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PETITIONER: THE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON,FATEHGARH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM MANOHAR LOHIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/01/1960

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  633            1960 SCR  (2) 821  CITATOR INFO :  APL        1962 SC1106  (8)  APL        1962 SC1166  (15)  R          1963 SC 812  (10)  MV         1966 SC 740  (49,66)  RF         1967 SC1110  (16)  RF         1971 SC2486  (14)  RF         1973 SC1091  (6)  R          1974 SC 911  (2,4)  R          1987 SC 998  (4)  RF         1989 SC 371  (9)

ACT:        Fundamental    Right-Infringement   of-Enactment    imposing        restrictions  on freedom of speech-Constitutional  validity-        Test-"In the interest of Public order". Meaning  of-Doctrine        of  severability-Applicability-Constitution of India,  Arts.        19(1)  (a), 19(2)U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 (U.P. XIV  Of        1932) s. 3.

HEADNOTE: Section  3  of  the U.P. Special Powers Act,  1932  (XIV  Of 1932), provided as follows:- "Whoever, by word, either spoken or written, or by signs  or by   visible  representations,  or  otherwise,   instigates, expressly or by implication, any person or class of  persons not to pay or to defer payment of any liability, and whoever does  any act, with intent or knowing it to be  likely  that any words, signs or visible representations containing  such instigation  shall  thereby  be  communicated  directly   or indirectly to any person or class of persons, in any  manner whatsoever, shall be punishable with imprisonment which  may extend to six months, or with fine, extending to Rs. 250, or with both." The  appellant,  who was prosecuted under  the  section  for delivering  speeches  instigating  cultivators  not  to  pay enhanced irrigation rates to the Government, applied to  the High  Court  for  a writ of habeas  corpus  on  the  ground, amongst others, that the said section was inconsistent  with Art.  19(1) (a) of the Constitution and as such  void.   The

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High  Court  decided in favour of the appellant and  he  was released.  The State appealed to this Court and the question for determination was whether the impugned section  embodied reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order and was thus protected by Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. Held,  that  even though in a comprehensive  sense  all  the grounds specified in Art. 19(2) of the Constitution on which any  reasonable  restrictions  on the right  to  freedom  of speech  must be based can be brought under the general  head "public  order", that expression, inserted into the  Article by  the  Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,  must  be demarcated from the other grounds and ordinarily read in  an exclusive sense to mean public peace, safety and tranquility in   contradistinction  to  national  upheavals,   such   as revolution, civil strife and war, affecting the security  of the State. Romesh  Thappar  v. The State of Madras (1950)  S.C.R.  594, Brij  Bhushan v.The State of Delhi. (1950) S.C.R.  605,  The State  of  Bihar v. Shailabala Devi. (1952) S.C.R.  654  and Cantewell v. Connecticut. (1940) 310 U.S. 296, discussed. 822 It  is  well settled by decisions of this Court  that  in  a restriction in order to be reasonable must have a reasonable relation to  the object the Legislation has in view and must not go beyond it.   Restrictions, therefore, meant to be  in the  interest  of  public  order  which  have  no  proximate relationship  or nexus with it but can be only  remotely  or hypothetically connected with it,  cannot   be    reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. Rex v. Basudeva, A.I.R.(1950) F.C. 67, applied. Ramji  Lal Modi v. The State of U.P. (1957) S.C.R.  86o  and Virendra  v.  The  State  of  Punjab,  (1958)  S.C.R.   308, explained. So judged, it cannot be said that the acts prohibited  under the wide and sweeping provisions of s. 3 of the Act can have any  proximate  or even foreseeable connection  with  public order sought to be protected by it, and, consequently,  that section,  being violative of the right to freedom of  speech guaranteed  by Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution,  must  be struck down as unconstitutional. It  would be incorrect to argue that since instigation by  a single individual not to pay taxes might ultimately lead  to a revolution resulting in distruction of public order,  that instigation  must  have a proximate connection  with  public order.   No  fundamental rights can be  restricted  on  such hypothetical and imaginary consideration. Nor  is it possible to accept the argument that in  a  demo- cratic set up there can be no scope for agitational approach or  that any instigation to break a bad law must  by  itself constitute  a breach of public order, for to do  so  without obvious limitations would be to destroy the right to freedom of speech on which democracy is founded. It  is  not possible to apply the doctrine  of  severability relating  to fundamental rights as enunciated by this  Court to  the provisions of the impugned section, since it is  not possible   to  precisely  determine  whether   the   various categories  of instigation mentioned therein fall within  or without   the   constitutionally   permissible   limits   of legislation and separate the valid parts from the invalid. R.M.D.  Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India (1957)  S.C.R. 93o, explained and distinguished. Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras (1950) S.C.R. 594  and Chintaman  Rao v. The State o Madhya Pradesh. (1950)  S.C.R. 759, referred to.

