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PETITIONER: THE UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: C. D. GOVINDA RAO AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/08/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1965 AIR  491            1964 SCR  (4) 576  CITATOR INFO :  F          1980 SC2141  (17)  F          1990 SC1402  (32)

ACT: Writs-Quo Warranto, Scope of-Appointment of Reader by  Board of Appointments of Mysore University-Constitution, Art. 226- Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere.

HEADNOTE:   The  University  of Mysore, Appellant  no.  1,  advertised inviting applications for 6 posts of Professors and 6  posts of  Rcaders.   Among  them  were  included  the  post  of  a Professor of English and of a Reader in English.  Candidates for the post of Reader were required to possess (a) a  first or high second class Master’s Degree of an Indian University in the subject; (b) a Research Degree of Doctorate  standard or  published work of a high standard and (c) experience  of teaching  post-graduate  classes  for 10 years  in  case  of Professors  and 5 years in case of Readers.   Anniah  Gowda, appellant  no.  2, was selected by a  Board  of  Appointment which was constituted to examine the fitness of the  several applicants  and he was appointed a Reader in English in  the Central College, ’Bangalore. 576 C.   D. Govinda Rao, respondent, filed an application in the Mysore  High  Court under Art. 226 of  the  Constitution  in which  he  prayed  that a writ of  quo  warranto  be  issued calling  upon  appellant  no. 2 to  show  cause  under  what authority  he was holding the post of a Reader  in  English. He  also prayed for a writ of mandamus or other  appropriate writ  or direction calling upon appellant no. 1  to  appoint him  Reader.   His contention was that  the  appointment  of Anniah  Gowda  was  illegal in the face  of  the  prescribed qualifications. The High Court set aside the appointment of Anniah Gowda  on the  ground that he did not satisfy the first  qualification which  required  "that he must possess either a first  or  a high  second class Master’s degree of an Indian  University" as he had secured just 50.2 per cent marks while the minimum

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required for a second class was 50 per cent.  As regards the second and third qualifications, the High Court did not make a finding against Anniah Gowda.  The appellants came to this Court by special leave. Held  : (i) The decision of the High Court was incorrect  in as  much as the High Court did not take  into  consideration the  Degree  of  Master of Arts  of  the  Durham  University obtained by Anniah Gowda.  It is true that Anniah Gowda  did not  possess  a  high  second  class  degree  of  an  Indian University but he did possess the alternative  qualification of  Master of Arts of a foreign University.  The High  Court was  in error in issuing a writ of quo waranto quashing  the appointment of appellant no. 2. (ii) Boards   of   appointments   are   nominated   by   the Universities  and when,recommendations made by them and  the appointments  following  on them are challenged  before  the courts,  normally, the courts should be slow  to   interfere with the opinions expressed by the experts unless there  are allegations of malafides against them.  Normally, it is wise and  safe for the courts to leave the decision  of  academic matters  to experts who are more familiar with the  problems they face than the courts generally can be.  What  the  High Court  should have considered in this case was  whether  the appointment  made  by  the Chancellor  had  contravened  any statutory  or binding rule or ordinance and while doing  so, the  High Court should have shown due regard to the  opinion expressed by the Board of experts and its recommendations on which the Chancellor had acted.  The High -Court should  not have thought that the Board was acting like a quasi judicial tribunal, deciding disputes referred to it for decision.  It should  not have applied tests which are applicable  in  the case of writ of certian; The  writ  of quo warranto gives the judiciary a  weapon  to control  the  executive from making appointments  to  public office  against  law  and to protect a  citizen  from  being deprived  of public office to which he has a  right.   These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office who might be 577 allowed  to  continue  either with  the  connivance  of  the executive  or by the reason of its apathy.  Before a  person can  effectively  claim a writ of quo warranto,  he  has  to satisfy  the court that the office in question is  a  public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  417  and 418 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated March 7, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 1197 of 1960. C.   K.   Daphtary,  Attorney-General  for  India,   B.   R. Ethira’ulu Naidu, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.  L. Vohra, for the appellant (in G.A. No. 417/63). V. K. Govindara’ulu and R. Gopalakrishnan for the  appellant in C.A.No. 418/63. S.   K. Venkataranga Iyengar, I. B. Dadachanji O.C.  Mathur, Ravinder Narain, for respondents. August 26, 1963.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.--The petition from which these appeals  by special  leave  arise  was filed  by  the  respondent,  C.D. Govinda Rao, in the Mysore High Court under art. 226 of  the Constitution.   By that petition, he prayed that a  writ  of

