“REPORTABLE”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2650-2652 OF 1998

Tika Ram & Ors. ….Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. ….Respondents

 WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3162 OF 1998

Smt. Saroj Agarwal ……Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors.        ……Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3176 OF 1998

Shivaji Nagar Sahakari Girah  Nirman Samiti Ltd., Lucknow ….Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Anr. ….Respondents

1

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3415 OF 1998

M/s Pratap Sahakari Grih  Nirman Samiti Ltd. …Appellant

Versus

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. …..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3561 OF 1998

M/s Shama Timber Works & Anr. …..Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Anr. …..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3597 OF 1998

Ganga Bux Singh & Ors. ….Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …..Respondents

2

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3923 OF 1998

M/s. Janta Steel Industry & Anr. …..Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Anr. …..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3939 OF 1998

M/s Sachin Surkhi Udyog & Anr. ….Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3645 OF 1998

Awadh Industries through its  Proprietor & Ors. ….Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …..Respondents

3

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3691 OF 1998

Pragatisheel Sahakari Grih Nirman  Samiti Ltd., Lucknow …...Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5346 OF 1998

M/s Indira Nagar Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. ….Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2116-2118 OF 1999

Tika Ram & Ors. Etc. Etc. ….Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. Etc. Etc. …..Respondents

4

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2139 OF 1999

Smt. Saroj Aggarwal ….Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2121 OF 1999

Shivaji Nagar Sahkari Girah Nirman  Samiti Ltd., Lucknow ……Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Anr. ……Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2113 OF 1999

Ganga Bux Singh & Ors. …..Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …..Respondents

5

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4995-4996 OF 1998

Swarg Ashram Sahakari Avas Samiti Ltd. …..Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. .…Respondents

WITH

SLP (C) NO. CC. 1540 OF 1999

Pragatisheel Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti …..Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …..Respondents  

J U D G M E N T

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

Background of Appeals

1. This judgment will dispose of Civil Appeal Nos. 2650-2652 of 1998,  

3162 of 1998, 3176 of 1998, 3415 of 1998, 3561 of 1998, 3597 of 1998,  

3923 of 1998, 3939 of 1998, 3645 of 1998, 3691 of 1998, 5346 of 1998,  

2116-2118 of 1999, 2139 of 1999, 2121 of 1999, 2113 of 1999, 4995-4996  

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of 1998 and SLP(C) No…(CC) 1540 of 1999.  All these appeals and the  

Special  Leave  Petition  challenge  a  common  judgment  passed  by  

Allahabad High Court, disposing of several Writ Petitions.  The High Court  

has granted certificate granting leave to file appeal.  These Writ Petitions  

were  filed  covering  various  subjects.   Basically,  in  some  of  the  Writ  

Petitions,  constitutionality  of  provisions  of  Sections  17(1),  17(1)(A),  

17(3)(A), 17(4) and proviso to Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’  for short) alongwith Section 2 of the  

U.P. Act No. VIII of 1994 (hereinafter called ‘the Validating Act’ for short)  

was challenged, so also constitutionality of Sections 3(A), 3(B), 4, 5, 6, 7  

and  8  of  the  Act  was  also  challenged.   In  that  set  of  Writ  Petitions,  

basically,  the notification  issued under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Act  and the  

award dated 25.2.1987 were in challenge.

2. In  some other  Writ  Petitions,  besides the challenge to  the above  

mentioned  provisions,  some  other  notifications  dated  30.12.1995,  

25.1.1992, 4.1.1992 and 15.12.1992 under Section 4(1) of the Act, as well  

as, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act were in challenge.

3. In  some  Writ  Petitions,  the  petitioners  prayed  for  a  Writ  of  

mandamus, commanding the State of U.P. to frame necessary rules and  

regulations  in  respect  of  Sections  11,  11-A  and  17(3)(A)  of  the  Act  

pertaining  to  the  functioning  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  and  also  

sought for an injunction restraining the authorities from interfering with the  

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possession of the Writ Petitioners’ land and to comply with the provisions  

under Sections 3(1A), 3(B), 4(2), 5 and 9(1) of the Act.  They have also  

prayed for a disciplinary action against the Station Officer, Police Station  

Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, U.P.

4. These  are  the  three  sets  of  Writ  Petitions,  which  came  to  be  

disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment.

5. In one of the Writ Petitions, bearing No. 16(L/A) of 1996 filed by one  

Ram Bharosey, award dated 25.2.1987 which was validated in pursuance  

of Section 2 of the Validating Act, was in challenge.

6. In  still  another  set  of  Writ  Petitions,  Pratap  Housing  Cooperative  

Society and some industries prayed for exempting their land from the land  

acquisition proceedings.  In these Writ Petitions, the Writ Petitioners had  

contended  that  they  had  purchased  their  land  from  tenure  holders  for  

Cooperative Societies for providing land to their members and construction  

of the houses.  The Writ Petitioners contended that some being industries  

were manufacturing certain articles and their running business had come  

to the standstill because of the land acquisition activities.

7. In  one  set  of  Writ  Petitions,  it  was  found  that  notifications  were  

issued  under  Section  4  and  sub  Section  (4)  of  Section  17  of  the  Act,  

simultaneously with the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  In these  

cases,  the  possession  was  taken  by  Lucknow  Development  Authority  

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(hereinafter referred to as ‘LDA’ for short), so also the award was passed  

on 25.2.1987.

8. In another set of Writ Petitions, wherein the leading Writ Petition was  

W.P. No. 2220 (L/A) of 1996 filed by Tika Ram & Anr., the notification was  

issued under Section 4(1) and 17 and declaration under Section 6 of the  

Act simultaneously.  However, they were treated to be lapsed and a fresh  

notification came to be issued on 30.12.1991 under Section 4(1) and 17 of  

the Act.  Even in these Writ Petitions, the awards were passed and the  

concerned persons were asked to receive payment of 80% compensation  

by a general  notice.   In  short,  the challenge generally  was to the land  

acquired at the instance of LDA.  Besides this challenge to the provisions  

of  the  Act,  as  also  to  the  provisions  of  the  Validating  Act,  the  Writ  

Petitioners have claimed the non-compliance with the essential provisions  

of Section 4 and 6 of the Act.  They have also challenged the urgency  

clause made applicable to the various land acquisitions.  On merits, it has  

been  suggested  that  there  has  been  no  proper  publication  in  the  

newspapers or at the convenient places of the locality as required under  

Section 4(1) and Section 6 of  the Act.   There has been no preliminary  

survey as envisaged under Section 3(A) of the Act and no damages were  

paid to any tenure holder as provided under Section 3(B) of the Act, either  

before  or  after  passing  of  the  Validating  Act.   There  are  various  such  

challenges on merit to the process of acquisition.

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Short History of Validating Act

9. Earlier, the acquisitions were made by formulating a scheme known  

as  Ujariyaon  Housing  Scheme  (Part-II  and  Part  III).   In  these,  the  

notifications under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6(2) of the  

Act  were  issued simultaneously.   That  was  challenged before the High  

Court at the instance of one Kashmira Singh.  All the Writ Petitions came  

to be allowed on the ground that simultaneous notifications under Sections  

4(1) and 6(2) could not  be issued, particularly,  after  the amendment  of  

Section 17(4) of the Act, which provision was amended by Amending Act  

No. 68 of 1984.  State of Uttar Pradesh filed Special Leave Petition before  

this  Court,  where the order passed by the High Court  was upheld in a  

reported decision in  State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Radhey Shyam Nigam  

reported  in  1989 (1)  SCC 591.   In  these petitions,  schemes known as  

Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II and Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-III  

were the subject matter of the dispute.  While disposing of the case of  

State  of  Uttar  Pradesh Vs.  Radhey Shyam (cited supra),  this  Court  

observed:-

“It  will,  however,  be open to the appellants to issue a fresh  declaration  under  Section  6,  if  so  advised,  within  a  period  contemplated in the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act read  with its first explanation.”

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However,  instead of  doing  that,  it  seems that  a  Bill  was  brought  

before the State Legislature and was passed and the same also received  

assent of the President of India in February, 1991, which was published in  

the Gazette on 27.2.1991.  There was a prefatory note to the following  

effect:-

“The Supreme Court in case of its judgment dated January 11,  1989  held  that  after  the  commencement  of  the  land  Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984), the  declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  cannot  be  made  simultaneously  with  the  publication  in  the  Gazette  Notification  under  Section  4(1)  even  though  the  application  of  Section  5-A  has  been  dispensed  with  under  Section  17(4)  of  the  said  Act.   In  a  large  number  of  proceedings  of  acquisition  of  land  for  the  Development  Authorities  for  the  implementation  of  various  housing  schemes,  the  declaration  under  Section  6  were  made  simultaneously with publication in the Gazette of notification  under Section 4(1).  The said proceedings were likely to be  held void in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme  Court.  In order to save the said scheme from being adversely  affected, it was decided to amend the Land Acquisition Act,  1894  in  its  application  to  Uttar  Pradesh  to  provide  for  validating  the  proceedings  of  land  acquisition  in  respect  of  which the notifications under sub Section (1) of Section 4 and  sub  Section  (4)  of  Section  17  of  the  said  Act  had  been  published in the Gazette on after  September 24,  1984 (the  date of amendment) but before January 11, 1989 (the date of  judgment  of  the Supreme Court)  and the declaration  under  Section  6 had been issued either  simultaneously  or  at  any  time after the application in the Gazette of the said notification  under Section 4(1).”

Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the said Validating Act were as under:-

“2. Amendment of Section 17 of Act No. 1 of 1894:- In  Section  17  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  as  amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, hereinafter  referred to as the Principal Act, in sub-Section (4), the  following proviso shall be inserted at the end and shall  

1

be deemed to  have been inserted on September  24,  1984, namely:-

Provided that where in the case of any land notification  under Section 4, sub-Section (1) has been published in  the official Gazette on or after September 24, 1984 but  before  January  11,  1989  and  the  appropriate  Government  has  under  this  sub-Section  directed  that  the  provisions  of  Section  5-A  shall  not  apply,  a  declaration under Section 6 in respect of the land may  be made either simultaneously with or at any time after  the publication in the official Gazette of the notification  under section 4, sub-Section (1).

3. Validation of certain acquisitions:- Notwithstanding and judgment, decree or order of any  Court, Tribunal or other authority, no acquisition of land  made,  or  purporting  to  have  been  made  under  the  Principal Act, before the commencement of this Act and  no action taken or thing done (including any order or  alteration made, agreement entered into or notification  published in connection with such acquisition which is in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the  Principal  Act  as  amended by this Act shall be deemed to be invalid of  ever  to  have been invalid  merely  on  the ground that  declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Principal  Act  was  published in the official  Gazette on the same date on  which notification under Section 4,  sub Section (1)  of  the Principal Act was published in the official Gazette or  on any other date prior to the date of publication of such  notification as defined in Section 4, sub Section (1) of  the Principal Act.

4. Repeal and saying:- (1) The land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment  

and Validation) ordinance 1990 (U.P. Ordinance  No. 32 of 1990) is hereby repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding  such  repeal,  anything  done  or  any  action  taken  under  the  provisions  of  the  Principal  Act,  as  amended  by  the  Ordinance  referred to in sub Section (1) shall be deemed to  have  been  done  or  taken  under  the  corresponding provisions of the Principal Act, as  

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amended by this Act, as it the provisions of this  Act were in force at all material times.”

10. It should be noted that this Act, which came on 27.2.1991, receiving  

assent  of  the  President  of  India,  was  earlier  challenged  before  the  

Allahabad High Court, where it was found to be valid.  The High Court held  

that the invalidity of the land acquisition in issuance of the Section 4 and  

Section 6 notification simultaneously,  was cured by this Act,  which was  

made applicable with retrospective effect.  It was not with an intention to  

wipe out the judgment of this Court in the case of Radhey Shyam (cited  

supra).   Validity  of  the  Validating  Act  also  came  before  this  Court  in  

Meerut  Development  Authority  Vs.  Satvir  Singh  &  Ors.  reported  in  

1996(11)  SCC 462.  There,  it  was  held that  the exercise of  the power  

under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 were not vitiated and  

the Validating Act was not invalid.  This Court specifically observed in that  

case:-

“It is not in dispute that the State Amendment Act 5 of 1991  was  enacted or  reserved for  consideration  of  the President  and received the assent of the President on 26.2.1991 and the  Act was published in the Gazette on 27.2.1991.  It  is to be  seen  that  as  regards  simultaneous  publication  of  the  notification and the declaration in respect of acquisition of the  land  for  public  purpose  exercising  the  power  of  eminent  domain  in  certain  situation  where  possession  was  needed  urgently,  depending upon the local  needs and the urgency,  Government  requires such power.   Consequently,  the State  Legislature thought it appropriate that despite the enactment  of the Amendment Act, 68 of 1984 amending Section 17(4),  the State needed further amendment.  Resultantly, the U.P.  Amendment Act 5 of 1991 came to be made and it was given  

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retrospective effect from the date of the Amendment Act 68 of  1984 has come into force, i.e., September 24, 1984.

It is true that the proviso was not happily worded but a reading  of it would clearly give us an indication that the proviso to sub  Section (4) introduced by Section 2 of the Amendment Act 5 of  1991  would  deal  with  both  the  situations,  namely,  the  notifications  published on  or  after  September  24,  1984 but  before  January  11,  1989  but  also  the  declaration  to  be  simultaneously  published  subsequent  thereto.   The  literal  interpretation  sought  to  be  put  up  by  Shri  Pradeep  Misra  would defeat the legislative object.  Therefore, ironing out the  creases we are of the view that the proviso applies not only to  the  notifications  and  declarations  simultaneously  published  after the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act 68 of  1984, but also to the future declarations as well.  Thus, it could  be  seen  that  the  proviso  would  operate  prospectively  and  retrospectively  from April  24,  1984 applying to the previous  notifications  and  declarations  but  also  the  notification  and  declaration to be published subsequently.   

It is true that normally the Legislature has to give effect to the  judgment of the Court only to cure the defects pointed out in  the previous judgment so that the operation of the law would  be but in view of the peculiarity namely the special needs of  the State Article 254(2) itself gives such a power to the State  Legislature to amend the law, to make applicable in relation to  that State through Central Law may be inconsistent with the  law operation in the other States.  In other words, when the  topic  is  occupied  in  the  Concurrent  List,  uniformity  of  the  operation of the law is not the rule but simultaneous existence  of the inconsistency would also operate in the same field.  But  when  the  assent  of  the  President  to  the  extent  of  inconsistency is saved in relation to that State.  Therefore, the  amendment by proviso to Section 17(4) is not invalid.   Any  other  construction  would  dry  out  the  power  of  the  State  Legislature to enact the law on the subject of acquisition.”