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JUDGMENT:        CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 76  of        1956.        Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 27, 1954, of        the  Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc.  Writ No. 20  of        1954.        823        K.   L.  Misra,  Advocate-General  for the  State  of  Uttar        Pradesh.  G. 0. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the appellants.        N.  S.  Bindra, for the respondent.1960.  January  21.   The        Judgment of the Court was delivered by        SUBBA   RAO   J.-This   appeal  raises   the   question   of        interpretation  of  the words " in the  interest  of  public        order " in Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.        The  facts  are  not  in dispute and they  lie  in  a  small        compass.   The  respondent, Dr. Ram Manohar  Lohia,  is  the        General  Secretary of the Socialist Party of India.  The  U.        P.  Government  enhanced  the  irrigation  rates  for  water        supplied from canals to cultivators.  The party to which the        respondent  belongs resolved to start an  agitation  against        the  said enhancement for the alleged reason that it  placed        an unbearable burden upon the cultivators.  Pursuant to  the        policy of his party, the respondent visited Farrukhabad  and        addressed  two  public  meetings wherein  he  made  speeches        instigating  the  audience not to  pay  enhanced  irrigation        rates to the Government.  On July 4, 1954, at 10 p.m. he was        arrested   and   produced  before   the   City   Magistrate,        Farrukhabad,   who  remanded  him  for  two   days.    After        investigation,  the  Station  officer,  Kaimganj,  filed   a        charge-sheet against the respondent before Sri P. R.  Gupta,        a  Judicial Officer at Farrukliabad.  On July 6,  1954,  the        Magistrate  went  to the jail to try the  case  against  the        respondent, but the latter took objection to the trial being        held  in  the jail premises.  When the  Magistrate  insisted        upon  proceeding with the trial, the respondent obtained  an        adjournment  on  the ground that he would like to  move  the        High  Court  for transfer of the case from the file  of  the        said Magistrate.  Thereafter the respondent filed a petition        before  the  High Court for a writ of habeas corpus  on  the        ground, among others, that s. 3 of the U. P. Special  Powers        Act  (Act  No. XIV of 1932), 1932, (hereinafter  called  the        Act) was void under the Constitution.        105        824        In  the  first instance the petition came  up  for  disposal        before   a   division   bench   of   the   High   Court   at        Allahabad  consisting  of Desai  and  Chaturvedi,  Elaborate        arguments were addressed before them covering a wide  field.        The learned Judges delivered differing judgments  expressing        their  views  on the main points raised before  them.   They        referred  the matter to the Chief Justice for obtaining  the        opinion of a third Judge on the following two points: "  (i)        Was  the’ provision of s. 3 of the U. P. Special Powers  Act        of  1932  making it penal for a person by  spoken  words  to        instigate  class of persons not to pay dues  recoverable  as        arrears of land revenue, inconsistent with Art. 19(1)(a)  of        the Constitution on the 26th of January, 1950 ? " and " (ii)        if  so,  was it in the interests of public order  ?  ".  The        petition  was placed before Agarwala, J., as a third  Judge,        who  agreeing with Desai, J., gave the following answers  to        the questions referred to him :        Question No. (i).  "The provision of section’s of the U.  P.        Special  Powers Act, 1932, making it penal for a  person  by

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      spoken words to instigate a class of persons not to pay dues        recoverable  as  arrears of land revenue,  was  inconsistent        with  Article  19(1)(a)  of the  Constitution  on  the  26th        January, 1950."        Question No. (ii).  " The restrictions imposed by section  3        of  the  U.  P. Special Powers Act, 1932, were  not  in  the        interests of public order."        In  the  usual course the matter was placed before  the  two        learned  Judges  who first heard the case and they,  on  the        basis  of  the  majority  view,  allowed  the  petition  and        directed  the  respondent  to be released..  The  State  has        preferred  the present appeal against the said order of  the        High Court.        The  learned Advocate General, appearing for the  appellant.        stated  before  us that be did not propose  to  canvass  the        correctness  of  the majority view on one of  the  important        points  raised in the case, namely, that the effect  of  the        passing  of the Act did not ipso facto deprive a citizen  of        his  freedom of speech guaranteed. under Art. 19(1)  (a)  of        the  Constitution and its validity should be tested  by  the        provisions        825        of Art. 19(2) thereof.  He did not. concede the validity  of        the  finding in this regard but assumed its correctness  for        the purpose of this case.  Nothing further, therefore,  need        be mentioned on this point.        The gist of the argument of the learned Advocate General may        be  stated  thus:  The legislature  can  make  laws  placing        reasonable  restrictions  on  the rights  of  a  citizen  to        freedom of speech and expression in the interests of  public        order  among other grounds.  The words "in the interests  of        public order" are wider in connotation than the words "  for        the  maintenance of public order ". Laws are rules  made  by        the  legislature  for the governance of the  people  in  the        State which they are bound to obey, and they are enacted  to        keep  public peace and order.  The avowed object of s. 3  of        the  Act was to prevent persons from instigating  others  to        break  the laws imposing a liability upon a person or  class        of  persons  to pay taxes and other dues to the  State,  any        authority  or to any land-owner.  The impugned  section  was        enacted  in the interests of public order and therefore  the        section  was  protected by Art. 19(2) of  the  Constitution.        The learned Advocate General pointed out that the object  of        the  State  in  preferring this appeal  was  to  obtain  the        decision  of  this Court on the question  of  constitutional        validity  of  s. 3 of the Act and not to pursue  the  matter        against Dr. Lohia.        The  respondent was not present at the time the  appeal  was        heard  and  was  not represented by  an  advocate.   As  the        question raised was an important one, we requested Mr. N. S.        Bindra  to assist the Court, and he kindly agreed to do  so.        He supported the majority view of the High Court.  We record        our thanks for his assistance.        At the outset it would not be out of place to notice briefly        the  history of the Act.  The Act was originally  passed  in        the  year  1932 during the British rule.  In an  attempt  to        offset the campaign of non-payment of taxes and other  forms        of  agitation resorted to by the Congress Party,  originally        it  was  put on the statute book for one year; but  in  1940        when  the State was under the " Governor’s rule ",  the  Act        was made        826        permanent.   Under  the Act, ss. 1 and 2  came  into  effect        immediately  on the passing of the Act and S.  1(2)  enabled        the Government by notification to  extend all or any of  the

