http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 59  

PETITIONER: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL .

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SUBODH GOPAL BOSE AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/12/1953

BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND DAS, SUDHI RANJAN HASAN, GHULAM JAGANNADHADAS, B.

CITATION:  1954 AIR   92            1954 SCR  587  CITATOR INFO :  E          1954 SC 119  (1)  RF         1954 SC 282  (13)  R          1954 SC 728  (25)  R          1955 SC  41  (6)  R          1955 SC 604  (19)  RF         1955 SC 781  (11)  RF         1956 SC 246  (65)  E&D        1957 SC 599  (24)  D          1957 SC 832  (25)  R          1958 SC 328  (9,10,11,34)  F          1958 SC 578  (170)  F          1958 SC 731  (21)  R          1959 SC 308  (6)  D          1959 SC 648  (38)  D          1960 SC1080  (22,27,28)  RF         1961 SC1684  (28,29)  E          1962 SC 263  (24)  D          1962 SC 458  (24)  RF         1962 SC1006  (67,72,78)  RF         1962 SC1781  (20)  C          1963 SC 864  (25,27)  R          1963 SC1019  (13,14)  RF         1963 SC1667  (11)  R          1965 SC 190  (4)  R          1967 SC 856  (9)  F          1967 SC1643  (179,227)  RF         1968 SC 394  (10,18)  RF         1969 SC 634  (33,35,38)  RF         1970 SC 564  (54,55,151,200)  R          1971 SC1594  (9)  RF         1973 SC1461  (310)  R          1978 SC 215  (68)  R          1978 SC 597  (189)  R          1978 SC 803  (35)  RF         1979 SC 248  (10)  E          1980 SC1042  (110)  E&R        1987 SC 180  (9)  F          1989 SC1629  (15)  F          1990 SC1927  (61)  RF         1992 SC1256  (14)

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 59  

ACT:  Constitution  of  India,  arts.      19 (1)(f)  &  31--Scope  of Correlation between art. 19 (1) (f)  and art. 31--Clauses  (1)    and    (2)   of   art.   31,    whether      mutually  exclusive--"Deprivation"--"Acquisition"--"Taking  possession  of"--Meanings   of--Bengal   Land Revenue Sales (West Bengal  Amendment)   Act, 1950 (West Bengal Act  VII  of  1950),  s.  7--Whether   ultra  vires  art. 19 (1) (f) and an. 31.

HEADNOTE:    The  first   respondent   B purchased  a  Touzi  in  24- Parganas  Collectorate   at  a  revenue  sale  held  on  9th January,  1942.  As such purchaser  he  acquired  under   s. 37  of  the  Bengal Revenue Sales Act,  1859,  the right "to avoid  and  annul all  under-tenures and forthwith to  eject all under-tenants"  with  certain  exceptions which are  not material here.  In exercise  of  that  right he gave notices of ejectment  and brought  a suit  in 1946  to evict certain under-tenants   including  the  second   respondent   herein and  to  recover  possession  of the lands.  The  suit   was decreed  against  the second respondent   who  preferred  an appeal- to the District Judge, 24-Parganas,  contending that his  under-tenure   came  within  one  of  the    exceptions referred to  in s.  37.  When  the  appeal was pending,  the Bill  which was later  passed  as  the  West Bengal  Revenue Sales  (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950, was introduced  in the   West   Bengal Legislative  ASsembly   on  23rd  March, 1950.  It   would  appear,  according to the  "statement  of objects   and  reasons"  annexed to  the  Bill,  that  great hardship  was being caused to a large section of the  people by  the   application of s. 37 of the Bengal   Land  Revenue Sales  Act,  1859,  in the urban areas and particularly   in Calcutta  and its  suburbs  where  "the  present  phenomenal increase   in  land  values  has   supplied   the  necessary incentive   to speculative  purchasers  in exploiting   this provision  (section.  37)  o/the law for  unwarranted  large scale eviction" and it was, therefore,  considered necessary to enlarge  the scope of protection  already  given  by  the section  to   certain  categories  of  ,tenants   with   due safeguards   for   the  security   of   Government  revenue. The   Bill was eventually  passed as  the  amending Act  and it      came   into   force   on   15th  March,  1950.    It substituted  by   s.  ’4  the   new s. 37in  place   of  the original  s.  37   and  it provided   by s.   7   that   all pending  suits, appeals  and other proceedings which had not already  resulted  in delivery of possession,  shall  abate. Thereupon B contending that s. 7 was void 588 as abridging  his fundamental rights under art. 19(1)(f) and art.  31  .  moved   the  High  Court  under   art.  228  to withdraw   the  pending  appeal  and   to   determine    the constitutional   issue  raised  by  him.  The   appeal   was accordingly   withdrawn  and the case was  heard  by  Trevor Harries    C.J  and  Banerjee   J.  who,  by  separate   but concurring   Judgments,  declared  s.   7   unconstitutional and   void. They held that B’s right to annul  under-tenures and evict  undertenants being a vested right acquired by him under  his   purchase  before  s.  37   was   amended,   the retrospective  deprivation  of that right  by s.  7 of   the amending   Act without   any abatement  of  the  price  paid by   him  at  the  revenue sale was an infringement  of  his fundamental   right  under art. 19 (1)(f) to  hold  property with all the rights  acquired  under  his  purchase,  and as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 59  

such deprivation  was    not  a reasonable  restriction   on the exercise of  his  vested  right,  s.  7  was  not  saved by cl. (5)  of  that article and was void.    The  State  of West   Bengal  preferred the present appeal to  the  Supreme Court:    Held,  per  PATANJALl SASTRI C.J.--Article  19  (1)  (f) has  no application  to this  case.  The word "hold"  in the article   means  own.  The said  sub-clause  (f)  gives  the citizen  of  India the abstract right to  acquire,  own  and dispose  of property. This article does not deal  with   the concrete   fights  of the citizens  of India in  respect  of the property so acquired and owned by him.  These   concrete rights are dealt with in art. 31 of the Constitution. Under the scheme of the  Constitution  all those  broad and basic  freedoms  inherent  in the  status  of a citizen   as a free man are embodied and protected from  invasion  by the State   under  cl. (1)of art. 19,  the   powers   of   State regulation    of  those freedoms in  public  interest  being defined in relation  to each of those freedoms  by  cls. (2) to (6) of that article, while rights of private property are separately   dealt with and their protection   provided  for in   art.  31,   the   cases   where  social   control   and regulation could extend to the  deprivation  of such  rights being indicated in  para. (ii) of sub-clause (b) of cl.  (5) of art. 31 and exempted. from liability to pay  compensation under cl. (2).    Held,  per  PATANJALI  SASTRI C.J.  (MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN’ and  GHULAM HASAN JJ. concurring)--(i) Article  31  protects the right  to  property  by defining the limitations  on the power of the State to take away private property without the consent  of the owner.  Clauses (1) and (2) of art.  31  are not   mutually exclusive in  scope and content,  but  should be read together and understood as  dealing  with  the  same subject,  namely the protection of the right   to   property by  means  of limitations  on the State’s power referred  to above,  the deprivation contemplated in clause (1) being  no other  than  the acquisition  or taking  possession  of  the property referred to in cl. (2).  The words "taking of  ........  possession or  ....   .... acquisition"  in art. 31(2) and’ the words  "acquisition  or requisitioning" in entry     589 No.  33   of List  I and entry  No. 36 of List  II  as  also the  words "acquired or requisitioned"  in entry No.  42  of List  III are different expressions connoting the same  idea and  instances  of  different   kinds   of  deprivation   of property   within  the   meaning  of  art.  31(1)   of   the Constitution. No   cut  and dried test  can be formulated  as to  whether in  a  given   case   the  owner   is   "deprived"   of  his property  within the meaning of art. 31; each case  must  be decided as it arises on its  own  facts.  Broadly   speaking it may be said that an abridgement would  be so  substantial as to amount to a deprivation with in the  meaning  of  art. 31,  .if,  in  effect, it withheld  the  property  from  the possession  and  enjoyment  of the   owner,   or   seriously impaired   its   use  and  enjoyment  by  him             or materially    reduced   its   value    .   The    expression "taking               possession" in  art   31(2)         of the  Constitution  can only  mean such  possession   as  the property taken   possession of is  susceptible  to  and need  not  be actual                 physical                  possession. ’  (ii)  It   is   difficult to hold   that  the  abridgement

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 59  

sought  to be effected retrospectively  of the rights  of  a purchaser  at a revenue sale is so substantial as to  amount to  a  deprivation of his  property within the  meaning   of art. 31(1)  and (2).  No question accordingly  arises  as to the  applicability of el. 5(b)(ii) of art. 31  to the     Per  DAs J.--(1) The abridgement of the rights  of  the purchaser  at a revenue sale brought about by the new s.  37 amounts  to  nothing  more  than   the   imposition   of   a reasonable  restriction  on  the exercise   of   the   right conferred  by  art. 19(1)(f)in the interests of the  general public  and is perfectly  legitimate  and permissible  under cl.  (5)  of that  article.  It is  well-settled  that   the statement  of objects and reasons  is not admissible  as  an aid to the construction of a statute  but it can be referred to  only  for  the  limited  purpose  of  ascertaining   the conditions   prevailing  at  the time  which  actuated   the sponsor  of the  Bill .to introduce  the same and the extent and urgency of the. evil which he. sought  to remedy.  Those are  matters  which must enter into  the   judicial  verdict as  to the reasonableness  of the restrictions   which  art. 19(5)   permits  to be imposed on the exercise of the  right guaranteed by art. 19(1)(f). (II) The  correlation  between art.  19(1)(f) and  art.   31 is that  if a person  loses his  property by reason  of  its having been compulsorily  acquired under  art.  31  he loses his  right   to hold that  property  and   Cannot   complain that  .his fundamental right under  art.  19(1)(f)has   been infringed.   The   rights enumerated in art.  19(1)  subsist while  the citizen has the legal capacity to exercise them. A.K.  Gopalan’s  case [1950] S.C.R. 88 and  Chiranjit  Lal’s case  [1950] S.C.R. 869 referred to. 590 For the purpose of this appeal  the. matter proceeds on the footing that  art. 19 relates to abstract  right as well  as to right to concrete property.                 . (III) The true scope and effect of cls. (1) and (2) of art. 31  is that cl. (1) deals  with  deprivation   of   property in   exercise   of  police  power   and    enunciates    the restrictions    which  our   Constitution   makers   thought necessary or sufficient  tO  be  placed  on  the exercise of that  power,  namely,  that such power can be exercised only by  authority  of law and not by a mere executive  fiat  and that  cl.  (2)deals  with  the  exercise  of  the  power  of eminent  domain and  places  limitations  on  the   exercise of   that    power.These   limitations    constitute     our fundamental   rights’ against the State’s power  of  eminent domain.    (IV)   Both   these   clauses  cannot  be  regarded   as concerned  only  with the State’s power of  eminent  domain, because then-   (a)  cl  (1)  would   be  wholly  redundant,   for   the necessity  of  a law is quite clearly implicit  in  cl.  (2) itself;    (b) deprivation  of property otherwise than  by   taking of  possession’   or acquisition of it will be outside.  the pale of constitutional protection:    (c)   there   will   beno   protection    against    the exercise  of police  power  in respectOf property either  by the executive or by the legislature.    Chiranjit  Lals  case [1950] S.C.R. 869  and  The  Bihar Zamindari case [1952] S.C.R. 889  referred to. (V) The State’s police power is not confined--    (a) within  the  ambit  of art. 19 forto say  otherwise ,will mean:      (i)  that  there  is no  protection  for  any  person,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 59  

citizen or non-citizen,  against  exercise of  police  power by the  executive over property;   (ii)      that   although  in cls. (2) to (6)  there   is protection  against’  (iei)  legislature   in   respect   of "restriction"     there    is    no    protection    against "deprivation";  or  (h)  within  d.   (5) (b)  of art.  31   because   to  say otherwise will mean :__    (i)   that  the  police  power  which  is  inherent   in sovereignty  and  does not require express  reservation  has been unnecessarily defined and reserved;     (ii)  that  the  Constitution does  not   prescribe  any test  for the ’validity of the laws which fail  within   the clause  and,  therefore, the law failing within  the  clause may  be  as archaic,  offensive and .  unreasonable  as  the legislature may choose to make it; (iii)  that  the  clause gives  no  protection  against  the executive;  (iv) that the exercise of the police   power  by the  legislature is confined  within’ the  very  narrow  and inelastic   limits of the clause and that no beneficial   or social  legislation involving taking  591 of property can be undertaken by the State if the  law-falls outside     the  clause  except  on  terms  of  payment   of compensation;    (v)   that   acqUiSition  Of    property    for    which compensation  is    Usually provided, e.g.;  acquisition  of land  for  a public park,  hospital    Or z’dearing  a  slum area   will  henceforth   be  permissible  without  the  law providing any compensation;     (VI)  The  argument that if art. 31(1)  is  read  as  a fundamental right  against  deprivation  of property by  the executive  and  art.,  31(2) as laying down  the  Iimits  of State’s  power of  eminent domain  then  there  will be   no real  protection.  whatever, for the State  will  deprive  a person  of  his  property without   compensation  by  simply making a law is not tenable because--     (i) there will  certainly  be protection  against   the execute  just as the 29th clause of the Magna Charts  was  a protection against the British Crown;     (ii)"’there  is protection under  art.  31(2)   against the  legislature in the matter of taking of possession   Or. acquisition for compensations to be given  and  under  cl. (5)  of  art, 19  against unreasonable’ restraint:      (iii)   the  absence   of  protection   against    the legislature in other cases  is  not greater than the absence of protection against the legislature in respect of taxation and if the legislature can be trusted in the latter case  it may equally  he’ trusted in the former case.      (VII)  Every taking  of a thing  into the  custody  of the   State or its nominee does  not necessarily   mean  the taking   of possession Of that thing within the  meaning  of art  31(2)   so as to call for  compensation.   The   police power   is  exercised  in the interest of the community  and the power of eminent-domain is  exercised to . implement   a public  purpose   and in both  cases there is  a  taking  of possession  of  private, property There is however a  marked difference  between  the exercise  of these   two  sovereign powers.  It  is   easy   to   perceive,   though    somewhat difficult   to  express, the .distinction between  the   two kinds  of taking of possession which undoubtedly exists.  In view  of the wide  sweep of  the  State’s police  power   it is   neither  desirable  nor  possible to lay down  a  fixed general  test   for  determining  whether   the  taking   of possession  authorised by any  particular. law falls  within

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 59  

one category or the other.  Without,  therefore,  attempting any such ’general enunciation of any inflexible  rule it  is possible  to  say  broadly  that the aim,  purpose  and  the effect  of  the  two  kinds  of  taking  of  possession  are different and that . in  each "case the  provisions of.  the particular  law  in  question" will  have   to’be  carefully scrutinised   in  order to   determine in which   category-’ falls  the taking  of possession authorised  by such law.  = A  consideration   of  the   ultimate   aim,  the  immediate purpose  ::and  the  mode  and  manner  of  the  taking  ’of possession    and,    the    duration".’for    which    such possession ..is taken, the effect of’ it ’-on the rights  of ’the  person dispossessed and other such like elements  must all determine the judicial verdict. 592  (VIII)  Treating the right to annul under-tenures and   to eject   under-tenants   .and   decree   for   ejectment   as "property" as used in art. 31(2)  the State has not acquired those rights for there has been  no  transfer  by  agreement or  by   operation   of  law of  those    rights   from  the respondent   B to the  State or anybody else.  The  purchase being at a Revenue  sale to. which  West  Bengal Act VII  of 1950  applies,   the  purchaser of the  property   has  been deprived  of  this right by authority of law  and  the  case falls    within cl. (1)  of  art.  31  and  no  Within   cl. (2)  of  art.  31.   If  the impugned  section  is  regarded as    imposing   restrictions   on  the   purchaser,    such restrictions   in the circumstances  of the case  are  quite reasonable  and permissible under article 19(5) and, in the premises,  the _plea of unconstitutionality cannot   prevail and must be rejected.    Pet’ JAGANNADHADAS J.--(i) On the  assumption that   the question   raised in  this  case  is one  that   arisesunder art.  19(1)(f)and  (5) of the  Constitution,   the  impugned section  of the West Bengal Act VII of 1950 is  intra  vires because  the restrictions are reasonable within the  meaning of art. 19(5) of the Constitution;    (ii) that art. 19(1)(f)  while probably meant to  relate tot  he  natural rights of the citizens  comprehends  within the  scope  also concrete property rights. The  restrictions on the exercise of rights envisaged in art. 19(5) appear  to relate--normally,   if not  invariably-to concrete  property rights; (iii) that  cl. (1).of  art. 31    cannot  be   construed as being  either  a declaration  or  implied   recognition   of the  American doctrine of "police power".    It  comprehends within  its  scope  the  requirement  of the  authority   of law,  as distinguished  from   executive fiat  for  the exercise of the power of eminent domain,  but its  scope may well be wider.  "Acquisition"   and   "taking possession"   in  art. 31(2) cannot be taken as  necessarily involving  transfer  of  tide or possession.  The  words  or phrases  comprehend all cases where the title or  possession is   taken  out  of the owner and appropriated  without  his consent  by  transfer   or extinction   or  by   some  other process, which in substance amounts  to it,  the  possession in this context meaning such possession as the nature of the property admits and which the law recognizes as possession. (iv) In the context of art. 31(2)  as in the cognate context article    19(1)(f)--the    connotation    of   the     word "property"is   limited   by    the    accompanying     words "acquisition"  and "taking possession". In the present. case the right to annul under-tenures cannot in itself be treated as property for it is not capable of independent acquisition or possession.  The  deprivation of it can only amount to  a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 59  

restriction   on the exercise  of the fights as regards  the main  property  itself  and  hence  must  fall  under   art. 19(1)(f) taken with 19(5). 593    .  Butchers  Union etc. Co. v. Crescent City  etc.  Co., (111  U.S. 746), Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh and  Others ([1946]  F.C.R.  1), Chiranjit Lal Chauduri v. The Union  of India  and Others ([1950] S.C.R. 869), A.K. Gopalan  v.  The State  of  Madras  ([1950] S.C.R. 88),  P.D.  Shamdasani  v. Central  Bank   of India ([1952] S.C.R.  391),  Ministry  of State.   for   the  Army  v.  Dalziel   (68   C.L.R.   261), Pennsylvania  Coal Co.  v.  Mahou (260 U.S. 322),  Dwarkadas Shrinivas  v.  Sholapur  Spinning  and  Weaving  Mills  Ltd. ([1954]  S.C.R. 674),’ State of Madras v. V.G.  Row  ([1952] S.C.R.   597),  Ram Singh v. The State  of  Madras   ([1951] S.C.R.   451), State of Bihar v.  Maharajadhiraja  Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga ([1952]  S.C.R. 889), Noble State Bank v. Haskeli   (219   U.S. 104),  Eubank v.  Richmond  (226  U.S. 137), Ioseph Hurtado V. People of California (1883) (10 U.S. 516), referred to..

JUDGMENT:  CIVIL   APPELLATE         JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal   No. 107 of 1952.  Appeal  from  the        Judgment  and  Order  dated   22nd March,   1951, of the  High Court of Judicature at  Calcutta (Harries  C.J.  and  Banerjee  J.) in  Reference  No.  4  of 1950 .in .Civil Rule No. 1643 Of 1950.     M.C.  Setalvad,  Attorney-General for India’  (B.   Sen, with him)  for the appellant.      Atul  Chandra  Gupta  (Jay Gopd Ghose,  with  him)  for respondent NO. 1. 1953.   December   17. The       following  Judgments   were delivered. PATANJALI    SASTRI  C.J.--This   appeal    raises    issues great public and private importance  regarding the extent of protection.  which  the . Constitution of India  accords  to ownerships of private property.      The first respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as the  respondent)  purchased the entire Touzi No. 341 of  the 24-Parganas Collectorate  at a revenue sale held on ,January 9,  1942. As such purchaser,  the respondent acquired  under section   37   of   the  Bengal   Revenue  Sales  Act,  1859 (Central  Act No. 11 of 1859) the right "to avoid and  annul all   under-tenures  and forthwith to   eject   all   under- tenants"-with   certain  exceptions which are  not  material here. In exercise  of that right the respondent gave notices of  ejectment  and brought a suit in 1946 to  evict  certain under-tenants,  including the second respondent herein,  and to recover  possession 594 of. the lands.  The  suit  was.  decreed against  the second respondent   who   preferred  an  appeal   to  the  District Judge,  24-Parganas,  Contending that his  undertenure  came within one of the exceptions referred to in section 37.     When the  appeal was pending, the Bill,  which was later passed  as  the  West Bengal Revenue Sales  (West  .  Bengal Amendment)   Act,  1950,  (hereinafter  referred  to  as"the ’amending   Act")   was  introduced  in  the   West   Bengal ’Legislative   Assembly  on   March  23,  1950.   It   would appear,   according  to  the  ."statement  0f  objects   and reasons"   annexed  to the Bill,   that great  hardship  was being  caused  to a large section   of the  people  by  the.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 59  

application   of  section  37 of  the  Bengal  Land  Revenue Sales Act, 1859,  in  the urban  areas  and particularly  in Calcutta  and its  suburbs  where "the present    phenomenal increase   in   land  values  has  supplied   the  necessary incentive   to  speculative purchasers  in  exploiting  this provision .(section 37) of the law for  unwarranted   large- scale    eviction"   and   it   was,therefore,.   considered necessary to enlarge the scope of protection  already  given by   the  section  to  certain categories of  tenants   with due   safeguards  for  the security Of  Government  revenue. The  Bill  was  eventually passed as the  amending  Act  and it  .came into force on.March  15,  1950. It substituted  by section  4 ’the’new section 37 in the place of the  original section  37, and’ it provided by section 7 that all  pending suits,  appeals and other proceedings which had not  already resulted   in   delivery  of  possession shall’ abate.,  Thereupon,  the  respondent,  contending  that  section   7 was’void  as  abriging   his   fundamental   fights    under article  19(1)   (f) and article 31, moved  the  High  Court ’under  article  228  to withdraw  the  pending  appeal  and determine  the  constitutional issue .’raised  by  him.  The appeal      accordingly. withdrawn ’and the  case was  heard by  Trevor  Harries  C.J.  and   Banerjee  J..  who,      by separate   but, concurring  ’judgments,  declared section  7 unconstitutional   and void ’::and. returned  the :case:  to the District Court ’for: disposal, in conformity       595 with  ’their  decision.  The learned Judges  held  that  the respondent’s  right   to  annul  under-tenures   and   evict under-tenants  being  a vested  right  acquired by him under his   purchase   before   section  37   was   amended,   the retrospective  deprivation of that right by section 7 of the amending Act without any abatement of the price paid by  the respondent  at the revenue sale was an infringement  of  his fundamental  right under article 19(1) (f) to hold  property with  all the rights . acquired under his purchase,  and  as such  deprivation  was not a reasonable restriction  on  the respondent’s  exercise of his vested right,  section  7  was not saved by clause (5) of that article and was void.     On   behalf  of   the   appellant  State   the   learned Attorney-General  contended  before  uS  that  if,  as   the respondent  claims,  his right  to annul  under-tenures and. evict   under-tenants   in  occupation   other   than  those protected    under    the      original    enactment,    was "property’"   within  the  meaning of clause (1) Of  article 19,  then,  it  was also "property" within  the  meaning  of clause  (1) of article 31, as the expression must  have  the same’connotation   in  both   the   provisions,   and    the respondent,’  having   been   "deprived"  of  it  under  the authority of law,  namely,  section 7 of the  amending  Act, such deprivation was lawful and could not be challenged.  In support   of   this  contention  learned  counsel   strongly relied  on  the  observations of  my learned brother Das  in Chiranjit   Lal   Choudhury’s   case(1  )   and’   also   on the  .analogy  of  the   reasoning  of   the  majority   ’in ;Gopalan’s  case(z).  Alternatively,  it  was urged that  if the   correct  view  was  that  the  nullification  of   the respondent’s   right   was  only   the   imposition   of   a "restriction"   on  the   enjoyment    of    the    property purchased  by   him,   as .has been  held   by  the  learned Judges.  below,   then, it  was  a  reasonable   restriction imposed  in  ,the’ interests  of the  general  public  under clause  (5)of  article 19, having regard to  the  facts  and circumstances  which  led  to  the enactment of  the measure as . disclosed in the Statement of Objects and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 59  