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quo  warranto be issued, calling upon Anniah Gowda  to  show cause as to under what authority he was holding the post  of a  Research  Reader  in  English  in  the  Central  College, Bangalore.   He also prayed for a writ of mandamus or  other appropriate writ or direction calling upon the University of Mysore  to appoint him Research Reader in the scale  of  Rs. 500-25-800.   His  case was that the appointment  of  Anniah Gowda to the post of Research Reader was illegal in the face of  the prescribed qualifications and that he was  qualified to  be  appointed to that post.  That is why he  wanted  the appointment of Anniah Gowda to be quashed, and he asked  for a  writ,  directing the University to appoint  him  in  that post.   To  his  petition, he impleaded  the  University  of Mysore  by its Registrar, and Anniah Gowda as  the  opposite party. 578 The  University  of  Mysore and Anniah  Gowda  disputed  the validity  of  the claim made by the respondent.  lie,  urged that Anniah Gowda was properly appointed Research Reader and that  the  contention made by the respondent that  the  said appointment was invalid was not justified. On these pleadings, evidence was led by both the parties  in respect  of  their  respective contentions in  the  form  of affidavits.  The High Court has held that the appointment of Anniah  Gowda  was  invalid  and  so  it  has  quashed   the Resolution of the Board of Appointment of the University  of Mysore  recommending his appointment and his  directed  that his  appointment subsequendy made by the Chancellor  of  the University  should be set aside.  The High  Court,  however, refrained  from granting the respondent a writ of  mandamus, directing  his  appointment to the said if  the  appointment post, because it took the view that even of Anniah Gowda was set  aside,  it  did not follow that  the  respondent  would necessarily  be  entitled  to  that  post.   That  question, according  to the High Court, may have to be  considered  by the  University  and the Board afresh.  The  University  and Anniah  Gowda, then, moved the High Court for a  certificate to  appeal  to  this Court against its  judgement,  but  the application  was  rejected.  Thereupon  the  University  and Anniah  Gowda by separate applications moved this Court  for special  leave, and on special leave being granted to  them, they  have brought the two present appeals before us  (Civil Appeals  417  &  418  of 63).  In  this  judgment,  we  will describe  the University and, Anniah Gowda as  Appellants  1 and 2 respectively. It appears that on 31st July 1959, appellant No. 1 published an  advertisement calling for applications for sit posts  of Professors  and  six posts of Readers.   Amongst  them  were included the post of Professor of English and the Reader  in English.  The qualifications prescribed for these posts  are material and it is convenient to set them out at this  stage :               "Qualifications               (a)   A  First or High Second  Class  Master’s               Degree   of   an  Indian  University   or   an               equivalent   qualification   of   a    Foreign               University in the subject concerned;               (b) A Research Degree of a Doctorate  Standard               or published work of a high Standard;               579               (c)   Ordinarily,  ten  years (not  less  than               five years in any case) experience of teaching               post-graduate classes and guiding research  in               the case of Professors and at least five years               experience  of.  teaching degree  classes  and