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      remaining  sections  to  any district or to any  part  of  a        district  in the United Provinces.  After the  Constitution,        the  Act was not repealed but was allowed to continue,  with        necessary  adaptations, in the statue book.   Between  April        and June, 1954, the State Government extended the provisions        of the Act to 33 districts including Farrukhabad district.        Now  lot us look at the provisions of the Act  to  ascertain        its  scope and field of operation.  The  preamble  discloses        that it was enacted in 1932 to make provision against and to        take powers to deal with instigation to the illegal  refusal        of  the  payment of certain liablities and s.  2  defines  "        liablity " to mean " land revenue or any sum recoverable  as        arrears of land revenue or any tax, rate, cess or other dues        or  amount payable to Government or to any local  authority,        or  rent  of agricultural land or  anything  recoverable  as        arrears  of or along with such rent ". Section 3  prescribes        the  punishment  for  instigation to the  non-payment  of  a        liability.   As the argument centres round this section,  it        will be convenient to read the same:        Section 3: Whoever, by word, either spoken or written, or by        signs   or   by  visible  representations,   or   otherwise,        instigates, expressly or by implication, any person or class        of persons not to pay or to defer payment of any  liability,        and  whoever does any act, with intent or knowing it  to  be        likely that any words, signs or visible representations con.        taining  such  instigation  shall  thereby  be  communicated        directly or indirectly to any person or class of persons, in        any manner whatsoever, shall be punishable with imprisonment        which  may extend to six months, or with fine, extending  to        Rs. 250, or with both."        Section  4  says  that  any person  to  whom  an  arrear  of        liability  is due may apply to the Collector to  realize  it        and the Collector is authorized to realize the same        827        as  an arrear of land revenue.  The impugned section may  be        dissected into the following components (i) whoever by word,        either  spoken  or  written,  or  by  signs  or  by  visible        representations or otherwise, (ii) instigates,         (iii)        expressly or by implication,(iv)   any  person or  class  of        persons, (v) not to pay any liability, (vi) to defer payment        of  any  liability, (vii) does an act with intent  that  any        words  etc. shall be communicated to any person or class  of        persons,  (viii) with the knowledge that it is  likely  that        such words etc. shall be communicated to any person or class        of persons, (ix) such communication may be made directly, or        indirectly  and (x) shall be punished with  imprisonment  or        with  fine or with both.  Under this section a wide net  has        been  cast  to  catch in a variety of  acts  of  instigation        ranging from friendly advice to a systematic propaganda  not        to  pay or to defer payment of liability to Government,  any        authority  or  to  any person to whom  rent  is  payable  in        respect of agricultural land.  The meaning of this  section,        read along with ss. 2 and 4, can be ascertained more clearly        by  illustration than by definition. (1) A instigates B  not        to pay any liability to Government, any authority or to  any        land  owner;  (2)  A instigates B to defer  payment  of  any        liability - to Government, any authority or landlord; (3)  A        instigates  a class of persons to do the same; (4) A may  do        any  one of the foregoing things not only by word, but  also        by signs, visible representations or otherwise; (5) A may do        any  one  of the things bona fide either to  get  the  claim        decided  in  a Court of law or to gain time to get  the  law        changed; (6) A may instigate B not to pay any amount due  to        Government  or to any authority, but the said amount can  be        recovered  by  the authority concerned as  arrears  of  land

