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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KAUSHALIYA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/10/1963

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1964 AIR  416            1964 SCR  (4)1002  CITATOR INFO :  F          1978 SC 771  (22)

ACT: Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act,  1956 (104 of 1956), s. 20-"On receiving information", meaning of- Whether information could be from any source. Constitution  of  India,  Art.  14-Whether  Suppression   of Immoral  Traffic in Women Act, 1956, s. 20 gives  Magistrate uncandlised  power-Article  19-Whether s.  20  a  reasonable restriction.

HEADNOTE: The  respondents  in the above 6 appeals are alleged  to  be prostitutes carrying on their trade in Kanpur.  On receiving information  from the Sub-Inspector of Police who is  not  a Special  Police Officer, the City Magistrate issued  notices to  the  respondents under s. 20(1) of  the  Suppression  of Immoral  Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 to show  cause why  they should not be required to remove  themselves  from the  place where they were residing.  The respondents  filed their  objections  claiming that the  proceedings  were  not legally   maintainable.    The   Magistrate   repelled   the objections.  Their revision petitions were dismissed by  the Additional Sessions Judge.  The High Court allowed their re- vision on the ground that s. 20 of the Act offended Arts. 14 and  19(1)(d)(e)  of the Constitution of India.   The  State appealed  to this Court on certificates granted by the  High Court. Before this Court it was contended that the information  re- ceived by the Magistrate must be information received from a special  police officer designated under s. 13 of  the  Act. The  next  Contention was that in as much under  s.  20  the Magistrate acted in his executive capacity, his powers  were uncanalized,   he  is  conferred  with  power   capable   of discriminating  between  prostitute and  prostitute  and  he could  interfere on flimsy grounds in the lives  of  respec- table  woman and that the section offended against Art.  14. It was further contended that s. 20 imposed an  unreasonable restriction   on   girls  and  women  leading  a   life   of

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prostitution and hence it violated Art. 19(1)(d) and (c). Held  :  (i)  If the Legislature  intended  to  confine  the expression  "information"  only to that given by  a  special police officer, it would have specifically stated so in  the section.   The  omission  is  a  clear  indication  that   a particular  source  of information is not material  for  the application of the section.  Giving the rational meaning  to the  expression "on receiving information" it is  dear  that information may be from any source. (ii)The  Act  discloses  a clear policy  affording  a  real guidance  for  the Magistrate to decide  the  two  questions which  he  is called upon to adjudicate under s. 20  of  the Act.   He  functions  as a court and decides  the  said  two questions after giving full opportu- 1003 nity  to the alleged prostitute to respresent her  case  and examine  her evidence.  His decision is subject to  revision by the Sessions Court or the High Court as the case may  be. In  the  circumstances  it  is  not  possible  to  say  that uncanalized  power  is  conferred on the  Magistrate  as  an executive  authority  to  decide the  fate.  of  an  alleged prostitute in an arbitrary manner. (iii)     It is well settled that Art. 14 does not  prohibit reasonable  classifications for the purpose  of  legislation and a law will not infringe Art. 14 if the classification is founded   on  an  intelligible  differentia  and  the   said differentia  has  rational  relation to  the  object  to  be achieved  by  the said law.  There are pronounced  and  real difference  between a woman who is a prostitute and one  who is  not  and  between a prostitute who does  not  demand  in public  interest  any  restriction on her  movements  and  a prostitute  whose  action  in public  places  call  for  the imposition   of  restriction  on  her  movement   and   even deportation.   The  difference  between  these  classes   of prostitutes has a rational relation to the object sought  to be  achieved  by the Act.  Section 20 in  order  to  prevent moral  decadence in a busy locality, seeks to  restrict  the movements of the second category of prostitutes or to deport such  of them as the peculiar methods of their operation  in an  area may demand.  Section 20 therefore does  not  offend Art. 14. Begum  State, A.I.R. 1963 Bom. 17 and Shama Bat v. State  of U. P. A.I.R. 1959 All 57. (iv) The  reasonableness of a restriction depends  upon  the value of life in a society, the circumstances obtaining at a particular  point of time when the restriction  is  imposed, the degree land urgency of the evil sought to be  controlled and  similar  others.  ’The vice of prostitution has  to  be controlled  and regulated and one of the objects of the  Act is  to control the’ growing evil of prostitution  in  public places.   The restrictions placed by s. 20 are certainly  in the interest of the general public and as the imposition  of the  restriction is done through a judicial process  on  the basis  of a clearly disclosed policy the  said  restrictions are reasonable. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R.  759 and State of Madras v. V. G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597. (v)  Once it is held that the activities of a prostitute  in a particular area having regard to the conditions  obtaining therein,   are  so  subversive  of  public  morals  and   so destructive of public health that it is necessary in  public interest  to deport her from that place, them is  no  reason why the restriction should be held to be unrea sonable.  The decision of the Bombay High Court in Begum v. State,      is not  correct  to the extent it holds  that  the  restriction

