rules  treating  the  gross turnover of  sales in  the course  of inter-State  trade and commerce amounting  to Rs.  7,13,94,903.63p. as  returned by the petitioners  under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 to be their taxable turnover and the tax payable thereon at 10% at Rs. 71,39,490.36p.  After  allowing  an  adjustment  of  Rs. 27,88,388.47p.  paid  by  the  petitioners  along  with  the quarterly return, the learned Sales Tax Officer has raised a demand for  payment  of  a  sum  of  Rs.  43,51,101.89p.  He disallowed their claim for deduction of Rs. 6,74,99,085.65p. representing sales  to registered dealers and departments of Government as  well as  of  Rs.  28,24,224.42p.  claimed  as deduction on account of tax collected from purchasers as the requisite declarations  in Form ’C’ were not forthcoming. He also  disallowed   the  concessional  rate  of  tax  at  4%. Similarly, while 747 making an  assessment under sub-s. (4) of s.12 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, he treated the gross turnover of inside sales amounting  to Rs.  2,02,07,852.65p. as returned by the petitioners to be their taxable turnover and the tax payable thereon at  7% at  Rs. 14,14,549.  71p.  After  allowing  an adjustment of  Rs. 1,08,480.11p.  paid  by  the  petitioners along with  the quarterly  return,  the  learned  Sales  Tax Officer has  raised a  demand for  payment of  a sum  of Rs. 13,06,069.60p. It  would thus  appear that  by the  impugned orders of  assessment the petitioners are faced with a total demand of  Rs. 56,57,171.49p.  for the assessment year 1980- 81. The petitioners instead of preferring appeals under sub- s. (1)  of s.  23 of the Act filed petitions before the High Court under  Art. 226  of the  Constitution challenging  the validity of the two orders of assessment.      The only  contention raised  before the  High Court was that the  impugned orders of assessment being a nullity, the petitioners  were   entitled  to  invoke  the  extraordinary jurisdiction of  the  High  Court  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution, but the High Court was not satisfied that this was a  case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. The High Court while dismissing the writ petitions observed:           "Having heard  the learned  counsel for  both  the      parties and having gone through the records, we are not      inclined to  interfere with  the impugned  order (s) in      exercise with  our  extra-ordinary  jurisdiction  since      there is  a right  of appeal  against the  same. It  is      contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impunged      order being  a nullity is entitled to invoke our extra-

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    ordinary jurisdiction.  We are  not satisfied that this      is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. There is no      violation of principles of natural justice."      In support of these petitions, the submissions advanced by learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  rest  purely  on procedural irregularities  or touch  upon the  merits of the assessments. Broadly  speaking, the  contentions were  that: (1) The  learned Sales  Tax  Officer  had  no  authority  or jurisdiction while  making an  assessment under r. 15 of the Central Sales  Tax (Orissa)  Rules, 1957  to treat the gross turnover as  returned by the petitioners to be their taxable turnover. (2)  He was not justified in disallowing the claim for deduction  of Rs. 6,74,99,085.65p. representing sales to registered dealers  and departments of Government as well as of Rs.  28,24,224.42p. on  account of tax collected from the purchasers from the gross 748 turnover of  sales in  the course  of inter-State  trade and commerce amounting  to Rs.  7,13,94,903.63p. (3)  He wrongly denied the  petitioners the benefit of the concessional rate of tax  at 4%  merely because  they failed  to  furnish  the requisite declarations  in Form  ’C’ (4)  He could  not, for similar reasons, while making an assessment under sub-s. (4) of s.  12 of  the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 treat the gross turnover of  inside sales  amounting to Rs. 2,02,07,852.65p. as returned  by the petitioners to be their taxable turnover nor  was   he  justified  in  disallowing  their  claim  for deduction of  Rs. 1,  80, 65, 167.66p. representing sales to registered dealers merely because they failed to produce the prescribed declarations from registered dealers. (5) And the learned Sales Tax officer had acted in flagrant violation of the  rules  of  natural  justice  as  the  petitioners  were deprived of  an opportunity  to place  their  case  for  the assessment  year   in  question.   We  are   afraid,   these contentions cannot  prevail. It is not for us to say whether or not  the learned  Sales  Tax  Officer  was  justified  in proceeding to best judgment under r. 15 of the Central Sales Tax (Orissa)  Rules, 1957  and under  sub-s. (4) of s. 12 of the Orissa  Sales Tax  Act, 1947 or whether he was justified in  treating   the  gross   turnover  as   returned  by  the petitioners to  be their  taxable turnover or whether he was wrong  in   disallowing  the   deductions  claimed  for  the assessment year  in question.  In the very nature of things, these are  the questions  which the petitioners should raise in  appeals   preferred  before   the  prescribed  Appellate Authority under sub-s. (1) of s. 23 of the Act.      We are  constrained to  dismiss these  petitions on the short  ground   that  the   petitioners  have   an   equally efficacious alternative  remedy by  way of  an appeal to the prescribed authority  under sub-s.  (1) of s. 23 of the Act, then a  second appeal  to the  Tribunal under sub s. (3) (a) thereof, and  thereafter in the event the petitioners get no relief, to  have the  case stated to the High Court under s. 23 of  the Act.  In Raleigh  Investment Company  Limited  v. Governor  General   in  Council,(1)   Lord  Uthwatt,  J.  in delivering the  judgment of  the Board  observed that in the provenance of  tax where  the Act  provided for  a  complete machinery which  enabled an assessee to effectively to raise in the  courts the question of the validity of an assessment denied an  alternative jurisdiction  to the  High  Court  to interfere. It is true that the decision of the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Company’s case, supra, was in relation to a  suit brought for a declaration that an assessment made by the Income Tax Officer was 749