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      revenue;  (7) A may tell C with intention or with  knowledge        that  the said instigation may be communicated to B so  that        he  may not pay; (8) any statement by A to C may imply  such        instigation.  In its wide amplitude the section takes in the        innocent  and  the guilty persons, bona fide and  mala  fide        advice,  individuals and class, abstention from payment  and        deferment of payment,        828        expressed   or  implied  instigation,  indirect  or   direct        instigation, liability due not only to Government but to any        authority or landholder.  In short, no person, whether legal        adviser or a friend or a well-wisher of a person  instigated        can escape the tentacles of this section, though in fact the        rent due has   been  collected through coercive  process  or        otherwise.        We shall now proceed to consider the constitutional validity        of  this  section.  The material portions  of  the  relevant        provisions of the Constitution may now be read:        Article 19: " (1) All citizens shall have the right-        (a) to freedom of speech and expression;        (2)  Nothing  in sub-clause (a) of clause (1)  shall  affect        the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from        making  any  law, in so far as such law  imposes  reasonable        restrictions  on the exercise of the right conferred by  the        said  sub-clause  in the interests of the  security  of  the        State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,        decenc   or  morality  or  in   relation  to   contempt   of        court,defamation or incitement to an offence."        Clause (2) of Art. 19 was amended by the Constitution (First        Amendment) Act, 1951.  By this amendment several new grounds        of  restrictions  upon  the  freedom  of  speech  have  been        introduced, such as friendly relations with foreign  States,        public  order  and  incitement to an offence.   It  is  self        evident  and common place that freedom of speech is  one  of        the  bulwarks  of a democratic form of  Government.   It  is        equally obvious that freedom of speech can only thrive in an        orderly society.  Clause (2) of Art. 19, therefore, does not        affect  the  operation of any existing law  or  prevent  the        State  from  making any law in so far as  such  law  imposes        reasonable  restrictions  on the exercise of  the  right  of        freedom  of  speech in the interest of public  order,  among        others.   To sustain the existing law or a new law  made  by        the State under cl. (2) of Art. 19, so far as it is relevant        to the present enquiry, two conditions should be        829        complied  with, viz., (i) the restrictions imposed  must  be        reasonable;  and  (ii) they should be in the  interests   of        public order.  Before we consider the scope of tile  word,-,        of  limitation,  "  reasonable restrictions" and  "  in  the        interests  of  ",  it is necessary  to  ascertain  the  true        meaning of the expression public order " in the said clause.        The  expression public order" has a very  wide  connotation.        Order  is  the  basic need in  any  organised  society.   It        implies  the orderly state of society or community in  which        citizens  can peacefully pursue their normal  activities  of        life.  In the words of an eminent Judge of the Supreme Court        of  America  "  the essential rights  are  subject  to  the,        elementary  need  for order without which the  guarantee  of        those  rights would be a mockery ". The expression  has  not        been define(] in the Constitution, but it occurs in List  II        of  its  Seventh  Schedule  and  is  also  inserted  by  the        Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 in el. (2) of  Art.        19.   The sense in which it is used in Art. 19 can  only  be        appreciates  by ascertaining how the Article  was  construed        before  it was inserted therein and what was the  defect  to

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      remedy  which the Parliament inserted the same by  the  said        amendment.   The  impact  of  el. (2) of  Art.  19  on  Art.        19(1)(a)  before the said amendment was subject to  judicial        scrutiny  by  this Court in Romesh Thappar v. The  State  of        Madras(l).   There the Government of Madras, in exercise  of        their  powers under s. 9(1-A) of the Madras  Maintenance  of        Public Order Act, 1949, purported to issue an order  whereby        they  imposed  a ban upon the entry and circulation  of  the        journal  called   "  Cross -.Roads "  in  that  State.   The        petitioner therein contended that the said order contravened        his  fundamental right to freedom of speech and  expression.        At  the  time when that order was issued the  (expression  "        public  order " was not in Art. 19(2) of  the  Constitution;        but the words " the security of the State " were there.   In        considering  whether  the  impugned  Act  was  made  in  the        interests of security of the State, Patanjali Sastri, J., as        he then was, after citing the observation of Stephen in  his        Criminal Law of England, states:        (1)  [1950) S.C.R. 594, 600, 601, 602,        830        "Though  all  these offences thus  involve  disturbances  of        public  tranquillity  and  are in  theory  offences  against        public  order,  the  difference between them  being  only  a        difference  of degree, yet for the purpose of  gurading  the        punishment  to be inflicted in respect of them they  may  be        classified into different minor categories as has been  done        by  the Indian Penal Code.  Similarly, the Constitution,  in        formulating the varying criteria for permissible legislation        imposing  restrictions on the fundamental rights  enumerated        in  article 19 (1), has placed in a distinct category  those        offences  against public order which aim at undermining  the        security  of  the State or overthrowing it, and  made  their        prevention   the   sole   justification   for    legislative        abridgement of freedom of speech and expression, that is  to        say,  nothing less than endangering the foundations  of  the        State   or   threatening  its   overthrow   could.   justify        curtailment  of the rights to freedom of speech and  expres-        sion.........."         The learned Judge continued to state:        "  The Constitution thus requires a line to be drawn in  the        field  of public order or tranquillity marking off, may  be,        roughly,  the boundary between those serious and  aggravated        forms  of public disorder which are calculated  to  endanger        the security of the State and the relatively minor  breaches        of  the peace of a purely local significance,  treating  for        this   purpose  differences  in  degree  as  if  they   were        differences in kind.  "        The learned Judge proceeded further to state:        " We, are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting        freedom of speech and expression is directed solely  against        the  undermining  of  the  security  of  the  State  or  the        overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation        under  clause (2) of article 19, although  the  restrictions        which  it seeks to impose may have been conceived  generally        in the interests of public order.  "        This  decision  establishes  two  propositions,  viz.,   (i)        maintenance  of public order is equated with maintenance  of        public tranquillity; and (ii) the offences against        831        public  order  are divided into two  categories,  viz.,  (a)        major offences affecting the security of the State, and  (b)        minor   offences   involving   breach   of   purely    local        significance.   This Court in Brij Bhushan v. The  state  of        Delhi (1) followed the earlier decision in the context of s.        7 (1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949.   Fazl