The effect of  judgment in case of  Radhey Shyam (cited supra),   

thus,  was  nullified.   This  Court  also  took  note  of  the  fact  that  despite  

enactment of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, amending Section 17(4), the  

State  needed  further  amendments  and  for  that  reason,  the  U.P.  

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Amendment Act V of 1991 was passed by giving the retrospective effect  

from the  date  of  the  Amendment  Act,  1984,  which  came into  force on  

24.9.1984.   

11. Relying on these two judgments, the High Court, by the impugned  

judgment, affirmed the validity again and the High Court further repealed  

the argument that these judgments were per incurium and hence required  

reconsideration.  The High Court came to the finding:-

“We have no reason to differ from the decisions of the Division  Benches of this Court, which upheld the vires of Validation Act  particularly  after  the  decisions  of  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  which  binding  upon  this  court  under  Article  141  of  the  Constitution.   As  we  have  indicated  in  the  foregoing  paragraph, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of  the  Constitution  of  India  cannot  open a  chapter  which  had  been closed by Hon’ble Supreme Court by upholding the vires  of  the  Validating  Act.   This  Court  cannot  declare  the  pronouncement  of  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court,  as  per  incurium, even if the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not dwelled  into the”

The  High  Court  held  that  the  Legislature,  by  amending  Act,  has  

merely removed the defect pointed out by this Court in case of  Radhey  

Shyam (cited supra) and removed the basis of the decision rendered by  

the  Court.   The  High  Court  also  rejected  the  argument  regarding  the  

Section 17(4) and the proviso added to it by Validating Act.  Ultimately, the  

High Court, wholly relying on the judgments in Ghaziabad Development  

Authority Vs. Jan Kalyan Samiti  Sheopuri  reported in  1996 (1) SCC  

562,  Ghaziabad  Development  Authority  Vs.  Jan  Kalyan  Samiti,   

Sheopuri reported  in  1996(2)  SCC  365  and  Meerut  Development  

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Authority Vs. Satvir Singh & Ors. (cited supra), held that the High Court  

had no authority to hold these three cases as  per incurium  and since in  

these three cases the Validating Act was upheld, there was no question of  

finding fault with the Validating Act.  Similarly, the High Court also rejected  

the argument regarding the invalidity of Sections 17(1)(3A) and (4) of the  

Act.   The  High  Court  also  independently  considered  the  principle  of  

eminent domain.  The High Court also considered the Ujariyaon Housing  

Scheme Part-II  and found that the final  award was made on 25.2.1987  

while  in  Ujariyaon  Housing  Scheme  Part-III  Scheme,  proceedings  for  

passing  the  award  were  completed  and  were  sent  to  the  appropriate  

authority for scrutiny, consideration and approval.  The High Court went on  

to approve of the application of the urgency clause in both the schemes.  It  

also took into account the argument of the LDA that the possession of the  

lands were  already taken and a new city has already come up on the  

banks of river Gomti and a huge township has come up consisting of flats,  

houses and markets etc. which was constructed by LDA.  Not only this,  

those premises have been transferred to thousands of people, inhabited in  

the colonies and, therefore, it would not be worthwhile to interfere in the  

process of acquisition.  The High Court also approved the argument that  

once a possession was already taken, the Government would not withdraw  

from acquisition nor would the proceedings lapse.  The High Court also  

found,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  the  possession  of  the  whole  land was  

already taken over, contrary to the claim made by the Writ Petitioners that  

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they were still  in possession.  Ultimately,  on all  these grounds, the Writ  

Petitions came to be dismissed.  All the present appeals are against the  

aforementioned common judgment of the High Court, disposing of the Writ  

Petitions.

12. Before this Court also, prolonged arguments were submitted by the  

parties and more particularly, by Shri R.N. Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel  

and Shri Qamar Ahmad & Shri Sudhir Kulshreshtha, Learned Counsel, all  

appearing on behalf of the appellants.  We will consider their contentions  

serially.  All these contentions raised were opposed by Shri Rakesh Kumar  

Dwivedi,  Learned Senior  Counsel  appearing on behalf  of  the LDA, Shri  

Dinesh Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of State of  

Uttar Pradesh, as also other Learned Counsel like Shri Manoj Swarup, Shri  

Anil  Kumar  Sangal,  Shri  C.D.  Singh  and  Shri  Arvind  Varma  etc.,  who  

addressed us extensively, supporting the order.  We have now to consider  

the various contentions raised.

Rival Contentions (Broadly)

I. The Validating Act did not remove the defects

13. Shri  Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel,  who ably led arguments on  

behalf of the appellants, as also Shri Qamar Ahmad, first pointed out that  

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the U.P.  Legislature  passed U.P.  Ordinance No. 32 of  1990,  being the  

Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Ordinance,  

1990 and enforced the same on 27.12.1990.  This Ordinance later on got  

the status of an Act, being Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment  

and Validation) Act, 1991 (U.P. Act No. V of 1991).  Amending Act was  

identical  as the Ordinance.  The thrust  of  the argument of  Shri  Trivedi,  

Learned Senior Counsel, as also other Learned Counsel was against the  

constitutional validity of this Act.  The Act consisted of 4 Sections.  Section  

1 is reproduced hereunder:-

“1. Short Title, extent and commencement:- (1) This Act may be called the Land Acquisition (Uttar  

Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1991. (2) It extends to the whole of Uttar Pradesh. (3) It  shall  be deemed to have come into force on  

December 28, 1990.

Sections 2, 3 & 4 have already been quoted hereinabove. The basic  

argument against this Act was that the only purpose of this Act was to set  

at naught or nullify the judgment of this Court in  State of Uttar Pradesh  

Vs. Radhey Shyam  reported in  1989(1) SCC 591,  by which it was held  

that the declarations under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, which  

were  made simultaneously  with  the publication of  the notification under  

Section 4 of  the Land Acquisition Act,  was an invalid exercise.   It  was  

pointed out by the Learned Senior Counsel further that it is clear from the  

Prefatory  Note  and  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons  that  in  a  large  

number of cases, the declarations under Section 6 of the Act were made  

1

simultaneously with the publication of a notification under Section 4 of the  

Act  and  all  those  acquisitions  had  become  invalid  on  account  of  the  

aforementioned  judgment  of  this  Court.   Further,  in  order  to  save  the  

scheme  of  the  land  acquisition,  it  was  decided  to  amend  the  Act  for  

validating the proceedings in respect of the notifications under Section 4 of  

the  Act  published  on  or  after  24.9.1984  but  before  11.1.1989.   Our  

attention  was  invited  to  sub-Section  (4)  of  Section  17,  which  was  

introduced by the amendment, thereby amending Section 17 of the Act in  

its  application to State of  Uttar  Pradesh.  The Learned Senior  Counsel  

contended that while it was permissible for the State Legislature to pass  

any legislation, it  was not permissible to pass such a legislation only to  

nullify the judgment of this Court, without providing for the displacement of  

the basis or foundation of that judgment.  Number of reported decisions of  

this Court were relied upon for this purpose.  In short, the contention was  

that the State Legislature, by passing the Validating Act, could not knock  

down the judgment passed by this Court unless and until the said Act took  

care to remove the defects or mischiefs pointed out by this Court in its  

judgment,  on  which  the  said  action  was  invalidated,  and  since  the  

Validating  Act  of  1991  did  not  remove  the  basis  or  foundation  of  the  

aforementioned  judgment  of  this  Court  in  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  Vs.  

Radhey Shyam (cited supra),  the Act itself was constitutionally invalid.  

According  to  the  Learned Senior  Counsel,  this  exercise  of  passing the  

Validating Act is nothing, but the invalid trenching upon the judicial powers.  

1

The Learned Senior Counsel, in support of his arguments, relied on the  

following decisions:-

1. S.R. Bhagwat Vs. State of Mysore  reported in  1995  (6) SCC 16.

2. ITW  Signode  India  Ltd.  Vs.  Collector  of  Central   Excise reported in 2004(3) SCC 48.

3. Bakhtawar Trust Vs. M.D. Narayan & Ors. reported in  2003 (5) SCC 298

4. Madan Mohan Pathak Vs. Union of India reported in  1978 (2) SCC 50

5. Indira Gandhi  Vs.  Raj  Narayan reported  in  1975  Supp. SCC 1

6. Virender Singh Hooda Vs. State of Haryana reported  in 2004(12) SCC 588

7. I.N. Saxena Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in  1976(4) SCC 750

8. Janpad Sabha Vs.  C.P.  Syndicate  reported in  1970  (1) SCC 509.

II. Act is ultra vires and constitutionally invalid

14. The second submission was that the said Act is ultra vires the Article  

300A of the Constitution of India, as its effect was to deprive the appellants  

of higher compensation which may be admissible, pursuant to the fresh  

acquisition proceedings after  1987.  Three decisions of  this Court were  

relied upon for this purpose, they being:-

2

1. State  of  Gujarat  Vs.  Ramanlal  reported  in  1983 (2)  SCC 33

2. T.R. Kapur & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana  reported in  1986 Supp. SCC 584

3. Union of India Vs. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty reported  in 1994 (5) SCC 450

Apart from the challenge to the validity of the Act itself, or, as the  

case may be, to the legislative exercise, the amendment brought about by  

that Act vide sub-Section (4) of Section 17 of the Act was challenged as  

ultra  vires,  as  it  sought  to  validate  the  simultaneous  notifications  only  

between 24.9.1984 and 11.9.1989 and no others.  Thereby, the Learned  

Counsel  contended  that  the  other  simultaneous  notifications  were  not  

covered  in  the  Act,  therefore,  the  provision  was  discriminatory.   As  a  

sequel of this Act, it was contended that Section 3 of the Amending Act  

was  ultra vires the Land Acquisition Act, as it permitted declaration being  

made even earlier than the publication of a notification under Section 4 of  

the Act, which was in clear breach of provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the  

Act.   The  Learned  Senior  Counsel  further  urged  that  even  as  per  the  

language of the amended Section 17(4), the said provision insisted that a  

declaration under Section 6 should come “after” Section 4 notification and  

did  not  permit  the  declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  and  the  

notification under Section 4 of the Act being published simulateneously.  It  

was pointed out that main part of the Section 17(4) was not amended.

2

15. The further contention was that Section 3 of the Amending Act is  

ultra vires, inasmuch as the various steps in between Section 4 notification  

and Section 6 declaration were sought to be avoided by the same.  The  

Learned Senior Counsel also sought to highlight  the basic difference in  

Section 4 and Section 6 by contending that while in the former, there is no  

declaration  required,  in  the  latter,  first  the declaration  would  come and  

thereafter, the notification thereof would come under Section 6(2) of the  

Act.  It was, therefore, pointed out that what was sought to be seen is the  

date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act and not its publication and  

thereby, the Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that since the declaration  

under Section 6 of the Act  was made on 4.12.1984, i.e., before the date of  

publication of the notification, therefore, the same is invalid.  The judgment  

in Khadim Hussain vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 1976(1) SCC 843  

was relied upon.  Number of other cases were relied upon to suggest that  

the law required in case of  Khadim Hussain vs. State of U.P. & Ors.   

(cited supra) was still good law and held the field.

15A. The Learned Senior Counsel also contended that even otherwise,  

the language of the Validating Act and more particularly,  of the proviso  

added to Section 17(4) of the principal Act could not remove or cure the  

defect.  It was also contended that  casus omissus cannot be supplied by  

the Court

2

16. The  Learned  Senior  Counsel  then  suggested  that  there  was  

discrimination in Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II and Ujariyaon Housing  

Scheme Part-III and, therefore, there was invidious discrimination meted  

out to the Writ Petitioners (appellants herein).

17. Finding that the challenge to the notification was held to be valid by  

this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Jan Kalyan Samiti   

(cited supra)  and in  Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satvir Singh  

(cited supra),  the Learned Senior Counsel assailed these cases on the  

ground that in these cases, the constitutional validity was not considered at  

all.  It was pointed out then that the High Court judgment was bad, as it did  

not consider the question of validity of the Act merely on the ground that in  

the aforementioned two decisions in Ghaziabad Development Authority  

Vs.  Jan  Kalyan  Samiti  (cited  supra)  and  in  Meerut  Development  

Authority Vs. Satvir  Singh (cited supra),  the said Act  was held valid  

though extensive arguments were made before the High Court suggesting  

as to why the two cases did not apply to the matter.  It was also suggested  

that  we  should  refer  the  matter  to  the  larger  Bench,  as  in  the  

aforementioned two cases,  the questions raised in the appeal were not  

decided.  The contentions raised by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel  

for the appellants can be classified in two major parts, the first part being  

constitutional validity of the Amending Act and the constitutional validity of  

Section  17(4)  proviso  of  the  Act  introduced  thereby,  as  also  the  

2

constitutionality of Section 3 of the Amending Act.  This would be the first  

part.  The other contentions of Shri Trivedi pertain to the merits of the land  

acquisition on the question of date of taking possession, non payment of  

80%  compensation  and  the  policy  of  the  State  Government  regarding  

Cooperative Societies.

Constitutional Validity of the Principal Act provisions

Doctrine of per incuriam

18. These  contentions  of  Shri  Trivedi,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  were  

adopted by Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel who led the arguments  

in  Tika  Ram’s  case  on  behalf  of  appellants.   According  to  him,  the  

judgments  referred  to  in  the  earlier  para  were  per  incuriam.   Learned  

Counsel further argued that Sections 17 (1), 17(1A), 17(3A) and 17(4) as  

also Section 2 are  ultra vires of  Constitution.   Learned Counsel  further  

contends  in  reference  to  the  “explanation”  that  power  given  to  issue  

Section 4 notification is without any guidelines.  Learned Counsel further  

relied on the case of  Anwar Ali Sarkar v. State of U.P.  reported in  AIR  

1952 SC 75 and contended that the said decision which was given by a  

Larger  Bench  of  this  Court  has  remained  undisturbed.   The  stress  of  

Learned Counsel is on Article 14 of the Constitution and he contended that  

the Validation Act allowed the State to discriminate and as a result, the  

2

State Government allowed the notification pertaining to Ujariyaon Part-III  

Scheme  to  lapse  while  the  notifications  pertaining  to  Ujariayon  Part-II  

Scheme were allowed to get protection of the Validation Act and, therefore,  

the  Validation  Act  itself  is  hit  by Article  14.   The Learned Counsel,  as  

regards the Constitutional validity of Section 17 (1) to 17 (4), contends that  

the guidelines on urgency or emergency in Section 17 did not furnish a  

clear  and  definite  guideline  and  consequently  the  State  Government  

discriminated by arbitrarily invoking these provisions in some cases while  

doing so in other cases of similar nature.  It is for this purpose that Anwar  

Ali Sarkar’s case and State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh reported in AIR  

1980 SC 319 were relied on by Shri Qamar Ahmad besides the decisions  

which followed Anwar Ali Sarkar’s case (cited supra).

