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PETITIONER: THE UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MESSRS.  BHANA MAL GULZARI MALAND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/12/1959

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SUBBARAO, K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  475            1960 SCR  (2) 627  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1961 SC 705  (18)  RF         1961 SC 928  (7,16)  R          1965 SC1107  (30,31)  RF         1967 SC1895  (14)  MV         1968 SC1232  (95)  F          1971 SC 474  (7)  R          1974 SC 366  (56,59)  F          1987 SC1802  (9)

ACT: Iron   and Steel Control-Notification issued  by  Controller fixing maximum price of steel--Constitutional  validity-Iron and  Steel (Control of Production and Distribution) Order  , 1941, cl.11B Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (XXIV  of  1946),  ss. 3,  4-Constitution  of  India,  Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g).

HEADNOTE: The  respondent company was registered a stock-holder  under the Iron and Steel (Control of Production and  Distribution) Order, 1941 issued by the Central Government in exercise  of its powers under r. 81(2) Of the Defence of India Rules.  On December  10, 1949, the Iron and Steel Controller  issued  a notification  under  cl.  11B of the  Order  decreasing  the prices  already fixed for all categories of steel by Rs.  30 per ton.  Crirminal cases were started against the  company, its three directors, its general 628 manager  and two sales-men under cl. 11B, read with s. 7  of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, on  the allegation  that they had sold their old stock of steel  for prices   higher   than   those  prescribed   by   the   said notification.   The respondents moved the High  Court  under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the said  criminal proceedings.  Their contention was that cl. 11B of the Order was  invalid  and  unconstitutional  as  it  violated  Arts. 19(1)(f)  and  (g) of the Constitution.  It was  also  urged that the said clause was ultra vires the powers conferred on the  Central Government by S. 3 Of the Act, under which  the

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order  must  now be deemed to have been  issued.   The  High Court held that the cl. 11B violated Arts. 19(1)(f) and  (g) of the Constitution.  The Union of India appealed. Held, that neither cl. 11B of the Iron and Steel (Control of Production  and Distribution) Order, 1941, nor the  impugned notification   violated  Art.  19(1)(f)  and  (g)   of   the Constitution and their validity was beyond question. The clear implication of the constitutional validity of  ss. 3  and 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary  powers)  Act, 1946,  as  found by this Court in Harishankar Bagla  v.  The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, is that if the Central Government, instead of exercising its own  authority under  s.  3  Of the Act, chooses by  a  notified  order  to authorise  the  Controller to pass appropriate  orders,  the notified  order cannot be challenged on the ground  that  it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. All  that  the  Iron and Steel (Control  of  Production  and Distribution)  Order, 1941, seeks to do is to  prescribe  an integrated  scheme  for the guidance of the  Controller  and other specified authorities in effectuating the policy  laid down  by s. 3 of the Act and it is obvious that cl.  11B  of the  Order by authorising the fixation of the maximum  price for  the  different categories of iron  and  steel  directly carries  out  that  legislative  object,  namely,  equitable distribution  of  the  goods  at  fair  prices.   The  power conferred  on  the  Central Government by S. 3  and  on  the specified  authority by s. 4 Of the Act is canalised by  the policy  clearly enunciated by S. 3, and cl. 11B which  seeks to  further  canalise the exercise of that power  cannot  be said  to  confer on the delegate  uncanalised  or  unbridled power or suffer from excessive delegation. It  is  apparent,  therefore, that cl. 11B  read  by  itself cannot  violate Art. 19 of the Constitution and there is  no basis for the argument that by conferring such powers as  it does  on  the  Controller,  it  unreasonably  restricts  the exercise  of fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(f) and  (g) of the Constitution. It  may,  however, still be open to a party to show  that  a price  structure  fixed by the Controller  by  a  particular notification  violates  Art. 19 of  the  Constitution.   But before  this  can be successfully done, he must be  able  to show not merely that a particular stock-holder suffered loss in respect of particular 629 transactions  but that in a large majority of cases, if  not all,  the  impugned  notification is  likely  -to  adversely affect  the  fundamental right of the  dealers  under  Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. M/s.   Dwarka  Prasad  Laxmi Narain v. The  State  of  Uttar Pradesh,[1954] S.C.R. 803 and The State of Rajasthan v. Nath Mul and Mitha Mal, [1954] S.C.R. 982, distinguished. Harishankar  Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955]  1 S.C.R. 380, explained and applied.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 36 to 38 of 1955. Appeals from the judgment and order dated the 14th February, 1955,  of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench),  Delhi,  in Criminal Writs Nos. 36-D, 37-D and 52-D of 1954. C.   K.  Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, N. S.  Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants. N.   C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and N. H. Hingorani, for the