(1) [1950] S.C. R: 869                        "  (2) [1950] 8. C.R. 88.     [1954] Reasons  annexed   to the Bill which, for this  purpose,  is admissible.     It  will  be convenient to deal first  with  the  latter contention  of   the Attorney-General.  Sub-clause   (f)  0f clause (1) of article 19 has, in my opinion, no  application to the case. That article enumerates certain freedoms  under the  caption "right to freedom"  and deals with those  great and  basic  rights which are recognised and  guaranteed   as the   natural   rights   inherent   in   the  status   of  a citizen  of a free  country.  The  freedoms declared in sub- clauses (a) to (e) and (g) are clearly of that   description and  in  such  context  sub-clause (f) should, I think, also be  understood as declaring the freedom appertaining to  the citizen  of  free  India  in  the  matter  of   acquisition, possession  and  disposal of private  property.   In   other words,   it declares  the  citizen’s right to  own  property and  has no reference to the right to the property owned  by him,  which is dealt with in article 31.  Referring  to  the "privileges   and   immunities" mentioned in article  4  and Amendment   14  of  the  American   Federal    Constitution, Bradley  J.   said  in Butchers Union etc. Co.  v.  Crescent City etc. Co.(1):     "The  phrase  has a broader meaning.  It  includes those fundamental    privileges-and   immunities    which   belong essentially to the citizens of every free government,  among which  Washington J.  enumerates  the’ right of  protection; the   right to  pursue  and  obtain happiness   and  safety; the right  to pass through and reside  in any State ’for the purposes  of trade, agriculture,  professional pursuits   or otherwise;   to  claim  the benefit of  the  wnt  of  habeas corpus;  to institute and maintain actions  of any kind   in the  courts of the State and  to take, hold and  dispose  of property  either real or personal.  (Corfield v. Coryell,  4 Wash.   (C.C.)   371). These rights are different  from  the concrete  fights which a man may have to a specific  chattel or  a piece of land or to the  performance by  another of  a particular  contract, or to damages of a  particular  wrong, all  which  may  be invaded by  individuals;  they  are  the capacity,  power or privilege of  having and  enjoying (1) 111 U. 8. 746.    597 those concrete rights and of maintaining them in the courts, which  capacity, power or privilege can only be invaded   by the   State.  These primordial and fundamental  rights   are the   privileges and immunities citizens which are  referred to  in  the 4th article of the Constitution   and   in   the 14th  Amendment  to  it." (Italics mine).   We  are not here  concerned with the meaning  and  content of  the phrase"privileges  and immunities"  in the   context of   thoseprovisions   which,   according  to  some  of  the Judges,have  a  reference  only  to  those  privileges   and immunities   which  owe  their  existence  to  the   Federal Constitution   or  its  laws.  What  is  of importance   for the   present   purpose  is that  the  two  learned   Judges thought   that  the  "right to take,  hold  and  dispose  of property"  was one of those "primordial  and     fundamental rights"   of  the   same  class’as   the  right   to  pursue happiness   and  safety  and  other  such  basic    freedoms appertaining  to free  citizens  and was different from  the concrete  rights which a person may have to a specific   res or  thing owned, being the capacity,  power   or   privilege of  having and enjoying those concrete  rights.   Sub-clause

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 59  

(f) of clause (1) of article 19 seems  analogous  to  clause (1) of  article 17  of  the United Nations  Declaration   of Human  Rights "Everyone has the right to own property  alone as  well as in association with others"  and article 31   to clause  (2)  of  article 17 "No one   shall  be  arbitrarily deprived  of   his property."  I have  no  doubt   that  the framers  of  our Constitution drew the same distinction  and classed  the  natural right  or capacity of  a  citizen  "to acquire,   hold  and   dispose   of  property"   with  other natural   rights and freedoms   inherent in the status of  a free  citizen and embodied  them  in article  19(1),   while they  provided  for  the protection of  concrete  rights  of property owned by a person in article 31. The meaning of the phrase,"to acquire,  hold and dispose  of property"  as well as  the  nature  of  the subject  matter  to  which  it  has reference  in the sense indicated above, is also clear  from the  terms  of sections  111 and 298 of  the  Government  of India Act, 1935, where the same phrase is used 598 in prohibiting  imposition  of "disability"  on  grounds  of religion,  place of birth, .descent, colour or any  of  them on  a  British subject domiciled ’in the United Kingdom  and on  an  indian subject of His Majesty determined,   in   the case  of   citizens  and   non-citizens  not   deal     with expropriation   of  specific   property belonging  to   such persons  which   is  dealt  with in section 299.     There are difficulties in the way of accepting the  view of  the learned Judges below that article 19 (1) (f) and  19 (5)   deal with the  concrete  rights of property  and   the restraint   to  which  they are  liable  to   be  subjected. In   the   first place, it will be noticed  that  sub-clause (f)  of clause (1) of article 19 deals only with the  rights of  citizens,  whereas article 31 deals with the  rights  of persons  in  general.  If article 31, which  is  headed   by the   caption   "right   to   property",   was  designed  to protect  property  rights  of  citizens  as  well  as   non- citizens,   why  was  it  considered necessary   to  provide for  the  protection of those rights in  sub-clause  (f)  of clause  (1)  of article 19 also ? I do not  think  that  our Constitution-makers   could have  intended  to   provide   a double-barrelled    constitutional  protection   to  private property.  Moreover,  right  to  "acquire"  and "dispose of" property  could only refer  to the capacity of  a   citizen. The  word "hold",  which  is  inserted between  those    two words   must,   in my   opinion, be  understood   to    mean "own",   and   not     as   having  reference  to  something different,  viz.,  rights  to specific  things  owned  by  a citizen  ? I see no force in the objection that unless  sub- clause (f)  of clause (1) of article 19 read with clause (5) is  construed as relating to concrete property rights  also, the  legislature  would  have  the  power  to  impose   even unreasonable  restrictions  on  the  enjoyment  of   private property by citizens.  It is  difficult to believe that  the framers   of  our  Constitution  could  have   intended   to differentiate  between citizens and  non-citizens in  regard to  imposition  of restrictions on   enjoyment   of  private property.  Such  restrictions are imposed in exercise of the power  inherent in the State to regulate private  rights  of property when they 599 are  sought to be exercised to ’the injury of others  having similar  rights, and the ,measure of restriction imposed. in exercise of such regulative power must be determined, in the case of citizens and non-citizens alike,  by the   necessity of   protecting    the   community.  On  the   other   hand,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 59  

differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens would be perfectly  intelligible  if subclause (f) of clause  (1)  of article  19  and clause (5) are understood as  dealing  only with  the freedom or capacity to acquire,  hold and  dispose of  property  in general, for, it would  be  justifiable  to exclude  aliens  from  such freedom, as has   been  done  in several   countries for the benefit of their own  nationals, particularly in respect     of land.  Moreover, both  by the preamble  and  the  directive  principles  of  State  policy in Part IV,  our "Constitution has  set the goal of a social welfare  State  and this must involve  the  exercise   of  a large  measure  of social  control  and regulation  of   the enjoyment  of private  property.   If  concrete  rights   of property are brought within the purview of article 19(1)(f), the   judicial    review   under   clause   (5)as   to   the reasonableness of such control and regulation might have  an unduly  hampering effect on legislation m that  behalf,  and the  makers  of our  Constitution may well have intended  to leave   the Legislatures free to exercise such  control  and regulation  in  relation  to the  enjoyment   of  rights  of property,  providing only that if such  regulation   reaches the  point of deprivation  of property the owner should   be indemnified   under  clause (2)  of article 31   subject  to the exceptions  specified in para. (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (5) of article 31.     ’Nor  am I much impressed with the suggestion  that  the reference  to "exercise" in clause (5) of article 19 of  the rights  conferred by sub-clause (f) of clause (1)  indicates that’  the’ latter  rights  must  be  fights   of  property. Clause  (5)  could as well contemplate restrictions  on  the excercise  of  a  citizen’s freedom to   acquire,  hold  and dispose of property, as for instance, banning acquisition of land  in  a   givien  locality,  say   a   tribal  area,  or putting a ceiling on the quantum of land that a citizen  can hold, or restricting alienation of land to specified classes of persons only (of. Punjab Province v. 600 Daulat Singh and Other (1) and the  reasonableness  of  such restrictions  being brought under judicial  review. For  all these reasons, I am of opinion that under the scheme of  the Constitution, all those broad and basic freedoms inherent in the  status  of a citizen as a free man  are  embodied   and protected  from  invasion by the State  under  clause  (1)of article  19,  the  powers  of  State  regulation   of  those freedoms   in public  interest being defined   in   relation to  each  of  those  freedoms by clauses (2) to (6) of  that article,  while rights of private property   are  separately dealt   with and their protection provided for  in   article 31,  the  cases  where  social control and regulation  could extend to the deprivation of  such  rights  being  indicated in  para. (ii)of  subclause (b)  of clause  (5)  of  article 31  and exempted from liability  to pay  compensation  under clause (2). On this view, no question of correlating article 19 (1) (f)  with article 31  could arise and the analogy  of Gopalan’s  case  has no application.  On   this  view,   the question  whether  section  7  0/3 the  amending  Act  is  a reasonable   restriction  on  the  exercise   of   the   res pondent’s right to the property  purchased by him could  not also arise,  as’ clause  (5) of article 19 could  then  have reference    only   to       disabilities   of   the    kind already mentioned.  Turning  next to the’ contention based on  article 31  (1), it  Was put thus in the language of Das J. in Chiranjit  Lal Choudhury’s  case(  ) which   the  learned  Attorney-General fully adopted:

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 59  

   "Article  31(1)  formulates  the  fundamental  right  in negative   form  prohibiting  the deprivation   of  property except  by authority of law.  It implies  that a person  may be  deprived  of his property by authority of  law.  Article 31(2)   prohibits  the acquisition or taking  possession  of property  for a public purpose  under any law,  unless  such law  provides for payment of compensation. It  is  suggested that clauses (1) and (2) 0f article 31 deal with  the   same topic,    namely,   compulsory   acquisition    or    taking possession   0f   property,   clause   (2)  being  only   an elaboration of clause (1). There appear (1) [1946] F.C .R. 1 CP. C.). (2) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 924.     , 601 to   me  to  be   two  objections  to   this   suggestion.If that   were  the  correct  view,  then  clause  (1) must  be held  to   be wholly redundant and clause  (2),  by  itself, would have been  sufficient.  In the next place such a  view would  exclude  deprivation  of property otherwise  than  by acquisition  or taking  of  possession. One   can   conceive of   circumstances  where  the State may have to deprive   a person   of  his  property  without  acquiring   or   taking possession  of  the  same.  For example,  in any  emergency, in order to prevent  a fire spreading,  the authorities  may have  to demolish  an intervening building. This deprivation of  property is supported in the United States of America as an  exercise  of  "police  power".   This  deprivation    of property  is  different  from  ’acquisition  or  taking   of possession  of property which goes by the name  of  "eminent domain"   m    the    American  law.    The     construction suggested implies  that our Constitution has dealt with only the  law  of  "eminent  domain",  but has not  provided  for deprivation  of property in exercise  of "police powers".  I am   not prepared to adopt such construction, for I  do  not feel pressed to do so by the language used in article 31. On the  contrary, the language of clause (1) of article 31   is wider than that of clause (2), for deprivation  of  property may welt be  brought about otherwise  than  by  acquiring or taking possession of it.  I think clause (1)  enunciates the general principle that no person  shall be deprived  of  his property  except  by  authority  of law,  which,  put  in  a positive  form, implies that a person  may be  deprived   of his  property,  provided he is so deprived by  authority  of law.  No question of compensation arises under clause   (1). The  effect  of clause (2)  is that only  certain  kinds  of deprivation  of  property,  namely those  brought  about  by acquisition  or  taking  possession  of  it,  will  not   be permissible  under  any law, unless such  law  provides  for payment of compensation.  If  the  deprivation  of  property is   brought about  by  means  other  than  acquisition   or taking  possession  of  it,  no  compensation  is  required, provided that such deprivation is by authority of law."     I  have  made  this lengthy extract in  order  to  avoid possible    unfairness   in   summarising   it.    These  2-9 S.C.I./59 602 observations  were  made while rejecting an argument of  the petitioner in that case,  which, however,  the learned Judge decided in his favour on another point, and are thus  purely obiter.   With   all  respect-to my  learned  brother  I  am unable   to  share  the view  expressed  by  him.  He  reads clauses   (1)  and (2)as mutually exclusive  in  scope   and content,  clause  (2)  imposing  limitations  only  on   two particular  kinds  of  deprivation  of  private    property, namely,   those  brought   about  by acquisition  or  taking

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 59  

possession thereof,  and clause (1). authorising  all  other kinds   of   deprivation  with no limitation   except   that they   should be  authorised  by law.  There   are   several objections   to the  acceptance of this view. But  the  most serious  of  them all is that it   largely   nullifies   the protection   afforded   by  the Constitution  to  rights  of private   property  and,  indeed,  stultifies    the    very conception  of the "right  to  property"  as  a  fundamental right.    For, on  this  view, the  State,  acting   through its  legislative organ,  could, for  instance,   arbitrarily prohibit   a person from using his  property, or   authorise its  destruction, or  render  it useless  for him,   without any  compensation   and with-out  a public  purpose   to  be served     thereby, as these two  conditions are  stipulated only for  acquisition  and taking  possession  under  clause (2).    Now,  the  whole  object   of   Part  Iii   of   the Constitution   is to provide protection  for  the   freedoms and  rights  mentioned therein against arbitrary invasion by the  State,  which as defined by article  12  includes   the Legislatures  of  the country.  It  would be   a   startling irony if the fundamental rights of property were, in effect, to  be turned by  ,construction  into  an  arbitrary   power of  the  State to deprive a person of his  property  without compensation   in  all  ways  other  than   acquisition   or taking possession of such property. If the Legislatures were to  have  such  arbitrary power,  why  should   compensation and public purpose be insisted upon in connection with  what are  termed  two particular forms  of  deprivation  ?   What could    be    the   rational    principle  underlying  this differentiation  ?  To  say that  clause  (1)  defines   the "police  power"   in relation to rights  of property  is  no satisfactory answer, as the Same power 603 could  as  well have  been extended to these two  particular kinds  of deprivation.  Such  extension would  at least have avoided   the  following  anomaly:compensation  is  paid  to indemnify  the  owner for the loss of his property. It could make  no  difference to him whether such   deprivation   was authorised   under  clause (1)or clause (2). In either  case his  property  would be gone and he would suffer  loss.   It would  matter little to him what happened  to  the  property after  he  was  deprived of it--whether it was  used  for  a public purpose or was simply destroyed  without  any  public purpose  being served.   In  fact,  he  could  more  readily reconcile  himself  to  the  loss  forced  upon  him if   he found  his   property     being used   for      the   public benefit;   for,   in   that     case,   he    would       be participating  in that  benefit     as  a  member         of the  public.   But that  consolation  would  be  denied   to him   by deprivation  under  clause (1),  which  makes   his 0loss  all the   more  grievous.   But,  according  to   Das J.s.  reading   of that  clause,   the   Constitution-makers have   provided    for   no    indemnification    of     the expropriated owner.  Why ?  Because,it is said,  deprivation under clause (1)  is an exercise of "police  power."   This, to  my mind,  is fallacious.You first  construe  the  clause as conferring upon the State acting through its  Legislature unfettered power to  deprive  owners  of  their property  in all other cases except the two mentioned m  clause (2),  and then  seek  to justify  such sweeping and  arbitrary   power by  calling it  "police  power." According to Das J.  clause (1)  was designed  to confer "police power"  on  the   State to   deprive  persons  of their  property  by  means   other than  acquisition  or taking  possession of such   property. He   would  read the clause in a positive form  as  implying

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 59  

that a person may  be deprived of his property by  authority of law. In other words, the framers of our Constitution, who began  Part Ill by  formulating  the fundamental  rights  of individuals   against invasion  by the Legislatures  in  the country,    ended   by   formulating  the  right   of    the Legislatures   to   deprive  individuals of  their  property without compensation. 604   Speaking   of  police   power,   as  applied  to  personal liberty,  Prof. Willis says( 1 ):   There  are  two main  requirements  for a  proper exercise of the police  power--(1) there must be a social interest to be  protected  which  is  more  important  than  the  social interest in  personal liberty,  and (2)  there must be, as a means   for  the              accomplishment of   this  end, something     which     bears              a     substantial relation there to.   This statement is equally true of police power as  applied to   private   property.   This  is   recognised  and  given effect to in clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 which  delimit the   regulative  power            of the  Legislatures   as applied  to the freedoms  enumerated  in clause (1)of   that article   including  the freedom referred to in   sub-clause (f).  But  clause   (1)  of  article  31  imposes  no   such limitations.  Why should such  absolute  power be  conferred on the Legislature  in relation to private property, whereas the  exercise  of   restrictive   power   under clauses  (2) to  (6)   of article  19 is carefully limited  to  specified purposes   and   to  the  imposition   of   only  reasonable restrictions in  each of  those  cases ? Could it have  been intended  that, while restriction imposed  on  the  freedoms mentioned   in  clause   (1)   of  article   19  should   be reasonable and in public interest, deprivation of  property, except  in  the  two cases provided for in  clause  (2)   of article  31,   need  not be reasonable nor  for  the  public benefit ?  To say  that  the  requirement of  "authorisation by  law"  was   considered   sufficient limitation  in   all other  cases  of deprivation  takes no note of the fact that in  the  case of restrictions under clauses (2) to  (6)   of article  19 also,  their authorisation could only be by  law and yet  other  limitations         have been  imposed.   In fact,   authorisation  by  law        can obviously  be   no limitation  on  the  Legislature,      and "police   power", as  developed   in  the  American            case  law,   is essentially a legislative power.     Now,  what  is  this "police power"  and  how  does  the Constitution  of India  provide for  its  exercise   by  the State ? Referring to the doctrine of  police  power (1) Constitutional Law, p. 728. 605 in America, I said  in Gopalan’s case(1):  "When that  power (legislative power)  was threatened with prostration by  the excesses  of due process,  the equally  vague and  expansive doctrine    of   "police  power",   i.e.,  the   power    of Government to regulate private  rights  in public  interest, was  evolved  to counteract such excesses" And Das  J.  (1), said  that  the  content of due process of  law  had  to  be narrowed  down by the "enunciation  and application  of  the new   doctrine of police power as an antidote or  palliative to   the   former".  This   court held  in   the   aforesaid case   that  the framers  of  our  Constitution   definitely rejected   the  doctrine  of  due process  of  law.   Is  it to  be  supposed  that  they accepted the "antidote"doctrine of police  power and embodied it in clause(1)  of article 31 as  a  specific power  conferred  on  the  Legislatures   to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 59  

deprive  persons of their property ?  The suggestion   seems unwarranted  and,  indeed, contrary to the   scheme  of  our Constitution.  That  scheme,  in marked  contrast  with  the Constitution  of  America,  is  to  distribute   legislative powers among the Union and the State Legislatures  according to   the  Lists of  the  Seventh  Schedule and  among   such powers   was   included   the  power   of  "acquisition   or requisitioning    of  property"   for   Union   and    State purposes   in  entry  No. 33  of List  I and No. 36 of  List II  respectively.   Thus,   what is  called  the  power   of eminent   domain,     which    is  assumed  to  be  inherent in   the   sovereignty    of  the    State   according    to Continental  and  American     jurists  and is   accordingly not    expressly    provided    for    in    the    American Constitution,   is made  the subject of an express grant  in our  Constitution.  Having  granted  the power  in   express terms,   the   Constitution  defines  in  article   31   the limitations   on  the  exercise  thereof  as    constituting the  fundamental  right  to property   of  the   owner,  all fundamental  rights  of the people   being   restraints   on the State  [see  observations  at  page  198  in   Gopalan’s case(1)].  But the power of social control and regulation of private rights and freedoms for the common good (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88, 200. (2) [1950] S.C.R. 88, 313. 606 being  an essential  attribute  of a  social  and  political organisation  otherwise  called a State,  and pervading,  as it  does,  the entire legislative field, was  not  specially provided  for  under any of the entries in  the  legislative Lists   and was  left  to be  exercised, wherever   desired, as   part  of  the  appropriate  legislative  power.    Even where    such   regulative   powers    are    defined    and delimited,  as  for instance in clauses  (2)   to   (6)   of article   19   in  relation  to  the  rights   and  freedoms specified in clause (1),  the  powers  themselves  are  left to  be  exercised  under  laws  made with respect to  those’ matters.   For example,  the power  of social   control  and regulation  as applied  to freedom of speech and  expression is  exercisable  under a law made   with  respect  to  entry No.  1 of List II (Public Order)  or entry  No. 39  of  List III  (Newspapers,   books  and    printing presses)  and  in relation  to  a freedom not falling under  clause  (1)  of-- article  19,  like the freedom to drink or to eat  what  one likes,    such  freedom   can   be   restrained   or    even prohibited under a law made with reference to entry No. 8 of List   II (Intoxicating  liquors,  etc.)  or  entry  No.  19 of  List   III (Drugs  and  poisons).   Thus   the  American doctrine  of  police  power  as  a  distinct  and   specific legislative    power    is    not    recognised    in    our Constitution  and it is therefore contrary to the scheme  of the Constitution to say that clause  (1) of article 31  must be  read  in  positive  terms  and understood  as conferring police  power  on the Legislature in relation to  rights  of property.   I  entirely   agree  with  the  observations  of Mukherjea  J.  in  Chiranjit  Lal’s  case(1  ),   that   "In interpreting  the provisions  of our Constitution  we should go  by the plain  words used by the Constitution makers  and the importing  of expressions  like  ’police’ power’,  which is   a  term  of  variable and   indefinite  connotation  in American  law,  can only   make the task  of  interpretation more difficult."     The   correct   approach,   in  my   opinion,   to   the interpretation   of   article  31  is to bear  in  mind  the context  and  setting  in which  it  has  ’been  placed.  As