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             independent research in the case of Readers ;               (d)   The knowledge of regional language  Kan-               nada    is   considered   as    a    desirable               qualification.   Preference will be  given  to               candidates who have had experience in teaching               and  organization  of research and  have  also               done advanced research work." In  accordance with s. 26(2) of the Mysore  University  Act, 1956  (No.  23  of  1956), as it  then  stood,  a  Board  of Appointments  was  nominated, consisting of  the  Vice-Chan- cellor  and two Specialists in English.   These  Specialists were  Professor  P. E. Dastoor of the Delhi  University  and Professor  L. D. Murphy of Madras.  The posts  of  Professor and Reader had been advertised in pursuance of a grant  made to  appellant  No. 1 by the  University  Grants  Commission. Four applications were received for the posts of  Professors and Reader in English and these Applicants were  interviewed by  the Board on June 8, 1960.  The Board had the  advantage of   consulting  Professor  C.D.   Narasimhiah,   Principal, Maharaja’s  College, Mysore.  After taking into account  the opinion   expressed   by  Prof.   Narasimhiah,   the   Board considered   the   academic  qualifications  of   the   four applicants  and their performance at the interview and  came to  the  conclusion that none of them was fit enough  to  be appointed a Professor under the U.G.C. Scheme in grade  800- 1,250.  Accordingly, the Board resolved that the said  posts be  kept  vacant for the present and  be  readvertised.   In regard to the filling of the post of Reader under the U.G.C. Scheme  in  the  grade  of  500-25-800,  the  Board,   after considering all aspects of the case, came to the  conclusion that appellant No. 2 was the most suitably qualified  person and unanimously resolved that he be appointed Reader in  the said grade under the U.G.C. Scheme.  This report was in  due course  approved by the Chancellor on October 3,  1960,  and after he was appointed to the post of Reader, appellant  No. 2  assumed  charge  on October 31,  1960.   Meanwhile,  even before he assumed charge of his office, the 580 respondent  had  filed his present petition on  October  15, 1960, and he had claimed an injunction against appellant No. 1  from proceeding to fill the post, but since the post  had already been filled up, he modified his claim and asked  for a writ of quo warranto against appellant No. 2. That is  how the main dispute which arose between the two appellants  and the  respondent  was  in  regard  to  the  validity  of  the appointment  of  appellant No. 2 to the post  of  Reader  in English, and as we have already pointed out, the High  Court upheld  the  contentions of the respondent and  quashed  the appointment of appellant No. 2. The  judgment of the High Court does not indicate  that  the attention  of  the  High Court was drawn  to  the  technical nature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by  the respondent  in the present proceedings, and  the  conditions which had to be satisfied before a writ could issue in  such proceedings. As Halsbury has observed* "An  information  in the nature of a quo warranto  took  the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a  person who claimed or usurped an office,  ’franchise,  or liberty,  to,  inquire by what authority  he  supported  his claim,  in order that the right to the office  or  franchise might be determined:" Broadly  stated,  the  quo  warranto  proceeding  affords  a judicial  remedy  by which any person, who  holds  an  inde- pendent  substantive public office or franchise or  liberty,

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is  called  upon  to show by what right he  holds  the  said office, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the  holder of  the  office has no title, he would be ousted  from  that office by judicial order.  In other words, the procedure  of quo  warranto  gives the judiciary a weapon to  control  the Executive from making appointments to public office  against law  and to protect a citizen from being deprived of  public office to which he has a right.  These proceedings also tend to  protect the public from usurpers of public  office,  who might  be allowed to continue either with the connivance  of the Executive or by reason of its apathy.  It will, thus, be seen  that before a person can effectively claim a  writ  of quo *Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol.  11, p. 145. 581 warranto,  he  has to satisfy the Court that the  office  in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal  authority,  and  that inevitably would  lead  to  the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. In  the present case, it does not appear that the  attention of  the Court was drawn to this aspect of the  matter.   The judgment  does not show that any statutory provision is  for rules  were placed before the Court and that in  making  the appointment  of appellant No. 2 these  statutory  provisions had  been  contravened.   The matter appears  to  have  been argued  before the High Court on the assumption that if  the appointment of appellant No. 2 was shown to be  inconsistent with the qualification as they were advertised by  appellant No. 1, that itself would justify the issue of a writ of  quo warranto.  