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respondents. 1959.    December  16.   The  judgment  of  Sinha,  C.   J., Gajendragadkar,  Das Gupta and Shah, JJ., was  delivered  by Gajendragadkar,  J.  Subba  Rao, J.,  delivered  a  separate judgment. GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-These three appeals which have been  filed in  this Court with certificates issued by the  Punjab  High Court  under  Art. 132(1) of the Constitution  are  directed against  the orders passed by the said High Court  by  which cl.  11B  of  Iron  and  Steel  (Control  of  Production   & Distribution) Order, 1941 (hereinafter called the Order) has been  declared  unconstitutional and  inoperative,  and  the criminal  proceedings  commenced  against  M/s.   Bhana  Mal Gulzari  Mal and others under the said clause 11B read  with s. 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,  1946 (Act  XXIV of 1946) (hereinafter called the Act)  have  been quashed.   M/s.   Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal Ltd., is  a  private limited  company  having  its registered  office  at  Chawri Bazar,  Delhi.   Since  1948, it has been  registered  as  a stockholder  by the Iron and Steel  Controller  (hereinafter called  the  Controller) under cl. 2(d) of  the  Order.   It appears that 630 under  cl.  11B of the Order notifications had  been  issued from  time  to  time giving a schedule  of  base  prices  in respect  of  iron  and steel.  On  December  10,  1949,  the Controller issued a, notification under  cl. 11B  decreasing by  Rs.  30  per  ton  the  prices  already  fixed  for  all categories   of   steel.   Several  criminal   cases,   were instituted (Nos. 385-410 of 1954) against the said  company, its  three directors, its general manager and  two  salesmen (hereinafter  called respondents 1 to 7) on  the  allegation that  they,  had sold their -old stock of steel  for  prices higher  than  those prescribed by the said  notification  of December  10, 1949.  When the respondents had thus  to  face several criminal proceedings they filed three writ petitions in  the  Punjab High Court against the Union of  India,  the State   of  Punjab  and  others  (hereinafter   called   the appellants).   By their Writ petition No. 36 of 1954  (23-3- 54)  they prayed for a direction, order or writ  restraining the appellants from enforcing or giving effect to cl. 11B or the  said notification, as well as a writ or order  quashing the  criminal  proceedings  commenced  against  them.    The decision  in this writ petition has given rise  to  Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 1955.  Writ Petition No. 37 of 1954  (23-3- 54)  prayed for a similar order specifically in  respect  of the criminal cases Nos. 385410 of 1954 then pending -against the  respondents, and asked for an interim stay of the  said proceedings.   The  order passed on this writ  petition  has given  rise to Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 1955.   It  appears that  under some of the criminal proceedings  filed  against the  respondents  orders for search had been passed  by  the trial  Magistrate  on  May 12,  1953.   These  orders  ,were challenged by the respondents by their Writ Petition No. 52- D  of  1954  (7-4-54).  An appropriate writ  was  asked  for quashing  the warrants issued under the said  orders.   From the orders passed on this writ petition, Criminal Appeal No. 38  of  1955  arises.   In all  ’these  writ  petitions  the respondents’  contention  was that cl. 11B was  invalid  and unconstitutional  as it violated Arts. 19(1)(f) and  (g)  as well  as Art. 31 of the Constitution.  They also urged  that the said clause was ultra vires the powers 631 conferred on the Central Government by s. 3 of the Act.  The notification issued by the Controller on December 10,  1949,

