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PETITIONER: THE STATESMAN LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THEIR WORKMEN

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/01/1976

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GUPTA, A.C. UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1976 AIR  758            1976 SCR  (3) 228  1976 SCC  (2) 223  CITATOR INFO :  R          1977 SC2031  (2)  RF         1992 SC 504  (35)

ACT:      Industrial Dispute-Illegal strike followed by lock-out- Lock-out  not   lifted  despite   the  workers  conciliatory atitude-Payment  of   half  wages  during  strike  period-If reasonable.      Constitution of  India 1950-Article  136-When the Court would interfere.

HEADNOTE:      Even when  a bonus  dispute  was  pending  adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal, the workmen of the appellant resorted to  rude tactics  to press their earlier charter of demands, which  took the  turn of  an illegal and disorderly strike. The  management  declared  a  lockout.  On  the  day following the  declaration of lockout, the workmen requested the management  to  lift  the  lockout  proferring  peaceful resumption of work and asking for an interim relief on their economic demands.  The management  did not agree to lift the lockout. Eventually  however, The lockout was lifted and the strike called  off. On  the question  of  wages  during  the strike period,  the Industrial  Tribunal, apportioning fault to both  the parties directed that the management should pay half the wages to the employees during the strike period.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: (1)  There is  much to  be said  in favour of the view of the Tribunal that the blameworthiness may be equally apportioned between the parties. Where the strike is illegal and sequel  of a  lockout legal,  the Court  has to view the whole course of developments and not stop with examining the initial  legitimacy.   If  one   side   or   other   behaves unreasonably or  the overall  interests of  good  industrial relations  warrant   the  Tribunal  making  such  directions regarding strike  period wage  as will  meet  with  justice, fairplay and  pragmatic wisdom,  there is  no error in doing so. The power of the Tribunal is flexible. [236 F; 233 D-E]      India Marine Service, [1963]  SCR 575, followed.      In the  instant case  there was  a  pending  industrial

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dispute when  the Unions  sprang a strike notice. The strike being illegal,  the lockout  that followed, be came a legal, defensive measure.  But  the  management  could  not  behave unreasonably merely  because the  lockout was born lawfully. If. by subsequent conduct, the Unions had shown readiness to resume work  peacefully, the refusal to restart the industry was not right and the initial legitimacy of the lockout lost its virtue by this blemished sequel. [232 G-Hl      (2) In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court  would interfere  with the  Award under challenge only if  extraordinary flaws  or grave  injustice our  other recognised grounds are made out. [231 E-F]      Bengal Chemical.  [1959] Suppl.  2 SCR  136,  141;  and Associated Cement   Companies  Ltd. AIR  1972 SC 1552. 1554, followed.      In the  instant case the direction of the Tribunal that the Company  should pay  tiffin allowance  at the rate of 50 paise on  working days to the employees in the staff canteen and that  the members of the subordinate staff should be sup plied with warm coats did not call for interference.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 232 of 1970.      Appeal by  special leave  from the Award dated the 2-9- 1969 of  the 5th  Industrial Tribunal,  West Bengal, in Case No. 321  of 1967 published in the Calcutta Gazette dated the 16-10-1969 229      S. Chaudhury and D. N. Gupta for the Appellant.      Kapil Sibbal for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by "      KRISHNA IYER,  J. There is a tragic touch in processual protraction as  this  little  lis  lasting  a  whole  decade pathetically illustrates.  Such lingering legal machinery is by-passed by  both sides  in practice  largely  because,  by sheer slow  motion, it  denies relief when needed and drives parties to  seek remedies  by  direct  action  or  political intervention. What  elegant  alibi  can  there  be  for  the routine charter  of demands  put forward  in the  middle  of 1966, ripening into an industrial reference in November 1966 after  a   flare-up  of   illegal  strike   and  failure  of conciliation, taking  around 3  years for  rendering a short award and  a little over five years for reviewing it in this Court? Law-makers  whose vocal  concern for industrial peace and constitutional  promises for  the working class is being put to the test by failure in the field will, we hope, alert themselves. Labour litigation can be a course or dread where one side  is weak,  as here,  and has  not been able to hire legal services  but has been made good by amicus curiae, and some other  side, regardless  of cost,  is anxious to settle some principle,  as counsel  for the  appellant impressed on us. We  now move  into the area of facts which wears a jural apparel.      The narrative  of necessary facts starts naturally with a bonus  dispute in  the Statesman  Ltd  (a  newspaper  with editions published in Calcutta and Delhi) which was referred to adjudication  in  September  1966  and  was,  admittedly, pending at  a time  when  the  Calcutta  workers  reportedly resorted to  rude tactics  to press  an earlier  charter  of demands presented  to-the management. On September 20, 1966, events reached  a crescendo of illegal and disorderly strike at midday  with a  reprisal of lock-out at mid-night so soon