In the present proceedings, we do not propose  to consider  whether this assumption was well founded  or  not. We propose to deal with the appeals on the basis that it may have  been open, to the High Court to quash the  appointment of  appellant  No. 2 even if it was shown that  one  or  the other of the qualifications prescribed by the  advertisement published by appellant No. 1 was not satisfied by him. Realising  the difficulty which he may have to face, Mr.  S. K. Venkataranga lyengar for the respondent wanted to   raise the  contention that the appointment of appellant No. 2  was made in contravention of the statutory rules and  ordinances framed by appellant No. 1. He attempted to argue that he had referred  to the statutory rules and ordinances in the  High Court,  but, unfortunately, the same had not been  mentioned or discussed in the judgment.  We have carefully  considered the  affidavits  filed by both the parties  in  the  present proceedings, and we have no hesitation in holding that at no stage it appears to have been urged by the respondent before the  High  Court that the infirmity in  the  appointment  of appellant  No. 2 proceeded from the fact that the  statutory rules  and  ordinances  made by  appellant  No.1    had  been contravened.   The  affidavit  filed by  the  respondent  in support of his petition merely described the appointment  of appellant  No. 2 as being illegal, and  significantly  added that the said appointment of appellant No. 2 and the failure of the University to appoint the respondent, 582 were  illegal in the face of the prescribed  qualifications, and these qualifications in the context undoubtedly referred to the qualifications published in the notification by which the relevant post had been advertised. It appears that in one of the affidavits filed on behalf  of appellant No. 1 reference was made to the rules framed under the Mysore University Act (No. 23 of 1956), and it was added

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that  the appointment to the post of Reader in question  had to be made in accordance with the regulations framed by  the University  Grants  Commission  under s. 26  (1)(e)  of  the University  Grants Commission Act, 1956.  This was  disputed by  the respondent, and in that connection, he alleged in  a vague manner that all the appointments made by appellant No. 1  were regulated by the ordinances and rules  framed  under the  Mysore  University  Act.  Then,  he  alleged  that  the ordinances  made  in  this regard by  the  Senate  in  their meeting  held  on  August 19, 1959,  were  approved  by  the Chancellor in his letter dated January  22,   1960.   Having made these allegations, no attempt was  made  in  the   High Court to produce these ordinances and   to  show  when  they came into force.  It appears that the   statutory      rules framed by appellant No. 1 under s. 26 (1)    received    the approval  of the Chancellor on January 22, 1960, but  we  do not know even today when they were published in the Gazette. Similarly,  the  ordinances  framed  were  approved  by  the Chancellor  on  the same day, but we do not know  when  they came  into  force.  The statutory rules,  thus,  framed  and approved, come into force on the date of the publication  of the Mysore Gazette, and the ordinances come into force  from such date as the Chancellor may direct (vide s. 42(5) of the Mysore  University Act No. 23 of 1956).   Therefore,  though some  reference was made to the ordinances, no  attempt  was made  to  show when the ordinances came into  force  and  no arguments  appear to have been urged ,on that account.   The judgment  delivered  by  the  High  Court  in  the   present proceedings  is an elaborate judgment and we think it  would be  legitimate  to  assume that it does  not  refer  to  the statutory  rules and ordinances for the simple  reason  that neither  party  relied  on them and the.   High  Court  had, therefore  no occasion to examine them.  In any case, we  do not  think  it would be open to the respondent  to  take  ;a ground about the effect of the statutory rules and ordi-                             583 nances for the first time in appeal.  The petition, which he originally filed, when read with the affidavit made by  him, does  support  this view and unambiguously  shows  that  lie confined his attack against the validity of the  appointment of appellant No. 2 solely to the ground that appellant No. 2 did  not satisfy the qualification prescribed by  the  noti- fications  by which applications had been called for by  ap- pellant No. 1. That is the basis on which the High Court has dealt  with  this matter and that is the basis on  which  we propose to deal with it. Let  us briefly indicate the findings recorded by  the  High Court before examining the merits of the contentions  raised by the appellants in these appeals.  In this connection,  it is necessary to recall the four qualifications prescribed by the  notification.  The last one which relates to the  know- ledge  of the Kannada language is not in dispute and may  be left out of consideration.  