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 59  

already   stated,   Part  III   of  the   Constitution    is designed   to afford protection to the freedoms  and  rights mentioned (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 907 607 therein  against  inroads  by  the  State   which   includes the  Legislatures  as  well as the executive Governments  in the   country.  Though,  as  pointed out  in Gopalan’s  case (1)  citing  Eshukbayi Eleko v.  Officer  Administering  the Government  of  Nigeria( 2 ), protection  against  executive action    is   not   really   needed   under   systems    of Government  based  on  British jurisprudence   according  to which  no  member of the executive  can interfere  with  the liberty  or  property  of  a subject  except  in   pursuance of   powers   given   by   law,   our   Constitution-makers, who  were  framing  a written  Constitution, conferred  such protection    explicitly   by   including   the    executive Governments  of the Union and the States  in the  definition of "the  State"  in article 12.  A fundamental right is thus sought  to be protected not only against   the   legislative organ   of  the   State  but  also  against   its  executive organ.  The  purpose of article 31, it is  hardly  necessary to emphasis, is  not to  declare the right  of the State  to deprive  a person  of his  property but,  as   the   heading of   the   article  shows,  to  protect   the    "right   to property"of  every  person.   But  how  does   the   article protect  the  right   to  property ?   It  protects   it  by defining   the  limitations  on the power of the  State   to take   away  private property  without  the consent  of  the owner.  It  is an important limitation on  that  power  that legislative  action is a pre-requisite for its exercise.  As pointed  out by Cooley, "The right to  appropriate   private property  to  public  uses lies dormant in the  State, until legislative   action  is had, pointing  out  the  occasions, the    modes,    conditions,    and   agencies    for    its appropriation.    Private   property   can  only  be   taken pursuant  to  law"(3).  In  England  the  struggle   between prerogative  and  Parliament  having ended in favour of  the latter, the prerogative right of taking   private   property became   merged in  the absolutism of Parliament,   and  the right   to  compensation  as a  fundamental  right   of  the subject  does  not exist  independently   of   Parliamentary enactment.   The  result  is  that  Parliament  alone  could authorise   interference   with   the        enjoyment    of private  property. (1) [1950] S.C.R 88. (2) [1931] A C. 662. (3) Constitutional Limitations, Vol. II, p. 1119. 608 Blackstone  also says that it is the Legislature alone  that can  interpose  and compel the individual to part  with  his property(1).   It is this limitation which the  framers   of our   Constitution   have   embodied  in   clause   (1)   of article  31 which is thus designed to protect the rights  to property   against   deprivation   by   the   State   acting through  its  executive organ, the  Government.  Clause  (2) imposes  two   further  limitations   on   the   Legislature itself.  It  is  prohibited from making  a  law  authorising expropriation  except  for public  purposes  and on  payment of compensation for the injury sustained by the owner. These important  limitations on the power of the   State,   acting through   the  executive  and legislative  organs,  to  take away  private  property are designed to  protect  the  owner against arbitrary deprivation of his property. Clauses   (1) and  (2)  of article 31 are thus not mutually exclusive   in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 59  

scope   and  content,   but  should, in  my  view,  be  read together  and understood as dealing with the  same  subject, namely,   the   protection  of the right  to   property   by means   of the limitations  on the State power  referred  to above,   the deprivation  contemplated in clause  (1)  being no  other  than  the acquisition  or  taking  possession  of property referred to in clause (2).       Much  argument  was expended to show that  clause  (2) dealt  only  with  two  specified  modes   of   depriving  a person   of   his   property,   namely,   acquisition    and requisitioning and could not,  therefore, be  considered  to be  a  mere  elaboration of clause  (1), which  referred  to deprivation  generally.  It was submitted  that  clause  (2) should  be read with entry No. 33 of List I, No. 36 of  List II  and  No.  42  of List  III, each  of  which  refers   to acquisition   or   requisitioning of property   and   to  no other mode  of deprivation.  It  was  also  pointed out that sub-section  (2)  of section 299 of the Government of  India Act,   1935,   as well as entry No. 9  of List  II   of  the Seventh   Schedule  thereof referred  only   to   compulsory acquisition  of  land for public purposes, and  it  was  not until  the  Bombay  High Court held in Tan  Bug  Taim    and Others  v.  The  Collector of Bombay anal Others  (2),  that rule 75(a) of the Defence of India Rules (1) Commentaries, Vol. I, p, 110. (2) I.L.R. 1946 Bom. 517. 609 under which a property situated in Bombay was  requisitioned was  ultra vires on the ground that  entry No. 9 of List  II did   not   confer   on  the  Legislature   the   power   of requisitioning, that such power was-conferred on the Central Legislature   by  the  India  (Proclamations  of  Emergency) Act, 1946 (9 and 10 Geo. V, Ch. 23). Attention was  drawn to the   Regulations   and   Acts  relating    to    compulsory acquisition   of land  in  this country including  the  Land Acquisition  Act,  1894,  all of which  provided   for   the vesting  of  the  property acquired  in the  Government   or in  one  of  its  officers, and it was  suggested  that  the framers of our Constitution, who must have been aware of the difficulties  arising out of the lacuna  in the   Government of   India  Act,  1935,   in   regard   to  the   power   of requisitioning, added  the  words "taken possession  of"  in clause (2)  and the word "requisitioning"  in the    entries referred  to above.  It  was, therefore,  urged   that   the words   "acquired"   or "taken  possession of"   should  not be  taken to have reference  to all forms of deprivation  of private property by the State.     I  see  no  sufficient  reason  to  construe  the  words "acquired  or  taken  possession" used  in  clause  (2)   of article  31 in a narrow technical  sense.  The  Constitution marks  a  definite break with the old order  and  introduces new  concepts  in   regard  to  many  matters,  particularly those  relating  to  fundamental rights, and  it  cannot  be assumed  that the ordinary  word "acquisition" was  used  in the Constitution  in the same narrow sense in which  it  may have  been used in  pre-Constitution legislation relating to acquisition  of  land.  These enactments,   it   should   be noted,   related to land, whereas article 31(2)   refers  to movable  property as well, as to which no  formal   transfer or vesting of title  is  necessary. Nor is there any warrant for  the assumption that "taking  possession   of  property" was intended  to :mean the same  thing as    "requisitioning property"  referred  to  in  the  entries  of  the   Seventh Schedule.  If that  was  the  intention, why was   the  word "requisitioning"  not  used in clause (2) as well  ?  It  is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 59  

fallacious  to  suggest  that  unless   "taking  possession" is  synonymous with "requisitioning",  the power  to make  a law 610 authorising  the  taking of possession of property would  be lacking because no entry in any of the Lists of the  Seventh Schedule  confers  that  power. A  specific  entry  in   the legislative  Lists  is  no  more  necessary  for  conferring such  power  than  for  conferring  power   to  make  a  jaw authorising  deprivation of property  which  clause (1)   of article   31    postulates.   [See  observations   in   P.D. Shamdasani   v.   Central  Bank  of  India(1)].   The   word "acquisition"  is  not  a  term  of art,  and  it ordinarily means  coming  into possession  of,  obtaining,  gaining  or getting as one’s own.  It is in this  general sense that the word  has been used in articles 9, 11 and 19(1) (f)and   not as implying any transfer or vesting of title. In Minister of State Jar the Army v. Dalziel(2 ) a Full Bench of the   High Court  of   Australia   had  to construe the  scope  of  the legislative  power  with  respect  to    "acquisition"    of property    conferred   on  the Commonwealth  Parliament  by section 51 (xxxi) of the Austrailan  Constitution  (63   and 64   Vic.,   Ch.   12),.  and  the   court   decided   by  a majority   that  the  power  included  the  power  to   take possession  of  property for a temporary   purpose   for  an indefinite  period. To  say that  acquisition  implies   the transfer   and  vesting of  title  in the Government  is  to overlook   the real nature of the power  of the State  as  a sovereign  acting  through  its  legislative  and  executive organs  to  appropriate the property  of a  subject  without his  consent.   When   the State chooses  to  exercise  such power,  it creates title in  itself  rather than acquire  it from  the  owner, the  nature and extent of the  title  thus created  depending on the purpose  and duration  of the  use to which the property appropriated is intended to be put  as disclosed  in  the  law authorising  its   acquisition.   No formula  of vesting is  necessary.  As already  stated,   in the  case  of moveable  property  no  formal   transfer   or vesting   of  title apart from seizing it  could  have  been contemplated   And, what is more, clause  (5) (b)  (ii)   of article  31, which excepts any law made in future  "for  the prevention  of  danger   to  life  or  property"   from  the operation, of clause (2)  shows that the latter clause,  but for  such  exception,  would   entail   liability  to    pay compensation  for  deprivation by   destruction,       which must therefore- (1) [1952] S.C.R. 391,394. (2) 68 C.L.R. 261. 611 be  taken to fall within the scope of clause (2), for a  law made  for the prevention of danger to life or  property  may often  have  to  provide  for  destruction  of  the property appropriate.   I am of opinion that the  word  "acquisition" and   its  grammatical  variations  should, in  the  context of  article  31  and the entries in the  Lists  referred  to above,   be  understood  in  their  ordinary sense,  and the additional       words    "taking    possession    of"    or "requisitioning" are used   in article  31(2)   and  in  the entries   respectively,  not   in   contradistinction  with, but  in  amplification  of  the  term "acquisition", so   as to  make  it clear  that the words taken together cover even those  kinds  of  deprivation  which  do  not  involve   the continued existence  of the property  after it is  acquired. They would, for instance, include destruction which  implies the  reducing  into possession of the  thing sought  to   be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 59  

destroyed   as    a  necessary  step  to  that  end.     The expression "taking  possession"  can only mean taking   such possession   as  the  property is susceptible  of  and   not actual  physical possession,  as "the   interest  in,  or in any   company    owing,    any  commercial   or   industrial undertaking",   which is expressly  included in clause   (2) of  article  31,  is  not’  susceptible   of   any    actual physical    occupancy    or  seizure.   It   is,    however, unnecessary  here  to  express any concluded opinion on  the precise  scope  and meaning of the  expression   "shall   be taken possession of or acquired"  in clause (2)  except   to say   that it does not admit of being construed in the  same wide sense as the word "taken" used in the  Fifth  Amendment of   the  American   Constitution,  but   implies   such  an appropriation  of  the  property   or  abridgement   of  the incidents of its ownerships as would amount to a deprivation of  the owner.  Any other interference with   enjoyment   of private    property    short  of   such   appropriation   or abridgement would not  be  compensable  under article 31(2).     It  will now be seen that the two objections  raised  by Das J.  to  the  view  expressed  above,  namely,  that 612 clauses  (1)  and (2)  must be read together and  understood as  dealing  with the same topic, are really  baseless.  The first   objection   is  that  clause  (1)   would   then  be redundant. It would not be so because it embodies one of the three  important  limitations on the exercise of  the  State power   of deprivation  of private  property,  namely,   the necessity  for   the   legislative action   as  a  condition precedent  to  the exercise of the power and  constitutes  a protection against  the executive  organ of the State.   The second objection  that the State’s power in an emergency  to deprive  a  person   of his   property  without  payment  of compensation,  as  for example, to demolish  an  intervening building  to  prevent a conflagration from spreading,  would be excluded is equally baseless.  Cases of that kind, as  we have  seen,  would  fail  within  the  exception  in  clause (5)(b)(ii),  and  no compensation would be payable  for  the loss  caused by the  destruction  of   property   authorised under    that   clause.    The   learned    Attorney-General suggested   that sub-clause (b)  was  inserted  ex-abundante cautela as even without it no one could have supposed that a law  of  the kind  mentioned in  that     sub-clause   would fall   under  clause (2).  There  could    have    been   no doubt,   for  instance,   that   the  power   of    taxation referred   to   in paragraph (i) of that  sub-clause  was  a distinct     power. It  is  difficult  to  appreciate   this argument.   If  the exceptions  in sub-clause (b)   were  so obvious   that  they  need   not   have   been    explicitly provided   for,   then equally must be second  objection  of Das  J. fall to the ground.  To say  that  sub-clause  (b)is introduced   by  way of abundant caution is not to  do  away with  the  exceptions  but to  emphasise   their   existence aliunde.  Whether     it  was   considered    necessary   to provide expressly   that  destruction  of private   property under  emergency   conditions   entails  no   liability   to pay  compensation  or whether the  State’s power to   do  so was   so   well  established   that   sub-clause  (b)(ii)was really   unnecessary   and  must  be taken   to  have   been inserted  ex abundante cautela, in either view, the   second objection must equally fail. The fact is that all  the cases referred to in sub-clause (b)  are  different  forms 613 of  deprivation  of  property  and,   as  difficulties    of construction  might arise in a written      Constitution  if

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 59  

they are not expressly and  specifically  excepted from  the requirement   under   clause    (2)   as   to   payment   of compensation,  the  framers  have thought  it  necessary  to insert clause (5) (b).     Where  was  the necessity, it was asked, to  provide  in clause  (1)  of  article  31  for  protection  against   the executive  government   in   the   matter   of    compulsory acquisition of property by the State, as no such  protection is  provided  for  in  the case  of  the  regulative  powers exercisable  under  article  19(2)  to (6)?  The answer  is: the same need apparently  which  dictated the  enactment  of article   265   providing  for similar  protection  in   the matter  of taxation.  In any case, this would be no more  of an  objection,  if it be an objection, to the  view  I  have indicated above than to the other view which also recognises the  necessity  for legislative action   before   a   person could  be  deprived  of  his property.     Attention   was called’ to article 38  as  showing  that one   of   the  goals  set  by  the  Constitution  was   the promotion  of  social  welfare, and it was  urged  that  the attainment   of   that  object  as  well  as   the   growing complexities   of modern  conditions  of life must call  for an  expanding  power  of social   control   and  regulation, particularly   in the sphere  of the enjoyment   of  private property  and  that  the  exercise  of  such  power  without entailing  liability  to pay compensation  ought not  to  be confined  within  the narrow limits specified in article  31 (5)  (b).   This is a misconception.  In  the  first  place, social  welfare  is not inconsistent with the  ownership  of private    property   and  does   not    demand    arbitrary expropriation   of such  property  by  the   State   without compensation.   On   the   other hand,  as  pointed  out  by Blackstone   "The   public   good   is   in   nothing   more essentially  interested  than  in the  protection  of  every individual’s  private rights as modelled  by  the  municipal law"(1).  This is not  an  antiquated  view.  So  modern   a document as  the  Declaration  of Human (1) Commentaries  Vol. I, p. 109. 614 Rights  in the United Nations has specifically provided  for the protection of private  property by  including the clause "No   one   shall  be  arbitrarily   deprived   of  his"  in article   17   and the framers of  our  Constitution    have evidently         proceeded       on       that        view. Secondly,  the  argument also overlooks that clause (5)  (b) was  not  intended   to   define   and   does   not   define exhaustively  the power of   social  control and  regulation in   relation  to  rights  of private  property.   It   only limits  the purposes for which the power could be  exercised without  liability  to pay compensation, though its exercise results   in deprivation  of property  in the sense  already explained.   But   where  its  exercise   does  not  involve deprivation of property, no question of paying  compensation would arise,  and the Legislatures  in the country would, as already indicated,  be free  to enact laws providing for the exercise of such power within the fields marked out for them in the  Legislative Lists. There is, therefore, no room  for the apprehension that article 31 (5)(b)  would unduly  cramp social  control and regulation of private  property for  the public   good or would lead to  any  alarming   consequences to  the safety of the community.     But  why  all this ado, it was asked,  about  protection against  deprivation  of property  by  legislative action  ? There is no such protection  provided  in the   Constitution against   deprivation   of   property   by  the  Legislature

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 59  

exercising  the  power  of taxation.  Why then  complain  if there   is   no   protection    against    the   Legislature authorising   deprivation  of property without  compensation under   article 31(1) ?  Our  Constitution-makers,   it  was said,   trusted   the Legislature,  as the people  of  Great Britain   trust   their  Parliament  which   protects    the Englishman’s     right    to     property.     In   ultimate analysis,   is   not   well-informed  and  organised  public opinion    the  true  and  effective    protection   against arbitrary  action  of the  Legislature ?  The  argument  has no  force.  So far  as the power  of taxation is  concerned, the   Constitution    recognises no  fundamental  right   to immunity   from  taxation and that  is  why  presumably   no constitutional     protection   is   provided  against   the exercise  of that  power.  But fundamental 615 rights   under   the  Constitution  stand   on  a  different footing.   Indeed,  the argument  is a bold   challenge   to the  policy  of including  a declaration of such  rights  in Part HI  of the  Constitution.  In  Gopalan’s    case(1),  I said:      "Madison   (who played a prominent part in framing  the First   Amendment  of   the        American    Constitution) pointing    out  the  distinction,      due  to   historical reasons, between the American  and the      British  ways of securing ’the great  and essential  rights  of the  people’, observed Here  they are  secured  not by  laws paramount  to prerogative but by  Constitutions paramount to laws.’"  This has been  translated into positive  law in Part 1I1’ of  the Indian Constitution.     There   have   always  been   two  schools  of   opinion regarding   the efficacy  of a declaration   of  fundamental rights   in a Constitution.  Britain  never believed   in  a formal  declaration  of  such  rights.   Referring  to   the ,demand  of  the  Indian  Delegation  that the Parliamentary Bill  which was later passed as the Government  India   Act, 1935,   should  embody  certain  fundamental   rights,   the Joint  Parliamentary  Committee observed(2 ):     "The   question   of  so-called    fundamental   rights, which   was  much  discussed  at  the  three   Round   Table Conferences,   was   brought  to our notice  by the  British India  Delegation,  many   members  of  which  were  anxious that  the  new  Constitution  should  contain a  declaration of  rights  of different kinds,  for  reassuring  minorities for   asserting  the  equality  of  all  persons before  the law,  and  for other like purposes; and   we  have  examined more  than  one  list  of  such  rights  which  have    been compiled.     The    Statutory   Commission  observe    with reference   to   this   subject:--’We  are aware  that  such provisions   have  been   inserted  in  many  Constitutions, notably in those  of the  European States formed  after  the war  Experience,  however,  has  not shown them  to   be  of any   great   practical  value.  Abstract  declarations  are useless  unless  there exist the will  and  means   to  make them effective.’With these    (1)[1950] S.cR. 88, 198. (2) Para. 366. 616 observations   we   entirely   agree;  and  a  cynic   might indeed  find plausible arguments, in the history during  the last   ten   years   of  more   than   one   country,    for asserting  that  the most effective method of  ensuring  the destruction   of  a  fundamental  right  is  to  include   a declaration    of   its   existence   in  a   constitutional instrument."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 59  

   But the American view is different. Answering a  similar objection  to  the  inclusion of a Bill  of  Rights  in  the American Constitution, Jefferson said:   "But  though  it is not  absolutely efficacious under  all circumstance’s, it is  of great ’potency always,  and rarely inefficacious.  A  brace the more will often   keep  up  the building which would have fallen with that brace  the  less. There    is     a   remarkable    difference   between   the characters    of  the   inconveniences    which   attend   a declaration  of rights, and those which attend the want   of it.   The inconveniences  of the declaration are,  that   it may   cram  Government  in  its  useful exertions.  But  the evil of this is short-lived, moderate  and  reparable.   The inconveniences    of  the   want  of  a   declaration    are permanent,   affective,   and   irreparable.  They  are   in constant  progressive from bad to worse. The  executive   in our  Governments   is  not  the sole, it  is  scarcely   the principal,   object  of my jealousy. The’ tyranny   of   the Legislatures  is  the  most formidable dread at present, and will   be   for   many   years."    (Quoted   in    Cooley’s Constitutional   Limitations,   8th  Edn.Vol. I, p. 535).   It is obvious that the .framers of our Constitution shared the   American  view   and  included   Part  III    in   the Constitution  of  India.   It  is,   therefore,   a   wrong’ approach to construe the articles of Part III by pointing to the   British  way,  which  is more  a  traditional  than  a constitutional way, of protecting  the rights  and liberties of  the  individual   by  making  Parliament supreme.      On this view of the meaning and effect’ of article  31, the question is whether section 7 read with section 4 of the amending   Act  infringes  the  fundamental  right  of   the respondent  under  that  article.  These  provisions 617 by their retrospective  operation  undoubtedly  abridge  the respondent’s   rights of property by nullifying one  of  the incidents   of the estate purchased  by him at  the  revenue sale, namely, the right to annul certain kinds    of  under- tenures   and  evict  certain  classes  of undertenants   in occupation    of   portions  of  the  estate.    Does   such abridgement  amount to deprivation  of  property within  the meaning of article 31 as interpreted above, and, if so, does it fall within the exception in clause (5) (b) (ii) of  that article ?     Now, the  word  "property"  in  the  context  of article 31  which  is designed  to protect private property  in  all its forms, must be understood both in a corporeal sense   as having  reference  to  all those specific  things  that  are susceptible  of private appropriation and enjoyment as  well as in its juridical  or  legal sense  of a bundle of  rights which  the owner can exercise under the municipal  law  with respect   to  the user ’and enjoyment of those   things   to the  exclusion of all  others. This wide  connotation of the term  makes  it sometimes difficult to determine whether  an impugned  law is a deprivation  of  property   within    the meaning  of article 31 (2),  for, any restriction imposed on the  use and enjoyment    of property can be regarded  as  a deprivation  of  one  or  more  of  the  rights  theretofore exercised by the owner. The American courts have experienced similar   difficulty in deciding whether a  given  statutory abridgement  of  the rights of the owner is an  exercise  of the-police power" for which no compensation can be  claimed, or  a "taking"  of property within the meaning of the  Fifth Amendment  clause "Nor shall private property be  taken  for public  use without just compensation."  "The general   rule at  least"  said  Holmes  J. in  delivering   the   majority