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      Ali,  J., in his dissenting judgment gave the  expression  "        public  order  "  a wider meaning than  that  given  by  the        majority view.  The learned Judge observed at p. 612 thus:        "  When  we approach the matter in this way,  we  find  that        while’ public disorder’ is wide enough to cover a small riot        or an affray and other cases where peace is disturbed by, or        affects,  a  small group or persons,  ’public  unsafety  (or        insecurity  of  the State), will usually be  connected  with        serious  internal disorders and such disturbances of  public        tranquillity as jeopardize the security of the State.  "        This  observation  also indicates that " public order  "  is        equated  with  public peace and safety.   Presumably  in  an        attempt  to get over the effect of these two decisions,  the        expression  " public order " was inserted in Art. 19 (2)  of        the Constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment)  Act,        1951,  with a view to bring in offences involving breach  of        purely  local significance within the scope  of  permissible        restrictions  under  cl.  (2) of Art. 19.   After  the  said        amendment,   this  Court  explained  the  scope  of   Romesh        Thappar’s Case (1) in The state of Bihar v. shailabala  Devi        ().   That  case  was  concerned  with  the   constitutional        validity  of  s. 4 (1) (a) of the  Indian  Press  (Emergency        Powers)  Act,  1931.  It deals with the words  or  signs  or        visible  representations  which incite to or  encourage,  or        tend to incite to or encourage the commission of any offence        of murder or any cognizable offence involving violence.        Mahajan, J., as he then was, observed at p. 660:        "  The  deduction that a person would be free to  incite  to        murder  or other cognizable offence through the  press  with        impunity drawn from our decision in        (1) [1950] S.C R. 605. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 654.        106        832        Romesh  Thappar’s case could easily have been avoided as  it        was  avoided by Shearer J., who in very emphatic terms  said        as follows:             "I  have read and re-read the judgments of the  Supreme        Court, and I can find nothing in them   myself  which   bear        directly  on the point at issue,and leads me to think  that,        in  their opinion, a restriction of this kind is  no  longer        permissible.  "        The validity of that section came up for consideration after        the  Constitution  (First Amendment) Act,  1951,  which  was        expressly made retrospective, and therefore the said section        clearly fell within the ambit of the words " in the interest        of  public order ". That apart the observations of  Mahajan,        J., as he then was, indicate that even without the amendment        that  section would have been good inasmuch as it  aimed  to        prevent incitement to murder.        The  words " public order " were also understood in  America        and  England  as offences against public  safety  or  public        peace.   The Supreme Court of America observed in  Cantewell        v. Connecticut (1) thus:        "The  offence known as breach of the peace embraces a  great        variety  of conduct destroying or menacing public order  and        tranquillity.   It includes not only violent acts and  words        likely to produce violence in others.  No one would have the        hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech        sanctions incitement to riot When clear and present  -danger        of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public        streets, or other immediate threat to public safety,  peace,        or  order  appears,  the power of the State  to  prevent  or        punish is obvious.  "        The American decisions sanctioned a variety of  restrictions        on  the freedom of speech in the interests of public  order.