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as  the  administrative  officer,  with  police  assistance, gained his  freedom. Even  in  humane  affairs  a  storm  is followed by  a calm,  may be.  For, the two Unions, sobered, perhaps by  this sudden  action of  the management wrote the very next  day (21st  September) to  the employer requesting for lifting  the lock-out, proferring peaceful resumption of work and  requiring  at  least  an  interim  relief  on  the ’economic’ demands.  The letter speaks for itself and may be read presently.  The employer  was not  ready to accept this assurance. The  lock-out dragged  on,  despite  the  seeming offer of the olive branch by Labour.      Mistrust on  both sides is inevitable when estrangement vitiates a relations and language is suspect when bitterness is  the   rule  of   interpretation.  Right  or  wrong,  the management took  the view that the offer of good behavior by the workers  was conditional and not convincing, so that the lock-out  was  not  lifted  for  several  days.  The  deputy Commissioner of  Labour, who  had interceded  to conciliate, had unavailingly  requested the Management to lift the lock- out  and   had  found   Labour  insisting  on  some  interim ’economic’ relief  as a  H ’’  ground for  withdrawal of the strike. At  certain stages  of conflict in this world, face- saving becomes  more important  than heart-searching Life is not logic and Prestige amends propriety. 230      The cold-war  correspondence  continued  for  a  little while more,  each blaming the other, till at last the State, on November  4, 1966.  referred SL  prints of dispute to the Fifth Industrial  Tribunal Calcutta,  before whom  the bonus dispute was  already pending.  Better sense  on  both  sides resulted in  the termination  of the strike and the closure, and work was resumed from November 8, 1966. The award that " followed upon the dispute was rendered on September 2, 1969, nearly three years after the reference of the dispute.      One is led to wonder why there should have been so much delays but  the blame,  if any, has to be shared between the State Government  and the  Tribunal. For,  after  the  Fifth Tribunal started  the enquiry  and examined a few witnesses, the State  Government ordered  transfer  of  the  industrial dispute to  another Tribunal  and, not surprisingly, omitted to communicate  promptly the  factum of such transfer to the affected Tribunal.  Thus, although the order of transfer was made on March 31, 1967- the enquiry continued upto April 22, 1967. When actual notice of the transfer was received by the Fifth Tribunal  on April  24, representation  was made by it about  the   enquiry  having   commenced   and,   naturally, Government re-transferred  the dispute to the same Tribunal. After this  minor episode,  of transfer and re-transfer, the enquiry was continued and the award made.      We are  now concerned  only with three disputes. Of the three issues,  two deal with petty items like warm coats for the  subordinate   staff  and   canteen  allowance  for  the employees’  canteen   staff-financially  too  negligible  to engage the attention of this Court. The other item, which is meaty enough  to merit  our verdict,  relates to  the  wages during the  period of  work stoppage from September 20, 1966 to November  8, 1966.  The  tribunal,  considering,  in  its totality the  facts and circumstances of the case, the share of blame on the part of each party the role of broad justice in producing industrial peace and advertence to the relevant materials on  record, held ’that the company should pay half the wages  to the employees during the period from September 20 to November 7, 1966.      The Management, disappointed by this directions as well as the  orders regarding  warm coats  and canteen allowance,