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a nullity,  and it  was held  by the  Privy Council  that an assessment made  under the  machinery provided  by the  Act, even if  based on  a provision subsequently held to be ultra vires, was  not a  nullity like  an order of a court lacking jurisdiction and  that s.  67 of  the Income  Tax Act,  1922 operated as  a bar to the maintainability of such a suit. In dealing with the question whether s. 67 operated as a bar to a suit  to set  aside or  modify an  assessment made under a provision of the Act which is ultra vires, the Privy Council observed:           "In construing  the section  it is  pertinent,  in      their Lordships  opinion to  ascertain whether  the Act      contains   machinery    which   enables   an   assessee      effectively to raise in the courts the question whether      a particular provision of the Income Tax Act bearing on      the assessment  made is  or is  not  ultra  vires.  The      presence  of   such  machinery,   though  by  no  means      conclusive, marches  with a construction of the section      which denies  an alternative  jurisdiction  to  inquire      into the same subject-matter."      We are  not oblivious  of the  fact that  this Court in K.S. Venkataraman  & Co.  v. State  of Madras,(1) in a five- Judge Bench  by a  majority of  3: 2  has dissented with the view expressed  by the  Privy Council  in Raleigh Investment Company’s case,  supra, and  held that an assessment made on the basis  of a  provision which  is ultra  vires is  not an assessment made  under the  Act. It  was observed  that  the entire reasoning  of the  Judicial Committee  was based upon the assumption  that the  question of  ultra  vires  can  be canvassed and finally decided through the machinery provided under the  Income Tax  Act. The  majority observed  that the hierarchy  of   authorities  set  up  under  the  Act  being creatures of  statute were  not concerned  as to whether the provisions of  the Act  were  intra  vires  or  not.  If  an assessee raises  such a  question, according to the decision of the majority in Venkataraman’s case, supra, the Appellate Tribunal can  only reject  it on  the ground  that it has no jurisdiction to  entertain  such  objection  or  render  any decision on  it. As  no such  question can  be raised or can even arise  out of  the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court cannot possibly give any decision on the question of ultra  vires because  its jurisdiction  under s.  66 is a special advisory  jurisdiction and  its  scope  is  strictly limited. It  can only decide questions of law that arise out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal and that are referred to it. Further, an appeal to this 750 Court under  s. 66A  (2) does  not enlarge  the scope of the jurisdiction of  this Court  as this  Court can only do what the High  Court can  under s.  66. It would therefore appear that the  majority decision  in Venkataramon’s  case, supra, rests on  the principle  that (i)  An ultra  vires provision cannot be  regarded as  a part  of the  Act at  all, and  an assessment under  such a  provision is  not "made  under the Act" but  is wholly  without the  jurisdiction  and  is  not directed by  s. 67 of the Act. And (ii) The question whether a provision  is ultra  vires or not cannot be decided by any of the  authorities created  by the Act and therefore cannot be the  subject matter of a reference to the High Court or a subsequent appeal to this Court.      No such  question arises  in a  case like  the  present where the  impugned orders  of assessment are not challenged on the  ground that  they are  based on a provision which is ultra vires.  We are  dealing  with  a  case  in  which  the entrustment of  power to  assess is  not in dispute, and the