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      They  cover  the entire gamut of restrictions  that  can  be        imposed   under  different  heads  in  Art.  19(2)  of   our        Constitution.  The following summary of some of the cases of        the  Supreme Court of America given in a well-known book  on        Constitutional  Law illustrates the range of  categories  of        cases covering         (1) (1940) 310 U S. 296, 308,         833        that  expression.  " In the interests of public  order,  the        State  may  prohibit  and punish the causing  of  ’loud  and        raucousnoise’ in streets and public places by means of sound        amplifying  instruments,  regulate the hours  and  place  of        public discussion, and the use of the public streets for the        purpose  of  exercising freedom of speech; provide  for  the        expulsion  of hecklers from meetings and assemblies,  punish        utterances  tending  to incite an immediate  breach  of  the        peace or riot as distinguished from utterances causing  mere        ’public  inconvenience, annoyance or unrest’.  " In  England        also  Acts like Public Order Act, 1936, Theatres  Act,  1843        were  passed:  the  former  making  it  an  offence  to  use        threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour in  any        public place or at any public meeting with intent to provoke        a  breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the  peace  is        likely to be caused, and the latter was enacted to authorise        the Lord Chamberlain to prohibit any stage play whenever  he        thought  its public performance would militate against  good        manners,  decorum and the preservation of the public  peace.        The  reason  underlying  all the decisions is  that  if  the        freedom  of  speech  was not restricted in  the  manner  the        relevant  Acts  did, public safety and tranquillity  in  the        State would be affected.         But in India under Art. 19(2) this wide concept of"   public        order  " is split up under different heads.  It enables  the        imposition of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the        right  to freedom of speech and expression in the  interests        of  the  security  of the  State,  friendly  relations  with        foreign  States,  public order, decency or morality,  or  in        relation  to contempt of court, defamation or incitement  to        an  offence.   All  the grounds  mentioned  therein  can  be        brought under the general head " public order " in its  most        comprehensive sense.  But the juxtaposition of the different        grounds  indicates  that,  though  sometimes  they  tend  to        overlap,  they must be ordinarily intended to  exclude  each        other.   "  Public order " is therefore something  which  is        demarcated   from  the  others.   In  that  limited   sense,        particularly  in view of, the history of the  amendment,  it        can be pustulated that "public order "        834        is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquillity.        The next question is what do the words " interest of  public        order  " mean ? The learned Advocate General  contends  that        the  phrase "in the interest of public order" is of a  wider        connotation  than the words "for the maintenance  of  public        order"  and,therefore, any breach of law which may have  the        tendency, however remote, to disturb the public order  would        be  covered  by the said phrase.  Support is  Sought  to  be        drawn  for this wide proposition from the judgment  of  this        Court in Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of U.P. (1).  It is not        necessary  to state the facts of that case, as  reliance  is        placed  only  on the observations of Das, C.J., at  p.  865,        which read:        "It  will  be  noticed that the  language  employed  in  the        amended  clause  is "in the interests of" and not  "for  the        maintenance of".  As one of us pointed out in Debi Saron  v.        The State of Bihar (2), the expression "in the interests of"

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      makes the ambit of protection very wide.  A law may not have        been  designed to directly maintain public order and yet  it        may have been enacted in the interests of public order."        The learned Chief Justice again in Virendra v. The State  of        Punjab (3) observed, at p. 317, much to the same effect:        "As  has been explained by this Court in Ramji Lal  Modi  v.        The  State of U.P. (1), the words "in the interests of"  are        words  of great amplitude and are much wider than the  words        "for  the maintenance of." The expression "in the  interests        of"  makes the ambit of the protection very wide, for a  law        may  not have been designed to directly maintain the  public        order or to directly protect the general public against  any        particular  evil  and yet it may have been enacted  "in  the        interests of" the public order or the general public as  the        case may be."        We  do not understand the observations of the Chief  Justice        to  mean that any remote or fanciful connection between  the        impugned Act and the public order        (1) [1957] S.C.R. 860.        (2) A.I R. (1954) Pat 254        (3)  [1958] S.C.R. 308.        835        would  be sufficient to sustain its validity.   The  learned        Chief Justice was only making a distinction between   an Act        which  expressly and directly purported to  maintain  public        order and one which did not expressly state the said purpose        but  left  it to be implied therefrom ; and between  an  Act        that  directly maintained public order and  that  indirectly        brought  about  the same result.  The distinction  does  not        ignore the necessity for intimate connection between the Act        and the public order sought to be maintained by the Act.        Apart  from  the  said phrase,  another  limitation  in  the        clause,  namely, that the restrictions shall be  reasonable,        brings  about  the same result.  The word  "reasonable"  has        been  defined by this Court in more than one  decision.   It        has been held that in order to be reasonable,  "restrictions        must  have  reasonable  relation to  the  object  which  the        legislation  seeks to achieve and must not go in  excess  of        that  object".   The restriction made "in the  interests  of        public  order"  must also have reasonable  relation  to  the        object  to  be  achieved, i.e., the public  order.   If  the        restriction has no proximate relationship to the achievement        of public order, it cannot be said that the restriction is a        reasonable  restriction  within  the  meaning  of  the  said        clause.   A full bench decision of the Federal Court in  Rex        v.  Basudeva  (1)  contains  some  observations  which  give        considerable  assistance  to construe the  words.   In  that        case,  the appellant was detained in pursuance of the  order        made by the Government of U.P. under the U.P. Prevention  of        Black-Marketing (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947.  The  question        was whether the preventive detention provided for in s. 3(1)        (i)  of  the said Act was preventive detention  for  reasons        connected  with  the  maintenance  of  public  order.    The        argument  in  that  case ran on the same  lines  as  in  the        present case.  The learned Advocate General there urged that        habitual black-marketing in essential commodities was  bound        sooner  or later to cause a dislocation of the machinery  of        controlled  distribution  which,  in  turn,  might  lead  to        breaches of the peace and that, therefore, detention with  a        view to prevent such black marketing was covered by the         (1) A.I.R. (1950) F.C. 67        836        entry.  Answering that argument, Patanjali Sastri, J.,as  he        then was, pointed out, at p. 69:        "Activities  such  as these are so remote in  the  chain  of        relation to the maintenance of public order that  preventive