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 59  

opinion   in  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.  Mahon(1 ), "is  that while  property may be regulated to a certain   extent,   if regulation   goes   too  far, it will  be  recognised  as  a taking." The vague and expansive  doctrine of "police power" and  the  use  of the term "taken" in  the  Fifth  Amendment construed m a very wide  sense  so  as  to cover  any injury or damage to property, coupled with the equally vague (1) 260 U.S. 393. 3--95 S.G.I./59 618 and    expansive    concept   of "due  process",   allow   a greater  freedom  of  action  to  the  American  courts   in accommodating   and adjusting, on what may seem  to  them  a just  basis,  the conflicting demands of police  power   and the  constitutional  prohibition of  the   Fifth  Amendment. Under  the  Constitution  of India,  however, such questions must be determined with reference to the  expression  "taken possession  of or  acquired" as interpreted  above,  namely, that   it  must  be read along  with  the   word  "deprived" in’  clause  (1)and understood   as  having   reference   to such   substantial abridgement  of the rights  of  ownership as   would  amount  to  deprivation  of  the  owner  of  his property.  No  cut and dried test  can be formulated  as  to whether  in  a given case the owner is  "deprived"   of  his property  within  the meaning of article 31; each case  must be  decided  as  it  arises  on  its   own  facts.   Broadly speaking  it  may be said  that an abridgement would  be  so substantial   as   to amount  to a deprivation   within  the meaning  of article 31  if,  in  effect,  it  withheld   the property   from   the   possession  and  enjoyment  of   the owner,  or seriously impaired its use and enjoyment by  him, or materially reduced its value.     The  learned Judges of the High Court did  not  consider the   case from  this  point of view.  As has  been  stated, they  applied  article  19 (1) (f) and (5)   and  held  that section  7  of  the amending  Act,   by  its   retrospective operation,  imposed  on the respondent’s  enjoyment  of  the property  purchased by him at the revenue sale  restrictions which   were   not   reasonable.  That   view,  for  reasons already indicated, cannot be accepted and the matter has  to be  looked   at  from the point of view  of  article  31  as interpreted   above.   A  comparison   of  the   scope   and effect  of  the old section 37 which is substituted  in  its place by section  4  of the  amending Act and which  section 7  shows  to  be  clearly  retrospective,   discloses  that, although   the right of a purchaser to annual  under-tenures and  evict under-tenants is curtailed by the new section  37 by  enlarging  the scope of the  exceptions   in   the   old section,   it entitles the purchaser,  as  a  countervailing advantage,   to   enhance  the rent payable  by  the  tenure holders and tenants 619 newly   brought  within  the  exception.  The  purchaser  is left  free in other  respects  to continue  in enjoyment  of the  property   as  before.  In  other   words,   what   the amending  Act  seeks to do is to enlarge the  scope  of  the protection provided  by the  exception  in the old  section, as  it was found to be inadequate, while conferring  certain compensating benefits on the purchaser. This amendment is in the  line  with the traditional   tenancy   legislation   in this   country  affording relief to  tenants  whenever   the tenancy  laws  were found,  due to changing  conditions,  to operate  harshly on  the  tenantry.  I  find  it   difficult to  hold  that  the abridgement  sought   to.  be   effected retrospectively   of the rights of a purchaser at a  revenue

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 24 of 59  

sale  is  so  substantial  as to amount   to  a  deprivation of  his property within  the  meaning    of  article 31  (1) and   (2).   No’  question  accordingly    arises   to   the applicability  of clause (5) (b) (ii) to  the case.     In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the  High  Court is set aside. The first   respondent   will pay   the  costs of this appeal incurred  by  the  appellant here and in the lower Court. MEHR  CHAND  MAHAJAN J.--For  reasons  given in my  judgment in   Dwarkadas Shrinivas  v.  Sholapur Spinning and  Weaving Mills  Ltd.,  (C.A. 141 of 1952)(1 ) I agree  with  my  Lord the  Chief Justice in his construction of article 31 of  the Constitution.  I also  concur in the conclusions  reached by him,  and in his decision of the appeal. DAS  J.--I agree  that this appeal  must  be allowed but   I have   arrived  at  this  conclusion by a different  process of   reasoning.    As  the  arguments  advanced  before   us have   raised  very  important  constitutional issues it  is only right that I should give the reasons for my decision in some detail.     The  facts   and   circumstances leading   up   to   the present appeal are as follows:     At  a  revenue sale held on the 9th January,  1942,  the respondent  Subodh  Gopal  Bose  purchased  the entire Touzi No. 341 recorded in the collectorate of the (1) Reported infra. 620 permanently   settled   district  of  24-Parganahs  in  West Bengal.  At  the  date of that sale the   auction-purchasers at a revenue sale  had, under section 37 of the Bengal  Land Revenue  Sales Act, 1859, ’as it then stood, certain  rights as therein mentioned.  That section  ran thus:     "37.  The   purchaser  of  an  entire   estate  ,in  the permanently-settled    districts  of  Bengal,   Bihar    and Orissa, sold under this Act for the recovery of arrears  due on  account of the same shall acquire the estate free   from all  encumbrances  which  may  have  been imposed   upon  it after  the  time  of settlement;  and shall be  entitled  to avoid  and annul all under-tenures and  forthwith  to  eject all  under-tenants,  with  the  following exceptions :--     First--Istimrari  or  Mukarrari tenures which have  been held  at  a  fixed  rent from  the  time  of  the  permanent settlement.     Secondly--Tenures  existing at  the  time  of settlement which have not been held at a fixed rent ,’     Provided  always  that  the  rents  of such tenure shall be liable to enhancement under any law for the time being in force for the enhancement of the rent of such tenures.     Thirdly--Talukdari    and    other    similar    tenure$ created since  the  time  of settlement and held immediately of the proprietors of estates  and farms  for terms of years so  held,   when  such tenures  and farms   have  been  duly registered under the provisions of this Act.   Fourthly--Leases   of   lands   whereon   dwelling houses, manufactories   or   other permanent  buildings  have   been erected,   or whereon  gardens,  plantations, tanks,  wells, canals,  places of  worship  or burning or burying   grounds have  been      made,  or wherein mines have been sunk.     And such a purchaser as’ is aforesaid shall be  entitled to proceed in the manner prescribed by any law for the  time being  in force for the enhancement of the rent of any  land coming within the fourth class of exceptions above made,  if he can prove the same to 621 have been held at what was orginally an unfair  rent, and if

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 25 of 59  

the same shall not have been held at a fixed rent, equal  to the  rent of good arable land, for a term  exceeding  twelve years; but not otherwise;     Provided always that nothing in this  section  contained shall  be  construed  to  entitle   any  such  purchaser  as aforesaid to eject any raiyat having a right of occupancy at a   fixed  rent or at a rent assessable according  to  fixed rules  under the laws in force, or to enhance  the  rent  of any such raiyat otherwise than  in the manner prescribed  by such  laws,   or  otherwise than  the   former   proprietor, irrespectively   of    all   engagements   made  since   the time of settlement,  may  have been entitled to do."     In  exercise  of his rights under the  section  set  out above,  the  respondent  Subodh  Gopal  Bose  annulled  all’ under-tenures   and  tenancies  appertaining  to  the   said Touzi   and on tile 18th  March, 1946,  instituted  a  suit, being Title Suit No. 35 of 1946, in the Fourth Court of  the Subordinate   Judge   at   Alipore   24-Parganahs   for  the ejectment of respondents Nos.  2  to 6, claiming that he was entitled   to recover   possession of the lands in suit   by virtue  of the rights  conferred  on him  by section 37. The respondent  No.      2, who was the defendant No.  1,  alone contested  the     suit.  His defence was, inter alia,  that he was a raiyat  and  as  such  protected by the proviso  to section 37.  He’ also  claimed protection under  the  fourth exception  to that  section.  The learned Subordinate  Judge who  tried  the  suit delivered his judgment   on  the  14th February,  1949.   By  that  judgment   he  overruled    the contentions   of the  contesting  defendant  and  passed   a decree   for  ejectment against him. He dismissed  the  suit against  the  other defendants (who  are   now   respondents Nos. 3  to 6), holding that they were not necessary  parties to the suit.     On the 25th March, 1949, the  respondent No. 2 preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 252 of 1949,  before   the District   Judge   at  Alipore,  24Parganahs.  That   appeal was  transferred   to the court of the  Additional  District Judge for hearing.  While 622 that  appeal was pending the West Bengal Legislature  passed West  Bengal  Act  VII  of  1950,  called  the Bengal   Land Revenue   Sales   (West Bengal  Amendment)    Act  of  1950, which  received  the assent  of the Governor  of  Bengal  on the  15th  March,  1950,  and was published in the  Official Gazette on the day.     By  section  4 of the amending Act, section  37  of  the Bengal   Revenue  Sales Act,  1859, was replaced  by  a  new section the material part of which runs thus:     "37. (1)  The purchaser  of  an  entire  estate  in  the permanently   settled   districts   of   West   Bengal  sold under   this   Act   for  the  recovery of  arrears  due  on account   of  the same,  shall acquire  the   estate   free. from all  encumbrances  which  may  have been  imposed after the   time  of settlement  and shall  be entitled  to  avoid and   annul  all tenures,   holdings  and  .leases with  the following exceptions:     (a) tenures  and  holdings  which  have  been held  from the   time  of the permanent   settlement  either  free   of rent or at  a fixed  rent  or fixed rate of rent,. and     (b) (i) tenures  and holdings not included in  exception (a) above made, and     (ii)  other  leases   of  land  whether  or   not    for purposes connected with agriculture or horticulture,     existing  at the date  of  issue  of the    notification for sale of the estate under this Act:

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 26 of 59  

   Provided  that  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in any  law  for  the time being in force or in  any  lease  or contract  no person shall be entitled  to hold under such  a purchaser  as  is  aforesaid any tenure   holding  or  lease coming  within  exception  (b)  above  made,  free  Of  rent or  at a low rent  or at a rent  or rate  of rent fixed   in perpetuity   or for any  specified period unless  the  right so   to hold  has  been expressly  recognised under any  law for   the  time  being in force  by any competent civil   or revenue   court;   and the  purchaser shall be  entitled  to proceed  in the manner prescribed; by any law  for the  time being in force for the 623 determination  of   a fair  and  equitable   rent   of  such tenure,  holding or lease."    Section  7  of the amending Act provides as  follows  :-:    "  7.  (1)  (a)  Every suit  or    proceeding   for   the ejectment   of any  person from any land  in   pursuance  of section 37 or section 52 of the said Act, and (b)  every appeal or application  for  review   or  revision arising  out  of such suit or proceeding, pending   at   the date of the  commencement  of  this  Act shall if the  suit, proceeding,   appeal  or  application could not   have  been validly   instituted,   preferred  or made  had   this   Act been  in  operation  at the date  of  the  institution,  the preferring or the making thereof, abate. (2) Every  decree passed  or  order  made,  before the  date of  commencement  of  this  Act, for  the  ejectment of  any person   from  any  land  in pursuance of  section   37   or section   52  of the said  Act  shall,  if  the  decree   or order   could   not have  been  validly passed or  made  had this  Act  been in operation at the date of the  passing  or making thereof, be void ,’        Provided   that   nothing  in  this   section   shall affect  any  decree or order in  execution    whereof    the possession of the  land  in  respect  of which  the   decree or  order was passed  or made,  has already  been  delivered before the date of commencement of this Act.        (3)  Whenever  any  suit,   proceeding,   appeal   or application    abates    under  sub-section   (1)   or   any decree or  order  becomes  void  under sub-section  (2), all fees  paid   under  the Court-fees  Act,  1870,   shall   be refunded  to   the  parties  by  whom      the   same   were respectively paid."    It  is  quite  clear that    under  this  section  7  the suit of the  respondent  Subodh  Gopal  Bose  must  abate and the decree  passed  in  his  favour must  become    void if  that   section   be  valid  law   and  intra  vires  the Constitution of India.        On  the  21st  July, 1950,  the   respondent   Subodh Gopal   Bose   applied   before  the   Additional   District Judge before whom the’ appeal was pending to make 624 a  reference under article 228 of the Constitution of  India for  a decision  of the question whether the provisions   of section  7 were  void  being  ultra vires the  Constitution. The   learned   Additional   District  Judge  by  his  order dated the 16th September, 1950, dismissed that  application. On   the   24th   November,   1950,the   respondent   Subodh Gopal   Bose  applied  to the High  Court under article  228 and eventually on the 18th December,  1950, the High   Court directedthe appeal to be transferred to the High Court  only for  the   decision   of  the   constitutional  point.   The proceedings  were numbered as Reference Case No. 4 of  1950. Notice   having  been given  by the Court to  the  Advocate-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 27 of 59  

General     of    Bengal,   the   State   of   West   Bengal appeared  on  the  Reference.   On  the  22nd  March,  1951, the High Court held that section 7 imposed an   unreasonable restriction   on   the   respondent  Subodh   Gopal   Bose’s right   to   hold  property  and violated  his   fundamental right  guaranteed  by article 19 (1) (f)  read with  article 19  (5)   and was, therefore  void  under  article  13  (1). With  this finding the  High Court sent back the records  to the lower appellate court  for  disposal   of the appeal  in the  light  of that finding.  On  the       30th   November, 1951,   the  High Court  gave  leave     to  the   State  of West   Bengal  to appeal to us. Hence the present appeal.    Section   7   of   the  amending    Act,   the   validity whereof   is  challenged  before  us,  in   terms,   affects preexisting   rights.   Accordnig to   that   section  every suit  or proceedings for ejectment under old section 37  and every   appeal  or  application  for  review   or   revision arising  out  of  such suit or  proceeding  pending  at  the commencement  of the amending Act is to abate if  the  suit, proceeding,   appeal  or application  could  not  have  been validly  instituted,  referred or  made,  had  the  amending Act been in operation at the date of such suit,  proceeding, appeal   or  application.  Further, every decree  passed  or order   made  before  the  commencement of the amending  Act for  the ejectment of any person from land in  pursuance  of old section 37 is likewise to become void if such decree  or order could not’have  been  validly  passed or made  if the 625 amending  Act  had  been in operation at  the  date  of  the decree    or      order.   The  proviso,   however,    saves -decrees  or orders  in execution  whereof   possession  had been    delivered      before  the   commencement  of    the amending  Act.      It  is,  therefore,clear  that   section 7   affects     pre-existing     rights    bygiving,      in effect,retrospective   operation  to  section4   which   has sub-stituted,   inter alia,  the  new  section 37  for   the old     section 37 of the Act of 1859. A cursory  comparison of  the  language  of the old section 37 with  that  of  the new   section  37  will at  once make  it  clear  that   the substantial   right   given  by  the   old   sectionto   the purchaser  to  avoid  and annul  under-tenuresand to   eject under-tenants    is  no  longer  availableto  him under  the new   section  37.  Although the opening part   of  the  new section  37 purports  to give to the purchaser the right  to avoid and annul  the tenures etc., that right, by reason  of the  wide sweep of exception (b), has,  for  all   practical purposes,   ceased  to exist.  The new section     37   does not   deprive  the  purchaser  of the  physical    property, namely,   the   estate   purchased at  the    revenue   sale and   he  continuesto  be  the owner of that  property   and can   exerciseand  enforce   all   the  rightes  which   his ownership giveshim,  except that  he  cannot,             by reason    of  the   new   section  37,  avoid    or    annul the  under-tenures  etc. or  eject  the  under-tenants.   In other   words,  out  of  the bundle of  rights  constituting the  ownership acquired  by him under  the old  section  37, an  item  of important right has  been taken  away,  thereby abridging or restrictin.g his  ownership.  The   respondent, Subodh   Gopal  Bose,   contends   that   his    fundamental right,   under  article  19(1)(f)   of   the   Constitution, namely his right to hold, that is to say, his right to enjoy and exercise the full rights of ownership in relation to the property acquired by him under the  old  section 37 has been I  violated  and,  therefore,  section   7  which   operates retrospectively   and  gives  retrospective   operation   to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 28 of 59  

the  new section 37 is ultra vires the Constitution  and  is void under article 13(1).     The  learned   Attorney-General   has   not    seriously contended  that  the  impugned   section   has   not 626 prejudicially   affected  the right  given to the  purchaser by the old section 37 but he maintains that the  abridgement of  the  rights of the purchaser at a revenue  sale  brought ’about  by  the  new  section  37. amounts to nothing   more than   the imposition  of a  reasonable restriction  on  the exercise   of the  right  conferred  by article  19 (1)  (f) in  the interests of the general public  and  is   perfectly legitimate   and permissible under clause (5)       of  that article.  The  High Court repealled the   above        noted contention   and   held   that   the  restriction        was unreasonable.The   High   Court based  its       conclusions on   three   things,   namely,  (1)   the      retrospective operation   of the  impugned  section,  (ii)   the   absence of   any    provision  for  the abatement  of  the  purchase price  and (iii)  the failure of the  State    to show   any reason   why  the   impugned  section    was      introduced into   the   amending  Act. The  learned    Attorney-General submits   that   the   first  two  elements    taken    into consideration   by  the  High Court  are  wholly  irrelevant for  the purpose of determining  whether   the   restriction imposed   was reasonable  in the interest  of  the   general public.   Ordinarily a statute  is  construed  prospectively unless   it  is  made retrospective  by  express  words   or necessary   intendment;   but,     the  learned    Attorney- General  submits,  the fact  that  a statute   is  expressly or   by  necessary implication  made   retrospective,   does not, by itself, furnish any cogent reason  for saying   that the  statute  is  prima.  facie  unfair   and,    therefore, unreasonable.   While I  see some force  in  this   argument I  am,   nevertheless,  not convinced  that  the   fact   of the  statute   being  given  retrospective   operation   may not    be    properly    taken   into   consideration     in determining  the  reasonableness of the restriction  imposed in the interest of the general public.  Nor  am I  satisfied that  the  loss  occasioned to the  purchaser  by  reducing, without any abatement of the ’purchase price,  an estate  in possession into one in reversion may not also be taken  into account   in    determining  the   reasonableness   of   the restrictions  permissible under article  19 (5). As said  by my  Lord the Chief justice  in The State of Madras  v.  V.G. Row(1) (I) [1952] S.C.R. 597 at 7.607. 627     "It  is important in this context to bear in  mind  that the  test  of reasonableness,  wherever  prescribed,  should be  applied  to  each individual statute  impugned,  and  no abstract   standard,  or general pattern, of  reasonableness can  be  laid’ down as applicable  to all cases. The  nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the  underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and  urgency of   the   evil  sought  to  be.  remedied   thereby,    the disproportion    of    the   imposition,    the   prevailing conditions  at the time, should all enter into the  judicial verdict."     As  regards  ,the  third element,  the  High  Court  has pointed  out  that  no suggestion  had been  made before  it that  the  number  of  pending  suits   or  proceeding   for ejectment  of tenants  was  abnormally large  or  that there was  any  other cogent reason for introducing  the  impugned section in the amending Act.  Indeed,  in the later case  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 29 of 59  

Iswari Prasad v. N.R. Sen(1)  a  special bench  of the  same High  Court,  consisting  of three learned Judges  including the   two who had decided the case under appeal  before  us, has distinguished  the very judgment from  the     one  then under   appeal,  and in doing so,  laid great   emphasis  on the  absence of any such suggestion  in  this    case.   The High  Court  held that those  circumstances were present  in the  later case and accordingly  held that the law  impugned in the later case was not unconstitutional.     It is, indeed,  very unfortunate that several  important matters  which  would  have  assisted  the   High  Court  in arriving at a right conclusion as to the reasonableness   of the   restrictions  imposed  by  the  impugned section  were not  brought to  the notice of the High Court.   Thus,   for example,  the  statement  of objects and  reasons   appended to the  Bill which  eventually became the amending Act  does not appear to have been placed before  the High  Court.  The statement  of the  objects  and, reasons  appended   to  the Bill quite clearly  refers  to  the  great  hardship  caused by   the  application  of  the old  section 37  to  a  large number  of people in the urban  area  and  particularly   in Calcutta (1) 55 C.W.N. 719 at p. 727. 628 and  its  suburbs  where  the  then  prevailing   phenomenal increase   in  land  values  had  supplied   the   necessary incentive  to speculative  purchasers  in  exploiting   that section    for   unwarranted   large-scale    eviction   and maintains,  according to the sponsor-of the Bill, that  such large-scale   evictions  necessitated  the  enlargement   of the scope of protection of that section, with due safeguards for the  securing of Government revenue. It is well  settled by  this court that the statement of objects and reasons  is not  admissible as an aid to the construction of  a  statute (see  Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose(1)) and 1 am  not, therefore,  referring to it for the purpose   of  construing any part of the  Act  or of ascertaining the meaning of  any word  used in the Act but I am referring to it only for  the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the  same  and the extent and urgency of the evil  which  he sought to remedy. Those  are  all  matters which, as already stated,   must enter into the  judicial verdict  as  to  the reasonableness  of the  restrictions  which  article 19  (5) permits   to  be  imposed  on the   exercise  of  the  right guaranteed   by   article  19 (1)(f).   Further,   there  is another significant fact which does not appear to have  been pressed  on the attention  of the High Court.  The Bill  had been.  introduced  in the Legislature on  the  23rd   March, 1949,   and  was referred to a select  committee.   On   the 25th  April,  1949,  when the Bengal Legislature was not  in session West Bengal Ordinance No. 1  of 1949 was passed, The two preambles to that Ordinance recited as follows:      "Whereas   it is expedient,  pending  the enactment  of further  legislation,  to  provide  for  the  temporary stay of  certain suits, proceedings and appeals in  pursuance  of the Act:      And  whereas  the  West Bengal Legislature  is  not  in session    and    the    Governor    is    satisfied    that circumstances  exist  which render it necessary for  him  to take immediate action ’"      The fact that an Ordinance had to be passed pending the passing of this Bill and the preambles to the (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1. 629