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was challenged by the respondents on the ground that it  was issued  under a clause which was invalid and  was  otherwise unreasonable  and  void.  In substance the  High  Court  has upheld the respondents’ plea that cl. 11B is ultra vires  as it is violative  of the fundamental rights  guaranteed under Arts. 19 (1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.  In the present appeals the appellants seek to challenge the correctness  of this  conclusion.  Thus the main point which calls  for  our decision in this group of appeals is whether cl.  11B of the Order is valid or not. The  impugned clause forms part of the Order which has  been issued  by the Central Government in exercise of its  powers conferred  by  sub-r. (2) of r. 81 of the Defence  of  India Rules.   Before considering the appellant’s contention  that cl.  11B is valid it would be necessary to refer briefly  to the parent Act, and to trace the vicissitudes through  which it has passed, to examine its material provisions and  their effect  on  the controversy in the present appeals.   It  is well-known that on September 29, 1939, the Defence of  India Act was passed to provide for special measures to ensure the public safety and interest and the defence of British  India and  the trial of certain offences.  The Act and  the  Rules framed  thereunder were enacted to meet the emergency  which had  arisen  as  a result of the  Second  World  War.   Rule 81(2)(b)  of  the Rules authorised  the  Central  Government inter  alia, so far as appears to it necessary or  expedient for  securing the defence of British India or the  efficient prosecution of war or for maintaining supplies and  services essential to the life of the community, to provide by  order for  controlling  the prices or rates at which  articles  or things  of any description whatsoever may be sold  or  hired and  for  relaxing any maximum or minimum  limits  otherwise imposed  on such prices or rates.  This Act was followed  by Ordinance  No.  XVIII  of 1946,  which  was  promulgated  on September  25, 1946.  Clauses 3 and 4 of this Ordinance  are relevant for our 632 purpose.  Clause 3(1) provides inter alia that  the  Central Government,  so  far  as  it  appears  to  it  necessary  or expedient  for  maintaining or increasing  supplies  of  any essential   commodity,  or  for  securing  their   equitable distribution  and  availability  at  fair  prices,  may   by notified  order  provide for regulating or  prohibiting  the production,  supply and distribution thereof, and trade  and commerce therein; sub-cl. 2(c) adds inter alia that  without prejudice to  the generality of the powers conferred by sub- s. (1), an order made thereunder may provide for controlling the prices at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold.   This  Ordinance  was  issued  to  provide  for   the continuance during a limited period of powers to control the production,  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade  and commerce  in,  certain  commodities which  were  treated  as essential  for national economy.  The essential  commodities which were covered by the Ordinance were defined by cl. 2(a) as meaning any of the classes of commodities specified; they included  iron,  steel and coal.  Having  provided  for  the delegation of the specified powers to the Central Government under cl. 3 the Ordinance provided for sub-delegation by cl. 4.  Under this clause the Central Government was  authorised to direct by a notified order that the power to make  orders under  cl. 3 shall, in relation to such matters and  subject to  such  conditions,  if any, as may be  specified  in  the direction, be exerciseable by (a) such officer or  authority subordinate   to  the  Central  Government,  or   (b)   such Provincial   Government   or  such  officer   or   authority

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subordinate to a Provincial Government, as may be  specified in the direction.  This Ordinance was later followed by  the Act  (Act  XXIV of 1946) which was passed  on  November  19, 1946.  The preamble to the Act, the definition of  essential commodity  and  the  provisions  for  delegation  and   sub- delegation  which were included in the Ordinance  have  been re-enacted by the Act.  The life of the Act thus passed  was continued from time to time until the Essential  Commodities Act  No.  10  of  1955 was put on  the  statute  book  as  a permanent measure.  The provisions of the ]Defence of  India Act and the 633 Rules  framed  thereunder  came  into  force  to  meet   the emergency created by the war; but even after the war came to an end and -hostilities ceased the emergency created by  the war  continued and the economic problems facing the  country needed  the  assistance of    similar  emergency provisions. That explains why those provisions have continued ever since 1939. The Order of which cl. 11B is a part was issued on July  26, 1941, by the Central Government in exercise of    the powers conferred  on it by r. 81(2) of the Defence of  India  Rules which correspond to the provisions of s.     3  of the  Act. It may be pointed out that as a result of    the    combined operation  of cl. 5 of Ordinance XVIII of 1946 and s.  7  of the  Act, the Order must now be deemed to have  been  issued under  s. 3 of the Act.  It is necessary to examine  briefly the  broad  features  of  the scheme  of  this  Order.   The Controller specified in the Order is the person appointed as Iron  and  Steel Controller by the  Central  Government  and includes any person described by cl. 2(a) of the Order.  The Order  applies  to  all iron and  steel  of  the  categories specified in its Second Schedule.  Clauses 4 and 5  regulate the  acquisition  and disposal of iron or steel, and  cl.  8 requires that the use of iron and steel must conform to  the conditions  governing  the acquisition.  This  clause  shows that, in exercise of the powers conferred on the  Controller by  the  proviso  to it, the Controller  has  to  take  into account  the  requirements of persons  holding  stocks,  the requirements  of persons needing such stocks, the  transport facilities available and any other factor including a strike or   lock-out  affecting  the  production  or   fabrication. Clauses 10B and 10C empower the Controller to direct sale of iron  and  steel  in cases specified in  the  said  clauses. Clause 11A authorises the Controller, where he is  satisfied that  such action is necessary in order to  co-ordinate  the production  of  iron and steel with the demands of  iron  or steel which have arisen or are likely to arise, to  prohibit or require production of the said commodities in the  manner indicated by sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) therein.  That  takes us to cl. 11 B the validity of which 81 634 falls  to  be considered in the present appeals.   It  reads thus: "11B.  Power to fix prices-(1) The Controller may      from time to time by notification in the Gazette of India fix the maximum prices at which any iron or steel may be sold (a) by a  producer,  (b)  by  Stockholder  including  a  Controller Stockholder and (c) by any other person or class of persons. Such  price  or  prices  may  differ  from  iron  and  steel obtainable from different sources and may include allowances for  contribution to and payment from any Equalisation  Fund established  by the Controller for equalising  freight,  the concession  rates  payable  to each  producer  or  class  of