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      detention  on account of them cannot, in our  opinion,  fall        within  the  purview  of Entry I  of  List  II...........The        connection  contemplated  must,  in our view,  be  real  and        proximate., not far-fetched or problematical."        The decision, in our view, lays down the correct test.   The        limitation imposed in the interests of public order to be  a        reasonable restriction, should be one which has a  proximate        connection  or  nexus with public order, but  not  one  far-        fetched, hypothetical or problematical or too remote in  the        chain of its relation with the public order.        We shall now test the impugned section, having regard to the        aforesaid  principles.  Have the acts prohibited under s.  3        any proximate connection with public safety or tranquility ?        We have already analysed the provisions of s. 3 of the  Act.        In  an  attempt to indicate its wide sweep, we  pointed  out        that  any instigation by word or visible representation  not        to pay or defer payment of any exaction or even  contractual        dues  to  Government, authority or a landowner  is  made  an        offence.   Even innocuous speeches are prohibited by  threat        of  punishment.   There is no proximate or  even  forseeable        connection  between  such instigation and the  public  order        sought to be protected under this section.  We cannot accept        the   argument   of  the  learned  Advocate   General   that        instigation of a single individual not to pay tax or dues is        a  spark  which may in the long run ignite  a  revolutionary        movement  destroying  public order.  We can  only  say  that        fundamental rights cannot be controlled on such hypothetical        and  imaginary  considerations.   It  is  said  that  in   a        democratic set up there is no scope for agitational approach        and  that  if  a law is bad the only course  is  to  get  it        modified  by democratic process and that any instigation  to        break  the  law is in itself a disturbance  of,  the  public        order.   If  this argument without  obvious  limitations  be        accepted, it would        837        destroy  the  right to freedom of speech which is  the  very        foundation  of  democratic way of life.  Unless there  is  a        proximate connection between the instigation and the  public        order,  the restriction, in our view, is neither  reasonable        nor is it in the interest of public order.  In this view, we        must  strike  down  s.  3  of  the  Act  as  infringing  the        fundamental  right  guaranteed under Art.  19(1)(a)  of  the        Constitution.        The learned Advocate General then contended that the section        is severable and that if so severed, the section may be made        to function within the limited field that stands the test of        Art.  19(2)  of the Constitution.  He asks us  to  read  the        section as follows :        "Whoever, by word, either spoken or written, or by signs  or        by   visible  representations,  or  otherwise,   instigates,        expressly or by implication, any class of persons not to pay        or  to defer payment of any liability, and whoever does  any        act, with intent or knowing it to be likely that any  words,        signs or visible representations containing such instigation        shall thereby be communicated directly or indirectly to  any        class  of  persons,  in  any  manner  whatsoever,  shall  be        punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months,        or with fine, extending to Rs. 250, or with both."        By so doing he argues that instigation of a class of persons        only  is made liable and thereby the section is rid  of  the        vice of unconstitutionality.        The  doctrine  of  severability  vis-a-vis  the  fundamental        rights is sought to be supported on the basis of the wording        of Art. 13(1) of the Constitution.  Under that Article laws,        in  so far as they are inconsistent with the  provisions  of