Defence

19. As  against  this,  Shri  Rakesh  Kumar  Dwivedi,  Learned  Senior  

Counsel appearing on behalf of the LDA and Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Learned  

Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of State of Uttar Pradesh vehemently  

contended that the argument regarding the invalidity of the Amending Act  

could  not  be  reconsidered.   The  Learned  Senior  Counsel  relied  on  

Doctrine of stare decisis in support of their contentions.  They pointed out  

that  this  very  Act  was  tested  by  this  Court  in  the  aforementioned  two  

2

decisions in Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Jan Kalyan Samiti   

(cited supra)  and in  Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satvir Singh  

(cited supra) and found to be valid and, therefore, it was no more open to  

the appellants to reiterate the constitutional invalidity all over again on the  

spacious  ground  that  this  Court  had  not  considered  some  particular  

arguments.  The Learned Senior Counsel were at pains to point out that  

such course is not permissible in law.

20. Even otherwise,  according to the Learned Senior Counsel for the  

respondents,  there was  not  dearth of  power  in  the State  Legislature  in  

introducing Section 17(4)  proviso to the Act  for  the State.   It  was  then  

contended that the very basis of the judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh  

Vs. Radhey Shyam (cited supra) was the invalidity of the State action in  

passing simultaneously the notification under Section 4 and the declaration  

under Section 6 of the Act.  Considering the language of Sections 2 and 3  

of the amending Act, as also considering the proviso provided to Section  

17 of the Principal Act, this Court had come to the conclusion that even  

after  applying  the  urgency  clause  under  Section  17,  such  exercise  of  

passing the Section 4 notification and Section 6 declaration simultaneously  

was valid.  All that the Amending Act had done was to provide a power to  

do so by introducing a proviso by the amendment with retrospective effect  

and, therefore, in reality,  the State Government had removed the defect  

pointed out by this Court of there being no power on the part of the State  

2

Government  to  issue  the  notification  under  Section  4  of  the  Act  and  

declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  simultaneously.   The  Learned  

Senior Counsel further argued that such exercise has been approved of by  

this Court on number of occasions in number of reported decisions.  The  

Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  State,  therefore,  submitted  that  the  

Amending  Act,  as  passed,  was  perfectly  valid,  even  apart  from  the  

argument that it was found to be valid by the two earlier decisions of this  

Court.  As regards the argument of Shri Trivedi that by the newly added  

proviso the defect was not cured.  The Learned Senior Counsel for the  

State argued that the challenge was based on the phrase, “a declaration  

may be made”.  Learned Counsel further contended that the plain reading  

or the literal construction of those words was not correct for the reason that  

the  Legislature  which  is  the  author  of  Section  6(1)  is  the  Central  

Legislature while the proviso which was introduced was by the Legislature  

of  the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh.   Learned  Counsel  argued that  both  the  

Legislatures being different, their choice of words are guided by their own  

objectives and, therefore, the word “made” in Section 6(1) of the principal  

Act and Section 2 of the U.P. Amendment Act can have different meanings  

depending upon the objectives which either Legislature had in mind while  

legislating.   The argument  went  further  and suggested that  if  by giving  

effect to the plain meaning, the very purpose of the law (the Amendment  

Act) is defeated or is rendered nugatory or redundant, it would raise the  

issue of ambiguity necessitating the purposive construction based not only  

2

on text but also the context.  Therefore, the Learned Counsel argued that  

the plain meaning could not be attributed to the concerned words.  Leaned  

Counsel further argued that since the Objects and Reasons appended to  

the U.P. Amendment Act were clear so as to save the scheme which were  

affected by the declaration in Radhey Shyam’s case (cited supra) such  

context had to be kept in mind while interpreting the terms.  In  Radhey  

Shyam’s case (cited supra) admittedly the notifications under Sections  

4(1)  and  6(2)  were  published  simultaneously  in  the  Gazette  clearly  

implying  that  the  declaration  under  Section  6(1)  was  “made”  before  

Gazette publication of the notification under Section 4(1).  If the object of  

Amendment Act was to save the schemes affected by Radhey Shyam’s  

case (cited supra), which is clear also from the language of Section 3 of  

the  Amendment  Act,  then  by  accepting  the  plain  meaning,  the  UP  

Amendment  Act  would  be  rendered  redundant  and,  therefore,  such  

interpretation  has  to  be  avoided.  Learned  Counsel,  relying  on  various  

reported  decisions  like  D.  Saibaba  v.  Bar  Council  of  India  &  Anr.  

reported in  2003 (6) SCC 186, Union of India v. Hansoli Devi & Ors.   

reported in  2002 (7) SCC 273, Prakash Kumar @ Prakash Bhutto v.   

State of Gujarat reported in 2005 (2) SCC 409, High Court of Gujarat &  

Anr. v. Gujarat Kisan Mazdoor Panchayat & Ors.  reported in  2003 (4)  

SCC 712, Padmausundara Rao (Dead)& Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu &   

Ors. reported in 2002 (3) SCC 533, Smt. Meera Gupta v. State of West  

Bengal & Ors.  reported in  1992 (2) SCC 494, M.V. Javali v. Mahajan  

2

Borewell & Co. & Ors.  reported in  1997 (8) SCC 72 stressed upon the  

purposive interpretation or, as the case may be, contextual interpretation  

and to avoid the literal construction rule.  He relied on a few other cases  

like State of  Tamil Nadu v. Kodai Kanal  reported in  1986 (3) SCC 91,   

Union of India & Ors.  v.  Filip  Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De  

Gama reported in 1990 (1) SCC 277 and Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh  

& Ors.  reported in  AIR 1955 SC 830.  The Learned Counsel contended  

that it was the duty of the Court to reshape the provisions, if need be, by  

adding or deleting words to make the provisions effective tools to achieve  

legislative objective and the Courts could not sit with folded hands blaming  

the  draftsmen.   As  regards  the  concerned  words  appearing  in  the  UP  

Amendment Act, the Learned Counsel suggested that while interpreting,  

the phrase “may be made” should be read as “may be published in the  

Gazette”.   

21. As regards the further arguments on merits, Learned Senior Counsel  

and, more particularly, the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of  

the LDA pointed out that the challenge to the land acquisitions on merits  

could  not  survive,  particularly,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  in  all  the  land  

acquisitions, possessions were already taken and the awards were already  

passed.  Both the Learned Counsel pointed out that in case of Ujariyaon  

Housing Scheme Part-III,  the Government had shown its  bona fides by  

allowing the notifications therein to lapse and thereby, the interests of the  

2

land  holders  covered  in  Ujariyaon  Housing  Scheme  Part-III  were  

safeguarded, particularly, because that scheme had not been completed.  

However, Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II was long back completed and  

could  not  be  rejuvenated  now,  finding  fault  with  the  process  of  land  

acquisition covered between Section 4 and Section 18 thereof.  Learned  

Counsel further pointed out that the delay in filing the writ petitions is also  

liable to be taken into account since it is likely to cause prejudice to those  

for  whom the  schemes were  framed.   As  regards  the  urgency  clause,  

Learned Counsel urged that the land was very urgently required for urban  

housing and after the acquisition there has been large scale development  

and utilization on the acquired land and thousands of constructions have  

been made and the schemes have been evolved leading to allotments to  

third parties.  Now at this stage, if the notifications were to be quashed it  

would seriously prejudice the interest of the large number of people and  

the High Court was right in dismissing the Writ Petitions on this ground.  

The Learned Counsel further argued that in this case it must be noted that  

there are no allegations of  mala fides or any evidence in support  of  it.  

Relying on a judgment in State of U.P. V. Pista Devi reported in 1986 (4)  

SCC 251 the  Senior  Counsel  pointed  out  that  judicial  notice  has  been  

taken by the High Court  of  the fact  that  the housing development  and  

planned developments are matters of great urgency and obviate Section  

5A enquiry.  In short, the argument was that the housing development was  

itself in urgency justifying the invocation of the urgency clause.  It was then  

3

pointed out by the Learned Senior Counsel that the High Court had looked  

into the record and found that there was sufficient material before the State  

Government so as to invoke the urgency clause.  It was also urged that  

there  was  no  discrimination  in  between  Ujariyaon  Part-II  Scheme  and  

Ujariyaon Part- III  Scheme as the factual situation was different.  It was  

further  argued that  the  argument  pressed on Section 17  (3A)  i.e.  non-

payment of compensation before taking possession cannot be held fatal to  

the acquisition as the Land Acquisition Act does not so provide, though it  

has so provided in case of Section 11 and Section 11A read with Section  

23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act.  Besides, the use of word “shall” in  

Section 17 (3A) is directory and not mandatory as held in  S.P. Jain v.   

State of U.P.  reported in  1993 (4) SCC 369, Nasiruddin & Ors. v. Sita   

Ram  Agrawal  reported  in  2003  (2)  SCC  577,  State  of  U.P.  v.   

Manbodhan  Lal  Srivastava  reported  in  1957  SCR  533.   It  was  also  

pointed out that the rulings relied on by the appellants covering this aspect,  

namely,  Hindustan  Petroleum  Corporation  Ltd.  v.  Darius  Shapur  

Chenai & Ors. reported in 2005 (7) SCC 627 and Union of India & Ors.   

v. Mukesh Hans  reported in 2004 (8) SCC 14 were not applicable and  

were distinct.   

22. The appeals were also opposed by respondent No. 9 Avadh School  

who supported the arguments on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh and  

LDA.  The respondent No.9 Avadh School pointed out that the land was  

3

granted  to  it  by  LDA for  99  years  dated  01.12.1995  whereas  the  Writ  

Petition challenging the same bearing No. 2220 (L/A)/1996 from which the  

Civil Appeal No. 2650/1998 arose was filed only later on, in the year 1996.  

It was pointed out that the respondent-Avadh School had already paid the  

entire  amount  due  to  the  LDA.   It  was  also  pointed  out  that  the  total  

constructed area on the land is  26,000 square feet.   It  was  urged that  

considering the laudable objects of the scheme, the school was developed  

and further considering its progress in the matter of infrastructure and the  

standard of education, it would be too late to cancel the acquisition of land  

a portion of which was allegedly allotted by the LDA.   

23. Learned Counsel on behalf of LDA referred to the history of case law  

and reiterated upon the validity of the UP Act No.5 of 1991.  The Learned  

Counsel  also  reiterated  that  the  declaration  under  Section  6  (1)  was  

different from a published declaration.  The contention, therefore, was that  

considering the scheme of the Act, the declaration referred to in Section 6  

is public or notified declaration. Taking that clue, it is argued that there will  

be  no  difficulty  if  Sections  2  and  3  of  the  Validating  Act  are  properly  

understood.   It  was  argued that  the Validating  Act  removes the  defect  

pointed out  in  the case of  Radhey Shyam (cited supra) and also the  

validating provisions and, therefore, it is not a case of simplicitor overruling  

of the judgment of the Supreme Court.

3

24. Learned Counsel for LDA also opposed reference to Larger Bench.  

It was further pointed that since the schemes of Ghaziabad Development  

Authority(GDA)  and  Meerut  Development  Authority(MDA)  were  already  

upheld, the dispute in Ujariyaon Part-II scheme of LDA involved only 150  

bighas  whereas  the  notification  pursuant  to  Ujariyaon  Part-II  Scheme  

involved 1776 acres of  land and barring the appellants,  everybody had  

accepted this scheme.  Learned Counsel seriously disputed the claim in  

Tika Ram’s case and contended that the landowners had already accepted  

the compensation.  In case of Pratap Sahakari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd., it  

was pointed out that the sale agreement in that case was that there was no  

passing of consideration and even transfers were subsequent to Section 4  

notification.   Therefore,  it  was  contended  that  the  sale  deed  and  the  

agreement of sale were created to take advantage of the policy decision of  

the State for giving back 25 per cent of the developed land to the Society  

for  its  members.   The  bona fides of  the  Pratap  Sahakari  Grih  Nirman  

Samiti Ltd. were, therefore, seriously questioned by the Counsel.  It was  

also pointed out that the land involved in this case was already taken over  

in the year 1985 and the same also stood utilized inasmuch as the whole  

township had come up thereupon.  Learned Counsel also relied on the  

principle of staire decisis insofar as the validity of the UP Amendment Act  

is concerned.   

3

25. Learned Counsel further argued that there was no question of future  

operation  of  the  proviso  as  it  was  not  concerned in  this  case.   It  was  

pointed  out  that  only  two  appeals  of  Ujariyaon  Part-III  Scheme  were  

concerned, with that question.  However, in that case the notification was  

published in the year 1991 and the Section 6 declaration was signed and  

published  in  the  year  1992.   Therefore,  there  was  no  question  of  

simultaneous  publication  and,  therefore,  the  issue  of  reference  to  the  

Larger Bench was a non-issue and could not be gone into.  It is pointed out  

that the case of  Meerut Development Authority (cited supra) was the  

complete answer to the validation aspect as that issue had arisen directly.  

It was further argued that there was no question of discriminating between  

the Ujariyaon Part-II  Scheme and Part-III  Scheme, and, therefore, there  

was no question of breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.  It was  

argued  that  in  Ujariyaon  Part-II  Scheme,  the  award  was  made  by  the  

Collector  within  the  time  prescribed,  so  there  was  no  question  of  

discrimination between Ujariyaon Part-II and Part-III Schemes where the  

award was not made within time.  Therefore, it  was lapsed and hence,  

there was necessity of  a fresh notification.   As regards the question of  

validity of Section 17 of the Act, it was mainly in Tika Ram’s appeal, it was  

pointed out by Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel that the reference to  

the decision in  Anwar Ali Sarkar v. State of U.P.  reported in AIR 1952  

SC 75 and State  of  Punjab  v.  Gurdial  Singh (cited supra)  was  not  

called for.  In support of his argument Shri Dwivedi pointed out that Anwar  

3

Ali Sarkar’s case (cited supra) was distinguished in the later decisions of  

Kathi Ranning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra reported in 1952 SCR 435  

and Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal reported in 1953 SCR  

30.   It  was  pointed  out  that  it  was  now  crystallized  law  that  if  the  

Legislature indicates the policy which inspired it  and the object which it  

seeks to attain then it can leave selective application of the law to be made  

by the Executive Authority.   Learned Counsel relied on  R.K. Dalmia v.  

S.R.  Tendolkar reported in  1959 SCR 279 and  In re:  Special  Courts  

Bills,  1978  reported in 1979 (1) SCC 380.   It  was pointed out that the  

criteria  of  “urgency”  and  “emergency”  in  the  instant  case  have  been  

prescribed in the context of the exercise of power of eminent domain and  

this power under the Constitution of India can be exercised only for public  

purpose.  