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has come  directly to  this Court  securing special  l  have under Art. 13.      Even though  leave has  been granted by this Court, the very width  of its power under Art. 136 is a warning against its free-wheeling  exercise save  in  grave  situations.  In Bengal Chemical  (1) Subbarao,  J. (as the then was) pointed out that:           "The same  principle should, therefore, be applied      in exercising the power of interference with the awards      of tribunals irrespective of the fact that the question      arises at  the time of granting special leave or at the      time the  appeal is  disposed of. It would be illogical      to apply  two  different  standards  at  two  different      stages of the same case. The same view was expressed by      this Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Madras (1950 SCR      453), Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer (1954 SCR (1) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 136, 141 231      1153) and  Sadhu Singh v. State of Pepsu (AIR 1954 SC A      271)". From  this   it  follows  that  when  awards  of  Industrial Tribunals are  challenged in  this Court,  we have  to apply those several  tests which  have become  part of  the  self- imposed restraints on its special jurisdiction.      What are  these self-created trammels upon the exercise of this  Court’s power  ? The  answer is  furnished by  this Court in  the Associated  Cement Companies Ltd.(1) Mathew J. followed Bengal  Chemical (2)  (both these  cases related to industrial awards challenged in appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution), where this Court had observed:           "Though Art. 136 is couched in widest terms, it is      necessary for  this Court to exercise its discretionary      jurisdiction only  in cases  where awards  are made  in      violation of  the principles of natural justice causing      substantial and  grave injustice  to parties or raising      an important  principle  of  industrial  law  requiring      elucidation  and   final  decision  by  this  Court  or      disclosing   such    other   exceptional   or   special      circumstances which  merit the  consideration  of  this      Court."           "The portion  of  the  award  with  which  we  are      concerned does not raise any important principle of law      requiring elucidation and final decision by this Court.      Nor  does   it  disclose  any  exceptional  or  special      circumstances which  merit decision by this Court. On a      question  like   this,  where   the  Tribunal,   on   a      consideration of  all the  materials placed  be fore it      and having  regard to  the overall  picture came  to  a      conclusion,  we   do  not   think  this   Court  should      interfere."      Circumspection  and   circumscription  must   therefore induce us  to interfere  with the award under challenge only if  extraordinary   flaws  or   grave  injustice   or  other recognised  grounds   are  made  out.  This  perspective  is sufficient in  itself to  dispose of  the two  tiny items of dispute bearing  on warm  coats and  canteen allowance. Even so, we will briefly refer to them.      The canteen  staff claimed  allowance of  50 paise  per working day.  There are  two canteens,  one for officers and the other  for the subordinate staff. While the staff of the officers’ canteen  are drawing  the dietary  allowance of SO paise, the  employees of  the staff  canteen are denied this paltry sum.  There is no reasonable basis for this invidious treatment and  we find  no  ground  to  interfere  with  the Tribunal’s direction  that ’the  company should  pay  tiffin

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allowance at  the rate  of 50 paise per  working days to the employees in  the staff  canteen’. Of  course, if  they take free food  from the  canteen they will be ineligible for the allowance since they cannot have both.      Equally untenable  is the  grievance against warm coats supplied to  the subordinate  staff. It  is common case that the management  does supply  warm coats  to Jamadars,  gate- darwans  and  inspectors  but  does  not  extend  this  warm facility to darwans and delivery peons Calcutta. (1) A1.I.R. 1972 S. C. 1552, 1554.   (2) [1959] Supp. S.C.R.                                                      136,141 16-L390 SCI/76 232 cold  does  not  spare  either  category  and  therefore  no climatic distiction  can be made between the two. True it is that in  the charter of demands warm coats were claimed only for those  employees who  delivered newspapers.  Even of the dispute referred  to the  Tribunal is  in wider terms and we are satisfied  that the award calls for no interference when it states  ’that all  the members  of the  subordinate staff should be  supplied with  warm coats’.  Of course,  it  need hardly be  said  that  these  employees  cannot  claim  warm jerseys over and above coats.      The bone  of contention  between the parties bears upon the  wages   during  the  strike  period.  We  have  already indicated  that   the  award  crystallizes  a  discretionary conclusion reached  after a  survey of  all  the  facts  and animated by  a sense  of broad  justice.  The  Tribunal  had something to  say against the workers and the management and felt impelled to state:           "I find  that both the parties were at fault. That      being, the  position I  am of  opinion  that  both  the      parties should be held responsible for the delay in the      matter of  the with  drawing of  the lock-out. In these      circumstances, I  am of opinion that the company should      pay half  the wages  to the employees during the period      from 20th September 1966 to 7th November 1966." Captious  criticisms   apart,  the  conspectus  of  relevant circumstances    more  or less bears out the propriety  this direction.      The crucial issue is as to whether we have any material to  castigate   this   conclusion   as   unconscionable   or unjuristic, involving  gross  injustice,  violating  a  well established rule  of law or otherwise attracting out special responsibility to declare the law in a twilit area of public importance to industrial life. We will examine the pertinent circumstances from  this angle  and it  will be evident that the more  we ponder  the subject  the more  we are satisfied about the legal soundness and practical wisdom of the award, having in mind industrial peace as the goal.      The smouldering  dispute between the Management and the workers apparently  burst into  flame on  September 2,  1966 Going by the Tribunal’s reading of the situation there was a strike  that   day.  The   pendency  of   certain  types  of proceedings Before  a Tribunal  stamps a  strike or  lockout with illegality  as. (s.24).  While s.  23 prohibits strikes and lock-outs when  mentioned there are under way, s. 24 (3) absolves a  lockout of  illegality if  it is  caused  by  an illegal  strike.  There  surely  was  a  pending  industrial dispute when  the Union  sprang the  strike. Being therefore illegal,  the   lock-out  that   followed  became  a  legal, defensive  measure.  So  far  is  smooth  sailing.  But  the management cannot  behave unreasonably  merely  because  the lock  out  is  born  lawfully.  If  by  subsequent  conduct, imaginatively interested  the Unions have shown readiness to