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under     s.   20  encroach  upon  the   fundamental   right guaranteed under Art     19(1)(d)   and  (e).    Those   are reasonable restrictions imposed  in ’public. interest and do not  infringe the fundamental rights  under Art. 19(1)(d)  & (e) of the Constitution.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal  Appeals  Nos.  21 to 26 of 1962. 1004 Appeals from the judgment and order dated November 17, 1961, of  the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision nos.  322, 323, 324, 611, 612 and 613 of 1961. C.   B.  Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellant  (in  all the  appeals). J.   P.  Goyal, for the respondents (in Cr.  A.  Nos.  21-24 and 26 of 1962)- October 1, 1963.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO J.-These six appeals filed by certificates granted by  the  High  Court of judicature at  Allahabad  raise  the question of the vires of s. 20 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic  in  Women  and  Girls  Act,  1956  (104  of  1956), hereinafter called the Act. The  relevant facts may be briefly stated.  The  respondents are alleged to be prostitutes carrying on their trade in the City  of  Kanpur.  On receiving information  from  the  Sub- Inspector  of Police, who is not a Special  Police  Officer, the   City  Magistrate,  Kanpur,  issued  notices   to   the respondents under s. 20(1) of the Act to show cause why they should not be required to remove themselves from the  places where they were residing and be prohibited from  re-entering them.   The  respondents  received  the  notices  and  filed objections  claiming that the proceedings were  not  legally maintainable.  The learned City Magistrate repelled the said objections.   Against  the  orders  of  the  Magistrate  the respondents  went up in revision to the Additional  Sessions Judge  Kanpur but the same were dismissed.   Thereafter  the respondents  preferred  revisions  to  the  High  Court   of judicature at Allahabad and the said High Court allowed  the revision  petitions  and set aside the  proceedings  pending against the respondents in the Court of the City Magistrate, Kanpur.  The High Court held that s. 20 of the Act  abridged the fundamental rights of the respondents under Art. 14  and sub-cls.  (d)  and (e) of Art. 19(1)  of  the  Constitution. After  obtaining certificates for leave to appeal  from  the High  Court, the present appeals have been preferred by  the State. As  the argument turns upon the provisions of s. 20  of  the Act, it will be convenient at the outset to read it : Section  20. (1) A Magistrate on receiving information  that any woman or girt residing in or frequent- 1005 ing any place within the local limits of his jurisdiction is a  prostitute, may record the substance of  the  information received and issue a notice to such woman or girl  requiring her  to appear before the Magistrate and show cause why  she should not be required to remove herself from the place  and be prohibited from re-entering it. (2)  Every  notice  issued  under subsection  (1)  shall  be accompanied  by a copy of the record aforesaid and the  copy shall  be served alongwith the notice on the woman  or  girl against whom the notice is issued. (3)  The  Magistrate shall, after the service of the  notice