26. Learned Counsel argued that the process of acquisition begins only  

when there is a public purpose and in such situation the effectuation of  

public  purpose  does  not  brook  any  delay  and  requires  quick  

implementation,  then  alone  the  power  under  Section  17  (1)  read  with  

Section 17 (4) can be exercised.  The Learned Counsel firmly admits that  

the criterion of “emergency” is still narrower category and there is sufficient  

guideline in sub-Section (2) of Section 17.  Therefore, the Counsel argues  

that the true criteria being clear guidelines, they are not arbitrary. It was  

further argued that there is no discretion in the matter of applied urgency  

3

clause to  these acquisitions  in  question.   Carrying  the  same argument  

further, Learned Counsel firmly admitted that Section 5A is a protection to  

the land acquisition and should not be lightly dispensed with.   He also  

admitted that there are cases where it was held that the mere existence of  

urgency is not enough and State Government must independently apply its  

mind to  the need of  dispensing  with  Section 5A enquiry.   Further  it  is  

pointed out that the High Court had considered this aspect in details and  

recorded  the  finding  that  the  land  was  acquired  for  planning  and  

development of housing accommodations.  It was pointed out that the High  

Court had also looked into the records and it found that there was sufficient  

material  for  forming  opinion  that  the  land  was  needed  urgently  for  

developing a new township known as Gomti Nagar.  Learned Counsel also  

pointed out to the finding of the High Court to the effect that the township  

had  already  come into  the  existence  and  the  houses  were  allotted  to  

thousands of people.  

27. Relying on Keshav Das v. State of U.P. reported in 1995 (6) SCC  

240, Learned Counsel urged that it has been held in the above ruling that  

where the possession of the land was already taken during the acquisition  

process and construction had been made and completed, the question of  

urgency and exercise of duty under Section 17 (4) of the Act could not be  

raised at a belated stage.  Therefore, Learned Counsel insisted that the  

situation is no different in the present  case.  Further relying on  Aditya  

3

Bhagat v. State of Bihar reported in 1974 (2) SCC 501 and Om Prakash  

v. State of U.P. reported in 1998 (6) SCC 1, Learned Counsel urged that  

as compared to the total acquisition, the appellants’ land holding is limited  

to only 150 bighas of land and in such circumstances the Court should not  

block  the  acquisition.   As  regards  the  question  of  non-payment  of  

compensation under Section 17 (3) and (3A) of the Act, Learned Counsel  

pointed out that the documents filed in support of their plea were never  

filed before the High Court whereas this Writ Petition was pending for as  

long as 13 years and even after filing the special  leave petition,  it  was  

pending for about 10 years.  The documents came to be filed only after 8  

years.  Since the document involved question of fact, applications made in  

this behalf, namely, I.A. Nos. 4-5 of 2006, were liable to be rejected.  It was  

pointed out  that  the documents filed along with  the said I.As.  were not  

authenticated and verified by the appellant.  The sources from which the  

documents emanated were also not indicated.  It was further pointed out  

that sub-Section (3) of Section 3(3A) of Section 17 are not attracted to a  

case  where  the  power  under  Section  17  (4)  has  been  exercised  and  

Section 5A has been dispensed with.  It is again pointed out that Section  

17 (3) and (3A) do not provide consequences of non-tendering and non-

payment of estimated compensation in terms of the said provision and the  

Act does not say that the if possession and development have been taken  

and  the  development  work  has  been  done  without  compliance  of  the  

provisions then the taking of possession and the work done would become  

3

illegal.  Learned Counsel further pointed out that all that it provided for was  

the payment of interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on the amount  

of compensation where compensation is not paid or deposited on or before  

taking possession. In support of this argument the Counsel relied on S.P.  

Jain  v.  State  of  U.P.  reported  in  1993  (4)  SCC  369 and  State  of  

Maharashtra  v.  Manubhai  Pragaji  Vashi  & Ors.  reported  in 1996 (3)  

SCC 1.

28. On the basis of these rival claims we shall now proceed to decide  

the issues raised in this appeal, which are as follows.

I. Constitutional Validity of Amendment Act 5/1991

29. The basic issue raised is regarding the Constitutional validity of the  

Land Acquisition Act (Amendment Act No. 5 of 1991) (hereinafter called,  

“the Amending Act”).  In this case the notification under Section 4 read with  

Section 17 (4), as it stood then, was made on 04.12.1984.  This notification  

was  published  in  the  Gazette  on  08.12.1984.   It  is  claimed  that  the  

declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 04.12.1984 and the  

said declaration was published in the Gazette on 08.12.1984.     It  was  

found that  simultaneous notification  under  Sections  4  and 6 of  the Act  

could not be made and, therefore, the acquisitions were bad, as held in  

Kashmira Singh Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1987 Allahabad 113  

3

(II/1).   Kashmira Singh’s  judgment  was  upheld by this  Court.   It  was,  

therefore, that an Ordinance came to be passed on 27.12.1989 by U.P. Act  

No. 32 of 1990 which ultimately became an Act on 27.02.1991 being UP  

Act No.5 of 1991.  The Statement of Objects and Reasons made reference  

to  the  aforementioned judgment  in  the  Kashmira Singh’s  case (cited  

supra) and provided that  in  large number  of  cases,  declarations under  

Sections 6 were made simultaneously with publication of notification under  

Section  4  and  the  said  proceedings  were  likely  to  be  held  void  and,  

therefore, in order to save the scheme, it was decided to amend the Act for  

validating the proceedings in respect of the notification under Section 4  

publication on or after 24.09.1984 but before 11.01.1989.  The amendment  

of Section 17 was brought on the legal anvil by way of a proviso to sub-

section (4) thereof which ran as under:

“provided  that  where  in  case  of  any  land  notification  under  Section  4(1)  has  been  published  in  the  official  Gazette on or after 24.09.1984 but before 11.01.1989  and  the  appropriate  Government  has  under  this  sub- Section  direction  that  proviso  of  Section  5A  was  not  applied, a declaration under Section 6 in respect of the  land may be made either simultaneously at a time after  the publication in the official Gazette of the notification  under Section 4(1)”

30. The first objection which was raised by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior  

Counsel for the appellants, as well as, the other Learned Counsel was that  

it was merely to overrule the decision of this Court in the aforementioned  

case of Kashmira Singh (cited supra) or, as the case may be, State of  

3

U.P.  v.  Radhey  Shyam  Nigam  (cited  supra)  which  matter  was  also  

disposed  of  along  with  Kashmira  Singh’s  case  (cited  supra) and,  

therefore,  the  State  Legislature  could  not  do  so.   This  argument  is  

completely  answered  in  Meerut  Development  Authority  Vs.  Satbir  

Singh  reported in  1996 (11) SCC 462.  This Court was considering this  

very  proviso  of  Section  17  (4)  inserted  by  Land  Acquisition  [U.P.  

Amendment and Validation Act, 1991 [UP Act No. 5 of   1991] and relying  

upon the judgment reported as GDA Vs. Jan Kalyan Samiti,  Sheopuri   

reported in 1996 (2) SCC 365, the Court took the view in paragraph 10 that  

when  this  Court  had  declared  a  particular  statute  to  be  invalid,  the  

Legislature had no power to overrule the judgment.  However, it has the  

power to suitably amend the law by use of proper phraseology removing  

the defects pointed out by the Court and by amending the law inconsistent  

with the law declared by the Court so that the defects which were pointed  

out were never on statute for enforcement of law.  Such an exercise of  

power to amend a statute is not an incursion on the judicial power of the  

Court  but  as  a  statutory  exercise  on  the  constituent  power  to  suitably  

amend the law and to validate the actions which have been declared to be  

invalid.   The  Court  had  specifically  referred  to  the  aforementioned  

judgment of State of UP. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam (cited supra) as also  

Somwanti & Ors. v. State of Punjab reported in 1963 (2) SCR 775.  The  

Court also referred to the judgment reported as Indian Aluminium Co. 7  

Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in 1996 (7) SCC 637 and referred  

4

to the nine principles of legislation referred to in this case, where principle  

Nos. 8 and 9 ran thus:

“[8] In exercising legislative power the Legislature by mere  declaration,  without  anything  more,  cannot  directly  overrule,  revise or override a judicial  decision.   It  can  render judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law  on  the  topic  within  its  legislative  field  fundamentally  altering  or  changing  its  character  retrospectively.  The  changed or altered conditions are such that the previous  decision would not have been rendered by the Court, if  those conditions had existed at the time of declaring the  law as invalid.   It  is also empowered to give effect to  retrospective  legislation  with  a  deeming  date  or  with  effect from a particular date. The Legislature can change  the character  of  the tax or duty form impermissible to  permissible tax but the tax or levy should answer such  character  and the Legislature is competent  to recover  the  invalid  tax  validating  such  a  tax  or  removing  the  invalid base for recovery from the subject or render the  recovery from the State ineffectual.   It is competent for  the legislature to enact the law with retrospective effect  and authorize its agencies to levy and collect the tax on  that  basis,  make  the  imposition  of  levy  collected  and  recovery  of  the  tax  made  valid,  notwithstanding  the  declaration  by  the  Court  or  the  direction  given  for  recovery thereof.

[9] The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions  of  this  Court  is  that  the  legislature  cannot  directly  overrule the decision or make a direction as not binding  on it but has power to make the decision ineffective by  removing the base on which the decision was rendered,  consistent  with  the  law  of  the  Constitution  and  the  legislature must have competence to do the same."  

31. As  regards  the  proviso  in  question,  the  Court  firstly  observed  in  

paragraph 13 and 14 as under:

“13. It is not in dispute that the State Amendment Act 5 of  1991 was enacted and reserved for consideration of the  

4

President and received the assent of the President on  26.02.1991 and the Act was published in the Gazette n  27.02.1991.   It  is  to  be  seen  that  as  regards  simultaneous  publication  of  the  notification  and  the  declaration in respect of acquisition of the land for public  purpose  exercising  the  power  of  eminent  domain  in  certain  situations  where  possession  was  needed  urgently,  depending  upon  the  local  needs  and  the  urgency,  Government  requires  such  power.  Consequently,  the  State  Legislature  thought  it  appropriate  that  despite  the  enactment  of  the  Amendment Act 68 of 1984 amending Section 17(4), the  State needed further amendment.  Resultantly, the UP  Amendment Act 5 of 1991 came to be made and it was  given retrospective effect from the date the Amendment  Act 68 of 1984 has come into force, i.e. 24.09.1984.

14. It is true that the proviso was not happily worded.  But a  reading of it would clearly give us an indication that the  proviso to sub-Section (4) introduced by Section 2 of the  Amendment  Act  5  of  1991  would  deal  with  both  the  situations, namely, the notifications published on or after  24.09.1984  but  before  11.01.1989  but  also  the  declaration to be simultaneously published subsequent  thereto.  The literal interpretation sought to be put up by  Shri Pradeep Misra would defeat the legislative object.  Therefore,  ironing out the creases we are of  the view  that the proviso applies not only to the notifications and  declarations simultaneously published after the date of  coming into force of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 but  also to the future declarations as well.  Thus, it could be  seen that the proviso would operate prospectively and  retrospectively from 24.04.1984 (sic 24.9.1984) applying  to the previous notifications and declarations but also to  the  notification  and  declaration  to  be  published  subsequently.”

Further in paragraph 16, the Court held:

“16. It is seen that Section 3 of the Amending Act No.5 of  1991  seeks  to  validate  the  illegal  declarations  made  simultaneously  with  the  publication  of  Section  4  notification  and  in  some  cases  even  prior  to  the  publication  of  Section  4  notification;  it  also  seeks  to  

4

validate  certain  acquisitions  envisaged  therein.   This  validation is not illegal.”

32. In the same paragraph the Court found that the amendment was not  

illegal merely because it was brought during the pendency of matter before  

this  Court.   The  Court  also  did  not  find  anything  wrong  with  the  

retrospective  operation  of  the  Amendment  Act.   The  Court  further  in  

paragraph 19 observed:

“It is seen that where large extent of land was acquired mere  existence of some houses even if they were constructed may  be according to the rules or may not be according to the rules;  the exercise of power under Section 17 (4) by the Government  dispensing with the enquiry does not become invalid,  when  there was urgency to take possession of the acquired land.  It  is now settled legal position that the acquisition for planned  development of housing scheme is also an urgent purpose as  laid down by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lieutenant Governor of   Delhi, State of UP v. Pista Devi and in recent judgment of this   Court .in State of Tamil  Nadu v. L. Krishnan.  In the light of  settled legal position the acquisition for housing development  is an urgent purpose and exercise of the power under Section  17(4)  dispensing  with  the  enquiry  under  Section  5A  is  not  invalid.”

33. In fact, this judgment is a complete answer to the questions raised  

by  Shri  Trivedi,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants.   It  holds  

Section 3 to be valid and also holds that it  had cured the defect.   The  

judgment also takes care of the contention that there was no necessity to  

raise the urgency clause in these acquisitions and the exercise of raising  

the  urgency clause was  not  bona fide.   Various  other  judgments  were  

referred by Shri Trivedi which we have included in the earlier part of the  

4

judgment  like  S.R.  Bhagwat  v.  State  of  Mysore  (cited  supra),  ITW  

Signode  India  Ltd.  v.  Collector  of  Central  Excise  (cited  supra),   

Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan & Ors. (cited supra), Madan Mohan  

Pathak v. Union of India (cited supra), Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narayan  

(cited supra), Virender  Singh  Hooda  v.  State  of  Haryana  (cited  

supra),  I.N.  Saxena  v.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh (cited  supra)  and  

Janpad Sabha v. C.P. Syndicate (cited supra).   In view of the specific  

questions of this very act having been considered in Meerut Development  

Authority’s case (cited supra) there would be no necessity to go into the  

principles laid down in aforementioned cases in details here.

34. The next argument of Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel was that  

the Amending Act did not remove the defect.  In our opinion, the contention  

is  incorrect  in  view  of  the  fact  that  this  question  was  considered  and  

concluded in Meerut Development Authority’s case (cited supra).  The  

same  applies  to  the  further  question  challenging  Section  3  of  the  

Amending  Act  wherein  it  is  provided  that  the  notification  would  not  be  

invalid  on  the  ground  that  declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  was  

published on the same day on which the notification under Section 4 of the  

Act was published or on any other date prior to the date of publication of  

notification under Section 4 of the Act.  We have already pointed out that  

this Section was also considered specifically in paragraph 7 where it  is  

4

quoted.  Further in paragraph 16 which we have quoted, this question is  

specifically answered.  We, therefore, need not dilate on that issue here.   