The first qualification is  that the  applicant  must  have a First or a  high  Second  Class Master’s  Degree  of an Indian University or  an  equivalent qualification  of a foreign University in the  subject  con- cerned.   It appears that appellant No. 2 secured  50.2  per cent marks in his Master’s Degree examination.  It was urged by  the  respondent before the High Court that when  50  per cent is the minimum required for securing a second class, it would be idle to suggest that a candidate, who obtains  50.2 per  cent, has secured a high Second Class Master’s  Degree, and  so the respondent pleaded that the first condition  had not  been satisfied by the appellant No. 2. The  High  Court has   upheld   this   plea.   In  regard   to   the   second

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qualification, it appears that appellant No. 2 has  obtained a Degree of Master of Arts of the University of Durham.  The High Court has held that in regard to this qualification, if the  Board took the view that the appellant No. 2  satisfied that  qualification, it would not be Just for the  Court  to differ  from that opinion.  In other words, the  High  Court did not make a finding in favour of the respondent in regard to   qualification   No.   2.  In  regard   to   the   third qualification,  the matter appears to have been  debated  at length before the High Court.  Evidence was led by both  the parties and the respondent seriously disputed the claim made by  both the appellants that appellant No. 2  satisfied  the test of five years experience of teaching 584 Degree  classes.  The High Court examined this evidence  and ultimately  came to the conclusion that though the  material adduced by the appellants on this point was  unsatisfactory, it could not make a finding in favour of the respondent.  In this connection, the High Court has severely criticised  the conduct  of  appellant No. 1 to which we will  refer  later. Thus, it is clear that substantially the High Court  decided to  quash the appointment of appellant No. 2 on  the  ground that  it  was  plain  that he  did  not  satisfy  the  first qualification.  In this connection, the High Court has  also criticised  the  report made by the Board and  has  observed that the Members of the Board did not appear to have applied their  minds to the question which they were called upon  to consider. In  our opinion, in coming to the conclusion that  appellant No.  2  did not satisfy the first  qualification,  the  High Court  is  plainly in error.  The judgment  shows  that  the learned Judges concentrated on the question as to whether  a candidate obtaining 50 per cent marks could be said to  have secured  a  high Second Class Degree, and  if  the  relevant question  had to be determined solely by reference  to  this aspect of the matter, the conclusion of the High Court would have  been  beyond reproach.  But what the  High  Court  has failed  to notice is the fact that the  first  qualification consists of two parts-the first part is: a high Second Class Master’s Degree of an Indian University, and the second part is: its equivalent which is an equivalent qualification of a foreign University.  The High Court does not appear to  have considered   the  question  as  to  whether  it   would   be appropriate for the High Court to differ from the opinion of the  Board when it was quite likely that the Board may  have taken  the  view that the Degree of Master of  Arts  of  the Durham  University. which appellant No. 2 had  obtained  was equivalent  to  a high Second Class Master’s  Degree  of  an Indian  University.   This aspect of the  question  pertains purely  to  an academic matter and  Courts  would  naturally hesitate  to express a definite opinion, particularly,  when it  appears  that the Board of experts  was  satisfied  that appellant No. 2 fulfilled the first qualification.  If  only the  attention  of  the High court had  been  drawn  to  the equivalent furnished in the first qualification, we have  no doubt  that it would not have held that the Board had  acted capriciously in: expressing the 585 opinion   that   appellant   No.   2   satisfied   all   the qualifications  including  the first qualification.   As  we have  already  observed  though the  High  Court  felt  some difficulty about the two remaining qualifications, the  High Court  has not rested its decision on any  definite  finding that  these qualifications also had not been satisfied.   On reading the first qualification, the position appears to  be