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 30 of 59  

Ordinance  do  undoubtedly  indicate  that,  in the  opinion of  the  authorities,   the   then   prevailing   conditions disclosed  a  serious  evil  which   urgently   necessitated the  taking of immediate action.  Further, it appears   from the   judgment   delivered   by  the  High  Court   on   the application   subsequently  made by  the State for leave  to appeal  to  this court that a number of cases  were  pending before the courts in which the same question  was  involved. This  is  also a circumstance which was not brought  to  the notice  of  the  High Court  before   the   judgment   under appeal  was   pronounced.  Finally, in  the  judgment  under appeal  I find no  reference  to the  proviso  to  the   new section   37  which  enlarges,  as  it  were,  by   way   of compensation  for  the loss of the right of  ejectment,  the purchaser’s  right  to  claim  enhancement   of  rent   much beyond  the  very  limited right  of  enhancement   of  rent which,  under  the  old section, was confined  only  to  the fourth  excepted under-tenures.  Then  there  is  the  fact, found  by  the High Court, that land values had gone  up  so high  that auction-purchasers could now be found  who,  even without  the  right   to  eject  the  under-tenants,   would willingly  pay  a  sum  much in excess  of  the  arrears  of Government   revenue  which  remains  constant   since   the permanent   settlement.  The   cumulative   effect  of   the foregoing facts which were not placed before the High  Court much   outweighs   the  consideration   of    the  pecuniary loss of the respondent, Subodh Gopal Bose, as the   auction- purchaser   and in  the  circumstances  the  infliction   of the  loss of the right to eject under-tenants can  only   be regarded   as   a   reasonable    restriction  permitted  by article  19(5)  to be imposed on the exercise of  the  right guaranteed  under  article 19(1) (f). In  my   judgment  the reasons  for which the High Court declared section 7 of  the amending  Act  to  be ultra vires the  Constitution  are  no longer  tenable in view  of the circumstances now before  us which were not brought to the notice  of the High  Court and the   decision  of the High  Court  cannot,   therefore,  be sustained.     An  alternative-argument,  however, has been  raised  by learned   advocate    for  the   respondent,   Subodh  Gopal Bose,  that  the  impugned  section violates  the 630 fundamental  right  secured to him by article 31(2)  of  the Constitution  and is, therefore, void under  article  13(1). The  contention,  shortly put, is that the right,  conferred by  the  old   section 37 to avoid and  annul   the   under- tenures   and   to  eject   the     under-tenants  is,    by itself,"property"   anti that  as the  new section  37   has taken  away  that  property  without      having   made  any provision for I compensation there for the impugned  section is unconstitutional  in  that  it  violates  the  provisions of article 31 (2).     The Bill which eventually became the Bengal Land Revenue Sales   (West Bengal Amendment)  Act,  1950, was  introduced in the West Bengal Legislature  on the 23rd March, 1949, and after  having been passed  by  the Legislature  it  received the   assent of the Governor on the 15th March,   1950.  The Bill was, therefore, pending in the West Bengal  Legislature when  the  Constitution ,of India came into  force  and  was passed  into  law after the date  of the  Constitution.   It does not appear,  however,  that  the  Bill was reserved for the   consideration  of  the  President   or  received   his assent.  Therefore,   the impugned law   cannot   claim  the protection   of article 31 (4) and, what is more, if  it  is such  a law as is referred to in clause (2) of  article  31,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 31 of 59  

then, by virtue of clause (3), it cannot have any effect  at all.   The  question,   therefore,  is  as  to  whether  the impugned  section   is  or  is  not  such   a  law   as   is referred  to in  article 31(2).  The question requires,  for a  proper answer, a close scrutiny of  the   provisions   of article    31    and   other   relevant  articles   of   the Constitution bearing on it.     At the outset it is well to bear in mind the decision of this  court  in  A.K.  Gopalan’s  case(1),  explaining   the correlation  between the provisions  of sub-clauses  (a)  to (e) and (g) of clause (1) of article 19 and articles 20,  21 and  22 of the  Constitution.  Kania  C.J., at page 101,  my Lord  the  present  Chief Justice at pages 191-192,  Mahajan J.,  at  page 229, Mukherjea J., at pages 255256  and  I  at pages  302-306  expressed  the  view  that the validity   of the  Preventive   Detention Act could not be judged  by  the provisions of article 19. The majority [1950] S.C.R. 88. 631 of  the Bench took  the view that  the  rights conferred  by article  19(1) (a) to  (e) and (g) could be enjoyed only  so long  as the citizen was free and had the liberty  of    his person  but that, the  moment he  was  lawfully deprived  of his   personal liberty  under  article  21 he     ceased  to have     the    rightsguaranteed    by   article   19    (I) (a)  to  (e) and (g). The result of this part  of  the  deci sion  in   A.K.  Gopalan’s  case(1)   was   summarised    in the later case of Ram Singh v. The State of Delhi(2), by  my Lord    the   present   Chief  Justice   in  the    judgment that   he  delivered  on behalf of himself,  Kania C.  1,and myself. Said his Lordship at pages 455-456:  "Although   personal  liberty has  a content   sufficiently comprehensive   to  includei  the  freedoms  enumerated   in article  19 (1),  and its deprivation  would result  in  the extinction   of  those   freedoms,   the   Constitution  has treated these civil liberties as distinct fundamental rights and made separate provisions in article  19 and articles  21 and  22  as  to the limitations and  conditions  subject  to which  alone   they could be  taken away of  abridged.   The interpretation   of  these articles  and their   correlation were  elaborately   dealt  with  by   the  full   court   in Gopalan’s case(1). The question  arose whether  section 3 of the Act was a law imposing restrictions  on  "the  right  to move    freely    throughout  the   territory    of   India" guaranteed   under  article 19 (1) (d)  and,  as  such,  was liable to be tested with reference    to its  reasonableness under  clause  (5)  of that article.  It was  decided  by  a majority  of 5 to 1 that a law which authorises  deprivation of  personal  liberty  did not  fall within  the purview  of article  19  and  its’validity  was not  be  judged  by  the criteria  indicated  in that article  but  depended  on  its compliance with the requirements of articles 21 and 22,  and as   section   3  satisfied  those  requirements,   it   was constitutional."     Mahajan J., who by a separate judgment dissented from the majority  on  another point, not material  for  our  present purpose, said at page 467:     "On  the  other  points  argued  in  the  case  I  agree judgment of Sastri J." (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.           (9) [1951] S.C.R. 451. 632   It  must,  therefore,  be regarded  as  settled  that  the freedom  referred to in article 19 (1)  sub-clauses  (a)  to (e) and (g) are guaranteed to a citizen of India while he is a free man. These freedoms, even when they are so available,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 32 of 59  

are,  however,  not absolute and unbridled licence  but  are subject  to social control in that  reasonable  restrictions may be imposed on them by law as indicated in clauses (2) to (6)  of article 19. But as soon as the citizen  is  lawfully deprived  of his personal liberty as a result of  detention, punitive or preventive, he  loses  his capacity  to exercise the  several rights enumerated in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) of article 19 (1) and cannot  complain of the infraction of  any  of  those rights. The validity  of  the  law  which deprived  a   citizen   of  his   personal   liberty   which inevitably  destroys  his  rights  under   the   sub-clauses mentioned   above   cannot  be  judged  by   the   test   of reasonableness  laid down in clauses  (2) to (6) of  article 19  but falls to  be determined according to the  provisions of  articles 20, 21 and 22 of the  Constitution.   This,   I apprehend,  is the result of the two decisions of this court referred  to above.       Such being the correct correlation between article (1) sub-clauses  (a) to (e) and (g) on the one hand and  article 21 on the other, the question  necessarily  arises as to the correlation  between  article  19  (1)(f)  and  article  31. Article   19 (1)(f)  guarantees to a citizen,as one  of  his freedoms,  the  right  to  acquire,  hold  and  dispose   of property  but reasonable restrictions  may be imposed on the exercise  of that right to  the  extent indicated in  clause (5).  Article  31, as its heading shows guarantees   to  all persons,   citizens    and  non-citizens  the   "right    to property"   as  a fundamental  right to  the extent  therein mentioned.  What, I ask myself, is the  correlation  between article 19 (1) (f) read with article 19 (5)  and article  31 ?   If,   as   held   by  my   Lord   in    A.K.   Gopalan’s case(1)   at  page  191,  sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g)  of article  19 (1) read with the relevant clauses  (2) to   (6) "presuppose  that  the  citizen  to whom the  possession  of these fundamental  rights  is secured retains the substratum of  personal freedom on which alone the enjoyment  of  these rights necessarily (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88. 633 rests", it must follow logically that article 19 (1)(f) read with  article  19  (5) must likewise  presuppose   that  the person   to  whom  that fundamental   right  is   guaranteed retains  his  property  over or with respect to which  alone that  right  may  be  exercised.  I  found myself unable  to escape  from this logical conclusion and so I said  in  A.K. Gopalan’s case at pages 304-305:     "But   suppose   a   person  loses   his   property   by reason  of  its  having  been  compulsorily  acquired  under article  31  he loses his right to hold  that  property  and cannot  complain that his fundamental right under  subclause (f)  of  clause (1) of article  19 has  been  infringed.  It follows that the rights enumerated in article 19 (1) subsist while   the  citizen has  the  legal  capacity  to  exercise them.  If his capacity to exercise them is  gone,  by reason of lawful  conviction  with  respect  to  the rights in sub- clauses  (a)  to  (e)  and (g), or by  reason  of  a  lawful compulsory acquisition with respect to the    right in  sub- clause  (f),   he ceases  to have those  rights   while  his incapacity lasts."     I  reiterated  the  same  opinion  in  my  judgment   in ChiranJitlal’s case(1).  Nothing that I have  heard  on  the present occasion has shaken the opinion I expressed in those cases   as  to the correlation of article 19  (1)  (f)  read with    article    19  (5)   and   article   31    of    our Constitution.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 33 of 59  

   A  suggestion  was thrown out by my Lord  in  course  of arguments,  that article 19 (1) (f) was concerned only  with the  abstract  right  and  capacity  to  acquire,  hold  and dispose   of property  and had no reference or  relation  to any  rights  in any particular property but that article  31 only was concerned with the right to a concrete property and there  was  no  correlation between the  two  articles.  The matter, however, was not argued by either side and I am  not prepared  to   express   any final opinion on  it.  For  the purpose  of  this appeal I am content  to  proceed   on  the footing  that  article  19 relates to abstract right as well as to right to concrete property.  (I) [1950] S.C.R. 869 at p. 919. 4--95 S.C.I./59 634     I now turn to article 31 which appears under the heading "right to  Property".  The  clauses  of  that article  which are material for the purposes of determining the question in debate run as follows-:     "(1) No person  shall be deprived of  his  property save by authority of law. (2)  No  property,  movable  or  immovable,  including   any interest  in, or  in any  company  owing,    any  commercial or    industrial  undertaking,  shall be   taken  possession 01:  or  acquired  for  public   purposes   under  any   law authorising    the   taking  of  such  possession  or   such acquisition,   unless the law  provides   for   compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and  either fixes   the  amount of  the compensation, or specifies   the principles  on  which,    and the manner in  which,      the compensation  is  to     be determined  and given.                *         *        *        * (5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect-     (a)  the  provisions  of any  existing law other than  a law to which the provisions of clause (6) apply, or     (b) the provisions  of  any  law  which  the  State  may hereafter make-     (i)  for the purpose of imposing or levying any  tax  or penalty, or     (ii)   for  the  promotion  of  public  health  or   the prevention of danger to life or property, or     (iii)  in  pursuance  of  any   agreement  entered  into between  the   Government of the Dominion of  India  or  the Government  of   India  and the  Government  of  any   other country,   or  otherwise, with respect to property  declared by law to be evacuee property."     It   is  suggested   that  the  two  clauses   are   not mutually   exclusive  but  must be  read  together and  that they are only concerned  with  what  has -been described  as the  State’s  power of eminent domain  which,  according  to Professor  Willis, means the legal capacity of  sovereignty, or  one  of  its   governmental  organs,  to  take   private property  for  a  public  use, upon  the 635 payment   of  just   compensation.   Reference  is  made  to certain  passages culled from the works of  eminent  ancient writers like the Dutch publicist and statesman Hugo  Grotius who   flourished   in   the’  17th   century  and    William Blackstone   the   celebrated English jurist who  wrote  his Commentaries round about  1769 and from Judge Cooley’s  well known  book  on Constitutional  Limitations  to  show   that from  early  times jurists have insisted on three things  as pre-requisites  for ’the exercise of this power  of  eminent domain,  namely,  (1)  the  authority  of  law,   (2)    the requirement  of  public use, and (3)  the  payment  of  just

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 34 of 59  

compensation.  These three prerequisites  which   constitute limitations on the power of eminent domain are said to  have been   epitomised in  1791 in  the  last two clauses of  the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States  of America.   The  contention is that  article  31   reproduces those   three limitations  on the power of  eminent  domain, namely,  that  clause  (1)  announces   the  necessity   for legislative  sanction  as  a pre-requisite for the  exercise of   the  power,   thus  protecting  all   persons   against expropriation  by   the State acting through  its  executive organ,  the Government, and that’ clause (2) reproduces  the necessity   of   a  public   purpose    and    payment    of compensation.   It   is concluded  that    these   important limitations   on   the State’s power of eminent  domain  are designed   to   protect   a   person    against    arbitrary deprivation   of  his property  and  they   constitute   his fundamental  right in relation to his property.     The    proposition   thus   formulated   is    certainly attractive   and, indeed, has found favour with  my  learned colleagues  but  appears  to  me  to  be  open  to   certain objections.   I  say in all humility  that  I  consider  the method   of   approach   and  the   line   of  reasoning  in support   of  that  proposition  entirely   fallacious   and wrong.  The  steps in the argument seem to  be  (i)that  the power  of eminent  domain  and the   limitations thereon  as explained   by  eminent  jurists  are  incorporated in   the Fifth  Amendment to  the Constitution of the United  States, (ii) that clauses  (1) and (2) of article 31  are  concerned with  the  same  topic of 636 eminent   domain and (iii) that, therefore, clauses (1)  and (2)    of article 31 must be read as having reproduced   the same  limitations  on  the  power of eminent domain.    This line of reasoning amounts, in effect, to likening  one thing with another thing and then saying that as that other  thing means   such and  such  this thing  must,  therefore,   bear the   same  meaning--a method which has been  deprecated  by Lord  Halsbury in Styles’ case(1).  Further, if  this   line of reasoning were correct  or permissible then we might   as ’well  have said,as  indeed  we  were  asked  to say,   that article     21reproduced   the   American     constitutional limitationsa  gainst   deprivation  of life   and   personal liberties     and   that,   therefore,     the    expression "procedure   established by law"  to be found in article  21 meant  exactly  what  the  expression  "dueprocess  of  law" occurring  in  the Fifth Amendmentdid. This  we   resolutely and   definitely   declinedto  do  in A. K.  Gopalan’s  case (supra).  At  page  108  of  the report of that  case  Kania C-I- expressed the view that that line of reasoning was  not proper  and  was misleading.  My Lord   the   present  Chief Justice’ at page’197     repelled  that   contention.  After quoting  the   words    of Madison  about  the   great   and essential  rights of the people" my Lord concluded  at  page 199:     "This   has  been  translated  into  positive   law   in Part III of  the Indian  Constitution,  and I agree  that in construing  these  provisions the  high purpose  and  spirit of   the   Preamble   as   well   as   the    constitutional significance   of  a  Declaration   of  Fundamental   Rights should be borne in mind.This, however, is  not to say   that the   languageof  the  provisions  should  be  stretched  to square    withthis   or  that   constitutional  theory    in disregard  of the cardinal  rule  of interpretation  of  any enactment,   constitutional  or other,  that its spirit,  no less  than  its intendment should  be  collected   primarily

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 35 of 59  

from  the  natural meaning of the words used".     After noticing  the argument of learned  counsel for the petitioner   Mukherjea  J.  at page  266 et  scq  found (1) [1889] L.R. 14 A.C. 381. 637      It impossible to introduce the American doctrine of due process  of law into our article 21. If the language of  our articlc  21   could  not be stretched  to  square  with  the American  due process clause so as  to give  effect to   the suggested   enlargement  of  the  scope  of our  fundamental right  to  life  and  personal  liberties  but  had   to  be interpreted    by   giving   the   words    their   ordinary natural   meaning   I   cannot  see  why   the  language  of article   31 should not bc construed in the usual way so  as to  give  effect to the plain intention  our   Constitution- makers.   I   say   with   the  utmost humility   that   the proper  method  of approach  is to adopt the golden rule  of construction referred to in the judgment of my Lord   quoted above  and not to start  off  with any kind   of  assumption that  our Constitution must be regarded as having reproduced this or that doctrine.     Apart  from the erroneous line of reasoning referred  to above,   the  conclusion  arrived   at   by  following  that reasoning  appears  to me to be open to serious   objections on  merits  also. If it were correct to say  that  the  two. clauses,  (1)  and (2), of  article 31 deal  with  the  same topic   of the State’s  power  of eminent  domain  which  is inherent  in  its sovereignty then, as I pointed out  in  my judgment   in  Chiranjitlal’s  case(1)  at page 925,  clause (1).  must be held to be  wholly redundant and  clause   (2) by itself would have  sufficed, for  the necessity of a  law is  quite clearly implicit in clause (2) itself which  alone would  have  served  as a protection  against  State  action through  its executive organ, the government.  Another   and more   serious   objection against reading both the  clauses as  dealing only with the same topic of eminent  domain  is, as  pointed out by me in Chiranjitlals case  (supra),   that such  construction will place  the deprivation  of  property otherwise than by the taking of possession or acquisition of it outside  the pale  of all constitutional  protection.  As I  said  there and as I shall also do hereafter  in  detail, one  can  conceive  of circumstances  where  the  State,  in exercise  of   the  State’s  police power,   may   have   to deprive  a person of his property without taking  possession of  it  or  acquiring  it  within  the  meaning of (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869. 638 article 31(2). This police power of the State is also one of the  powers  inherent in the sovereignty of the  State.  The suggestion  that the first two clauses of article 31  should be  read  as  dealing  only with  eminent  domain  will,  if accepted,  lead  us to hold that our  Constitution  has  not dealt  with the State’s police power to deprive a person  of his property and has not provided  for  us  any   protection against   the  State  by imposing  any  limitation  on   the exercise   of   that power.   The   suggested   construction will  render  the enunciation  of  our  fundamental   "Right to  property" patently   incomplete.  It  has   been   urged that   the  State’s   police   power   is   recognised   and regulated  by article 19 clauses (2) to (6)  and article  31 (5)  (b).   I shall  deal with  that   argument  in   detail hereafter  and    show  that it is  quite  untenable.  Apart from  that   argument,   the   result of   reading   article 31, clauses (1) and (2) together will be to hold  that   our Constitution   has   not  provided  for  us  any  protection

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 36 of 59  

against   the   exercise  of  the  State’s    police   power either  by  the Legislature or by  the  executive.   Such  a conclusion I am not prepared to accept.  Accordingly I  thus explained what I conceived  to be the true scope and  effect of clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 in Chiranjitlal’s  case (supra)  at page 925, namely,  that  clause (1)  deals  with deprivation  of  property in exercise of  police  power  and enunciates   the restriction which our   Constitution-makers thought   necessary   or sufficient  to  be placed   on  the exercise   of that  power,  namely,  that such power can  be exercised   only  by  authority  of law and not  by  a  mere executive  fiat  and  that  clause  (2)  deals   with    the exercise   of   the  power  of  eminent domain   and  places limitations  on the exercise  of that power.  It  is   these limitations    which   constitute   our  fundamental   right against the State’s power of eminent domain.  The   language used  in  article  31(2)  clearly indicates   beyond   doubt that   the   power   of eminent domain as   adopted  in  our Constitution    is   concerned  with  only  that   kind   of deprivation of property which is brought about by the taking of  possession or acquisition contemplated by that   clause. I again adverted to this  matter  in  The  State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja 639 Kameshwar  Singh  of Darbhanga(1 ). It is said that  such  a construction   of article 31(1)  instead of enunciating  any fundamental  right  of  the  people  at  all  will,  on  the contrary,  declare the fundamental right of the  Legislature to  deprive a person of his property by merely. enacting   a law.   This   appears   to  me  to be  a  very  superficial. criticism  which  completely  overlooks  that article 31(1), as  far  as it goes, does lay down a  fundamental  right  by imposing a limitation at least on the executive  power.   It is   this   limitation   placed  on   the  executive   power that   constitutes   our  fundamental  right  to    property under article31(1). I see no compelling  or   cogent  reason for   changing  the views I expressed on this  point  in  my judgments  in those  two cases.     It is necessary, at this stage,  to examine the  several other objections  that  have been taken to  the  correctness of  the interpretation  suggested  by me.  It is  said  that the State’s. police power in relation to the citizens’ right to   freedom  is  fully  recognised  in article  19.  Clause (1)   of that article  secures  to  the  citizens  of  India seven  specified  rights  but  clauses (2)  to   (6)  permit the  State to make laws imposing reasonable limitations   on the   exercise of these seven rights  as therein  mentioned. The   argument  is   that clauses (2)  to  (6)recognise  the police  power of the State in that they permit  it  to  make laws  imposing  restrictions   on the seven  rights  of  the citizens and that they at the same time regulate  that power by  placing   limitations upon it  by  requiring   that  the restrictions  which may be imposed  must be reasonable.   It is  then pointed out that  the  State’s  police   power   is further   saved  by article 31(5)  (b)  and it is  concluded that the police power having been  recognised  and  provided for   in  article  19 and article 31(5)  (b)-  there  is  no necessity  to  read  article 31(1)  as  concerned  with  the State’s   police power at all.  I see no force  or  validity in the aforesaid objection.     I  first  deal  with the objection in so far  as  it  is founded  on  the  recognition  of the  State’s police  power in (1) [1952] S.C.R. 889 at pp. 988-989. article  19. I say that there is no force in this  objection