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producers  under agreements entered into by  the  Controller with  the  producers  from  time  to  time,  and  any  other disadvantages. The  Controller, may also, by a general or special order  in writing, require any person or, class of persons  enumerated above  to  pay  such amount on  account  of  allowances  for contribution  to any Equalisation Fund, within  such  period and  in  such manner as the Controller may  direct  in  this behalf. (2)  For the purpose of applying the prices  notified  under sub-clause (1) the Controller may himself classify any  iron and  steel  and  may, if no appropriate price  has  been  so notified, fix such price as he considers appropriate: Provided  that  the Controller may direct that  the  maximum prices fixed under sub-clause (1) or (2) shall not apply  to any specified stocks of iron or steel and may, in respect of such stocks specify the maximum prices at which such iron or steel may be sold and communicate the same in writing to the persons  concerned  and any person or persons  holding  such stocks  of  iron  and steel for which prices  have  been  so specified  shall,  at the time of the sale of such  iron  or steel  or part thereof, mention the number and date  of  the order  of the Controller in every Cash Memo, Bill  or  other document  evidencing  the  sale  or  disposal  out  of   the respective  stocks  to  which the order  of  the  Controller applies. 635 (3)  No  producer or stockholder or other person shall  sell or  offer to sell, and no person shall acquire any  iron  or steel  at a price exceeding the maximum prices  fixed  under sub-clause (1) or (2)." Clause  12  gives power to the Central  Government  to  give directions to the Controller or other authorities in respect of the procedure to be followed by them in exercising  their powers and generally for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions  of  the Order.  It would thus be  seen  that  in issuing this Order the Central Government have prescribed  a self sufficient scheme for regulating the production, supply and  distribution  of steel and iron at  fair  prices.   The Controller is required to take an over-all view of the needs of  national  economy in respect of steel and  iron  and  to issue  appropriate  directions in order  to  effectuate  the policy  of the Act.  The appellants’ contention is  that  if cl. 11 B is considered in the light of the scheme which  the Order has in view it cannot be said that the said clause  is violative of Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. Before we address ourselves to the question about the  vires of  cl.  11B  it  is necessary to make  it  clear  that  the validity  of  ss. 3 and 4 of the Act has not  been  disputed before us, and indeed it cannot be disputed, in view of  the decision  of  the Court in Harishankar Bagla & Anr.  v.  The State of Madhya Pradesh (1).  The challenge to the vires  of cl. 11B has, therefore, to be examined on the basis that ss. 3 and 4 of the Act are valid.  It is relevant to set out the implications of this position.  When it is assumed that  ss. 3  and  4 are valid it necessarily means that  they  do  not suffer  from  the vice of excessive  delegation.   When  the Legislature   delegated   its  authority  to   the   Central Government to provide by order for regulating or prohibiting the  production, supply and distribution of steel and  iron, it had not surrendered its essential legislative function in favour  of the Central Government.  The preamble to the  Act and  the  material words used in s. 3(1) itself  embody  the decision of the Legislature in the matter of the legislative policy, and their effect is to lay