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very   simple;  but  unfortunately,  since  the   equivalent qualification  specified  by  cl.  (a)  was  apparently  not brought  to the notice of the High Court, it has  failed  to take that aspect of the matter into account.  On that aspect of the matter, it may follow that the Master’s Degree of the Durham University secured by appellant No. 2, would  satisfy the  first qualification and even the second.   Besides,  it appears  that  appellant No. 2 has to his  credit  published works   which  by  themselves  would  satisfy   the   second qualification.   Therefore, there is no doubt that the  High Court  was in error in coming to the conclusion  that  since appellant  No.  2 could not be said to have secured  a  high Second Class Master’s Degree of an Indian University, he did not  satisfy  the  first qualification.  It  is  plain  that Master’s Degree of the Durham University which appellant No. 2 has obtained, can be and must have been taken by the Board to  be equivalent to a high Second Class Master’s Degree  of an Indian University, and that means the first qualification is satisfied by appellant No. 2. That being so, we must hold that  the High Court was in error in issuing a writ  of  quo warranto, quashing the appointment of appellant No. 2. Before  we part with these appeals, however, reference  must be  made  to two other matters.  In dealing  with  the  case presented  before it by the respondent, the High  Court  has criticised  the  report made by the Board and  has  observed that  the  circumstances  disclosed by the  report  made  it difficult  for the High Court to treat  the  recommendations made  by  the experts with the respect that  they  generally deserve.  We are unable to see the point of criticism of the High Court in such academic matters.  Boards of Appointments are  nominated by the Universities and when  recommendations made  by  them and the appointments following on  them,  are challenged before courts, normally the courts should be slow to  interfere  with the opinions expressed by  the  experts. There is no allegation about mala fides against 38-2 S. C. India/64 586 the  experts who constituted the present Board; and  so,  we think, it would normally be wise and safe for the courts  to leave  the decisions of academic matters to experts who  are more  familiar with the problems they face than  the  courts generally  can  be.  The criticism made by  the  High  Court against  the report made by the Board seems to suggest  that the High Court thought that the Board was in the position of an  executive authority, issuing an executive fiat,  or  was acting like a quasi-judicial tribunal, deciding disputes re- ferred to it for its decisions.  In dealing with  complaints made by citizens in regard to appointments made by  academic bodies, like the Universities, such an approach would not be reasonable  or appropriate.  In fact, in issuing  the  writ, the  High  Court has made certain  observations  which  show ’that the High Court applied tests ’Which would legitimately be  applied  in  the case of writ  of  certiorari.   In  the judgment,  it has been observed that the error in this  case is  undoubtedly a manifest error.  That is  a  consideration which is more germane and relevant in a procedure for a writ of  certiorari.  What the High Court should have  considered is  whether  the  appointment made  by  the  Chancellor  had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance,  and in doing so, the High Court should have shown due regard  to the opinions expressed by the Board & its recommendations on which  the  Chancellor has acted.  In this  connection,  the High  Court has failed to notice one significant  fact  that when  the  Board  considered the claims  of  the  respective applicants,  it  examined them very carefully  and  actually

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came  to  the conclusion that none of them  deserved  to  be appointed  a Professor.  These recommendations made  by  the Board clearly show that they considered the relevant factors carefully  and  ultimately  came  to  the  conclusion   that appellant  No.  2  should be recommended  for  the  post  of Reader.  Therefore, we are satisfied that the criticism made by the High Court against the Board and its deliberations is not justified. It  appears that the High Court was also  dissatisfied  with the  conduct  of appellant No. 1 and its  officers,  and  in fact,  while dealing with the question about the  length  of the  teaching experience of appellant No. 2, the High  Court has  observed  that "the material placed on record is  of  a doubtful nature characterised by a clear tendency 587 to  mislead the Court, if not an actual attempt to  do  so". The  learned  Attorney-General  has  complained  that   this criticism is not justified.  In fact, after the judgment was pronounced,  an  application was made to  the  same  learned Judges  to expunge the criticism made against appellant  No. 1, and in support of this application, Mr. Ethirajulu Naidu, who  was  then the Advocate-General and who had  argued  the matter  before  the High Court, made an  affidavit,  showing that  appellant  No.  1  could not be  charged  with  having attempted  to mislead the High Court.  