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 37 of 59  

for the following reasons:     (a) article 19(1) enumerates seven rights to freedom and guarantees  them to the citizens  of India.  Clauses (2)  to (6)   of that article  recognise and regulate  the  exercise of  police power over those rights by the State through  its legislative  organ,  for the State is,  by   those  clauses, permitted to impose  reasonable  restrictions  by law  only. Therefore, it follows  that  article 19  does not  give  any protection    to  the  citizens   against    the   executive government  in  respect of  even  those  seven  rights.  The citizens,   however, have  protection against the  executive as  well  as  the  Legislature under  article  21  but  that protection   covers   life  and  personal   liberties  only. Where,  then,  is   the citizen’s  protection   against  the exercise   of  police   power  by  the  executive  over  his property?  It   is  nowhere  except  in  article   31(1)  as construed by me.     (b)  Article   19 guarantees the  seven  rights  of  the citizens   only and recognises  and regulates  the  exercise of  police  power  over those  rights  by   the  legislative organ   of the State.  A  non-citizen  is entirely   outside that  article and consequently  he  has  none of those seven rights  and has no protection  against the State under  that article. He has, therefore, to fail back upon article 21 and contended   that all his personal  liberties  including  the six rights enunciated in article 19(1)(a) to (e)  and (g)are protected   against  the  exercise  of police power by   the State  through  its  executive  or legislative   limb.   But article   21, as  already  observed, only protects him  from deprivation  of life and personal liberties.  Where,   then, is the non-citizen’s  protection against deprivation of  his property by the exercise of police  power  by the  executive government.   It  is  no where unless    article  31(1)   is read in the  way I have suggested.     (c) Finally, clauses (2) to (6) of article 19  authorise the    State    to   make    laws     imposing    reasonable "restrictions"  on the citizen’s  rights  under clause  (1). It  is true that in A. K. Gopalan’s case (supra)  Fazl   Ali J. in  his  dissenting  judgment  took  the  view  that 641 "restrictions"    might    cover   the    case    of   total deprivation,  but  none of the other members of  that  Bench accepted that position. Kania C.J. said at page 106:     "Therefore,    article  19  (5)   cannot   apply  to   a substantive  law depriving a citizen of personal liberty.  I am   unable   to  accept  the  contention  that   the   word ’deprivation’   includes  within  its   scope  "restriction" when interpreting article 21".     My Lord the present Chief Justice expressed his views at p. 191 in the words following: "The   use   of  the  word   ’restrictions’         in   the various   sub-clauses   seems to  imply, in   the   context, that   the  rights  guaranteed by  the  article  are   still capable   of being  exercised,  and to exclude  the idea  of incarceration    though    the   words   ’restriction’   and ’deprivation’   are   sometimes  used   as   interchangeable terms,  as  restriction  may reach a point where it may well amount  to  deprivation.  Read  as  a whole  and viewed   in its  setting  among the  group of provisions (articles   19- 22)    relating to  ’Right  to  Freedom’, article 19   seems to  my  mind to presuppose  that  the citizen  to  whom  the possession of these fundamental fights  is  secured  retails the   substratum  of  personal ’freedom on which  alone  the enjoyment of these rights necessarily rests".     The contrary view expressed by a Bench of the  Allahabad

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 38 of 59  

High  Court was rejected by my Lord at the end of  page  193 with the following remark:     "  ........  their major  premise  that  deprivation  of personal  liberty was  a  ’restriction’  within  the mean- ing of article 19 is, in my judgment, erroneous’. Mahajan J. expressed the same view in the following passage at page 227 in  his  judgment in that case:  "Preventive   detention  in  substance  is a  negation  the freedom    of   locomotion    guaranteed     under   article 19(1)(d) but it cannot be said that it merely restricts it". Mukherjea J. said at page 256:     .....   and the purpose of article  19  is  to  indicate the limits  within which the State could, by legislation, 642 impose   restrictions  on the  exercise  of these fights  by the   individuals.  The  reasonableness  or   otherwise   of such  legislation can indeed be determined by the  court  to the   extent   laid   down in   the   several   clauses  of’ article 19, though no such review is permissible with regard to   laws   relating  to  deprivation  oflife  and  personal liberty".  His Lordship concluded thus at page 264:     "The   result  is  that,   in  my  opinion,   the  first contention   raised  by Mr. Nambiar  cannot  succeed and  it must  be  held  that  we are not  entitled  to  examine  the reasonableness or otherwise  of  the  Preventive   Detention Act  and  see whether it is within  the  permissible  bounds specified  in clause (5) of article 19".    After discussing the matter at some length at pages  302- 305  I concluded on page 306:    "In  my  judgment  article  19 has  no  beating  on   the question  of   the  validity  or otherwise   of   preventive detention  and, that being so, clause (5)  which  prescribes a  test  of  reasonableness  to  be  defined  and applied by the  court  has no application at all".    A  suggestion  was made that although in  A.K.  Gopalan’s case (supra)  the  word  "restriction"  occurring in clauses (2) to (6) could not, in its application to, sub-clauses (a) to  (e)  and (g) be taken as  extending to  "deprivation  ", there  is  no  compelling  reason  to  hold  that  the  word "restriction"   occurring  in  clause (5)  may  not  in  its application  to  sub-clause (f)  cover  "derivation"   There is  no  substance  in  this  contention. Clause  (5)  covers sub-clauses  (d),  (e) and (f) and surely one and  the  same word  "restriction"   used in one and the  same  clause  (5) cannot have one meaning in its application  to   sub-clauses (d)  and (e)  and a different meaning  and  connotation   in its   application   to subclause (f). Further,  the  reasons why, in A.K. Gopalan’s case (supra),  that word was given  a narrower  meaning in its application to sub-clauses  (a)  to (e) and (g) apply mutatis mutandis in  its  application   to sub-clause (f) read’ in correlation  to article 31.  It  is, therefore,   clear from  the  decision  of  this  court   in A.K.  Gopalan’s case (supra) that article 19 does  not  give any protection 643 against   deprivation  of property as  distinct  from   mere restriction   imposed   on the  right  ’to   property.   For protection   against  deprivation  of  life   and   personal liberties    including   the   several  rights   to  freedom enunciated  in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) of article  19 by   the exercise of police  power  by  the  legislative  or the   executive  organ of the State the citizen as  well  as the  non-citizen   will  have to look  to article  21.   For protection   against  the  deprivation     of  property   by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 39 of 59  

legislative   or executive  State  action  both the  citizen and  the  non-citizen will have to rely     on  article  31. If,  as  I  shall  show  presently,   clause  (5)  (b)  were inserted in  article 31  ex abundanti cautela and not  as  a substantive  provision defining  the ambit  or scope of  the police   power or formulating any limitation on that  power, then  the protection  against deprivation of  property  will have   to be  derived from  only clauses (1) and  (2).   If, in such  circumstances,  both those clauses are read in  the way  suggested   by  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent, Subodh Gopal Bose, namely, as dealing only with the topic of the   State’s  power  of  eminent domain  then  there   will remain   no  escape   from  the conclusion   that   in   the Republic  of  India neither a citizen nor a non-citizen  has any  constitutional  protection against  the   exercise   of police  power either by the legislative or executive   organ of  the  State.  On the other hand, if the      construction suggested  by me  be adopted,  everybody,   citizen or  non- citizen,  will  have, under article 31 (2),  full protection against  the exercise     the power  of eminent   domain  by both  the  executive as well as Legislature and in  addition to  that will also have  protection  against  the   exercise of   police  power over property  by  the   executive.   The preservation  of this protection  alone,  even if some   may regard  it  as very meagre, is, to my mind,  a  sufficiently cogent reason for adopting the construction suggested by  me in   preference  to  the  other   construction   which,   if adopted, will not save even this meagre protection.     The  next objection  to the conclusion arrived at by  me is that police  power  of depriving a person of his property is  amply provided for in article 31 (5) (b) and it is   not necessary  to read it into article 31 (1). 644 A perusal of clause (5)  of article 31 which 1 have  already quoted  will  at   once  show   that   that  clause  excepts certain laws from the operation of clause (2) only.  It will also  appear that  the  exception  covers, under  sub-clause (b), only certain kinds of future laws. Item (i) under  sub- clause (b)  comprises  future  laws imposing or levying  any tax or penalty. Item (ii) under that sub-clause saves future laws  for the  promotion public health or the prevention  of danger  to life or property. It is  said  that  this  clause (5)(b)(ii)saves  laws to be made in exercise of the  State’s police power. The  argument  is  that  the  State’s   police power   of  imposing   "restriction"   on   the    citizens’ right    to  acquire,  hold  and  dispose  of  property   is recognised  and controlled by clause (5) of article  19  and that   when  it becomes  necessary  for  the  police   power to   extend  beyond   "restrictions"    and    to    inflict "deprivation"     property  it can do so by the kind  of law which is, by clause (5)(b)  (ii)  of article 31, saved  from the operation of clause (2).  It is pointed out that in  the matter  of imposition  of "restrictions"  on  the   exercise of  the right to acquire, hold and dispose of  property  the only    limitation  on  the  police   power   is  that   the "restrictions"   to be  imposed by law must  be   reasonable as indicated  in article  19 (5)  but  that  in  the  matter of  "deprivation"  of property  by  authority  of law  under article  31  the  limitation on the  police  power  is  more ’stringent,  namely, that such law may be made only for  the promotion of public  health or the prevention of danger   to life   or  property  as  mentioned  in clause (5)  (b)  (ii) and for no other purpose. The argument  thus  formulated  is attractive   for  its  simplicity and  has  the   appearance of   plausibility  but  cannot stand  the   test  of   close

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 40 of 59  

scrutiny. I   say so far the  following reasons :-   (i)  Every student  of Constitutional  law       is   well aware  that  constitutional  lawyers  classify  the   State’ sovereign     power   into   three    categories,    namely, the   power    of   taxation,    the   power    of   eminent domain  and  the   police   power.   These   are    distinct categories     of   sovereign    powers    with    different connotations  subserving different needs of the society  and the State.  If both 645 clauses  (1)  and (2) of article 31 deal  with  and   impose restrictions   only   on  the  State’s ’power   of   eminent domain,  then there was  no real necessity for exempting  by article 31 (5)(b)the taxation power or the police power from the  operation  of  the power of  eminent  domain,  for,  ex hypothesis,   the   two   first   mentioned  powers,   being distinct  from  the power of  eminent domain,  did  not  and could  not  fail  within  the  last  mentioned  power   and, therefore,  needed no exemption. Even a  casual student   of Constitutional  law  knows that money is one of the kinds of property which, it is said, cannot  be taken in exercise  of the State’s power of eminent domain and that being so  there could  be  no necessity for exempting laws   imposing  taxes from  the operation of article 31 (2)  which  embodies  only the doctrine  of   eminent  domain.   Further,  the   police power,   like   the  pOwer  of taxation  and  the  power  of eminent domain,  is an  attribute  of sovereignty  itself.It is,  as  Professor       Willis  calls-it,  "the   offspring of   political    necessity".      This    coercive    legal capacity   is  inherent     in  every         sovereign  and requires   no  specific reservation. Indeed,         in  the Constitution   of   the   United   States   there.   is   no specific  reservation  of the police power   of  the  State. There   was,  therefore, no necessity for  expressly  saving the   police  power  of  our  State  by   a   constitutional provision.   Why,  then,  was  clause (5) (b) (ii)  inserted in article 31 at all ? The answer will become obvious if  it is  remembered  that  it is extremely  difficult  to  define precisely the ambit and scope of the State’s  police   power over or in  relation  to  private property  and some of  the instances  and  forms of the exercise of such  police  power over  or in relation to property may superficially  resemble the   exercise  of  the  power   of  eminent   domain.   The conclusion,  therefore, becomes irresistible  that  although clause  (5)(b)(ii) was  not  strictly   speaking   necessary for    saving   the  police   power,    nevertheless,    our Constitution-makers,  out  of abundant caution  and  with  a view to avoid any possible  argument, thought fit to  insert sub-clause  (5) (b) (ii)in article 31. It is  impossible  to hold that the entire police power of the State to deprive  a person  of his property is contained in that sub-clause. 646     (ii)  According to the argument article 31 (5)(b)  saves the  power of’ the State to make certain laws   in  exercise of  its power  of taxation or its police power. It  will  be noticed   that  it does not give us any  protection  against the   Legislature by laying down any  test for the  validity of those laws. The acceptance of the suggested  construction will  mean   that  laws  thus   saved  may  be  as  archaic, offensive  and unreasonable  as  the legislature  may choose to  make  them  so  long as they  relate  to  the   subjects referred  to  in  that sub-clause. If  our   sense   of  the sanctity   of  private  property  is   not  shocked  at  the prospect of leaving our property at the unfettered mercy  of the Legislature in respect of laws of the kind specified  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 41 of 59  

clause  (5)  (b) (ii), I do not see why   the   construction suggested   by  me  should  be rejected only on  the  ground that  it will give a carte blanche to the   Legislature   to make  any law it  pleases for the deprivation  of   property in exercise  of police power. (iii)  Article  31 (5)  (b)  gives  us  no        protection against the executive with respect to the exercise of  these powers.  Take article 31 (5)(b)(i)first. That it  was.   not intended   to be  a  protection  against  the executive   in the   exercise   of  the  power of  taxation  cannot  for  a moment be doubted, for if it were so intended, there was  no necessity,  then,  for  inserting  into   the   Constitution article  265  providing  that no taxes.  shall  be levied or collected  except by  authority of law, which clearly  means that the executive cannot, on its  own authority,  levy   or collect  any   tax.   It is,  therefore,  quite  plain  that article 31 (5)(b)(i)was not designed to give any  protection against  the  executive in the matter of the exercise of the power  of  taxation  and  that   our    Constitution-makers, precisely   for   that  reason,  considered   that   it  was necessary    that   such  protection   should    be    given expressly  and,  therefore, inserted article  265. Likewise, article  31  (5)(b)(ii) saves certain laws and does  not  in terms give us any protection against the exercise of  police power   by   the  executive.    Where,   then,     is    our protection  against deprivation of property by the  exercise of  police  power by  the  executive   Government?    It  is nowhere to be 647 found in our Constitution except in article 31(1). This,  to my  mind, clearly indicates that article  31(1)was  designed to formulate  a  fundamental  right  against deprivation  of property by the exercise’ of police power by  the  executive arm  of  the State.  The protection against the exercise  of the power of eminent domain by the executive  government  is to  be  found in  the requirement of a law which  alone  may authorise  the taking of possession  or the acquisition   of the  property  which,  as  will  be  explained   later,   is implicit in article 31(2) itself and it is,  therefore,  not necessary  to have recourse to article 31(1) to secure  that protection.     (iv) To say that the entire police power of the State to deprive  a  person of his property is to be  found  only  in article 31(5)(b)(ii) will be to confine the exercise of that power by the Legislature within a very narrow and  inelastic limit,  namely,  only  for  the promotion of public   health or  the  prevention of danger to life or  property.  On  the assumption  that  article 31 (5)(b)(ii)  is  concerned  with saving   the   police  power  it  may   cover    the    laws authorising   the   destruction  of  rotten  or  adulterated foodstuff  or  the pulling down of a  dangerous  dilapidated building  or the demolition a building to prevent fire  from spreading. But it is quite easy to contemplate laws which do not   fall  within  article  31  (5)  (b)  (ii)   but   are, nevertheless,   made  mistakably   in   exercise   of    the State’s   police   power.  Consider   the  case  of  a   law authorising   the seizure and destruction of,  say,  obscene pictures   or blasphemous literature.  Such  law is  clearly necessary  for   the   promotion  or  protection  of  public morality.  Nobody can for a moment think of contending  that such   law  will  be  void  if  it  does  not  provide   for compensation  and yet that will be the result if we  are  to accept  the suggested construction,  for  such  a law   made for  protecting public morality  is obviously  not   covered by  article  31  (5)(b)(ii)  and  will,  according  to  such

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 42 of 59  

construction, be hit by article 31(2). A  construction which leads  to the astounding result of compelling the  State  to buy up  obscene  pictures and.blasphemous literature  if  it desires   to preserve public morality cannot  merit  serious consideration  and  must  be discarded at  once.  Take 648 the case of a law providing for the compulsory  contribution by  all  banks  based  upon the average daily  deposits  for the purpose of creating a guarantee fund to secure  the full repayment  of deposits  to  all depositors in case any  such bank  becomes  insolvent and i$ ordered to  be   wound   up. This  law  quite  clearly deprives the banks of property  in the  shape of their respective contributions and it  is  not covered by clause (5) (b) (i) as it cannot be said to impose a  tax  or a penalty and does not fail within (5)  (b)  (ii) either,  for  it is not a law for the  promotion  of  public health  or  for  the  prevention   of  danger   to  life  or property.  This law being thus outside clause  (5)(b)cannot, according  to the suggested  construction  be  supported  as an instance of  exercise of police power for, ex  hypothesis the  entire  police  power with  regard  to  deprivation  of property  is contained in clause (5)(b)and consequently  the law  I  have  mentioned  will  not  be  protected  from  the operation  of  article  31(2)   and must  be  void  for  not providing   any   compensation.    Yet   in    the    United States  where  so much is made of the  sanctity  of  private property and from where we are prone to draw inspiration  in these matters such a law has been upheld as ,constitutional, as  an instance of a  valid  exercise of the  State’s-police power "which extends to all the  great  public needs."  [See Noble  State  Bank v. Haskell(1)].   Again, suppose there is a  labour dispute between,  say, a tramway company  and  its workers  and the running of the tram cars is stopped. A  law which  in   such  circumstances  authorises  the   State  to take possession  of the tram  depot and run the tram cars by the  military or other personnel during such  emergency  for the  convenience  of  the travelling public  is  not  within clause  (5)(b)(ii) and on this construction will be void  if it does not provide for compensation to the tramway company. On   the   suggested  construction  pushed  to  its  logical conclusion  it will not be possible in future to impose  any social  control on the profiteers or blackmarketeers, for  a law controlling and fixing prices of essential supplies will always  deprive   them   of  property of  the  value  to  be measured by the difference between (1) 219 U.S. 104. 649 the  blackmarket   price  and  the  controlled  price.   The suggested construction may even make it difficult to support any  future law containing provisions  similar to  those  in the  procedure  codes  or other laws  not  strictly  falling within the clause (5)(b)(ii)but authorising the seizure   of books,  documents  or other  property or the appointment  of a   receiver   or   sequestrator   to  take  possession   of property,   for   in  all  such  cases  there  will   be   a "deprivation"    of  property.   It   is   unnecessary    to multiply  instances.   The  several instances  I  have  just given   above  appear  to me to furnish ample  justification for rejecting a construction which  may  make  it impossible for  the  State  to  undertake  beneficial  legislation   to promote  social  interest  and  may  invalidate laws of  the kind I have mentioned.     (v) Article 31 (5) (b) (ii) saves from the operation  of clause  (2) laws to be made in future for the  promotion  of public   health   or the prevention  of danger  to  life  or

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 43 of 59  

property.  Obviously   it  was  contemplated  that  the laws thus  saved  would  involve  the  taking  of  possession  or acquisition of private property,  for otherwise  there would be   no necessity  for the exemption at all.  Take the  case of  a law authorising the opening out of a  congested   part of a town  and the acquisition of land for the laying out of a  public park  for affording fresh air and   other   health amenities   to   the  public.  Consider the case  of  a  law authorising  the  clearing up of slums and the closing  down of  putrid  and unhealthy surface drains and acquisition  of land  for broadening the lanes so as  to   lay   underground sewers  thereunder.  One may also refer to a law authorising the acquisition of land for the erection  of a hospital  for patients suffering from infectious  diseases, e.g.,  plague, small-pox  and cholera. All these laws will ,come under  the heading  of promotion of public health or the prevention  of danger  to life.  According to the  suggested   construction the  acquisition  of property  authorised by  each of  these laws  will  be exempt from  payment of compensation  to  the owner,  for these laws are, by clause (5)(b)  (ii)  exempted from  article 31(2).   And yet acquisition of land for  such public purposes is precisely the kind of acquisition   which is  always  made   on  payment  of  5--95 s.C.I.159 650 compensation   under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  1894.   A construction   which   takes   a  law   made   really    and essentially  in exercise of the power of eminent domain  out of  article 31(2)  cannot readily be accepted as  cogent  or correct.     (vi)  The  complexities  of modern   States   constantly give rise to conflicts between opposing social interest  and it  is  easy   to visualise circumstances  when  much  wider social  control legislation than is envisaged or  recognised in  the  laws   referred  to in  article  31(5)(b)  will  be imperatively  necessary.  Indeed,  as  Professor  Willoughby states  in  his  Constitutional  Law  of the United  States, Vol.  III, p. 1774,  "the  police  power knows  no  definite limit. It extends to every possible phase of what the Courts deem to be the public welfare".  In  the  language  used  by Holmes J. in  Noble State Bank v. Haskell (supra),  "it  may be  said in  a general way that the police power extends  to all  the  great public  needs".  In  Eubank  v.  Richmond(1) the Court said of the police power:     "It   extends    not   only    to    regulation    which promote   the  public  health,  morals, and safety,  but  to those  which  promote       the public  convenience  or  the general    prosperity    ......It    is          the    most essential      of    powers,     at      times          most insistent,    and   always one  of  the least  limitable  of the  powers  of   government."     And  all  the  more  will such  wide  police  powers  be required   in a State which,’ like our own, aims at being  a welfare State governed by the directive principles of  State policy   such  as  are  to be found in  Chapter  IV  of  our Constitution.   To  so  confine  the  State’s  police  power as suggested by learned advocate for the respondent will  be to bring about social stagnation and thereby  to retard  the progress of our State. There is nothing  in the language  of our  Constitution  which  compels  us   to  adopt   such   a construction.   In  my  judgment  a  construction  which  is calculated   to  produce  the  undesirable  result  I   have mentioned must, I feel sure, be rejected. (1) 226 U.S. 137. 651

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 44 of 59  

    The  last  objection  to reading  article31(1)  as  the enunciation of the fundamental right against deprivation  of property by the exercise of police power and reading article 31(2)as  laying  down limitations on the  State’s  power  of eminent domain is that so read  article 31 will, in reality, afford no effective  protection  at all, for the State  will always  exercise its police power under article 31 (1)   and deprive    a    person   of  his    property   without   any compensation by the simple device of making a law  and  will never  exercise  its  power of eminent domain under  article 31(2).  Where, then, it is asked, is our protection  against the   State with respect to our  property ?   The  objection thus   formulated  overlooks  the difference   between   the nature   and  purpose  of  the  two  powers  which  I  shall presently  discuss  and explain and  is not  otherwise  well rounded for the following’ reasons:      (1)  It  is  incorrect to say that article  31  (1)   as construed  by me gives no protection at all.   It  certainly gives   protection  against  deprivation  of   property   by executive  fiat  just as did that  part of the  famous  29th Clause  of  the Magna Charta which proclaimed that  no  free person   should  be  dispossessed  of any  free tenement  of his  except  by  the law of the land.  As  pointed  out   by Mathews  J.  in  joseph Hurtado v. People of  California(1), by the 29th Clause of the Magna Charta  the English   Barons were   not providing for security against their own body  or in favour of the commons by limiting the power of Parliament but  were  protecting themselves  against   oppression   and usurpation  of the King’s  prerogatives.  In  other   words, that   clause  of  the Magna Charta was not  designed  as  a protection  against  Parliament at all and  indeed  did  not purport  to formulate any limitation on the Sate’s power  of eminent  domain  but was only intended to  be  a  protection against   the  exercise  of  police  power  by  the  highest executive,  the  King.  There  is  unmistakably  a  familiar ring in the language of our article 31(1) echoing the  sound of  the  language  of  the 29th  Clause     of  that   great charter  which  the  English Barons  had wrested from  their King.  The purpose  and  function  (1) (1883) 10 U.g. 516 at p. 531. 652 of  our article 31(1), as I apprehend it, are the  same   as those   of the  Magna  Charta.  Our   Constitution       has given   us  ample  protection  against  the   executive   in relation to all the three  sovereign  powers  of the  State. Thus   the  executive  cannot,  on its own  authority,   and without  the  sanction  of a law deprive  any person of  his life  or personal liberty by reason of article 21 or of  his property because  of article 31(1)  or take possession of or acquire   private  property under article 31 (2)  or  impose any  tax   under  article  265.  ’Our   Constitution  makers evidently  considered  the   protection  against deprivation of property in exercise of police power or of the power   of eminent domain by the executive to be of greater  importance than   the   protection  against  deprivation   of  property brought   about by the exercise of  the  power  of  taxation by  the  executive,  for  they found a place for  the  first mentioned  protection  in article 31(1)  and (2)  set out in Part III  dealing with fundamental rights while they  placed the last mentioned  protection  in article 265  to be  found in Part XII dealing with finance etc. So with regard to  all the three  sovereign powers  we  have  complete   protection against the executive organ of the State.     (2)   It  is   said  we  have   no  protection   against legislative   tyranny  in  respect  of our  property.   This