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(1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380. 636 down  a  binding rule of conduct in the light of  which  the Central  Government had to exercise its powers conferred  on it  by s. 3. The Legislature has declared its decision  that the   commodities   in  question  are  essential   for   the maintenance  and pi-ogress of national economy, and  it  has also  expressed  its determination that in the  interest  of national economy it is expedient that the supply of the said commodities   should   be   maintained   or   increased   as circumstances may require and the commodities should be made available  for equitable distribution at fair  prices.   The concept   of  fair  prices  which  has   been   deliberately introduced  by  the  Legislature in s.  3  gives  sufficient guidance to the Central Government in prescribing the  price structure  for the commodities from time to time.  With  the rise and fall of national demand for the said commodities or fluctuations  in the supplies thereof, the chart  of  prices may,  in  the  absence of  well  planned  regulation,  prove erratic  and  prejudicial to national economy,  and  without rational and well-planned regulation equitable  distribution may  be  difficult to achieve; and so  the  Legislature  has empowered  the Central Government to achieve the  object  of equitable  distribution  of the commodities in  question  by fixing fair prices for them.  Thus, when it is said that the delegation  to the Central Government by s. 3 is  valid,  it means that the Central Government has been given  sufficient and   proper   guidance  for  exercising   its   powers   in effectuating the policy of the statute. Similarly  the validity of s. 4 postulates that  the  powers conferred on the sub-delegate do not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation.  Sub-delegation authorised by s. 4  is also  justified because, like the delegate under s.  3,  the sub-delegate  under  s. 4 has been given ample  guidance  to exercise  his  powers when he is authorised by  the  Central Government  in  that  behalf.   If  the  Central  Government chooses to exercise its powers under s. 3 itself it may pass appropriate  orders to give effect to the policy of the  Act in  respect of matters covered by s. 3(1) and (2).  When  it adopts  such  a  course the Central  Government  would  have exercised its own authority under s. 3; and the exercise 637 of  its  power cannot be challenged on’ the ground  that  it suffers  from the vice of excessive delegation.    Similarly where  by a notified order passed by the Central  Government tinder s. 3 the Controller is authorised to pass appropriate orders,  the  notified  order cannot be  challenged  on  the ground   that  it  suffers  from  the  vice   of   excessive delegation.   In our opinion, this position implicit in  the assumption that ss. 3 and 4 are valid. What does the Order purport to do ? It purports to prescribe a  scheme  for  the  guidance of  the  Controller  or  other authorities specified in it when they exercise their  powers and attempt to effectuate the policy of the Act.  There  can be  no  doubt that in exercising its powers under s.  3  the Central  Government  could itself have  prescribed  a  price structure for steel and iron from time to time.   Similarly, if  by  a  notified  order issued under  s.  3  the  Central Government bad authorised the Controller to do so, he  could have  himself  prescribed a price structure  in  respect  of steel and iron from time to time.  Instead of passing a bare notified   order   authorising  the   Controller   to   take appropriate  steps to effectuate the policy of the Act,  the Order  purports  to give him additional guidance  by  making several  relevant  provisions in regard to  the  production,

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supply  and sale of steel and iron.  The several clauses  of the Order constitute an integrated scheme which would enable the  Controller to take steps to give effect to  the  policy laid  down by s. 3 of the Act.  Clause 11B  itself  provides for  the  fixation  of maximum prices for  iron  and  steel. First  of all the Controller has to classify iron and  steel into  different categories according as they are  tested  or untested; an Equalisation Fund has to be established by  him for equalising freight, and he has to take into account  the concession  which  is payable to each producer or  class  of producers  under  existing valid agreements  and  any  other disadvantages.   He  is  empowered to  require  the  parties concerned  to make a contribution to the Equalisation  Fund, and the maximum prices which he has to fix have to be  fixed separately for the producers, the stockholders including the controlled  stockholders  and  other  persons  or  class  of persons.  Having fixed 638 maximum  prices as prescribed by cl. 12 the proviso  confers power  on  the Controller to grant exemptions  to  specified stocks  of  iron and steel falling under the  said  proviso. After thus prescribing the procedure for fixing the  maximum prices  and after indicating some of the factors which  have to be considered in  fixing the maximum prices, sub-cl.  (3) of  cl.  11B  imposes a statutory  prohibition  against  the specified persons from selling or offering to sell iron  and steel  at  a price exceeding the maximum price  fixed  under sub-cl. (2). It  is obvious that by prescribing the maximum   prices  for the different categories of iron and steel cl.  11B directly carries  out  the  legislative object  prescribed  in  s.  3 because the fixation of maximum prices would make stocks  of iron and steel available for equitable distribution at  fair prices.   It is not difficult to appreciate how and why  the Legislature  must have thought that it would be  inexpedient either  to  define or describe in detail  all  the  relevant factors which have to be considered in fixing the fair price of an essential commodity from time to time.  In prescribing a schedule of maximum prices the Controller has to take into account  the  position  in  respect  of  production  of  the commodities   in   question,  the  demand   for   the   said commodities,  the availability of the said commodities  from foreign sources and the anticipated increase or decrease  in the  said  supply or demand.  Foreign prices  for  the  said commodities  may also be not irrelevant.  Having  regard  to the  fact  that  the decision about the  maximum  prices  in respect  of  iron  and  steel would  depend  on  a  rational evaluation from time to time of all these varied factors the Legislature  may well have thought that this problem  should be  left to be tackled by the delegate with enough  freedom, the policy of the Legislature having been clearly  indicated by   s.  3  in  that  behalf.   The  object   is   equitable distribution of the commodity, and for achieving the  object the delegate has to see that the said commodity is available in  sufficient  quantities to meet the demand from  time  to time at fair prices.  In our opinion, therefore, if cl.  11B is considered as a part of the composite scheme evidenced 639 by  the whole of the Order and its validity is  examined  in the  light of the provisions of ss. 3 and 4 of the  Act,  it would  be difficult to sustain the plea that it  confers  on the  delegate  uncanalised  or  unbridled  power.   We   are inclined  to  hold that the power conferred on  the  Central Government by s. 3 and on the authority specified by s. 4 is canalised by the clear enunciation of the legislative policy