35. At this juncture, we must note the argument raised in the present  

case  that  the  declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  was  made  on  

04.12.1984 but was published on 08.12.1984.  Therefore, in reality,  the  

proviso did not actually cure the defect.  It is because of the wording used  

to the effect “a declaration under Section 6     in respect of the land may be    

made either simultaneously with or at any time after the publication in the  

official Gazette of the notification under Section 4.”

36. Learned Counsel  pointed out  that  in  the present  case,  Section 6  

declarations  were  made  earlier  to  the  publication  of  notification  under  

Section 4 of the Act.  They further pointed out in proviso again the wording  

used is “declaration may be made.”  Learned Counsel, therefore, argued  

that even reading Sections 2 and 3 of the Amending Act, the defect is not  

cured as the proviso empowers to “make a declaration” and does not refer  

to “notification of declaration” under Section 6(2).  The Learned Counsel,  

therefore,  intended  that  it  is  not  permissible  to  supply  words  (casus  

omissus) to the proviso and, therefore, if the proviso is read as it is, then it  

conflicts with the language of Section 3 which speaks not of declaration,  

but  “publication  of  Section  6  notification”.   We  do  not  think  that  the  

contention  is  correct.   In  paragraph  16  of  Meerut  Development  

4

Authority’s  case  (cited  supra),  this  Court  considered  Section  3  and  

observed that:-

“it is seen that Section 3 of the Amending Act No.5 of 1991 seeks to  validate  the  illegal  declarations  made  simultaneously  with  the  publication of Section 4 notification and in some cases even prior to  the publication of Section 4 notification.”

Thus, even a situation where Section 6 declaration was made prior  

to the publication of notification under Section 4, was held to be covered  

and cured under Section 3,  the validity of  which was confirmed by this  

Court.  It would, therefore, be futile to argue that the Act did not cure the  

defect  and on that  account,  the provision is bad. In our opinion, added  

proviso would have to be read along with and in the light of Section 3 of  

the amending Act which clearly envisages a situation of  the declaration  

under Section 6 being published in the official Gazette on the same date  

on which notification under Section 4 sub-section (1) of the principal Act   

was  published  in  official  Gazette  or  on  any  day  prior  to  the  date  of   

publication of such notification as defined in Section 4 sub-section (1) of   

the principal Act   (emphasis supplied).    Therefore, what is contemplated in  

proviso  is  the  “publication”  of  notification.   Since  this  position  was  not  

happily obtained in the proviso, the Court in MDA’s case (cited supra), in  

paragraph 14, commented that proviso was not happily worded.    

37. It must be noted here that in  Somwanti’s case (cited supra), as  

also in  Mohd. Ali & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.  reported in  1998 (9)  

4

SCC 480  decided by 3 Judge Bench, identical situation was obtained on  

the  facts  where  there was  a simultaneous  publication  of  the  Section 4  

notification along with the publishing of Section 6 declaration.  The Court  

observed in Mohd. Ali’s case (cited supra):

“And,  therefore,  in  relation  to  the  State  of  U.P.,  it  is  now  settled law that when the State exercises power of imminent  domain and in  exercise of  the power  under  Section  17 (4)  dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A to acquire the  land  under  Section  4  (1),  the  State  is  entitled  to  have  the  notification  under  Section  4(1)  and  the  declaration  under  Section 6 simultaneously published so as to take further steps  as required under Section 9 of the Act…….”

38. In  that  case,  the  notification  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Act  was  

published on 12.10.1974 whereas the declaration under Section 6 of the  

Act was dated 28.09.1974.  However, it was published along with Section  

4 notification simultaneously.  This being the factual situation the argument  

regarding the prior declaration under Section 6 of the Act must fall to the  

ground.

39. We are also of the opinion that the word ‘a declaration’ in proviso to  

Section 17 (4) as inserted by the Validating Act would mean published or a  

notified declaration under Section 6 (2) of the Act when it is read in the  

light of Section 3 which refers to and validates not merely “a declaration”,  

but  the publication thereof  in  official  Gazette.   As such we do not  find  

anything wrong even if the declaration is prior in time and its notification is  

4

simultaneous with the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition  

Act.  The two authorities cited above, namely,  Ghaziabad Development  

Authority’s case and Meerut Development Authority’s case have taken  

the same view and we are in respectful agreement with the same.

40. It was then argued that Section 17 (4) of the Act as amended by the  

Amending Act is ultra vires of the Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution  

as it nearly overrules the decision of this Court in State of UP v. Radhey  

Shyam Nigam (cited supra).  We have already dealt with this issue and  

pointed  out  that  this  question  was  specifically  dealt  with  in  the  two  

judgments  of  Lucknow  Development  Authority  and  Meerut  

Development Authority (cited supra).  A very strong reliance was placed  

on Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India reported in 1978 (2) SCC 50  

by Shri  Trivedi,  Learned Senior  Counsel  for  the appellants.   In  Meerut  

Development  Authority’s  case  (cited  supra), the  aforementioned  

decision in Madan Mohan Pathak’s case (cited supra) has already been  

considered in paragraph 11 of that judgment.  Reliance was also placed on  

the judgment in  Bakhtawar Trust v.  M.D. Narayan & Ors.  reported in  

2003  (5)  SCC  298.   Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant  relied  on  

paragraphs 14 to 16. In our opinion, paragraph 14 was completely against  

the appellants wherein the State Legislature’s power to make retrospective  

legislation and thereby validating the prior executive and legislative acts  

retrospectively is recognized.  Of course, the same has to be done only  

4

after curing the defects that led to the invalidation.  We respectfully agree  

with the propositions laid down in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 thereof. In  

Shri  Prithvi  Cotton  Mills  Ltd.  Vs.  Broach  Borough  Municipality  

reported in 1969 (2) SCC 283,  which is referred to in paragraph 16 of the  

decision, it is stated that:-

“the Legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while  it does so, it may neutralize the effect of earlier decision of the Court  which becomes ineffective after the change of law”.   

It  is  further  stated  therein  that  the  validity  of  the  validating  law,  

therefore,  depends  upon  whether  the  Legislature  possesses  the  

competence which it claims over the subject matter and whether in making  

the validation  it  removes the defect  which  the Courts  had found in  the  

existing law.  The Amending Act has clearly passed these tests.  All the  

relevant  cases  on this  subject  have  been considered  in  this  judgment.  

Again in ITW Signode v. Collector of Central Excise reported in 2004 (3)  

SCC  48  (cited  supra),  our  attention  was  invited  by  Shri  Trivedi  to  

paragraphs  44  to  46  of  this  decision  which  dealt  with  the  question  of  

validity of  validating Act  and reference is  made to  Shri  Prithvi  Cotton  

Mills Ltd. Vs. Broach Borough Municipality  reported in  1969 (2) SCC  

283  and M/s.  Ujagar  Prints  and  Others  (II)  Vs.  Union of  India  and  

Others  reported  in  1989  (3)  SCC  488.  There  is  nothing  in  these  

paragraphs which would go counter to the expressions made in  MDA’s  

case (cited  supra) or  the  finding  that  the  present  Amending  Act  has  

4

removed the defects pointed out in Radhey Shyam’s case (cited supra).  

Of  course,  this  case  pertains  to  the  taxing  statutes.   We do  not  find  

anything  contrary  in  the  other  decisions,  namely,  S.R.  Bhagwat’s  and  

Indira Gandhi’s case (both cited supra) to which we have already made  

reference.  The other cases, namely, Virender Singh Hooda’s case, I.M.  

Saxena’s case, and Janpad Sabha’s case (all cited supra) need not be  

considered in view of what we have held above and further there is nothing  

in those cases which would make us take another view of the matter.  We,  

therefore,  do  not  agree  with  the  contention  raised  by  Shri  Trivedi  that  

amended Section 17 (4) is  ultra vires as it does not remove the defects  

That question is closed by  MDA’s case (cited supra).  We also do not  

agree that it merely nullifies the judgment in Radhey Shyam’s case (cited  

supra).

41. It was further argued by Shri Trivedi that the Amending Act is  ultra  

vires the  Article  300 A of  the  Constitution  inasmuch as it  deprives  the  

petitioner of higher compensation as may be admissible pursuant to the  

fresh acquisition proceedings after 1987.  Three cases have been relied  

upon, namely, State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni &  

Ors.  reported  in  1983  (2)  SCC  33,  T.R.  Kapoor  &  Ors.  v.  State  of   

Haryana & Ors. reported in 1986 Suppl. SCC 584 and Union of India v.   

Tushar Rajan Mohanty reported in 1994 (5) SCC 450, wherein it is held  

that the Legislature cannot create prospective or retrospective law so as to  

5

contravene  the  fundamental  rights  and  that  the  law  must  satisfy  the  

requirements of the Constitution.  We have absolutely no quarrel with that,  

however, we fail to understand as to how it applies here.  For establishing  

their  rights,  the  appellants  would  have  to  establish  that  the  State  

Government was required, in law, to make a fresh acquisition and could  

not  continue with  the old  one.   We have already held that  we are not  

convinced by the argument that there was anything wrong with  the old  

proceedings which came to be validated by the Amending Act.  We have  

also found that the Amending Act was a perfectly valid legislation.  In that  

view, the challenge must fail.   

42. The second decision relied upon is T.R. Kapoor & Ors. v. State of   

Haryana & Ors. reported in 1986 Suppl. SCC 584.  This case has been  

relied upon for the contents in paragraphs 5 and 16 wherein it has been  

held that benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away  

by an amendment with retrospective effect.  The present case is not such  

a case.  No benefits could be said to have been accrued in favour of the  

appellants herein which have been taken away.   

43. To the same effect, is the third decision reported as Union of India  

v. Tushar Rajan Mohanty reported in 1994 (5) SCC 450.  We do not think  

that the case is relevant to the present issue.

5

44. The  further  argument  by  the  Shri  R.N.  Trivedi,  Learned  Senior  

Counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  herein  was  about  the  

validity of Section 3 of the Validating Act, providing that a notification would  

not be invalid on a ground that a declaration under Section 6 of the Act  

was published on the same date, on which the notification under Section 4  

of the Act was published or any other day prior to the date of publication of  

the notification under Section 4 of the Act.  The contentions made in this  

behalf  have  already  been  considered  by  us  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  

judgment, where we held that the relevant date would be that of notification  

under Section 4 of the Act or the notification of declaration under Section 6  

of the Act and not the mere declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  We  

have already held with reference to the earlier decisions in this behalf that  

this is not  res integra  and is partly covered in  Mohd. Ali’s case (cited  

supra).   In  Mohd.  Ali’s case (cited supra),  a  reference was made to  

Khadim Hussain’s  case (cited supra),  where  it  has been held that  a  

notification  under  Section  6(2)  amounts  to  the  evidence of  declaration,  

which is in the form of an order.  The notification is the publication of such  

declaration and the proof of  its  existence.  Our attention was invited to  

another reported decision of this Court in Sriniwas Ramnath Khatod Vs.  

State of Maharashtra & Ors.  reported in  2002(1) SCC 689 to the effect  

that publication under Section 6(2) is a ministerial act.  What is tried be  

impressed is that the relevant date should only be the declaration and not  

its publication.  We have already dealt with this subject earlier, particularly  

5

relying on  Mohd. Ali’s case (cited supra)  and the MDA’s case (cited  

supra).  In view of the subsequent decisions, we are not in a position to  

accept  the  argument  that  Section  3  itself,  providing  for  the  eventuality  

contained  therein,  is  in  any  way  invalid.   We,  therefore,  reject  the  

argument.  The Learned Senior Counsel also referred to the decision in the  

case of  Eugenio Misquita & Ors. Vs. State of Goa & Ors.  reported in  

1997(8) SCC 47, in which reference was made to the decision in the case  

of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Makrand Singh & Ors. reported in  

1995(2) SCC 497.   It  must be immediately  pointed out that  both these  

decisions would not be relevant to the present controversy,  as in these  

decisions, what was being considered was as to which would be the last  

date under Section 6(2) of the Act for the purposes of Section 11A.  The  

controversy involved in the case of Eugenio Misquita & Ors. Vs. State of  

Goa & Ors.  (cited supra), as  well  as  in  the  case of  Krishi  Utpadan  

Mandi  Samiti  Vs.  Makrand  Singh  &  Ors.  (cited  supra)  is  entirely  

different than the one involved in this matter.  Those two cases in Eugenio  

Misquita  &  Ors.  Vs.  State  of  Goa  &  Ors.  (cited  supra)  and  Krishi  

Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Makrand Singh & Ors. (cited supra)  would  

not be apposite.   

45. A further reference was made by the Learned Senior Counsel for the  

appellants  to  the  decision  in  the  case  of  Mohan  Singh  &  Ors.  Vs.   

International Airport Authority of India & Ors. reported in 1997(9) SCC  

5

132  and  S.H.  Rangappa  Vs.  State  of  Karnataka  &  Anr.  reported  in  

2002(1) SCC 538.  In the second matter, a reference was made to the  

larger Bench, as the Court was of the opinion that the view taken in two  

decisions in  Eugenio Misquita & Ors. Vs. State of Goa & Ors. (cited  

supra)  and  Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti  Vs. Makrand Singh & Ors.   

(cited supra)  was contrary to the decision in  Khadim Hussain’s case  

(cited  supra).   As  regards  the  case  of  Mohan  Singh  &  Ors.  Vs.  

International  Airport  Authority  of  India  &  Ors.  (cited  supra),   the  

Learned Senior Counsel relied on the observations made in paragraphs 13  

and 16.  In paragraph 13, it is stated there that:-

“What is needed is that there should be a gap of time of at  least a day between the publication of the notification under  Section 4(1) and of the declaration under Section 6(1).”

Further in paragraph 16, it is observed that:-

“What  is  material  is  that  the  declaration  under  Section  6  should be published in the Gazette after the notification under  Section 4(1) was published, i.e., after a gap of at least one  day.”