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 45 of 59  

complaint   obviously   is   not  well  rounded,   for   our Constitution  has   given  us some   measure  of  protection against the legislature in respect of our property. Thus  if the  State exercises its power of eminent domain  by  taking possession   of  or  acquiring  private  property   of   any person   it    must  do  so  upon   the   three   conditions prescribed  by  article 31 (2). There is no shorter  cut  in such  a  case.  Apart from  this  the  citizens   of   India have  further   protection   against  the   legislature   in respect   of their right  to acquire,  hold and dispose   of property.   This   right    is  guaranteed    to   them   by article  19(1)(f). The Constitution, however, recognises  by clause  (5)   that   the   State   has   police   power   to restrict  the right  in the interest of the general   public or  for  the protection of the interests  of  any  Scheduled tribe   but  prescribes a limitation on this  police   power by requiring that the restrictions to be imposed by 653 law must be reasonable.  This  requirement  constitutes  the citizens’  fundamental  right   against   the   exercise  of police  power  by the legislature in respect  of  his  fight under  article 19 (1)(f)whilst  they  are in possession  and enjoyment of this right.     (3)  It is then urged  that our Constitution,  according to my construction of it,  does not give us  any  protection against  the  legislature  in the  matter of deprivation  of property  in exercise of the State’s police power.  This  is no  ground  for rejecting  my construction,   for,  on   the construction  suggested  to  the  contrary, the position  is exactly the same, for article 31 (5) (b)  only saves certain laws  from  article 31(2), that is to say,  recognises   the police   power   but  does  not   formulate  any  test   for determining  the  validity   of  those  laws which may be as unreasonable as the legislature may make them.  Apart   from this,   what,   I  ask,  is  our  protection   against   the legislature   in  the  matter of deprivation of property  by the exercise of the power of taxation ?  None. whatever.  By exercising  its  power  of taxation by law  the   State  may deprive  uS,   citizen or non-citizen   of  almost   sixteen annas in the rupee of our income.  What,  I next ask, is the protection  which our  Constitution  gives  to  any   person against   the  legislature  in  the  matter  of  deprivation even  of  life  or personal liberty ?   None,   except   the requirement   of article 21,  namely,  a  procedure  to   be established  by  the  legislature  itself   and  a  skeleton procedure  prescribed in article 22. In  A.K. Gopalan’s case (supra),  notwithstanding   the  reference   made   to   the epigrammatic observation of Bronson J. in Taylor v. Porte(1) to   the  effect  that  it  sounded  very  much   like   the Constitution   speaking   to  the   legislature   that   the latter  could not infringe our right unless it chose  to  do so,  the  majority of this Court declined  to  question  the wisdom  and   policy   of the Constitution or  to    stretch the  language of article 21 so as to square it with its  own notions  of what the ambit of the right should be  but  felt bound to give effect to the plain words of the Constitution. (See  Kania  C.J. at page  11,  Mukherjea J. at page 277 and my judgment at page 321). If, (1) 4 Hill 140. 654 therefore,  in the matter of deprivation of property by  the exercise    of  the   State’s   power   of   taxation    our Constitution  has  only given us protection by  article  265 against   the  executive   but  none  whatever  against  the legislature  and  if,  in the matter of deprivation  of  our

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 46 of 59  

life  and personal liberty our Constitution has given us  no better  protection   against   the   legislature  than   the requirement  of  a  procedure  to  be  established  by   the legislature  itself:  and the skeleton  procedure prescribed by   article 22,  and seeking that our Constitution has,  by article  31(2), given us protection against the  legislature at  least  with  respect to the exercise  of  the  power  of eminent  domain,  what is there to complain of ,if,  in  the matter  015 deprivation of property by the exercise  of  the State’s   police  power,  our  Constitution has, by  article 31 (1), given us protection only against the executive   but none  against  the  legislature ?  What is abnormal  if  our Constitution  has trusted the legislature, as the people  of Great Britain have trusted their Parliament ? Right to  life and  personal  liberty  and the right  to  private  property still  exist in Great Britain in spite of the  supremacy  of Parliament.  Why  should we assume or  apprehend   that  our Parliament or  State legislatures  should act like  mad  men and deprive us of our property without any rhyme or reason ? After  all  our  executive  government  is   responsible  to the  legislature  and  the  legislature  is  answerable   to the  people. Even if the legislature indulges in  occasional vagaries, we have to put up with it for the time being. That is   the  price  we  must  pay  for  democracy.    But   the apprehension  of such vagaries can be no  justification  for stretching  the  language of  the  Constitution to bring  it into  line  with our notion of what  an  ideal  Constitution should  be.  To do so is not to interpret  the  Constitution but to make a new Constitution by unmaking the one which the people   of  India  have  given  to  themselves.   That,   I apprehend,  is  not  the function of  the  court.   If   the Constitution,  properly construed according to the  cardinal rules  of  interpretation, appears to some to  disclose  any defect  or  lacuna  the appeal  must be  to   the  authority competent  to amend the Constitution and not to the court. 655 (4)  Further,  there may be quite   cogent   and  compelling reason  why  our  Constitution does  not   provide  for  any protection   against  the  legislature  in  the  matter   of deprivation   of  property  otherwise  than  by  taking   of possession  or acquisition of it.  It is futile  to cling to our  notions  of absolute  sanctity  of individual   liberty or  private  property  and  to  wishfully  think  that   our Constitution-makers   have  enshrined  m  our   Constitution the notions of individual liberty and private property  that prevailed   in   the   16th    century   when  Hugo  Grotius flourished  or  in the 18th century when  Blackstone   wrote his  Commentaries  and  when  the Federal   Constitution  of the    United   States  of America  was  framed.    We  must reconcile ourselves to the plain truth  that  emphasis   has now   unmistakably  shifted  from  the  individual  to   the community. We cannot overlook  that  the  avowed purpose  of our   Constitution  is  to  set  up  a  welfare   State   by subordinating the  social  interest in individual liberty or property  to the larger  social  interest  in the rights  of the  community. As already observed, the police power of the State  is  "the most essential of powers,  at   times   most insistent,  and always one of the least limitable  powers of the  government".  Social  interests  are   ever   expanding and  are too numerous to enumerate  or  even to   anticipate and,   therefore,  it is not possible to  circumscribe   the limits   of social control to be  exercised by the State  or adopt a construction which will confine it within the narrow limits  of article 31 (5) (b) (ii). It must be left  to  the State   to   decide   when  and how and to  what  extent  it

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 47 of 59  

should  exercise this social control.  Our Constitution  has not  thought  fit  to  leave the responsibility of depriving a  person of his property, whether  it  be  in  exercise  of the  power of eminent domain or of the police power, to  the will or caprice of the executive but has left it to that  of the  legislature.  In  the  matter   of    deprivation    of property  otherwise than by the taking of possession  or  by the  acquisition of it within the meaning of article 31  (2) our  Constitution  has  trusted  our  legislature   and  has not   thought   fit  to  impose  any   limitation   on   the legislature’s   exercise  of  the   State’s   police   power over 656 private  property.   Our  protection   against   legislative tyranny,  if any, lies, in ultimate analysis, in a free  and intelligent  public  opinion  which  must eventually  assert itself.     Having  dealt with the correlation between  clauses  (1) and  (2)  of  article  31 as  I  apprehend  it   and  having considered    and   rejected   the   objections    to    the conclusions  I have  arrived  at,  I proceed now to  examine and   analyse   the   provisions  of   clause  (2).   As   I explained  in my judgment in the Darbhanga case  (supra)  at pp. 989-990, article 31 (2) has  imposed  three   conditions on  the  exercise  of the State’s  power of  eminent  domain over  private  property  and  those  limitations  constitute the protection granted tO the owner of the property  as  his fundamental  right.  It  insists  that this sovereign  power may  be exercised  only  if it is authorised  by a law.   It is,   therefore, clear that  the executive   limb  of    the State    cannot’   exercise   this  power  on     its    own authority  and  without  the  sanction of law.   The  taking of possession  or  acquisition must be for a public  purpose which  implies that this power  cannot be  exercised  except for  implementing  a public purpose. It cannot be  exercised for  a private purpose.  What is a public purpose has   been elaborately   dealt  with  in  that  case and need  not   be discussed    over   again  here.    Finally,    the      law authorising  the taking  of possession  or  acquisition   of the   property   must     provide      for     compensation. Compensation,  therefore,  is payable only  when  the  State takes  possession    of  or   acquires   private   property. What,    then,  is  the  meaning   of  the   words.   "taken possession    of  or  acquired",  and   their    grammatical variations  as  used in article 31 (2) ?     It  is  pointed out that the last clause  of  the  Fifth Amendment  which   deals with eminent domain uses  the  word "taken"  and it  is  suggested  that  as  our article 31 (2) deals  with  the  same topic of eminent domain  it  will  be reasonable to hold that our article 31 (2)  reproduces   the American       constitutional   limitations    and     that, therefore,   the    expression   "taken  possession  of   or acquired"  used in  our  article  31 (2) 657 must  be  read  as having the same meaning  which  has  been attributed  , by   the  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court   of the   United  States  to  the  word  "taken"  occurring   in their   Fifth   Amendment.  I  am  quite  unable  to  accept this  construction  and  the line of reasoning  on which  it is  founded.  In the first  place, I  deprecate   the   line of  reasoning  which starts  by likening  one   thing   with another  and then ends  by (imputing  the qualities  of  the other  thing to the  first mentioned  thing.   The  cardinal rule  of   interpretation is to ascertain  the  meaning  and effect  of  an enactment,   constitutional   or   otherwise,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 48 of 59  

from   the   words  used ’therein.  If the words  used  have acquired  a technical or  special  meaning,   that   meaning must  be   given  to them.  To say   that   the   expression "taken  possession" of or acquired" must be read as  "taken" and  given.  the same wide meaning as the  ’American  courts have  given  to  the  word  "taken"   is   to   ignore   the entire  historical  background  of  the  law   relating   to compulsory   acquisition   of  private   property   by   the State.  Under   the English  law,  on which ’more  or   less our  modern laws  are rounded,  the term  "acquisition"  has a special  meaning.  It  connotes     the idea  of  transfer of  title, voluntary or involuntary.  When the   acquisition by    the   State   is   effected     by   agreement   after negotiation  there is a regular conveyance  transferring the title   from  the  vendor  to  the  State.  Even  when   the acquisition  by   the  State  is effected  by  the  coercive -process  of  exercising its sovereign power  the   idea  of purchase  is nevertheless present, for there is  vesting  of the  property in the State by operation of law.  Acquisition of private property by the State under  the English     law, therefore,   connotes   the   concept   of   a     purchase, voluntary    or  involuntary,  ’and   involves  a  ’transfer of   the  entire  title  from the  owner to  the State or  a third party for whom the State acquires ’the  property.   In India,   the  compulsory  acquisition  of  private  property was first introduced by Bengal Regulation I of 1824.   Since then  we have had no less ’than seven Acts dealing with  the compulsory  acquisition  of   private   property   by    the State,   namely, Act I of  1850, Act XLII of  1850,  Act  XX of 1852, Act I of 658 1854,  Act.  XXII  of 1863, Act X of 1870  and  lastly   the present Land Acquisition Act, Act I of 1894. Each, of  these Acts  provides for the vesting of the acquired  property  in the  State. This means that the owner is  divested  and  his title passes,  by operation of law to the    State. The word "acquisition",  therefore,  has become,   as  it   were,   a word   of art having a long accepted   legislative   meaning implying  the  transfer of title. It will  be  quite  wrong, according  to the correct  principles   of   interpretation, not to give  the word  "acquisition"  and   its  grammatical variations  this    technical    and   special  meaning   I, therefore, respectfully  agree-with what Mukherjea  J.  said in Chiranjit Lal’s case (supra) at page 902, namely:   "It   cannot   be  disputed that  acquisition   means  and implies   the   acquiring of  the  entire   title  of    the expropriated   owner, whatever  the   nature or  extent   of that  title might be.   The  entire  bundle of rights  which were   vested  in  the  original  holder  would   pass    on acquisition   to  the  acquirer  leaving  nothing   in   the former.   In   taking  possession  on the  other  hand,  the title  to  the property admittedly remains in  the  original holder,    though  he  is  excluded  from   possession    or enjoyment   of    the  property. Article  31  (2)   of   the Constitution   itself makes  a clear   distinction,  between acquisition  of property and  taking  possession  of it  for a   public   purpose, though it places both of them  on  the same   footing   in   the   sense    that    a   legislation authorising   either of  these  acts   must make   provision for   payment  of  ’compensation   to  the   displaced    or expropriated’  holder  ’of the property. In the  context  in which the, word "acquisition"  appears  in  article 31  (2), it   can  only  mean  and refer  to   acquisition   of   the entire, interest  of  the  previous  holder  by  transfer of title and.........."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 49 of 59  

   It’  follows  from what has been stated above  that  the word  "acquired" used in article 31 (2)  must be given   the special   meaning   which   that   word   has  acquired  and cannot   be  read  as synonymous  with: "taken" as  used  in the  Fifth  Amendment  to the  Constitution  of  the  United States. 659     It is then suggested that any rate the expression "taken possession  of"   should be read in the sense in  which  the word  "taken" is understood in the American law.  But   even in   America   the   word  "taken"  has  not   always   been interpreted  in  the  same  way.  The old view was  that  in order to be a "taken" there must be either an actual  taking of  physical  property or a physical   occupancy   of   some physical  property. This view was, however, regarded as  too narrow and mechanical.  It   was  said  that  the  ownership of   a  thing,  tangible  or  intangible, was made   up   of the   rights,    powers,    privileges    and     immunities concerning  that   thing  and that  the   property  was  not the  thing  itself but consisted  of these  rights,  powers, privileges  and  immunities. It  was,  therefore,  concluded that  there  must  be  a "taking"  whenever  there  was  any injury  to property  otherwise  than by the police power  or taxation  which, if done by a private individual,  would  be actionable  as a tort; in other words  that it must be  held that   there  would  be a  "taking"  whenever   any  of  the rights,  powers,  privileges  or immunities  making  up  the ownership   was  taken  from the owner.  Indeed,  this  wide interpretation  of the word "taken" was facilitated  by  the fact  that,  in order to avoid the old, narrow view  of  the meaning  of that word, many of the States so  amended  their Constitutions  as  to  require  compensation  for   property "damaged,  injured  or destroyed" for a  public  use.   (See Professor  Willis’ Constitutional  Law,  pp. 820-821).   Our Constitution-makers  were  well  aware   of  the  very  wide meaning eventually given to the word "taken" by the American courts.   They  did not, however,  use the word  "taken"  in article  31  (2) which they would surely have done  if  they intended   to  reproduce  the  wide  American   concept   of "taking".    Our   Constitution-makers,  on   the  contrary, deliberately   chose  to adopt the narrower view  point  and accordingly used the words "taken possession of" in order to make  it quite clear that they required compensation  to  be paid  only when there was an actual  taking of the  property out  of the possession of the owner or possessor  into   the possession   of  the  State or its nominee.  Of  course  the manner of 660 taking possession must depend on the nature of the  property itself.  I repeat with humility that it is  not  permissible to  ignore  the  historical  background and the actual words used in our Constitution.   It  is   finally  said  that  both  clauses  (1)and  (2)of article  31deal  with  the  topic  of  eminent  domain  and, therefore,the    expression  "taken    possession   of    or acquired"occurring  in clause (2)has the same meaning  which the  word "deprived"  used  in  clause  (1)  has   In  other words,  both the clauses  are concerned with deprivation  of property   and  there  is  no reason   to  think  that   the expression  "taken  possession  of or acquired"  was  usedin clause  (2)   to indicate any particular  kind  or   shadeof deprivation.   The  Obvious  retort  that at once  comes  to one’s mind is that if it were intended by our  Constitution- makers  to convey  the  same  general idea of deprivation of property by whatever means or mode it was brought about  why

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 50 of 59  

did  they  use the word "deprived"  in clause (1)   and  why did  they  use  in clause (2)  a different expression which, as  commonly  used   and  understood,    connotes   a   much narrower  meaning  ?   It would  have  been quite   easy  to frame clause (2)  by using the word  "deprived"  instead  of the    expression  "taken   possession  of  oracquired".  As our  Constitution-makers used different expressions  in  the two   clauses  it must be held that they had done so  for  a very  definite  purpose  and that purpose could  be  nothing else    but  to  provide   for  compensation   for  only   a particular kind  of deprivation  specifically mentioned  and not  for  any  and  every  kind  of  deprivation.  In   this connection  reference  may be made to Entry 33  in  List  I, Entry 36 in List II and Entry 42 in List III  of the Seventh Schedule.  The words used in those entries are  "acquisition or  requisitioning"  ortheir  grammatical   variations.  The legislative   powerbeing confined only to  "acquisition   or requisitioning"it  will not be unreasonable  to  hold   that "taking of  possession" referred to in article 31 (2) is  in the nature of "requisitioning".  In  section 299 (2)  of the Government of India  Act the  words "taking  of  possession" did  not occur nor did they occur in any of the  legislative lists  in  the Seventh Schedule  to that   Act,   but   they have 661 been  introduced   in   article 31 (2)  and   in  the  three entries  mentioned  above  the   word  "requisitioning"  has been   added    after  the   word  "acquisition". If  "taken possession   of or   acquired"-occurring  in article 31  (2) be  given a meaning wider  than what is meant  by  "acquired or requisitioned"  or  their variations used in the  entries then  it  will amount to saying that article  31-  (2)  even contemplates   a  law with  the respect  to  matters   which are    beyond    the   legislative  powers    conferred   on Parliament  and the State Legislatures, for they   can  only make   a   law    with   respect   to   "acquisition      or requisitioning".    To    counter   this  reasoning   it  is pointed   out that Parliament under the Union List  has  the residuary  power of legislation and, therefore, there is  no difficulty in giving a wider meaning   to   the   expression "taken  possession   of  or acquired".  It will then  amount to   giving  one  and  the  same   expression      different meanings.   Thus  in  its application  to a   law   made  by the  State  Legislature "taken  possession  of or  acquired" must  perforce mean "requisitioned"  or "acquired"   whereas in   its   application to a law made by Parliament  it  will have  a much wider meaning. This is opposed to the  cardinal rules  interpretation.  Therefore,  "taken   possession   of or acquired"  should  be read as indicative  of the  concept of  "requisition  or acquisition".  A  further question, however, arises at this stage  and  it may   be  now  considered.   Does every taking of   a  thing into    the   custody  of  the   State  or    its    nominee necessarily   mean the taking of possession  of  that  thing within   the  meaning  of article 31 (2) so as to  call  for compensation ?  The exercise  of police  power  in  relation to  property  may conceivably result in the  extinction   or destruction   of  the  property  or  in  the   State  taking the  property  in  its  control.  Take the case of  the  law authorising   the   municipal  bailiff   to   seize   rotten vegetables or adulterated foodstuffs and destroy them or  to enter upon the property of a private owner to pull down  the dilapidated structure. ’Consider the law authorising the men of  the  fire brigade to go upon the property of  a  private owner and demolish it to prevent the fire from spreading  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 51 of 59  

the houses beyond or on the 662 other  side  of  that  house.  Take  the  case  of  the  law authorising  the seizure  and destruction  of property   for the protection  of public  morality.  Although  in  none  of the  above  cases  there  is  any  acquisition  of  property involving a transfer of title, there is in each of the above cases   a   "taking   of  possession"   and  destruction  of property  by the State by authority  of law and  yet  nobody will  say that any of the above laws authorise the   "taking of   possession"  of  the  property  within the  meaning  of article  31  (2) so that if such law does  not  provide  for compensation  the law will be unconstitutional   and   void. Take  the  case  of the Court  of Wards  Act.  It is a   law which authorises  the State to take possession of the estate of a disqualified proprietor and to manage  it for him.  The State   only   manages  the  estate on behalf  and  for  the benefit  of the disqualified  proprietor.  The  disqualified proprietor   does   not  appoint  the  State  or  any  State official  to  manage  his estate and he  cannot  dismiss  or discharge   the  manager  appointed  by  the   State.    The possession of the manager can hardly,  in such a  situation, be   described   as   the  possession  of  the  disqualified proprietor.  The disqualified proprietor is, therefore, in a sense,  deprived  of the possession of his estate   and  the State   takes  the estates m its possession. The same  thing may be said of the Lunacy Act. There is no transfer of title to  the State and, therefore,  there  is no  acquisition  of property   by  the  State.   This law,  however,  takes  the property   out  of   the possession of  the   owner  who  is adjudged  a lunatic.’ But nobody will say that the  Court of Wards Act or the Lunacy Act calls for compensation.     The   learned  Attorney-General  has  also   drawn   our attention  to  statutes,  namely, Act  XLVII  of  1950  (The Insurance  (Amendment)  Act, 1950) passed on the  20th  May, 1950,  and which has added several sections to the Insurance Act,   1938,  Act LI of 1951 (Railway  Companies  (Emergency Provisions)  Act,  1951),  passed  on the  14th   September, 1951,   and  Act LXV of  1951 (Industries  (Development  and Regulation)  Act, 1951) enacted on the 30th  October,  1951, in  support  of  his  contention. He points out that each of those laws is :strictly Speaking outside article 31 (5)  (b) and that the 663 result   of  our holding  that  the  taking   of  possession authorised  by those Acts fails within article 31 (2) so  as to  call for compensation will be    to prevent   imposition of  social   control   so   urgently   necessary   for   the protection  of the  larger  interests  of the society.   His argument is that the taking of possession authorised by none of  these  three Acts fails within article  31  (2)and  only illustrates  the exercise  of the State’s  police power.  As all  the three Acts were passed after the Constitution  came into  force  and  as they may be  challenged  in  future  an argument rounded on them will really be begging the question in debate before us. I, therefore, prefer just to note   the Attorney-General’s contention and pass on and not to base my decision  on consideration of any of those Acts.     Confining myself then to the illustrations given by me I think it is fairly clear from the foregoing discussion  that none  of  the  laws referred to above by  me  authorise  any "acquisition"  of  property  in  the  sense explained  above and   although   each  of  them  does authorise  a  sort  of taking of possession of the property yet nobody  can contend that  the taking of possession so authorised by  them  fails