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      Part III, ire void only to the extent of such inconsistency.        But this implies that consistent and inconsistent parts of a        law  are  severable.   This  doctrine  in  its  relation  to        fundamental  rights  was considered by this Court  in  three        decisions.   In Romesh Thapper’s case (1) such an.  argument        has  been repelled by this Court.  Patanjali Sastri, J.,  as        he then was, stat@d the legal position thus at p. 603:        (1)  [1950) S.C.R. 594, 600, 601 602.        838        Where  a  law  purports  to  authorise  the  imposition   of        restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide  enough        to cover restrictions both within and without the limits  of        constitutionally    permissible legislative action affecting        such right,it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it        may  be applied within the constitutional limits, as  it  is        not  severable.   So long as the possibility  of  its  being        applied  for  purposes not sanctioned  by  the  Constitution        cannot  be  ruled  out,  it  must  be  held  to  be   wholly        unconstitutional and void."        In  Chintaman  Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh  the  same        principle  is again restated.  Mahajan, J., as he  then  was        observed at p. 765:         The  law  even  to  the extent that it  could  be  said  to        authorize  the  imposition  of  restrictions  in  regard  to        agricultural  labour  cannot  be  held  valid  because   the        language employed is wide enough to cover restrictions  both        within   and   without  the   limits   of   constitutionally        permissible legislative action affecting the right.  So long        as  the possibility of’ its being applied for  purposes  not        sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it  must        be held to be wholly void."        The  wide  reach  of this principle  appears  to  have  been        circumscribed  to  some extent in a later decision  of  this        Court in R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India (2).        In  that  case the constitutionality of ss. 4 and 5  of  the        Prize  Competitions Act (42 of 1955) was challenged  on  the        ground that prize competition’ as defined in s. 2(d) of  the        Act included not merely competitions that were of a gambling        nature  but  also  those  in which  success  depended  to  a        substantial  degree on skill.  This Court, having regard  to        the history of the legislation, the declared object  thereof        and the wording of the statute, came to the conclusion  that        the  competitions  which were Sought to  be  controlled  and        regulated  by the Act were only those competitions in  which        success  did not depend to any substantial degree on  skill.        That  conclusion  was sufficient to  reject  the  contention        raised in that case; but even on the assumption that        (1) [1950] S.C.R. 759.        (2) [1957) S.C.R. 930.        839        prize competition  as defined in s. 2(d) of the Act included        those  in  which success depended to substantial  degree  on        skill  as well as those in which it did not so depend,  this        Court  elaborately considered the doctrine  of  severability        and  laid down as many as seven rules of  construction.   On        the  application  of  the said rules it was  held  that  the        impugned  provisions were severable in their application  to        competitions  in  which  success  did  not  depend  to   any        substantial degree on skill.        The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) "        Public  order  "  is  synonymous  with  public  safety   and        tranquillity  :  it  is the absence  of  disorder  involving        breaches  of  local  significance  in  contradistinction  to        national  upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife,  war,        affecting  the  security  of the State; (2)  there  must  be

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      proximate  and reasonable nexus between the speech  and  the        public order; (3) s. 3, as it now stands, does not establish        in most of the cases comprehended by it any such nexus;  (4)        there  is  a  conflict  of  decision  on  the  question   of        severability  in the context of an offending  provision  the        language  whereof is wide enough to cover restrictions  both        within   and   without  the   limits   of   constitutionally        permissible legislation; one view is that it cannot be split        up if there is possibility of its being applied for purposes        not  sanctioned  by the Constitution and the other  view  is        that  such  a provision is valid if it is severable  in  its        application  to an object which is clearly  demarcated  from        other  object  or  objects falling  outside  the  limits  of        constitutionally   permissible  legislation;  and  (5)   the        provisions of the section are so inextricably mixed up  that        it is not possible to apply the doctrine of severability  so        as  to enable us to affirm the validity of a part of it  and        reject the rest.        It  is not necessary in this case to express our  preference        for one or other of the foregoing decisions.  Assuming  that        the  summary of the rules of construction given in the  last        of the cases cited supra are correct and exhaustive, we  are        not satisfied that in the instant case the impugned  section        with the        107        840        omissions  suggested by the learned Advocate General  could,        wholly  or  to any extent, be salvaged.  The  words  of  the        section with the suggested omissions     continue to  suffer        from  the same vice they are subjected to without  the  said        omissions.   The Suggested omissions from the  section  only        exclude   individuals from the operation of the section  and        confine it to a class of persons and in other respects it is        not freed from the defects already pointed out by us.  In R.        M. D. Chamarbaugwalla’s Case (1) the difference between  two        classes of competitions, namely, those that are of  gambling        nature  and  those  in which success depends  on  skill,  is        clear-cut  and  has  long  been  recognized  in  legislative        practice.   But in the present case it is not even  possible        to  predicate  with  some kind of  precision  the  different        categories  of  instigation falling within  or  without  the        field  of constitutional prohibitions.   The  constitutional        validity of a section cannot be made to depend upon such  an        uncertain  factor.  Whether the principle of the  first  two        decisions  is applied or that of the third is  invoked,  the        constitutional validity of the section cannot be sustained.        We,  therefore,  hold  that  s. 3 of  the  Act  is  void  as        infringing  Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.  The,  entire        section  therefore must be struck down as invalid.   If  so,        the  prosecution  of the respondent under  that  section  is        void.        The  learned Advocate General made an impassioned appeal  to        persuade  us  to express our view that  though  the  present        section  is  void on the ground that it is  an  unreasonable        restriction  on the fundamental right, in the  interests  of        public  order the State could legitimately re-draft it in  a        way that it would conform to the provisions of Art. 19(2) of        the  Constitution.   It  is not  this  Court’s  province  to        express  or  give  advice or make  general  observations  on        situations  that  are not presented to it  in  a  particular        case.   It  is  always  open  to  the  State  to  make  such        reasonable  restrictions  which are permissible  under  Art.        19(2) of the Constitution.        In the result, the appeal is dismissed.        Appeal dismissed.

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      (1)  [1957] S.C.R. 930.        841