It will be seen that a reference is made to the decision in the case of  

Radhey Shyam Nigam (cited supra)  in  this paragraph,  as also to the  

simultaneous publication of notification under Section 4 and the declaration  

under Section 6 of the Act.  A reference was also made to Section 17(4),  

as also Section 17(1) A.  It  is significant to note that later on when the  

question of  validity  of  the Validating Act  came before this  Court  [which  

validating provision and proviso to Section 17 (4)  were  not  available in  

5

Mohan Singh’s case (cited supra), this Court upheld the validity of the  

Validating Act, refuting the argument that the Validating Act was only for  

the purpose of invalidating the decision in Radhey Shyam Nigam’s case  

(cited supra).  In our opinion, once this Court upheld the validity and once  

we have also approved of the Constitutional validity of Validating Act, all  

these questions must lose their relevance.  We do not think that decision in  

the case of Mohan Singh & Ors. Vs. International Airport Authority of   

India & Ors. (cited supra) can be of any help to the appellants in the light  

of the facts of the present case.  Decision in S.H. Rangappa Vs. State of  

Karnataka & Anr. reported in 2002(1) SCC 538, which is a decision after  

the reference was made to the larger Bench was also referred before us by  

the Learned Senior Counsel.  The question, which fell for consideration in  

that decision was whether the notification under Section 6(2) of the Act  

should be published within the period prescribed by the proviso to Section  

6(1)  of  the  Act.   The  Court  ultimately  upheld  the  decision  in  Khadim  

Hussain’s  case  (cited  supra)  and  observed  that  in  the  decisions  in  

Eugenio Misquita & Ors. Vs. State of Goa & Ors. (cited supra)  and  

Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Makrand Singh & Ors. (cited supra),   

the binding decision of  Khadim Hussain’s case (cited supra)  was not  

referred.  It was also observed that even otherwise in both these cases,  

declaration under Section 6 of the Act had been published within one year  

of the notification under Section 4 of the Act and the question in form, in  

which it has arisen in S.H. Rangappa’s case (cited supra), did not arise  

5

there.  We would like to say the same thing in respect of the decision in the  

case of S.H. Rangappa’s case (cited supra) that the question which we  

have  to  consider  in  the  present  case,  as  also  the  facts,  are  entirely  

different than the ones in that case.  Once Section 3 of the Validating Act  

came validly on the statute book, there will be no question of any further  

consideration.  The decision in the case of S.H. Rangappa’s case (cited  

supra)  turns essentially on the question of limitation.  In the decision in  

S.H.  Rangappa’s  case  (cited  supra),  the  law  laid  down  in  Khadim  

Hussain’s case (cited supra)  has been approved.   Once we give the  

interpretation that we have given to Section 3 and the proviso supplied by  

Section 2, the things become clear.  We are, therefore, of the clear opinion  

that decision in  S.H. Rangappa’s case (cited supra)  also does not help  

the  appellants  herein  in  view  of  the  different  factual  scenario,  as  also  

because the question of validity of the Validating Act is entirely different  

from the question of limitation.

46. The Learned Senior Counsel further argued that we should make a  

reference to the larger Bench and has formulated the questions as under:-

“1. Whether  the proviso to  Section  17(4)  inserted by the  

Amending Act cures the defect pointed out in Radhey  

Shyam  only for  the  period  between  24.9.1984  and  

11.1.1989?

5

2. Whether  “declaration”  mentioned  in  the  aforesaid  

proviso  refers  to  it  as  understood  by Section  6(1)  or  

Section 6(2)?

3. Whether  the  validation  provision  in  Section  3  of  the  

Amending Act goes beyond the newly inserted proviso  

inasmuch as:-

(h) it  cures  the  defect  of  “publication”  of  the  

declaration  and  not  making  of  the  

declaration.

(i) it  validates  publication  of  the  declaration  

under  Section  6  prior  and  subsequent  to  

the  date  of  the  publication  under  Section  

4(1) of the principal Act.

4. Whether the distinction between declaration simpliciter  

in  Section  6(1)  and  a  published  declaration  under  

Section 6(2), pointed out in Khadim Hussain (4 Judges’  

decision)  and  followed  by  3  Judges’  decision  in  

Rangappa’s Case was ignored in Meerut Development  

Authority’s case?

5. It would appear that what is cured is not validated and  

what it validates is not cured.

6. Whether  in  view  of  the  admitted  incapacity  to  offer,  

tender and pay the compensation under sub-Section (3)  

and (3A) of Section 17, the notification under Section  

17(4) becomes void?

5

47. We do not think that there is any need to refer any of the questions  

raised above in view of our observations in the earlier paragraphs, as the  

schemes of Ghaziabad Development Authority and Meerut Development  

Authority have already been upheld by this Court in the earlier decisions.  

Secondly,  the  basic  objective  of  the  Validating  Act  was  to  protect  the  

scheme during the period 1984-89 only and subsequently, there has been  

no such case of simultaneous notification in the State of Uttar Pradesh for  

the last two decades, as stated by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing  

on behalf of the LDA.  Even in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-

III, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act is published much after the  

publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act.  Thirdly, as has been  

done  in  MDA’s  case  (cited  supra) we  have  held  that  Section  17  (4)  

proviso has to be read together with and in the light of Section 3 of the  

amending Act and not  de hors of each other in view of the statement of  

objects and reasons of that Act.  It must be realized that this Court ironed  

the creases in the proviso added to Section 17(4) in  MDA’s case (cited  

supra).  Fourthly,  in one of the appeals before us in Civil  Appeal Nos.  

2116-2118 (Tika Ram & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.) represented by  

Shri  Qamar  Ahmad,  Learned  Counsel,  the  land  owners  have  already  

accepted the compensation, while in the matter of Civil Appeal No. 3415 of  

1998 (Pratap Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &  

Ors.),  the  title  of  Society  itself  has  been  found  to  be  infirm  and  not  

established  as  per  the  findings  of  the  High  Court.   It  is  obvious  that  

5

registration of the Sale Deed in respect of the Society is subsequent to the  

notification under Section 4 of the Act and, therefore, inconsequential.  The  

agreements  in  favour  of  that  Society  do  not  show that  there  was  any  

consideration passed.  Again, the possession of the land has already been  

taken, as claimed by the LDA, way back in the year 1985 for which there  

are documents like Panchanama and the whole township has now come  

up, persons have built their houses.  As far as the sixth point of reference  

is concerned, we would deal with the same separately in this judgment as  

we do not agree with the proposition made in that point.  Lastly, as held in  

the cases of Mishri Lal (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Dhirendra Nath (Dead) by  

L.Rs. reported in 1999 (4) SCC 11 and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra  

Community Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2005(2) SCC 673, the  

principle  of  Stare  Decisis  would  apply.   In  this  case,  their  Lordships  

referred  to  observations  by  Lord  Reid  and  quoted  seven  principles  

regarding the binding precedent.  They are:

“(1) The  freedom  granted  by  the  1966  Practice  Statement  ought  to  be  exercised  sparingly  (the  'use  sparingly'  criterion)  (Jones  Vs.  Secretary  of  State  for  Social  Services, 1972 AC 944, 966).

(2) A decision ought  not  to be overruled if  to  do so would  upset  the  legitimate  expectations  of  people  who  have  entered  into  contracts  or  settlements  or  otherwise  regulated  their  affairs  in  reliance  on the  validity  of  that  decision  (the  'legitimate  expectations'  criterion)  (Ross  Smith Vs. Ross-Smith, 1963 AC 280, 303 and Indyka Vs.  Indyka, (1969) AC 33, 69).

5

(3) A  decision  concerning  questions  of  construction  of  statutes  or  other  documents  ought  not  to  be  overruled  except  in  rare  and exceptional  cases (the  'construction'  criterion) (Jones case (supra))  

(4) (a)  A decision  ought  not  to  be  overruled  if  it  would  be  impracticable for the Lords to foresee the consequence of  departing  from  it  (the  'unforeseeable  consequences'  criterion) (Steadman Vs. Steadman, 1976 AC 536, 542C).  (b) A decision ought not to be overruled if to do so would  involve a change that ought to be part of a comprehensive  reform  of  the  law.   Such  changes  are  best  done  'by  legislation following on a wide survey of the whole field'  (the 'need for comprehensive reform' criterion) (Myers Vs.  DPP,  1965  AC  1001,  1022;  Cassell  &  Co.  Ltd.  Vs.  Broome, 1972 AC 1027, 1086; Haughton Vs. Smith, 1975  AC 476, 500).

(5) In  the  interest  of  certainty,  a  decision  ought  not  to  be  overruled merely because the Law Lords consider that it  was  wrongly  decided.   There  must  be  some additional  reasons  to  justify  such  a  step  (the  'precedent  merely  wrong' criterion) (Knuller Vs. DPP, 1973 AC 435, 455).

(6) A decision ought to be overruled if  it  causes such great  uncertainty in practice that the parties' advisers are unable  to give any clear indication as to what the courts will hold  the  law to  be  (the 'rectification  of  uncertainty'  criterion),  (Jones case (supra)); Oldendorff (E.L.) & Co. GamBH Vs.  Tradax Export SA, 1974 AC 479, 533, 535: (1972) 3 All  ER 420)

(7) A decision  ought  to  be  overruled if  in  relation to  some  broad  issue  or  principle  it  is  not  considered  just  or  in  keeping  with  contemporary  social  conditions  or  modern  conceptions  of  public  policy  (the  'unjust  or  outmoded'  criterion)  (Jones  case  (supra));  Conway  Vs.  Rimmer,  (1968) AC 910, 938).”

48. We would immediately point out that principles at serial Nos. 2, 3, 4  

(a)  above as also principle No.  5 would  apply  to  the present  situation,  

6

where, by upsetting the whole acquisition tremendous upheaval is likely to  

follow.  In that view we do not see any reason for making the reference as  

argued by the Learned Counsel.

II Effect of alleged non-payment of 80% compensation under  Section 17 of the Principal Act

49. As has been observed in Para 47, we would not take up the above  

topic.  It was urged by the Learned Counsel that the State Government,  

though it acquired the possession under Section 17 of the Act, did not pay  

the 80% of compensation, as required under Section 17 of the Act and on  

that  account,  the  whole  exercise  was  bad.   We do  not  think  that  the  

proposition is  correct.   It  was  tried to  be established that  the sufficient  

funds were not available with the Government.  We would prefer not to go  

into  the  factual  questions  as the  High  Court  has commented  upon the  

same in great details.  The tenor of the argument is that Sections 17(3)  

and 17(3A) of the Act are mandatory and the compensation ought to have  

been  offered,  tendered  and  paid  to  the  land  owners  before  taking  the  

possession.  Some documents were referred to in I.A. Nos. 4 and 5 of  

2006 to show that  LDA did not  have the funds and it  failed to provide  

sufficient funds even as late as upto 2004.  The further argument was that  

even if it was assumed that the possession was taken on 21.5.1985, yet  

6

the compensation was paid to the concerned persons much later and in  

some cases, it was never paid.   

50. Heavy  reliance  was  placed  on  the  documents  which  were  filed  

alongwith I.A. Nos. 4 and 5.  This question in the precise form, was not  

raised before the High Court.  These documents were not the part of the  

High Court record.  Shri Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for LDA further  

argued that these documents could not be accepted at this late stage and  

that the LDA did not have any opportunity to meet those documents, since  

on I.A. Nos. 4 and 5, no notice has been issued by this Court.  Since the  

source, authentication and verification of those documents was not clear,  

these documents were not liable to be considered.  The Learned Senior  

Counsel, however, submitted that the land acquisition proceedings on that  

account cannot be faulted with and cannot be set at naught.   

50A. The  Learned  Senior  Counsel  argued  that  in  case  where  the  

accelerated possession is required to be taken, Section 17(1) of the Act,  

as also Section 17(2) of the Act would be attracted and such possession  

can be taken immediately after the publication of Section 9(1).  Section  

17(3)  of  the  Act  provides  that  in  every  case  under  Section  17(1)  and  

Section  17(2)  of  the  Act,  the  Collector  shall  offer  compensation  for  

standing crops and trees or other damage at the time of taking possession.  

The  Learned  Senior  Counsel  pointed  out  that  the  expression  –  “under  

either of the Sub-Sections” shows that Sub-Section (3) is attracted only  

6

when the possession is taken under Sub-Section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of  

the Act.   He, therefore,  contended that where Section 5-A is dispensed  

with under Section 17(4) of the Act, two Sub-Sections, i.e., (3) and (3A) of  

Section 17 of the Act would not apply.  The argument is clearly incorrect.  

By this, the attempt is to dissect Sub-Section (4) in two parts, firstly, where  

Sub-Section (1) and (2) are applicable and secondly, where the enquiry  

under  Section  5-A  is  dispensed  with.   That  is  not  the  import  of  the  

language.  Section 17 has to be read in full.  It plainly reads that where the  

possession is taken with the aid of Section 17(2), the compensation must  

fall in advance as per the provisions of Section 3A.  In fact, Section 3A has  

been  brought  on  the  legislature  with  the  sole  purpose  of  providing  a  

compensation for the possession taken.  That is why 80% of the estimated  

compensation  is  to  be  paid  because  even  thereafter,  the  award  

proceedings would go on and the total compensation would be decided  

upon.  The attempt on the part of the Learned Senior Counsel to read that  

the payment of compensation is not required where Section 5-A enquiry is  

dispensed with, would be doing violence to the language, firstly, of Section  

3A and secondly, of Sub-Section (4) itself.  The clear legal position is that  

the dispensation of  Section 5-A enquiry  is  only and only to  enable the  

State Government to take possession under Sub-Section (1) and (2) of  

Section 17.  A third category cannot be created so as to avoid the payment  

of compensation.  The contention is, therefore, clearly wrong.   

6

51. However, the question is as to what happens when such payment is  

not made and the possession is taken.  Can the whole acquisition be set at  

naught?  In our opinion, this contention on the part of the appellants is also  

incorrect.  If we find fault with the whole acquisition process on account of  

the  non-payment  of  the  80%  of  the  compensation,  then  the  further  

question would be as to whether the estimation of 80% of compensation is  

correct or not.  A further controversy can then be raised by the landlords  

that what was paid was not 80% and was short of 80% and, therefore, the  

acquisition should be set at naught.  Such extreme interpretation cannot be  

afforded because indeed under Section 17 itself, the basic idea of avoiding  

the enquiry under Section 5-A is in view of the urgent need on the part of  

the  State  Government  for  the  land  to  be  acquired  for  any  eventuality  

discovered by either Sub-Section (1) or Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of  

the Act.   

52. The only question that would remain is that of the estimation of the  

compensation.  In our considered view, even if the compensation is not  

paid  or  is  short  of  80%,  the  acquisition  would  not  suffer.   One  could  

imagine the unreasonableness of the situation.   Now suppose,  there is  

state of emergency as contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the  

compensation is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught?  

It  would  entail  serious  consequences.   This  situation  was  considered,  

firstly, in Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported  

6

in 1993 (4) SCC 369.  It was held therein that once the possession is taken  

as a matter of fact, then the owner is divested of the title to the land.  The  

Court held that there was then no question of application of even Section  

11-A.  Commenting upon Section 11-A, it was held that that Section could  

not be so construed as to leave the Government holding title of the land  

without an obligation to determine the compensation, make an award and  

pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the  

amount of the 80% of the estimated compensation.   The three Judges’  

Bench of the Court took the view that even where 80% of the estimated  

compensation was not paid to the land owners, it did not mean that the  

possession  was  taken  illegally  or  that  the  land  did  not  vest  in  the  

Government.  In short, this Court held that the proceedings of acquisition  

are not affected by the non-payment of compensation.  In that case, the  

Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, for which the possession was made, sought  

to escape from the liability to make the payment.  That was not allowed.  