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in  s.  3 and that cl.  11B seeks further  to  canalise  the exercise  of the said power ; and so it is not a case  where the validity of the clause can be successfully challenged on the  ground  of excessive delegation.  We have  referred  to this aspect of the matter at some length because it  appears to  have  influenced the final conclusion  in  the  judgment under  appeal.  As we will presently indicate  the  argument before  us  has,  however, centred on  the  question  as  to whether the clause has violated Art. 19 of the Constitution. It  was faintly argued that cl. 11B should have referred  to the  prices  of some specified year as basic prices  of  the commodities  and  should  have directed  the  Controller  to prescribe the maximum prices in respect thereof by reference to  the  said basic prices.  In support of  this  contention reliance is placed on the provisions of s. 3 of the  English Prices of Goods Act, 1939.  It appears that s. 1 of the said Act  prohibits  sale of price-regulated goods at  more  than permitted  price,  and s. 3 defines the expression  "  basic price  "  as the price at which in the  ordinary  course  of business  in the case of which those goods were to be  sold, agreed  to be sold or offered for sale at the 21,st  day  of August,  1939.  Section 4 defines the  permitted  increases. It is in the light of the operation of ss. 3 and 4 that  the prohibition enacted by s. 1 becomes effective under the act. Reference  is  also  made to the  American  Emergency  Price Control Act 1942, under which the administrator is directed, in  fixing  prices,  to give due  consideration  so  far  as practicable  to prices prevailing during a  designated  base period  and  to  make adjustments for  relevant  factors  of general  applicability (Vide: Yakus v. United  States  (1)). In our (1)  (1943) 321 U. S. 4314. 640 opinion, the analogy of the two statutes cannot  effectively sustain the argument that in the absence of a  corresponding provision in cl. 11B it must necessarily     be  held to  be unconstitutional.  In deciding the nature and extent of  the guidance  which should be given to the delegate  Legislature must inevitably take   into account the special features  of the  object  which  it intends to achieve  by  a  particular statute.  As we have already indicated the object which  was intended to be achieved and the means which were required to be  adopted in the achievement of the said object have  been clearly  enumerated  by  the  Legislature  as  a  matter  of legislative  decision.   Whether or not some  other  matters also  should have been included in the legislative  decision must be left to the Legislature itself.  The question  which we  have to consider is whether the power conferred  on  the delegate  is  uncanalised or unguided.  The answer  to  this question  must,  we think, be in favour of  the  appellants. Having  regard  to  the  nature of  the  problem  which  the Legislature  wanted  to  attack  it may  have  come  to  the conclusion  that  it  would  be  inexpedient  to  limit  the discretion  of the delegate in fixing the maximum prices  by reference to any basic price.  Therefore, we must hold  that cl.  11B is not unconstitutional on the ground of  excessive delegation. It  is  of  course  true that though  cl.  11B  may  not  be unconstitutional  on the ground of excessive delegation  its validity  can  still  be  attacked on  the  ground  that  it violates  Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the  Constitution.   Mr. Chatterjee realised that failure to appreciate the effect of this  Court’s decision in Bagla’s case (1)  constituted  the main  infirmity in the judgment under appeal; and so he  did not  press  the  argument about  excessive  delegation.   He