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authority within  the limits  of his  power is a Tribunal of exclusive  jurisdiction.   The  challenge  is  only  to  the regularity of  the proceeding  before the  learned Sales Tax Officer as  also his  authority to  treat the gross turnover returned by  the petitioners  to be  the  taxable  turnover. Investment of  authority to  tax involves  authority to  tax transactions which  in exercise  of his authority the Taxing Officer regards  as taxable, and not merely authority to tax only those  transactions which  are, on  a true  view of the facts and the law, taxable.      Emphasis is  laid on the following observations made by this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh(1):           "If  an   inferior  Court  or  tribunal  of  first      instance acts  wholly without  jurisdiction or patently      in excess  of jurisdiction  or manifestly  conducts the      proceedings before  it in a manner which is contrary to      the rules  of natural justice and all accepted rules of      procedure and  which offends the superior court’s sense      of fair  play the  superior Court  may, we think, quite      properly exercise  its power  to issue  the prerogative      writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or      tribunal of  first  instance,  even  if  an  appeal  to      another inferior  Court or  tribunal was  available and      recourse was  not had  to it  or if recourse was had to      it, it  confirmed what  ex  facie  was  a  nullity  for      reasons aforementioned."      We find  no justification  for extending the principles laid down in Mohammad Nooh’s case, supra, to a case like the present where 751 there is an assessment made by the learned Sales Tax Officer under the  Act. In Raleigh Investment Company’s case, supra, the Privy  Council rightly  observed that  the phrase  "made under the  Act" described  the provenance of the assessment; it does  not relate to its accuracy in point of law. The use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that use, is the test.      The  decision  in  Mohamamd  Nooh’s  case,  (supra)  is clearly distinguishable as in that case there was total lack of jurisdiction.  There is  no suggestion  that the  learned Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to make an assessment. Nor can it be contended that he had acted in breach of rules of natural  justice. There  is no  denying the fact that the petitioner was served with a notice of the proceedings under r. 12(5)  of the  Rules and  sub-s. (4) of s. 12 of the Act. The impugned  orders clearly  show that the petitioners were afforded sufficient  opportunity to place their case. Merely because the  learned Sales  Tax Officer refused to grant any further adjournment and decided to proceed to best judgment, it cannot be said that he acted in violation of the rules of natural justice.  The question  whether another  adjournment should have been granted or not was within the discretion of the learned  Sales Tax  Officer and  is a  matter which  can properly be  raised only in an appeal under sub-s. (1) of s. 23 of  the Act.  All that  this Court  laid down in Mohammad Nooh’s case,  supra, is  that the  rule which  requires  the exhaustion of  alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law; in other words, it does not bar the jurisdiction of the Court.      Under the  scheme of  the Act,  there is a hierarchy of authorities before  which the  petitioners can  get adequate redress  against   the  wrongful  acts  complained  of.  The petitioners have  the right  to prefer  an appeal before the prescribed authority  under sub-s.  (1) of s. 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the

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appeal, they  can prefer  a further  appeal to  the Tribunal under sub-s.  (3) of  s. 23  of the  Act, and then ask for a case to  be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High  Court under s. 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment and the impugned  orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode  prescribed by  the Act and not by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a  right or  liability is  created by  a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must 752 be availed  of. This  rule was  stated with great clarity by Willes,  J.   in  Wolverhampton   New  Water  Works  Co.  v. Hawkesford(1) in the following passage:           "There are  three classes  of  cases  in  which  a      liability   may    be    established    founded    upon      statute....................................But there is      a third  class, viz., where a liability not existing at      common law  is created  by a  statute which at the same      time  gives   a  special   and  particular  remedy  for      enforcing it................the  remedy provided by the      statute must  be followed,  and it  is not competent to      the party  to pursue  the course applicable to cases of      the second class. The form given by the statute must be      adopted and adhered to."      The rule  laid down in this passage was approved by the House of  Lords  in  Neville  v.  London  Express  Newspaper Ltd.(2) and  has been  reaffirmed by  the Privy  Council  in Attorney-General of  Trinidad and  Tobago v.  Gordon Grant & Co.(3) and  Secretary of  State v. Mask & Co.(4) It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has  been followed  by this  Court throughout.  The High Court  was   therefore  justified  in  dismissing  the  writ petitions in limine.      Furthermore, the Act provides for an adequate safeguard against an  arbitrary or  unjust assessment. The petitioners have a  right to  prefer an appeal under sub-s. (1) of s. 23 of the  Act subject  to their payment of the admitted amount of tax  as enjoined  by the  proviso thereto. As regards the disputed amount  of tax,  the petitioners have the remedy of applying for  stay of  recovery to the Commissioner of Sales Tax under  cl. (a) of the second proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act which runs:      "Provided further that-      (a)  When the dealer or person, as the case may be, has      presented an  appeal under  sub-s. (1)  of s.  23,  the      Commissioner may,  on an  application  in  that  behalf      filed by  such dealer or person within thirty days from      the date of 753      receipt by  him of  the notice under sub-s. (4), in his      discretion, stay  the recovery of the amount in respect      of which  such notice  has been  issued or  any portion      thereof, for such period and subject to such conditions      as the Commissioner thinks fit;"      The petitioners  are at  liberty to make an application for stay  of the  disputed amount  and the Commissioner will decide whether  or not  there should  be such  stay on  such terms and conditions as he thinks fit, looking to the nature of the  demand raised  in the facts and circumstances of the present case.      For these  reasons, the  petitions must  fail  and  are dismissed. We  hope and  trust that  the Appellate Authority will dispose  of the  appeals as  expeditiously as possible.

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Shri Nariman,  appearing on  behalf of  the State  of Orissa fairly stated  that he  has no objection to the appeal being heard as  early as  possible without  any  objection  as  to limitation.                                         Petitions dismissed. 754