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resume work peacefully, the refusal to re-start the industry is not right and the initial legitimacy of the lockout loses its virtue by this blemished sequel.  Nor can any management expect, as  feelings run  high,  charge-sheets  in  criminal courts are  laid against  workers  and  they  are  otherwise afflicted by the pinch of 233 unemployment ,  to get  proof of good behaviour beyond their written   word. Nor  can they realistically insist that they abandon their  demands for  better benefits before the lock- out is  lifted. In  this hungry world the weaker many cannot afford the  luxury of finery in speech which the happier new can afford.  In the  rough and tumble of industrial disputes conciliation is  a necessary  grace the  stronger party, the socially conscious  management, must  cultivate and  huff  a flaw it  must eschew.  In the realistic temper of bargaining between two  wings of  an  industry-  loth  managements  and workers belong  equally to the industry, for in one owns the other produces-a  feeling of  partnership  must  prevail  to persuade the  two sides  to trust  each rather  than such to point flaws  t in  the language  used. Such is the spirit of give and  take which  must inform  industrial negotiation if peace and  production are  the bona  fide end  and  national development  the   great  concern.  This  broad  philosophic approach amply  vindicates the  justice  of  the  Tribunal’s impugned award.      To appreciate  this view,  a flash back into the events around and after September 20, 1966 is helpful. The backdrop of law  may  be  briefly  recapitulated  before  going  into factual details.      If the  strike is illegal, wages during the period will ordinary  be   negatived  unless  considerate  circumstances constrain a  different course.  Likewise if  the lock-out is illegal full  wages for  the closure period shall have to be ’forked out’, if one may use that expression. But in between lies a grey area of twilit law. Strictly speaking, the whole field is  left to  the judicious discretion of the Tribunal. Where the  strike is  illegal and  the sequel  of a lock-out legal, we  have to view the whole course of developments and not stop  with examining  the initial  legitimately. If  one side or other behaves unreasonably or the over-all interests of good  industrial relations  warrant the  tribunal  making such directions  regarding strike  period wages as will meet with justice,  fair play  and pragmatic  wisdom, there is no error in doing so. His power is flexible.      We are  heartened and  strengthened in  our approach by the decision  in India  Marine Service(1).  There the  Court noted that ’the attitude of the company was a reasonable one and that it even proposed to the union and through it to its workmen that  work should  go on, that the dispute should be taken before  the Conciliation  officer for conciliation and that in  the meanwhile  they were  prepared  to  grant  some interim relief  to the  workmen. ’In our opinion’, added the Court           "while the  strike was unjustifiable, the lock-out      when  it   was  ordered  on  November  13.,  1958,  was      justified. It  seems to  us, however,  that though  the      lock-out  was   justified  at   its  commencement   its      continuance for  53 days  was wholly  unreasonable  and      therefore, unjustified.  IQ a  case where  a strike  is      unjustified and  is followed  by a  lock-out which has,      because of  its long  duration. become  unjustified  it      would not be a proper course for an industrial tribunal      to direct the payment of the whole of the wages for the      period of  the lock-out. We would like to make it clear