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contended that cl. 11B was void because it violated Arts. 19 (1)(f)  and  (g)  inasmuch as the  power  conferred  on  the Controller   by  the  said  clause  puts   an   unreasonable restriction   on   the   respondents’   fundamental   rights guaranteed  under Art. 19.  In support of this  argument  he has  relied on the decisions of this Court in  M/s.   Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Two Ors. (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380. (2) [1954] S.C.R. 803. 641 and  The State of Rajasthan v. Nath Mal and Mitha  Mal  (1). On  the  other  hand,  the  learned  Solicitor-General   has contended  that  the decision of this Court in the  case  of Harishankar  Bagla (2) in effect concludes  the  controversy between  the  parties  in the  present    appeals.   We will presently  refer to these decisions; but before we do so  we may  mention the material facts on which the  contention  is raised.   The  challenge  to the validity  of  the  criminal proceedings  pending against the respondents can be made  on three alternative grounds; it can be urged that ss. 3 and  4 of  the Act are ultra vires, and if that is so  neither  the Order  subsequently issued nor cl. 11B nor the  fixation  of prices would be valid.  We have already shown that this form of  challenge has not been adopted by the  respondents.   It can also be urged that either the whole of the Order  issued by  the  Central  Government or cl.  11B  in  particular  is invalid   as  offending  Arts.  19(1)(f)  and  (i)  of   the Constitution.   It  is  with this argument that  we  are  at present  concerned: or, alternatively it can be  urged  that the  actual fixation of prices by which a flat reduction  of Rs.  30  per  ton was directed is  itself  unreasonable  and violative  of Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g).  Now in regard to  the challenge to cl. 11B on the ground that it violates Art.  19 it is difficult to see how this clause by itself can be said to  violate Art. 19.  In so far as the argument proceeds  on the   assumption  that  the  authority  conferred   on   the Controller  by  cl.  11B  is  uncanalised  or  unbridled  or unguided,  we  have already held that the  clause  does  not suffer  from any such infirmity.  Therefore reading cl.  11B by  itself  we do not see bow it would be possible  to  hold that  the said clause is violative of Art. 19.  In fact,  if ss.  3 and 4 are valid and cl. 11B do-es nothing  more  than prescribe  conditions  for the exercise  of  the  delegate’s authority  which  are consistent with s. 3 it  is  only  the actual  price structure fixed by the Controller which  in  a given  case can be successfully challenged as  violative  of Art.  19.  Let us therefore consider whether it is  open  to the respondents to challenge the said price structure in the present appeals. (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 982. (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380. 82 642 In  their  writ  petition  the  respondents  had  challenged the  validity of the notification issued by  the  Controller on  December  10,  1949,  mainly,  if  not  wholly,  on  the ground  that  it was issued under cl. 11B which  itself  was void.    It  is  true  that  in  the  course  of  the   argu ments  it appears to have been urged before the  High  Court that  the flat deduction of Rs. 30 per ton directed  by  the impugned  notification is unreasonable, and in its  judgment the High Court has characterised the said deduction as being confiscatory.   It also appears that the price for  sale  by registered  producers of untested articles was Rs.  333  per ton  whereas the price for sale by controlled stock  holders

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is Rs. 363 and the price at which the respondents could sell was  Rs. 378 per ton.  As a result of -the deduction of  Rs. 30  directed  by the impugned notification  the  respondents were required to sell at Rs. 348 per ton.  It is alleged  on their behalf that they had purchased the commodity from  the controlled  stockholders at the rate of Rs. 363 per ton  and in  consequence compelling them to sell the comm.  odity  at the reduced price means a loss of Rs. 15 per ton.  This part of  the  respondents’ case has not been tried  by  the  High Court  and  since  it was a matter in  dispute  between  the parties it could not be tried in writ proceedings; but apart from  it  the  petitions do not show  that  the  respondents seriously  challenged  the validity of the  notification  on this  aspect  of  the matter.  Besides  in  considering  the validity of the notification it would not be enough to  show that  a particular registered stockholder suffered  loss  in respect  of particular transactions.  What will have  to  be proved in such a case is -the general effect of the impugned notification on all the classes of dealers taken as a whole. If  it  is shown that in a large majority of cases,  if  not all,  the impugned notification would adversely  affect  the fundamental  right  of the dealers  guaranteed  under  Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g) that may constitute a serious infirmity  in the   validity   of  the  notification.   In   the   present proceedings no case has been made out on this ground and  so we cannot embark upon an enquiry of that type in appeal. 643 It still re mains to consider the decisions of this Court on which  Mr.  Chatterjee  has relied.  In  the  case  of  M/s. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain (1) the provision of cl. 4(3)  of the  Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953, was held to  be void  as  imposing  an  unreasonable  restriction  upon  the freedom of trade and business guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of  the Constitution, and not coming within  the  protection afforded by cl. (6) of the article.  It is significant  that in  dealing  with the validity of the  impugned  clause  the court has expressly stated that the vires of ss. 3 and 4  of the  Act were not challenged.  The impugned clause, it  was, however,  held,  had conferred on  the  licensing  authority unrestricted power without framing any rules or issuing  any directions to regulate or guide his discretion.  Besides the power  could  be  exercised  not  only  by  the  State  Coal Controller  but  by  any person to whom  he  may  choose  to delegate the same and it was observed that the choice can be made  in favour of any and every person.  It is  because  of these  features of the impugned clause that this Court  held that  the  clause cannot be held to be  reasonable.   It  is difficult to see how this decision can help the  respondents in  attacking cl. 11B.  We have already indicated  that  the powers  exerciseable by the Controller under cl. 11B are  in terms  made  subject  to the general power  of  the  Central Government   to  give  directions  prescribed  by  cl.   12. Incidentally  we  may  point out that though  cl.  4(3)  was struck  down  by this Court cls. 7 and 8 which  empower  the Coal  Controller to prescribe the terms and prices on  which the  commodity  in  question could be sold  were  upheld  as valid.  Mr. Chatterjee contends that in upholding these  two clauses  this  Court  has taken  into  account  the  formula prescribed by Schedule III and it appeared to the Court that the application of the formula did not on the whole lead  to any  unreasonable result.  Besides the explanation to cl.  8 also  provided  some guidance to the  authority  fixing  the price  structure  and  that guidance  was  also  taken  into account  by this Court in upholding the validity of the  two impugned  clauses.   That  no doubt is  true;  but,  in  our