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 52 of 59  

within  article  31  (2). In other words,   the  taking   of possession  authorised  by those laws does not amount to the exercise of the power of eminent domain but is the result of the exercise of police power.  It follows,  therefore,  that every   taking   of   possession  does   not   fail   within article  31  (2). What, then, is the  test  for  determining whether  a taking of possession  authorised by a  particular law  is a taking of possession in exercise of the  power  of eminent  domain or is a taking of possession in exercise  of the  State’s police power.  I have already referred  to  the nature  of  the State’s police power and quoted   from  some American  decisions  showing  that the State’s police  power extends not only to regulations which promote public health, morals  and  safety but to those which  promote  the  public convenience or the general prosperity. In its application to private property it, in some measure, resembles the exercise of  the  power of eminent domain. Thus the police  power  is exercised in the interest of the community and the power 664 of  eminent  domain   is exercised to  implement  a  public’ purpose  and in both cases there is a taking  of  possession of  private   property.   There  is,   however,   a   marked distinction   between the exercise  of these  two  sovereign powers.  According to Professor Willis at page 717   eminent domain   takes  property  for  use by the public or for  the benefit  of  the  public, while the  police  power  prevents people  from   so  using their own property   as  to  injure others. The  fundamental principle which is held to  justify the  exercise of police power is that no one  shall use  his property   or  exercise  any  of  his   legal   rights    as -injuriously   to interfere  with  or affect  the   property or   other   legal rights  of   others.  (See    Willoughby, Vol. Ill, p.  1775).  The  primary purpose of police   power is   protection   or  prevention  that   persons    may   be restrained  from  so  exercising their  private  rights   of property,   contract or  conduct as to infringe   the  equal rights   of  others or to prejudice the  interests   of  the community.   (Willoughby, Vol. III, p.  1783).    When   the State   finds   that   a   certain  public   purpose   needs fulfillment  and  then in order  to  implement  that  public purpose  the State takes possession  of   private   property on   its  own account after acquiring it or   even   without acquiring  it and having taken  possession  of the  property the     State  itself uses or utilises   the   property   or makes    it   over  to  a  third  party  to   do   so    for implementing  that     public purpose which  the  State  has taken upon’ itself to serve  and for which  the property was taken  possession of or acquired the State is said  to  have exercised  its  power of eminent domain.  This   power   can only   be  exercised under a and that law must  provide  for compensation.  The point to note is that in such a case  the public purpose is one which the State has set out to  fulfil as its own obligation and the State takes  possession on its own account to discharge its own obligation. In police power the State  destroys  or  extinguishes  or takes   possession of property  in order to prevent the owner from indulging in anti-social   activities  or  otherwise   inflicting  injury upon  the  legitimate  interests  of other members   of  the community   either  by using his  property in  a  manner  he should not do or by omitting to use it in a manner 665 he  should   do.  In  such a case the State  steps  in   and destroys   or  extinguishes only  to prevent an  injury   to social   interest   or  takes possession  and  assumes   the superintendence  of  the property not on  its   own  account

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 53 of 59  

for   implementing   its   own  public   purpose   but   for protecting the interests  of the community.  It is  easy  to perceive,though    somewhat  difficult   to   express,   the distinction between  the two kinds  of taking of  possession which undoubtedly  exists.  In  view  of  the wide sweep  of the  State’s  police  power  it  is  neither  desirable  nor possible  to lay down a fixed general test  for  determining whether   the  taking  of  possession  authorised   by   any particular  law  fails  into  one  category  or  the  other. Without,    therefore,    attempting    any   such   general enunciation  of  any  inflexible  rule it is possible to say broadly   that  the  aim,  purpose  and the effect   of  the two kinds of taking of possession  are different and that in each  case    the  provisions  of the  particular   law   in question  will  have  to be  carefully  scrutinised in order to  determine    in  which category  falls  the  taking   of possession authorised by such  law.  A  consideration of the ultimate  aim,   the  immediate  purpose  and  the mode  and manner      of  the taking  of possession and  the  duration for  which  such possession is taken,  the effect of  it  on the  rights of the person dispossessed and other such   like elements  must  all  determine  the  judicial verdict.   The task  is  difficult  and  onerous but  the court  will  have to  hold  the scale  even between  the social  control   and individual   rights  and  determine whether,  in  the  light of  the  constitutional  limitation, the operation   of  the law  is confined  to the legitimate sphere  of the   State’s police  power   or whether it has overstepped   its   limits and  entered  into  the field of eminent domain. It is  only in  this  way  that  the  Court  serves   and  upholds   the Constitution    by   reconciling  the   conflicting   social interests.     In   the  light  of the foregoing  discussions  and  the conclusions   reached   by me I now proceed to  examine  the contention. that  the  impugned  section 7 of  the  amending Act   (VII  of  1950)   is  unconstitutional  ’in  that   it infringes  Subodh Gopal Bose’s fundamental right to property guaranteed by article  31.  The  argument is 6--95 S.C. India/59. 666 that  having purchased the entire Touzine at a revenue  sale the  respondent Subodh Gopal Bose had under the old  section 37 of the Act of 1859, acquired the valuable right  to annul the  under-tenures   and to eject   the  under-tenants   and that   he  had  actually  obtained a decree   for  ejectment but that he had been deprived of those vested rights by  the operation  of  section 7 of the amending  Act    which,   in effect,    gave   retrospective  operation   to   the    new section-37.   Assuming   that   the right  to  annul  under- tenures  and  to  eject under-tenants and  the   decree  for ejectment  come  within  the term  "property",  as  used  in article 31(2)  as to which I have considerable  doubts   the question   at  once  arises whether  they  have  been  taken possession of or acquired under the impugned Act. The  Touzi still  remains the property of the respondent Subodh   Gopal Bose.   He  can  realise  rents  and exercise  all  acts  of ownership  except   that  he  cannot exercise the  right  to annul  the  under-tenures  or  eject  any  under-tenants  or execute  the decree he has  obtained.  But  have these  last mentioned  rights  been taken  possession  of or acquired by the    State   within  the  meaning  of   article   31(2)  ? There  is  no doubt  that the State has not "acquired" these rights in the sense I have explained, for there has been  no transfer,  by  agreement or by operation of  law,  of  those rights  from  the respondent  Subodh Gopal Bose to the State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 54 of 59  

or  anybody else. The impugned law has  not   vested   those fights   in  the   State  or anybody  else   and  does   not authorise   the   State or anybody else  to  exercise  these rights.  Referring  to the position   of  the   shareholders under    the   Sholapur   Spinning   and   Weaving   Company (Emergency  Provision)  Act, 1950, Mukherjea  J.   said   in his  judgment  in   Chiranjitlal’s case (supra) at pp.  905- 906 :-   "The    State   has  not  usurped      the   shareholders’ right  to vote  or vested  it in any other  authority.   The State appoints directors of its own choice but that it does, not  in exercise of the shareholders’ right to vote  but  in exercise   of  the  powers  vested  in it by   the  impugned Act.  Thus  there  has  been   no   dispossession  ’of   the shareholders  from  their right of voting at all.  The  same reasoning applies to the other fights of the 667 shareholders   spoken  of above,  namely,  their  right   of passing resolutions and of presenting winding up  petitions. These rights have been restricted undoubtedly and may not be capable of being exercised to the fullest extent as long  as the  management  by   the  State  continues.   Whether   the restrictions   are  such as would bring the case within  the mischief  of article 19(1)(f) of the  Constitution   I  will examine presently; but I have no hesitation in holding  that they  do not amount to dispossession  of  the   shareholders from these rights in the  sense  that the rights  have  been usurped by other people who are exercising them in place  of the displaced shareholders."     The above reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to the case now  before  us.  The truth is that  these rights  have  not been  taken possession of or acquired at all in exercise  of the  power of eminent domain but have been extinguished   or destroyed   in  exercise  of  the  State’s police  power  to prevent public mischief and anti-social activities  referred to  in the objects and reasons appended  to the  bill  which eventually  became  the impugned law. In the  premises,  the respondent  Subodh Gopal Bose has  been  deprived   of   his "property",    if  these  rights   can   be   properly    so described, by authority  of law  and the  case fails  within article 31(1) and  not within article 31(2) at all.     If  the  impugned  section is  regarded  as  imposing  a restriction  on  the  right of Subodh  Gopal  Bose  to  hold property   then,   for  reasons  I have  mentioned,  I  hold such  restrictions,  in the circumstances  of this  case, to be  quite   reasonable  and permissible  under   article  19 (5).  If the impugned section operates as an  extinguishment of his right to property, treating the right to annul under- tenures   and to eject  under-tenants  and to  execute   the decree  for ejectment as property,  then,  in  my  judgment, these rights of the respondent Subodh Gopal  Bose  have  not been  taken  possession of  or acquired by the  State within the  meaning of article 31(2)  but he has been  deprived  of his  property by authority of law under article 31(1)  which calls  for no compensation.  In  the  premises,   the   plea of   unconstitutionality   cannot   prevail  and   must   be rejected.  I 668 would,   therefore, allow the appeal with costs  both  here’ and in the High Court.     GHULAM  HASAN  J.--I  concur with  my  Lord   the  Chief Justice  that  the view of the High  Court,  Calcutta,  that section   7   of   the  West  Bengal  Revenue   Sales  (West Bengal  Amendment)  Act,  1950,  is  void  as abridging  the fundamental  rights  of the first respondent  under  article

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 55 of 59  

19(1)(f)and (5) of the Constitution cannot be sustained  and I agree with the order proposed by him. JGANNADHADAS J.--l have  had  the  advantage  of reading the judgments of my Lord  the  Chief  Justice and of my  learned brother Justice S.R. Das.     On the assumption that the question raised in this  case is  one that arises under article 19(1)  (f) and (5) of  the Constitution--that   being   the   footing   on   which  the learned  Judges  of the High Court dealt  with  the  case--I agree  with  that  portion of the  judgment  of  my  learned brother  Justice  S.R.  Das which holds  that  the  impugned section  7  of the Bengal  Land-Revenue Sales (West   Bengal Amendment)   Act,  1950  (West Bengal Act VII of  1950)   is intra vires and  for  the  reasons stated by him.   A  larger      question has, however, been  raised  as  to whether this   is  a case  which falls  within the scope  of article   19(1)   (f)   and  (5)  or  article  31   of   the Constitution.  Since,  on either view,  we are all agreed as to  the  final result   of this appeal, I have  felt  rather reluctant  to go into     this larger question. But  out  of profound  respect  for my Lord  the  Chief  Justice  and  my learned brother  Justice S.R. Das  who  have dealt with  the matter  fully  and out of a sense of duty to  the  Court,  I venture to express my views briefly.   My Lord the Chief Justice is inclined to the view that the fundamental  right   declared in article 19(1)  (f)  has  no reference to concrete property rights but refers only to the natural  rights  and freedoms inherent in the status  ’of  a citizen.  Even  so,  with respect, I fail to  see   how  the restrictions on the exercise of those  fights referred to in article  19(5)   can be otherwise than  with  reference   to concrete  property  rights.   To  me, it 669 appears,  that  article 19(1) (f), while probably  meant  to relate   to the natural  rights of the citizen,  comprehends within  its  scope also concrete property  rights.  That,  I believe,  is how it has been generally  understood with  out question in various cases  these  nearly four years in  this Court and in the High Courts.  At any rate, the restrictions on   the  exercise of  rights  envisaged  in ’article  19(5) appear to relate--normally, if not invariably to    concrete property   rights.   To   construe ’article  19(1) (f)   and (5)   as  not   having  reference   to  concrete    property rights   and   restrictions   on  them  would   enable   the legislature   to  impose unreasonable restrictions   on  the enjoyment    of   concrete   property  (except  where   such restrictions  can  be brought within the  scope  of  article 31(2)   by  some process of construction).  As  at   present advised, I am unable  to give my assent to such a view. Now as regards article 31, I agree that clause (1) cannot be construed     as  being  either  a  declaration  or  implied recognition   of   the    American   doctrine   of  "’police power".   The  negative  language  used  therein  cannot,  I think  with respect, be turned into the grant,  express   or implied,  of  a positive power.   I need as   my  Lord   the Chief  Justice  has  pointed out in his judgment,  no   such grant  of  police  power is  necessary having regard  to the scheme  of the Constitution. That scheme,  as  I  understand it,   is   this.   The  respective  ’legislatures   in   the country   have    plenary   powers assigned   to  them  with reference  to the various  subjects covered by  the  entries enumerated  in  the  Lists of   the  Seventh   Schedule   by virtue   of  articles   245   to  255.  These   powers   are subject   to   the  limitation  under article  13  that  the power  is  not  to  be so  exercised  as  to  infringe   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 56 of 59  

fundamental    rights    declared  in  Part   III   of   the Constitution.   And,   therefore,   the   legislatures  ’can exercise  ’every power--including  the  police power,  ’  if it  is  necessary  to import that  concept--within  these  : limits, in so far as it is not provided for in article 19(2) to  (6)  and  article  31 (5) (b)  (ii)  or  other  specific provisions  in the  Constitution, if any. The  only  problem thus  presented  to  the Courts is not as  to  what  is  the extent of the police power, ’but as to what is the scope 670 and limit of the fundamental right which is alleged to  have been  infringed  by  legislative action.  I  agree  with  my learned   brother Justice S.R. Das  that  the   Constitution envisages  a  large  measure of social control  a  means  to achieve  the  goal  set  out in  the  preamble  and  in  the directive  principles enumerated  in Part IV. I am  also  of the  view  that  the Courts may  not  ignore  the  directive principles, as having no bearing on the interpretation    of constitutional        problems,      since    article     31 categorically  states  that  "it  shall  be  the duty of the State (including the legislature by virtue of the definition of ’State’  in Part III made applicable by  article 36)   to apply    these   principles  in    making   laws".    While, therefore,   I  agree   in  thinking   that   a  substantial measure    of  social   control   legislation   may   become necessary  in the fullness of time, that to my mind,  is  no reason  for  construing  article  31(1)   as  implying  some undefined  police  power, though such a  consideration   may have   relevance   in the determination of the  ambit  of  a fundamental right.    On  the  other hand, I am unable to agree with  the  view that  article  31(1)  has reference only  to  the  power  of Eminent Domain. I do not dispute that it comprehends  within its  scope  the  requirement of the authority  of   law,  as distinguished  from  executive  fiat  for  the exercise   of the  power  of  Eminent  Domain.  But it appears to me  that its scope may well be wider. This really depends on what  is the exact meaning to be assigned  to the word "property"  as herein used  and on  whether "deprivation"  contemplated  by article   31  (I)  is  in substance  the  same  as   "taking possession"  or  "acquisition"   contemplated   in   article 31(2).   My   Lord the Chief Justice  is  inclined   to  the view  that  "taking possession"  or "acquisition" is  to  be construed   as   having    reference    to    and    meaning "deprivation"    or  vice    versa.    Undoubtedly   "taking Possession"   and "acquisition"   amount   to  "deprivation" but   the converse may not follow in the particular  context in  which  these  words and phrases  are  used.  With  great respect,   I  can  see  no  warrant  for  the   construction adopted  except  the   assumption  that  article  31(1)  and article 31(2)  refer to the same  and identical  topic of 671 eminent  domain  and  that they provide  for  the  different requirements   thereof,  i.e.,  the   requirement  authority of law under article 31(1)  and the requirements  of  public purpose    and  compensation  under article 31(2).   But  it appears  to  me that if in article  31  (2)    "acquisition" and   "taking   possession"   were meant  to  be  synonymous with  "deprivation"  already used in article 31  (1)   there was  no reason  to drop the use  of  the word  "deprivation" in  article  31(2)  and  to use other  words   and   phrases therein.  For instance, article 31(2)  may well have run  as follows.   "There  shall  be no  deprivation   of  property, movable  or immovable,  ............  for  public   purposes under   any   law ’authorising the same   unless   the   law

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 57 of 59  

provides   ........   " or  some  other  such   clause   may have been  suitably drafted. It  appears  to me that   while the    framers  of  the   Constitution   laid    down    the requirement  of the authority  of law  for  "deprivation  of property"   with  a  larger connotation,  they  limited  the requirement   of  payment   of compensation   to  what   may reasonably  be comprehended  within  the  concepts        of "acquisition"  and "taking possession".  With  respect,   to read   these  words  and  phrases in  article 31  (2)     as meaning the same  thing  as  "deprivation"  used in  article 31 (1) and to make the test of "substantial abridgement"  or "deprivation"   as   the  sine  qua  non  for   payment   of compensation  under article 31 (2)  is to open the door  for introduction  of  most,  if not all  the  elements  of  wide uncertainty  which   have gathered round  the  word  "taken" used   in   the  corresponding  context   in   the  American Constitution,   notwithstanding  caution  to  the   contrary which    my  Lord   the  Chief  Justice  has  indicated   in his   judgment.  I am inclined to think that it is in  order to  obviate  this  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution deliberately  avoided  the use of the  word  "deprived"   or "deprivation"  in article 31(2).     I am conscious of the principle that a Constitution  has to be liberally construed  so as  to advance  the content of the  right  guaranteed by it. But where, as in  this   case, there is, what appears, a deliberate choice of the  language used, and where it is not unlikely that having regard to the goal  that  the  Constitution  has 672 set  to  itself in Part IV, certain degree  of  caution  and restraint  may well have been intended as to the  limits  of the  right, the intendment of the language used has,  in  my opinion, to prevail.     On the other hand, I am unable to agree with my  learned brother Justice  S.R. Das  that  "acquisition" and   "taking possession"   in   article  31  (2)  have  to  be  taken  as necessarily  involving transfer  of title or possession. The words or phrases appear to me to comprehend all cases  where the   title or possession  is  taken  out of the  owner  and appropriated   without    his   consent  by   transfer    or extinction   or by some other process,  which in   substance amounts     to   it,   the   possession   in   this  context meaning such     possession  as the  nature  of the property admits  and     which  the  law  recognises  as  possession. This seems    to follow from the enumeration of  the classes of  property  in article 31 (2)  to which it  is  applicable and  also   by reason  of the  broader  consideration   that from  the  point  of view of the owner or  possessor   whose title  or  possession  is  appropriated, every such  act  of appropriation   stands   on the  same  footing.   That   the idea   of   transference   of  title or  possession  is  not necessarily to be implied by article 31 (2) appears to me to be  also  indicated by article 31 (5) (b) (ii),  which  more often  than  not,  would  cover  cases  of  destruction   of property.  Incidentally,  I may  mention that I am  inclined to  the view, in agreement with my LOrd the  Chief  Justice, that article 31 (5) (b) (ii) is an  exception to article  31 (2) and is intended to absolve  the  need  for  payment   of compensation  for  "acquisition"  or  "taking    possession" of   property  for  the purposes  specified   therein.   It, therefore,   seems   to imply payment of  compensation,   if such  "acquisition" or   "taking  possession"  of   property is  for  other purposes.     The  question  then  remains as to  what  is  "property" contemplated  by  article 31 (2), apart from  the  specified

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 58 of 59  

categories  included   therein  by    enumeration   in"  the ’phrase   "any  interest in, or in any company  owning,  any commercial   or industrial  undertaking.""  It  is no  doubt true that in a wide sense, property  connotes   not 673 only   a  concrete  thing--corporeal   or   incorporeal--but all  the  bundle of rights which  constitute  the  ownership thereof and probably also each individual fight out of  that bundle  in relation to such ownership. But  in the  ’context of  article 31 (2)--as  in the cognate  context  of  article 19 (1)(f)--the  connotation  of  the  word  is limited    by the    accompanying    words   "acquisition"   and    "taken possession".  Hence out  of the  general and wide   category falling   within         the   connotation   of  the    word "property",  only  that         which  can  be  the  subject matter  of "acquisition"  or  "taking possession",  is   the "property"    which    is  within  the  scope   of  ’article 31(2).   This   to my mind excludes,  for instance,  a  bare individual  right,  out  of the  bundle  of rights which  go to  make up property as being itself property  for  purposes of  article  31 (2),  unless  such  individual right  is  in itself recognised  by law as property or as an interest   in property--an    easement,   a   profits-a-prendre  and   the like--and  as   capable   of  distinctive   acquisition   or possession. Thus for instance in the case with which we  are concerned  in  the present  appeal,  the   right   to  annul under-tenures   cannot  in itself  be  treated  as property, for  it  is  not  capable  of  independent  acquisition   or possession.  The  deprivation  of  it  can only amount to  a restriction  on the exercise  of the rights as  regards  the main  property itself and hence must fail under  article  19 (1)  (f)  taken with 19 (5), according to  my  understanding thereof.     In  my view,  however, the word "property"  as  used  in article 31 (1) may have been  intended  to be  understood in a  wider sense and deprivation of any individual right   out of  a  bundle  of  rights  constituting  concrete   property may   be  deprivation  of  "property"  which  would  require the authority of law. I am aware of the  possible  criticism that in two parts of the same article the same word must  be intended to have been used in the same sense. While this  is a  normal  rule  of  construction,  it  can  yield  to   the requirement   of   the   context    arising    from     the’ juxtaposition   of  other  words  or   phrases. To my’  mind article 31 (1), though part of an  article is in essence1 an independent  provision to  some  extent overlapping with the requirements of the law 674 of Eminent Domain. It is on a par with article 21. It  seems to  me  to  serve a distinct purpose  over  and  above  that relating  to  the  law of Eminent  Domain,  viz.,   that  it relates  also  to deprivation  of  property other than  that which  may  fall  within the scope of article  31  (2).   It enjoins  that  such deprivation  shall not be brought  about save by authority of law.      In view of what I have said above, it follows that  the assumption  with which I have  started, viz., that this is a case  falling  under article 19 (1) (f) and (5)  is,  in  my opinion, correct.      In the result I agree that the appeal should be allowed with costs here and in the High Court.                                              Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant: P.K. Bose. Agent for respondent No.1: R.R. Biswas.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 59 of 59