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    that in  a case where the strike is unjustified and the      lock-out is justified the      (1) (1963) 2 S.C.R. 575. 234      workmen would  not be  entitled to  any wages  at  all.      Similarly where  the strike  is justified and the lock-      out is unjustified the workmen would be entitled to the      entire wages  for the  period of  strike and  lock-out.      Where, however, a strike is unjustified and is followed      by a  lock-out which  becomes unjustified,  a case  for      apportionment of  blame arises.  In our  opinion in the      case before  us the  blame for  the situation  "  which      resulted after  the strike  and  the  lock-out  can  be      apportioned roughly  half and  half between the company      and its  workers. In  the  circumstances  we  therefore      direct that  the workmen  should get  half their  wages      from November  14, , 1958 to January 3, 1959 (both days      inclusive)."      The  factual  milieu  surrounding  the  strike-lock-out complex, as neatly presented by Shri Kapil Sibbal, shows how the  flow   of  events  exonerated  the  Unions  of  serious impropriety and  the employer  was trying  to be too clever. When the  workers struck,  the Management put up a notice of closure wherein it was stated:           "The stay-in-strike  resorted to by the workmen is      unjustified and  illegal in view of the pendency of the      proceedings before  the Fifth  Industrial Tribunal  and      also   violates    the   Code    of   Discipline.   The      representatives of  the Unions  were made aware of this      fact when  the management  met them  to  discuss  their      demands today.           In the circumstances, the management has no option      but to keep the establishment closed until such time as      the work  men  assure  the  management  of  Normal  and      peaceful resum-ption of work."                                            (emphasis, added) The simple  insistence of  the  Management  in  the  closure notice was  an assurance  from the  workmen ’of  normal  and peaceful resumption  of work’. No sooner was this notice put up than  the Unions responded constructively, moderating the usual tantrums  they  are  given  to  in  an  atmosphere  of conflict. The  very next  day after  the closure,  i.e.,  on September 21, the Secretary of the Union wrote back a letter wherein he stated inter alia:           "While we  deny the  various allegations contained      in your  said Notice and hold you wholly liable for the      development  on   20-9-66  in  suddenly  advising  your      supervisory staff  to stop  all processes  of work from      12.30 p.m. and creating a confusion amongst the workmen      who were  working all the time till then, presumably to      prepare a  ground for  the illegal  Lockout since  some      days past  as peaceful  and’ constitutional movement of      the Unions  was there  to your  dislike, we should tell      you here  and now that no useful purpose will be served      by such  black-mailing Notice far less the cause of the      industrial peace  and progress  of a  reputable concern      like ’The Statesman’ .... "      x    x    x    x    x           "You know  more  than  anybody.  else  that  your-      workmen are all peace loving people and have coop rated with you 235      all along with respect and affection. You had never any      A  occasion   to  find   fault  with   them   for   any      indisciplined con  duct. Our  Unions have  also a  long