Even then,  the  High Court  was  not  fully  satisfied,  and  so  in  a  judgment delivered  by  it on the application  subsequently  made  to quash  the  said observations, the learned  judges  observed that  they were willing to accept and did accept  the  assu- rance  given by the learned Advocate-General that there  was no actual attempt made to mislead the Court.’ Even so,  they held that the material placed before the Court could or  did have  a tendency to mislead, and that is the  opinion  which they  thought  even  after  hearing  the  learned  Advocate- General, was well founded, at any rate, not unwarranted This criticism has been made by the High Court because  when an  affidavit  was filed before it by  Mr.  Thimmaraju,  the Gazatted  Assistant of appellant No. 1, he produced on  June 1, 1961, a statement from the Service Register of  appellant No.  2. This extract purported to show that appellant No.  2 had more than five years’ teaching experience prescribed  by the third qualification.  The Register was then sent for  by the  High  Court  and examined, and  it  became  clear  that whereas the first four entries in the statement filed by the deponent were borne out by the said Register, the subsequent eight  entries did not appear in that Register.  Later  when the High Court was moved, after the judgment was pronounced, for  expunging the remarks, another document  was  produced. This  purported to be the gazetted Officers’  Register,  and the statements contained in the extract filed by  Thimmaraju appeared  in  that  Register.   The  explanation  given   by Appellant  No. 1 and the learned Advocate-General  was  that when appellant No. 2 was a non-gazetted servant, his service register  was separately kept; but in regard  to  Government gazetted servants, a general service Register was kept,  and all the statements 588 filed  by Mr. Thimmaraju really contained facts  taken  from the separate service Register of appellant No. 2 when he was a non-gazetted servant, and facts taken from the  Government gazetted  servants’  Register, after he  became  a  gazetted servant.  It is undoubtedly true that the statement filed by Thimmaraju seems to suggest that all the facts stated in the statement  were gathered from service Register of  appellant No.  2,  and  that,  strictly,  was  not  accurate  at  all.

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Therefore,  on the inaccuracy of the statement made  by  Mr. Tlimmaraju,  the  High Court would have  been  justified  in making  an adverse comment; but in considering the  question as to whether Thimmaraju or appellant No. 1 on whose  behalf he made the affidavit, attempted or intended to mislead  the Court, it is necessary to bear in mind other relevant facts. On  the question about the length of the teaching career  of appellant  No.  2,  appellant  No. 2  had  made  a  detailed affidavit  on July 22, 1961.  In this affidavit, he had  set out  the  several teaching assignments he had held  and  the periods  during which he held them;, and these clearly  show that his teaching experience of the prescribed character  is much  more than five years which is the minimum  prescribed. It  is  remarkable that though the respondent  purported  to make a rejoinder to the affidavit filed by appellant No.  2, the  details  given  by appellant No. 2  in  regard  to  his teaching   experience   have  not   been   specifically   or categorically  traversed by the respondent.  Besides, it  is significant that the Government gazetted officers’ Register, which was produced before the High Court later-, amply bears out  the  facts  in  the  statement  filed  by   Thimmaraju. Therefore,  one thing is clear that the material fact  about the length of the teaching experience of appellant No. 2  is fully  established by the affidavit of appellant No,. 2  and even  by  the gazetted officers’ Register  which  was  later produced,  and so, it seems to us that the High  Court  need not have been so severe on appellant No. 1 when it  observed that the material produced by appellant No. 1 had a tendency to mislead the Court, if not an actual attempt to do so.  It is undoubtedly true that Thimmaraju should have looked  into the  record  more carefully and should have  stated  clearly that  the  facts stated in the statement filed by  him  were taken  partly  from  the  individual  service  register   of appellant No. 2 and partly from the Register, 589 which is kept as a general Register for gazetted servants in the  State.  Therefore, we think there is some substance  in the contention made by the learned Attorney-General that the harsh criticism made by the High Court against appellant No. 1 is not fully justified. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the. order passed by the  High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed  by the  respondent  is dismissed with costs  throughout,  There will be one set of hearing fees in both the appeals filed by the two appellants. Appeals allowed.