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opinion, it would be unreasonable (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 803. 644 to  suggest,  as Mr. Chatterjee sought to do,  that  in  the absence  of provisions like the explanation to cl. 8 or  the formula to Schedule 111 cl.  11B in the present ease  should be struck down as void.  Such a contention finds no  support in   the   decision   in   the   case   of   M/s.     Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain (1). In  the  case of Nath Mal (2), this  Court struck  down  the latter  part of cl. 25 of the Rajasthan  Foodgrains  Control Order, 1949.  In this case again it is significant that  the challenge  to the impugned clause proceeded on the  specific and express assumption that s. 3 of the Act was valid.   Now it appears that the impugned clause empowered the Government to  requisition the stock at a price lower than the  selling price  thus  causing loss to the persons  whose  stocks  are freezed  while at the same time the Government was  free  to sell  the same stocks at a higher price and make  a  profit. The  case of the respondent which illustrated  this  vicious tendency  of  the impugned clause was treated as  a  typical case  which  showed how business of grain-dealers  would  be paralysed  by the operation of the clause.  It was  on  this view  about  the effect of the clause in  general  that  the offending portion was struck down under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.   It was held also to contravene  Art.  31(2). This  decision again does not assist the  respondents’  case because, as we have already pointed out, the validity of the impugned  notification has not been challenged on  any  such ground in the present proceedings. That  takes us to the decision of this Court in the case  of Harishankar Bagla (3) on which the appellants strongly rely. In that case this Court has held that ss. 3 and 4 of the Act are  not ultra vires.  It appears that s. 6 of the  Act  was held to be ultra vires by, the Nagpur High Court from  whose decision  the  appeal  arose.   This  Court  reversed   that conclusion  and  held that s. 6 of the Act also  was  valid. The appellant had challenged not only ss. 3, 4 and 6 of  the Act but also the impugned Control Order.  This order was the Cotton Textile (Control of Movement) Order, 1948.  Section 3 of the Control Order in particular was (1) [1954] S.C.R. 803.           (2) [1954] S.C.R. 982. (3)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380. 645 challenged as infringing the rights of a citizen  guaranteed under Arts. 19(1)(f) and Broadly stated this section of  the Control  Order  prohibited  transport except  under  and  in accordance  with  a  general permit  or  special  transport, permit as prescribed by it.  The argument was that the power conferred by s. 3 constituted an unreasonable restriction on the  fundamental rights of the citizen under Arts.  19(1)(f) and (g) and that in substance it suffered from the same vice as  cl. 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control  Order  which had  been  struck  down by this Court in the  case  of  M/s. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain (1).  This argument was  rejected and it was observed that the impugned clause was not at  all similar  to cl. 4(3) with which this Court was concerned  in the  case  of  M/ s. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi  Narain  (1).   The appellants  contend that the reasons given by this Court  in upholding s. 3 of the Order applied with equal force to  cl. 11B in the present appeals.  It cannot be said that there is no  force  in this contention.  In the result we  hold  that neither cl.  11B of the Order nor the impugned  notification issued  by the Controller on December 10, 1949, violate  the respondents’  fundamental  rights under Arts.  19(1)(f)  and

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(g),   and   so  their  validity  cannot   be   successfully challenged. The  orders passed by the High Court on the  writ  petitions filed by the respondents before it would, therefore, be  set aside and the said petitions dismissed. SUBBA  RAO  J.-I  have had the  advantage  of  perusing  the judgment  of my learned brother, Gajendragadkar, J. I  agree with his conclusion. The question raised in this case is whether cl. 11B of  Iron and  Steel (Control of Production And  Distribution)  Order, 1941,  violates  the fundamental rights  enshrined  in  Art. 19(1)(f)  and  (g)  of the Constitution.   In  view  of  the decision of this Court in Harishankar Bagla v. The State  of Madhya  Pradesh (2) which is binding on us, I agree with  my learned brother that cl. 11B of the said Order is valid.   I do  not  propose to express my view on  any  other  question raised in this appeal. Appeals allowed. (1) [1954] S.C.R. 803 (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380. 646