The Court, in para 17, held as under:-

“17. In  the  instant  case,  even  that  80% of  the  estimated  compensation was not paid to the appellants although  Section 17(3-A) required that it should have been paid  before possession of the said land was taken but that  does not mean that the possession was taken illegally  or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first  respondent.   It  is,  at  any  rate,  not  open  to  the  third  respondent,  who,  as  the  letter  of  the  Special  Land  Acquisition Officer dated June 27, 1990 shows, failed to  make  the  necessary  monies  available  and  who  has  been  in  occupation  of  the  said  land  ever  since  its  possession was taken, to urge that the possession was  

6

taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not  vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is  under no obligation to make an award.”

53. Further, in a judgment of this Court in  Pratap & Anr. Vs. State of  

Rajasthan & Ors. etc. etc. reported in 1996 (3) SCC 1, similar view was  

reported.  That was a case under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act,  

1987, under which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act.  

The Court took the view that once the possession was taken under Section  

17 of the Act, the Government could not withdrew from that position under  

Section 18 and even the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted.  

That was of course a case where the award was not passed under Section  

11-A after taking of the possession.  A clear cut observation came to be  

made in that behalf in Para 12, to the effect that the non-compliance with  

Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is concerned,  

did not result in lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings.  The law laid  

down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. &   

Ors. (cited supra) was approved.  The Court also relied on the decision in  

P.  Chinnanna  Vs.  State  of  A.P.  reported  in  1994  (5)  SCC  486  and  

Awadh Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar  reported in  1995 (6) SCC 31,   

where similar view was taken regarding the land acquisition proceedings  

not getting lapsed.  The only result that may follow by the non-payment  

would be the payment of interest, as contemplated in Section 34 and the  

proviso added thereto by 1984 Act.  In that view, we do not wish to further  

refer the matter,  as suggested by Shri  Trivedi,  Learned Senior Counsel  

6

and Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel for the appellants.  Therefore,  

even on the sixth question, there is no necessity of any reference.

III. Challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution of India

54. Learned  Senior  Counsel  then  urged  that  the  provisions  of  the  

amending Act and also the provisions of Land Acquisition Act like Section  

17 (4) are invalid on the test of Article 14 of the Constitution.  It is pointed  

out by Shri Trivedi,  Learned Senior Counsel that in  GDA’s case (cited  

supra)  the  impugned  notification  was  held  to  be  valid  in  view  of  the  

amendment made to Section 17 (4) of the Act.  However, there was no  

challenge to  the validity  of  Section 17  (4)  of  the Act  in  the said  case.  

Similarly, it was argued that in MDA v. Satbir Singh [1996 (11) SCC 462],  

the Court had made observation in paragraph 8 that the validity of Section  

17 (4) was upheld in GDA’s case (cited supra), whereas in fact it was not  

tested in  GDA’s case (cited supra)  at all.  It was further urged that the  

validity  of  the Act  was  not  tested with  respect  to  its  inconsistency with  

Article 14 and Article 300A of the Constitution of India.  In this behalf it was  

argued by the Learned Counsel that there was an observation to the effect  

in paragraph 14 that the proviso was not happily worded.  But a reading of  

it  would clearly give us an indication that the proviso to sub-section (4)  

introduced by Section 2 of the Amendment  Act 5  of  1991 would  deal  

6

with  both the situations ,namely,  the notification  published on or after  

September 24,  1984 but before January 11, 1989 as also the declaration  

to be simultaneously published subsequent thereto.  It was further argued  

that if we read the proviso in the manner that we have already done then it  

would be a case of casus omissus being supplied by the Court.  We have  

already  taken  all  these  arguments  into  consideration.   In  view  of  the  

interpretation given by us to Section 3 and the proviso and the necessity of  

reading the two provisions in the light of each other, there would be no  

occasion of supplying casus omissus and the argument in that behalf must  

fail.

55. Insofar as the validity on the backdrop of Article 14 is concerned, it is  

true that in paragraph 8 there has been an observation that the validity of  

the proviso added by the State Legislature by way of an amendment to  

Section  17  (4)  of  the  Act  has  been  upheld  by  the  two  Judge  Bench  

decision in GDA’s case (cited supra).   However, when we see the rest of  

the  judgment  it  can  be  said  that  no  such  question  was  considered.  

However, the fact remains that in  GDA’s case (cited supra),  the validity  

was not questioned or doubted and the challenged Section was interpreted  

and treated to be valid by the Court. When we see the further judgment in  

MDA’s  case  (cited  supra)  in  the  further  paragraphs,  this  Court  has  

approved of the whole amending Act reiterating on the decision in Indian  

Aluminium Co. (cited supra).   The Court has taken a full review of the  

6

then existing law by way of the decision of this Court in  State of Orissa  

Vs. Gopal Chandrarath  reported in 1995 (6) SCC 243,  Bhubaneswar  

Singh and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1994 (6) SCC 77  

and Comorin Match Industries P. Ltd, Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported  

in 1996 (4) SCC 281.  Thereafter, referring to Gouri Shankar Gauri  and  

Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.  reported in 1994 (1) SCC 92, the Court  

also referred to the provisions of Article 254 (2) and (3) and approved of  

the whole Amending Act as such.  In our opinion, reading paragraph 14 of  

this judgment in its correct perspective would repel the argument of the  

appellants that the provision is arbitrary in any manner or has the effect of  

creating  impermissible  classification.   In  our  opinion,  the  language  of  

paragraph 14 does not help the petitioners.  If  the petitioners in  MDA’s  

case (cited supra) did not specifically address the Court on the question  

of Constitutional validity of the Amending Act (as is being claimed by the  

appellants), we do not think it will be permissible for the petitioners to raise  

this point which was admittedly not  raised either in  GDA’s case (cited  

supra) or MDA’s case (cited supra).  Petitioners would not be permitted  

to take such a course [see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. Vs.   

Shambhu Nath Mukherji & Ors. reported in AIR 1978 SC 8].  We need  

not go in that question since MDA’s case (cited supra)  is a Larger Bench  

decision.   

6

56. However, this is apart from the fact that in our opinion there can be  

no question of Section 17 (4) proviso or the provisions of the Amending Act  

being invalid in any way.  We, therefore, do not feel necessary to refer this  

case on this issue to a Larger Bench, particularly, in respect of the validity  

of the provisions vis-à-vis Article 14 of the Constitution.  We do not find the  

provisions in any manner arbitrary or making impermissible classifications  

or  suggesting  invidious  discrimination  nor  can  the  provisions  in  the  

amending Act can be termed as “arbitrary” providing no guiding principles.

57. The  Learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  had  

heavily relied on paragraph 14 of the judgment in  Meerut Development  

Authority Vs. Satvir Singh & Ors. (cited supra).   Basically we do not  

accept the contention raised that the contents in paragraph 14 holding that  

the  provisions  of  the  amending  Act  are  not  limited  to  the  two  dates  

mentioned and can be applicable even subsequently, results in creation of  

two classes and the possible discrimination.  In our opinion, it will not be  

necessary to go into that question as the present appeals pertaining to  

Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II are relating only to the period between  

24.9.1984  and 11.1.1989.   It  is  stated  by  the  Learned  Senior  Counsel  

appearing for the LDA that only two appeals pertain to Ujariyaon Housing  

Scheme Part-III and even in that case, the notifications were published in  

the  year  1991 and the issue of  simultaneous  publication  of  notification  

does not arise, as Section 6 declaration was signed and published in 1992.  

7

Therefore, there will be no need to go into the academic question whether  

Amending Act applies only to the period between 24.9.1984 and 11.1.1989  

or even the subsequent period.  Further, even if, as held in MDA’s Case  

(cited supra),  it  applied  to  the  subsequent  period,  it  does not  infringe  

Article 14 for the reasons given by us earlier.

58. Shri  Trivedi,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants  further  

argued  that  there  was  invidious  discrimination  between  the  Ujariyaon  

Housing Scheme Part-II and Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-III, inasmuch  

as while the notification published on 8.12.1984 under Section 4 read with  

Section  17(4)  of  the  Act  was  allowed  to  proceed  with  the  help  of  the  

Validating Act, in case of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-III, however, a  

fresh  notification  was  issued  on  30.12.1991  and  Section  6  declaration  

came to be issued on 30.12.1992.  Thus, while the notification in respect of  

Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II was validated, the notification in respect  

of the Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-III was allowed to lapse and a fresh  

notification was published,  meaning thereby that  persons coming under  

Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-III, got the better deal (if they really did)  

and higher compensation.  This argument of Shri Trivedi was adopted by  

Shri Qamar Ahmad.   Though we have considered this argument in the  

earlier part of the judgment we again reiterate that the argument is clearly  

incorrect.  The Validation Act did not confer any discretion on the State  

Government to apply its provisions to a particular scheme and then issue  

7

notifications.  It was a one time exercise for validating a particular scheme  

by amending the Act which has already been found to be valid in MDA’s  

case  (cited  supra). Again  Ujariyaon  Housing  Scheme  Part-III  did  not  

lapse because of the decision of the Government.  Since the award was  

not made within the time prescribed by the Section 11A of the Act, it had  

the effect of lapsing the notifications.  Therefore, the State Government  

was  left  with  no  other  way  and  had  to  issue  a  fresh  notification.   In  

Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II, the award was made by the Collector  

within  the  time  and,  therefore,  those  notifications  were  not  affected.  

Therefore, the argument that there was invidious discrimination in between  

the two schemes has to fail.  

59. It was reiterated by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel, as also,  

Shri  Qamar Ahmed, Learned Counsel that the question of constitutional  

validity of the Act was not considered by the High Court as the Act was  

held to be valid in  GDA’s case (cited supra) and in  MDA’s case (cited  

supra).  It was, however, urged that the question of Constitutional validity  

was never considered in these cases.  Reliance was placed on judgments  

reported as  Arnit Das v. State of Bihar  reported in 2000 (5) SCC 488,  

State of UP & Anr. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. & Anr.  reported in  

1991 (4) SCC 139, Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.   

reported  in 2004  (7)  SCC  558,  ICICI  Bank  &  Anr.  v.  Municipal   

Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors.  reported in 2005 (6) SCC 404,  

7

A.R. Antulay v. R.S.  Naik & Ors.  reported in  1988 (2) SCC 602,  Zee  

Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2005 (4) SCC  

649,  P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka reported in  2002 (4)  

SCC 578,  Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab  reported in 1995 (6) SCC  

614, Isabella Johnson v. M.A. Susai reported in 1991 (1) SCC 494.  We  

do not  think that  the law laid  down in  these cases would  apply  to  the  

present  situation.   In  all  these cases,  it  has been basically  held that  a  

Supreme Court decision does not become a precedent unless a question  

is directly raised and considered therein, so also it does not become a law  

declared unless the question is actually decided upon.  We need not take  

stock  of  all  these  cases  and  we  indeed  have  no  quarrel  with  the  

propositions settled therein.  However, we may point out that, firstly, the  

question of validity is settled in MDA’s case (cited supra).  This is apart  

from the fact that we are of the opinion that there is nothing wrong with the  

Amending Act insofar as its Constitutional validity is concerned.  We have  

already rejected the argument that there was any discrimination between  

Ujariyaon Part II and Ujariyaon Part III schemes.  We are convinced with  

the explanation given by the State Government as to why Ujariyaon Part III  

scheme  was  left  out  of  the  consideration  of  validation.   Indeed  the  

acquisition therein could not have been validated on account of the time  

having lapsed for doing so.  Once Sections 2 and 3 and the proviso are  

read in the manner indicated in MDA’s case (cited supra) as also in the  

light  of  observations  made  by  us,  no  question  remains  of  any  

7

Constitutional  invalidity.   We are not at  all  impressed by the contention  

raised that the Amending Act cannot pass the test of Article 14.  We hold  

accordingly.

60. Our attention was invited to  R.K. Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar (cited  

supra).  In fact, according to us this judgment does not help the appellants  

for  assailing  the  Constitutional  validity  of  the  statute.   In  so far  as  the  

Executive action is concerned, we do not think that there is any scope to  

interfere in this matter.  Shri Qamar Ahmed in his written arguments has  

adopted the arguments of Shri Trivedi.  In his written submissions he has  

challenged the provisions of Sections 17 (1), 17 (1A), 17 (3A) and 17 (4A)  

and proviso to Section 17 (4) as ultra vires to the Constitution.  He has also  

challenged the provisions of Section 2 of the UP Act No. 8 of  1974 as  

violative and ultra vires  to Section 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 of Land Acquisition  

Act  No.1  of  1894  as  amended  from  time  to  time.  In  support  of  his  

argument, Learned Counsel has relied on the law laid down in Anwar Ali  

Sarkar’s case (cited supra).  According to him, Sections 17(1), 17(1A),  

17(3A) and 17(4) of the Act and Section 2 of the UP Act No. VIII of 1974,  

as also the UP Act No. 5 of 1991 are violative of Articles 14, 19, 21, 39, 48,  

48A and 300A for invidious discrimination.  Learned Counsel also submits  

that there are no guidelines for the exercise of power under Sections 17(1),  

17(1A) and Section 17 (4), as the word “urgency” is too vague, uncertain  

and  elusive  criteria  to  form  the  basis  of  a  valid  and  reasonable  

7

classification.  Learned Counsel also referred to the case of Lachman Das  

v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1952 SC 235.  A reference was also  

made to Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India & Ors. reported in  

AIR  1951  SC  41.   Learned  Counsel  has  traced  the  whole  case  law  

following  Anwar  Ali  Sarkar’s  case  (cited  supra)  and  has  quoted  

extensively from that case as also from Kathi Ranning Rawat v. State of  

Saurashtra reported in  AIR 1952 SC 123.  We have already pointed out  

that this group of cases would be of no help to the appellants, particularly,  

because  the  fact  situation  and  the  controversy  involved  in  the  present  

matter is entirely different.  We do not agree with the Learned Counsel that  

there is any classification, much less any impermissible classification and  

any group has been treated favourably as against another group or that  

the law has treated a group more favourably than the other, refusing equal  

protection to such group.  As regards the general principles from Anwar  

Ali Sarkar’s case (cited supra) as also from State of Punjab v. Gurdial   

Singh reported in AIR 1980 SC 319, we must point out that ultimately this  

Court culled out the principle that if the Legislature indicates a policy which  

inspires  it  and  the  object  which  it  seeks  to  attain,  then  the  selective  

application of the law can be left to the discretion of the Executive authority  

[see Kedar Nath Bajoria’s case reported in 1953 SCR 30].  Such law has  

been approved in  R.K. Dalmia’s case (cited supra)  as also in  In Re:  

Special Courts Bill (cited supra).