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    tradition of  faithful cooperation  with the management      in every  hour of  crisis and  we are proud of our said      lofty  tradition.  There  was  no  obstruction  in  the      movement of  anybody at any stage on 20-9-66 as alleged      or at all and the police ought not to have been invited      in the  office. Considering everything we are of "P the      opinion that  no interest  of the  management or of the      workmen   will    be   served   by   such   acrimonious      correspondence "   any  delay in  the settlement of the      outstanding  disputes  will  make  the  situation  more      complex.           You  are  therefore  requested  to  withdraw  your      aforesaid Notice,  arrange an immediate sitting with us      and meet  the genuine  grievances of  the employees, if      not in full at least as an interim arrangement and note      in this  context if any assurance is necessary that all      along in  the past  the workmen will maintain peace and      work  normally   and   peacefully   unless   they   are      sufficiently provoked from your end."                                            (emphasis, added) It is  obvious that  the tone  of this reply is conciliatory and literally  conforms to the demand for the assurance from the workmen of peaceful and normal resumption of work. It is fair to  infer that  the receipt  of this letter should have persuaded the  Management in  a spirit  of goodwill, to lift the lock-out  and give  a trial to the workers’ willingness. Is not  a worker’s  word, until  the contrary  is proved, as good as his bond ? Moreover, a strike is called off when the strikers agree  to come  back to work. Curiously enough, the management struck a discordant note in their letter two days later. Instead  of  a  favourable  response,  the  appellant recited the  old facts and concluded:           "We have no intention of keeping the office closed      longer than is necessary, and as soon as the Management      is reason  ably convinced  that discipline  and  normal      production will be maintained and that there will be no      recurrence of the acts of indiscipline which led to the      illegal strike and closure, we shall take steps to open      the office " The shift  in stand  is obvious.  The  first  letter  merely demanded of  the workmen an assurance of normal and peaceful resumption of  work. When  this  was  given  the  Management quietly tilted  its stance  and demanded  that it  should be ’reasonably convinced  that discipline and normal production will be  maintained and  that there will be no recurrence of the acts  of indiscipline’..  The further  letter of October 31, 1966  by the Union highlights the anxiety of the workers for resumption  of work  Of course, the staying power of the workers is  limited and  wanes after a time. Naturally, they press the  Management to  withdraw the closure. The language of the letter Exhibit E-7 is tellingly temperate:           "Assuming though not conceding even by any stretch      of imagination  that there  was an  illegal  strike  as      alleged by 236      you and  the lock-out  for 41  days till date after the      Unions’  unequivocal assurance of peace and cooperation      given to  you on  behalf of the workmen in their letter      dated 21-9-66  in reply  to your  notice dated  20-9-66      where you  asked for  such an  assurance. So far as the      Unions  demands   are  concerned,   they  are  only  of      incidental nature  because of the suffering thrust upon      the workers  on account  of the  unproved lock  out. We      want peace  and a climate where lock and strike will he      a matter  of the  past. In that spirit we have selected

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    the   least controversial 11 items out of all the items      of demands  for immediate  settlement.  Hope  you  will      appreciate the  same  by  entering  into  a  negotiated      settlement and we assure you that if necessary we shall      not even fight the Bonus case before the Tribunal if on      that item also you agree to settle." J’      lt was mentioned by Shri Sibbal that there were charge- sheets against the workers at the instance of the Management which embittered  relations. There  is also the reference in the evidence  of the  Deputy Commissioner of Labour that the Management was unwilling to lift the lock-out when requested and the  workers  were  unwilling  to  withdraw  the  strike without settlement  of disputes.  In an escalating situation of  conflict,   developments  lead   to   deterioration   of industrial quiet  and we  have to  look at the whole picture with realism.      There was  a minor  ripple of disputation as to whether the evidence  recorded  by  the  Fifth  Industrial  Tribunal between the  date when  the transfer order was passed by the government and  the re-transfer order was made could be read as evidence.  The Tribunal  has come  to the same conclusion both by  excluding and  by including  such evidence  in  his verdict. Shri Kapil Sibbal has fairly taken us through these materials  to   convince  us  that  the  verdict  cannot  be deflected by  eliminating or reading the disputed testimony. We feel satisfied that there is much to be said in favour of the ultimate view taken by the Tribunal that blameworthiness may be  equally apportioned  between  the  parties  Had  the Management reacted  with goodwill  when the workers the very next day  offered  to  be  peaceful  and  resume  work,  the prolonged situation  of cessation  of work  could have  been saved. It  is therefore  a case which attracts Indian Marine Service (supra).  In that case also this Court found it fair to direct  that the workmen should get half the wages during the strike  period. The  Tribunal’s view  is  certainly  not unreasonable. May  be, it  is a  just solution. We hope that both sides after these long years, will bury the hatchet and work for  the better  efficiency and  greater  status  of  a leading newspaper of India.      Having regard  to the  circumstances of the case, it is proper to  direct that  the  appeal  be  dismissed  but  the parties will  bear their  respective costs.  Before  parting with  this   case  we   deem  it  our  duty  to  record  our appreciation of  the thoroughness  of  preparation  of  Shri Kapil Sibbal  a young  advocate of promise, who has assisted the Court  as amicus  curiae with  presidential industry and persuasive felicity. P.B.R.                                      Appeal dismissed 237