7

61. There can be no dispute that the law must indicate the policy and  

the object clearly while acquiring.  Discretion upon the application of law  

and the power under Section 17 of the Act of doing away with Section 5A  

inquiry has to be exercised in a proper manner.  There are cases where  

this Court has not brooked any breach of provision under Section 17 of the  

Act.  However, we must say that there are clear guidelines provided under  

Section  17(1)  read  with  Section  4  for  understanding  the  concepts  of  

urgency and emergency.  In this behalf, we must hold that the criteria of  

emergency as provided under Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 is separate  

and distinct from the criteria of urgency.  In our opinion, these two criteria  

provide  clear  guidelines  and  cannot  be  held  as  arbitrary.   In  Krishi  

Utpadan Mandi Samiti’s case and Pista Devi’s case (cited supra), this  

Court has laid down that mere existence of urgency is not enough and the  

Government  must  further  consider  the  matters  objectively  as  to  the  

dispensation with Section 5A permissible under that  particular situation.  

Section 17 of the Act has existed on the statute book for a long time and  

on  a  number  of  occasions  the  applicable  criteria  of  urgency  and  

emergency have been tested by the Courts on account of the Government  

actions in that behalf being challenged.  Wherever the Courts have found  

that urgency did not exist in reality or the dispensation of Section 5A was  

not considered separately such notifications have been struck down on a  

number of occasions.  However, we do not see any reasonable argument  

having been made against the Constitutional validity.  The validity of this  

7

Section 17 of the Act has been upheld by the Allahabad High Court as also  

the Gujarat High Court in Sarju Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh &  

Ors. reported in AIR 1962 ALL 221 and Ram Sevak v. State of UP Ors.   

reported in AIR 1963 All  24.  The second judgment of  Allahabad High  

Court has been approved by the court in Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc.   

v. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in AIR 1968 SC 870.  We, therefore,  

do  not  accept  the  contention  raised  by  Shri  Qamar  Ahmad,  Learned  

Counsel for the appellants that the power under Section 17(4) of the Act of  

dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A is in the nature of unbridled  

and  uncanalised  power  in  the  hands  of  Executive  to  take  possession,  

invoking urgency clause.  As discussed in the earlier cases by this Court  

(cited  above),  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  Section  suffers  from  any  

constitutional invalidity on account of being arbitrary in the nature.

62. In fact, the reliance was placed on the decision in Suraj Mall Mohta  

and Company Vs. A.V. Visvanatha Sastri and Anr. reported in AIR 1954  

SC 545.  That was a case under the tax jurisprudence, dealing with certain  

Sections of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947.  

It was found to be invalid as it had provided different procedure for the tax  

abettors.  This Court had found that the procedure was more drastic for a  

certain group.  The provisions of Sub-Section (4) of Section 5 were found  

to  be  discriminatory.   The  High  Court  has  also  dealt  with  this  case.  

Though there can be no dispute on the principles, we do not think that the  

7

principle are applicable to the present controversy.  We have already given  

a reference of the case of  Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. Vs. State of  

Gujarat (cited supra).  The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the  

respondents  invited  our  attention  to  the  findings  recorded  by  the  High  

Court, with which we are satisfied.  We must observe that merely because  

the decision of the Government on question of urgency is not justiciable, it  

does not mean that Section 17(4) of the Act is discriminatory.  The High  

Court has made a reference to the observation by this Court in  Matajog  

Dubey  Vs.  H.C.  Bhari reported  in  AIR  1956  SC  44,  holding  that  a  

discretionary  power  is  not  necessarily  a  discriminatory  power  and  that  

abuse of such power is not to be easily assumed.  Even at the cost of  

repetition, we may mention the case of  R.K. Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar  

(cited  supra)  as  a  complete  answer  to  the  argument  of  Shri  Qamar  

Ahmad,  Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellants.   Ishwarlal’s  case  (cited  

supra) is also a total answer to the argument that Sub-Section (1) and (4)  

of Section 17 of the Act are unconstitutional.  The High Court has correctly  

held that Sub-Sections (1), (3A) and (4) of Section 17 of the Act do not  

suffer  from any  unconstitutionality  on  account  of  the  alleged breach of  

Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   Shri  Qamar  Ahmad,  Learned  

Counsel for the appellants also argued that before deciding to take the  

possession under the various provisions of Section 17 of the Act, a person  

is  entitled  to  a  notice.   The  High  Court  has  correctly  dealt  with  this  

question.  It firstly considered the law laid down in the cases of  Kraipak  

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Vs. Union of India reported in  AIR 1970 SC 150, Maneka Gandhi Vs.  

Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC 597 and Olga Tellis Vs. Bombay  

Municipal Corporation reported in AIR 1986 SC 180 as also in Union of  

India Vs. Tulsi  Ram reported in  AIR 1985 SC 1416  which were relied  

upon by the High Court.   The High Court  was,  undoubtedly,  correct  in  

holding  that  there  was  no  necessity  of  a  notice  since  the  satisfaction  

required on the part of the Executive is a subject of satisfaction, which can  

only be assailed on the ground that there was no sufficient  material  to  

dispense with the enquiry or the order suffers from malice.  We will deal  

with  the question as to whether  there was an urgency and what  is  the  

nature of urgency required.  We, therefore, do not think that Sub-Sections  

(1)  (3A)  and (4)  of  Section  17  of  the  Act  suffer,  as  there is  no  notice  

provided in those Sub-Sections before the possession is taken.

IV. Issue  of  urgency  and  application  of  Section  17  of  the  Principal Act

63. At this juncture itself, we must also consider the argument that there  

was no real urgency in this matter.  It can not be ignored that this land was  

urgently needed for housing.  Large-scale development and utilization of  

acquired land after the acquisition is apparent on the face of the record.  A  

number  of  houses  have  been  constructed,  third  party  interests  were  

created in whose favour the plots were allotted and the High Court has  

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also commented while disposing of the writ petitions that the quashing of  

the notification at this stage will  prejudice the interests of the people for  

whom the schemes were evolved.  While considering as to whether the  

Government was justified in doing away with the inquiry under Section 5A,  

it  must be noted that there are no allegations of  mala fides  against the  

authority.   No evidence has been brought  before the judgment and the  

High Court has also commented on this.  The housing development and  

the  planned  developments  have  been  held  to  be  the  matters  of  great  

urgency by the court in  Pista Devi’s case (cited supra).  In the present  

case we have seen the judgment of the High Court which has gone into  

the records and has recorded categorical finding that there was sufficient  

material  before  the  State  Government  and  the  State  Government  has  

objectively considered the issue of urgency.  Even before this Court, there  

were no allegations of mala fides.   A notice can be taken of the fact that all  

the  lands  which  were  acquired  ultimately  came  to  be  utilized  for  the  

scheme.  We, therefore, reject the argument that there was no urgency to  

justify dispensation of Section 5A inquiry by applying the urgency clause.  

In a reported decision Kishan Das & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. reported  

in  1995  (6)  SCC  240, this  Court  has  taken  a  view  that  where  the  

acquisition has been completed by taking the possession of the land under  

acquisition  and  the  constructions  have been made and  completed,  the  

question of urgency and the exercise of power under Section 17(4) would  

not arise.  We must notice that acquisitions in this case are of 1984-1985  

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and two decades have passed thereafter.  The whole township has come  

up, the houses and the lands have been allotted, sold and re-sold, awards  

have been passed and overwhelming majority of land owners have also  

accepted the compensation, this includes even some of the appellants.  In  

such circumstances we do not think that the High Court was in any way  

wrong in not interfering with the exercise of power under Section 17 (4) of  

the Act.  At any rate, after the considered findings on the factual questions  

recorded by the High Court, we would not go into that question.  

64. The High Court has taken a stock of the argument on behalf of the  

respondents  herein  that  there  was  material  available  in  support  of  the  

satisfaction on the part of the Executive to take possession under Section  

17 of the Act.  The High Court has relied on the decisions in Raja Anand  

Braha Shah Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1081, in Narayan  

Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1977 SC 183,  in  Kailashwati   

Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1978 All. 181, in Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt.   

Governor of Delhi reported in AIR 1984 SC 1721, as also in Pista Devi’s  

case  (cited  supra)  and  Krishi  Utpadan  Mandi  Samiti’s  case  (cited  

supra).  The High Court has correctly come to the conclusion that there  

was  all  the  justification  for  invoking the  urgency  clause  and taking  the  

possession for the lands in question.  We endorse the said finding of the  

High Court.  

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Other contentions on merits

65. Apart  from  these  contentions,  both  Shri  Trivedi,  Learned  Senior  

Counsel, as also Shri Qamar Ahmed, Learned Counsel again raised the  

same  questions  of  facts  like  the  non-publication  of  Sections  4  and  6  

notifications. Insofar as that is concerned, we have mentioned it only for  

rejecting the contention.  After the judgment of the High Court we will not  

go into that question again being a pure question of fact.  Similar is the  

question raised about the land belonging to the cooperative society and  

the release of the same.  We do not think that that question needs to be  

answered  in  the  wake  of  the  High  Court’s  judgment.   The  High  Court  

judgment is absolutely correct in that behalf.  In our considered opinion,  

even  if  the  Government  had  taken  a  decision  not  to  acquire  the  land  

belonging to the cooperative society as far as possible, there is nothing  

wrong if such lands were acquired.  What is to be seen is the bona fides of  

the Government behind the decision to acquire the lands.  On that account  

no fault can be found with the concerned notifications under Sections 4  

and 6.   

66. Similar contentions were raised regarding the possession.  We do  

not propose to go into the question of facts and questions relating to the  

individual  claims.  We  have  noted  that  the  respondents  herein  having  

specifically  claimed that  the possession  of  the  lands has  already  been  

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taken.  Therefore,  accepting that  claim, as has been done by the High  

Court, we would not go into those questions of fact.

67. To put the record straight, there is enough evidence in shape of the  

stand taken by the LDA in its counter affidavit before the High Court, where  

it  was  asserted  that  the  possession  was  already  taken.   Even  in  the  

present  Civil  Appeal,  the  same  stand  is  reported  with  reference  to  a  

particular date, i.e., 21.5.1985 that the possession was taken and there is  

also a true copy of the Panchanama on record.  Insofar as the Civil Appeal  

Nos.  2116-2118 (Tika  Ram & Ors.  Vs.  The  State  of  U.P.  &  Ors.)  are  

concerned, it was urged by the appellants that in the affidavit of State of  

U.P. before the High Court, the date of taking possession was mentioned  

as 30.3.1986 and, therefore, it was urged that the possession could not  

have  been  taken  on  21.5.1985  as  per  record.   The  Learned  Senior  

Counsel for the LDA pointed out that this was incorrect and the correct  

date of  taking possession was  only  21.5.1985,  while  the possession of  

some plots was handed over to the LDA on 30.3.1986.  This is apart from  

the fact that in today’s context, when the whole township is standing, this  

question goes to the backdrop.  In the face of Panchanama, which is on  

record, we would endorse the finding of the High Court that the possession  

was taken on 21.5.1985.

68. Shri  Dwivedi,  Learned Senior Counsel  appearing on behalf  of  the  

LDA also found fault with the Sale Deed in favour of Pratap Sahkari Grih  

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Nirman Samiti Ltd., which is being represented by Shri Trivedi,  Learned  

Senior  Counsel.   It  was  urged  that  its  claim  was  based  on  the  Sale  

agreement, which was executed one day before the publication of Section  

4 Notification in the Gazette, i.e., 8.12.1984.  It is admitted case that the  

Sale Deed was registered on 22.1.1986, which is clearly a date beyond the  

date of Section 4 notification.  It is already held by this Court in  U.P. Jal  

Nigam Vs. Kalra Properties Ltd. reported in 1996 (3) SCC 124 and Star  

Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in 1996 (11) SCC  

698 that if  any purchases of the land are made after the publication of  

Section 4(1) notification, landlords in this case would not get any right or  

entitlement to question the validity of the title of the State based on the  

acquisition.   Obviously,  the claim of  this  society  is  on the basis  of  the  

Agreement of Sale dated 7.4.1983.  It was reported by the Learned Senior  

Counsel  that  Shri  Hukum Chand Gupta also expired on 27.7.1983 and  

ultimately, the Sale Deed was executed on 7.12.1984.  We do not want to  

go into this question of fact, but we will certainly go with and endorse the  

finding of the High Court in this behalf that the society had purchased the  

land after the issuance of notification.

69. It  was  urged  by  Shri  Trivedi,  Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  

appellants that there was a policy to give back 25% of the acquired land to  

the cooperative societies.   This was suggested on the basis of  various  

letters on record, suggesting that LDA was considering the revision.  Shri  

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Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for LDA pointed out that once the land  

was  acquired  and  the  possession  had  been  taken,  Section  48  did  not  

apply.   Besides,  according  to  the  Learned  Senior  Counsel,  the  policy  

applied to the cooperative societies, who had land before the acquisition  

process  begins.   This  was  obviously  with  the  object  to  safeguard  the  

interests of the members of the society.  The Learned Senior Counsel was  

at pains to point out that there is no such disclosure as to who were the  

members of the society.  According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the  

society was nothing, but a front piece set up for obtaining 25% of the land.  

Therefore, the rent of the 25% of the land was not acceptable.  It was also  

pointed out that the Sale Agreement was also entered into a day before  

the publication of the notification in the Gazette and the registration of the  

Sale Deed was also done much after the notification was published and,  

therefore, this policy, even if there is one, would not be applicable to the  

society in question.  We would not, therefore, accept that claim that Pratap  

Sahkari  Grih Nirman Samiti  Ltd. should be given back 25% of the land  

acquired, which is again not possible in view of the township having come  

up in Gomti Nagar.

70. In view of what we have held above, we confirm the judgment of the  

High Court and dismiss all the appeals being Civil Appeal Nos. 2650-2652  

of 1998, 3162 of 1998, 3176 of 1998, 3415 of 1998, 3561 of 1998, 3597 of  

1998, 3923 of 1998, 3939 of 1998, 3645 of 1998, 3691 of 1998, 5346 of  

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1998, 2116-2118 of 1999, 2139 of 1999, 2121 of 1999, 2113 of 1999 and  

4995-4996 of 1998.   

SLP (CIVIL) No. 23551/2009  (CC 1540/1999)

71. Delay  condoned  in  SLP  (Civil)  No.  23551/2009  (CC 1540/1999).  

The Special Leave Petition is dismissed in view of the above order.

72. In the circumstances, there would be no orders as to the costs.

………………………………..J. (Tarun Chatterjee)

………………………………..J. (V.S. Sirpurkar)

New Delhi; September 09, 2009

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