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referred to in sub-section (2), proceed to inquire into  the truth  of  the information received, and  after  giving  the woman or girl an opportunity of adducing evidence, take such further  evidence as he thinks fit and if upon such  inquiry it  appears to him that such woman or girl is  a  prostitute and  that  it is necessary in the interests of  the  general public that such woman or girl should be required to  remove herself  therefrom  and be prohibited from  re-entering  the same, the Magistrate shall, by order in writing communicated to  the  woman  or girl in  the  manner  specified  therein, require  her  after a date (to be specified  in  the  order) which shall not be less than seven days from the date of the order,  to  remove  herself from the  place  to  such  place whether   within   or  without  the  local  limits   of   Ms jurisdiction,  by such route or routes and within such  time as may be specified in the order and also prohibit her  from re-entering  the place without the permission in writing  of the Magistrate having jurisdiction over such place. The  first  question  raised  is  whether  the   information received  enabling  a Magistrate under s. 20 of the  Act  to make  the enquiry provided thereunder should be only from  a special  police officer designated under s. 13 of  the  Act. Section 13 of the Act says that there shall be for each area to  be  specified by the State Government in this  behalf  a special  police  officer appointed by or on behalf  of  that Government for dealing with offences under this Act in  that area.  The post of special 1006 police  officer  is created under the Act for  dealing  with offences  under  the Act, whereas s. 20 does not  deal  with offences.  That apart, the expression used in s. 20, namely, on  receiving information" is not expressly or by  necessary implication  limited to information received from a  special police officer.  If the Legislature intended to confine  the expression  "information"  only to that given by  a  special police officer, it would have specifically stated so in  the section.   The  omission  is  a  clear  indication  that   a particular  source  of information is not material  for  the application   of  the  section.   There  is   an   essential distinction  between  an  investigation and  arrest  in  the matter  of offences and information to the Magistrate :  the former,  when  dealing with women,  has  potentialities  for grave  mischief and, therefore, entrusted only  to  specific officers, while mere giving of information ’Would. not  have such  consequences particularly when" as we  would  indicate later, the information received by the Magistrate would only start  the machinery of a judicial enquiry.   We  therefore, hold,  giving  the  natural meaning to  the  expression  "on receiving information", that’ "information" may be from  any source. The next question is whether s.20 of the Act offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.  It is stated that the power  conferred on  the Magistrate under s. 20 of the Act is an  uncanalized and  uncontrolled  one,  that  he  acts  thereunder  in  his executive  capacity,  that the said section enables  him  to discriminate between prostitute and prostitute in the matter of restricting their movements and deporting them to  places outside  his jurisdiction, and that it also enables  him  on flimsy and untested evidence to interfere with the lives  of respectable  women  by holding them to be  prostitutes  and, therefore,  it  violates  Art.14 of  the  Constitution.   So stated,  the argument appears to be plausible, but a  closer scrutiny of the section and the connected sections not only, reveals  a  clearcut  policy  but  also  the  existence  of, effective  checks  against, arbitrariness. ; Let us  At  the

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outset scrutinize the. provisions of the Act.  The  preamble of  the  Act  shows  that the Act was  made  to  provide  in pursuance  of  the Intentional  Convention signed,  at)  New York  on May 9, 1950, for suppression of immoral traffic  in women and girls.  The short title of the Act 1007 says that the Act may be called "The Suppression of  Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956".  Though the  preamble as  well as the short title shows that the Act was  intended to  prevent  immoral traffic in women and girls,  the  other sections  of  the  Act indicate that it  was  not  the  only purpose  of the Act.  Section 2(b) defines "girl" to mean  a female who has not completed the age of twenty-one, s. 2(1), "woman"  to  mean a female who has completed the age  of  21 years,  s. 2 (e), "prostitute" to mean a female  who  offers her  body  for  promiscuous  sexual  intercourse  for  lure, whether in money or in kind, and s. 2(f), "prostitution"  to mean  the act of a female offering her body for  promiscuous sexual  intercourse for hire, whether in money or  in  kind. There  are provisions in the Act for punishing men  who  run brothels  and who procure girls and women for  prostitution, for punishing women and girls who seduce or solicit for  the purpose  of Prostitution in public places, for  placing  the rescued  women  and  girls in detention  in  protections  in protection  home  for closure of brothels  and  eviction  of offenders  from premises, for restricting the  movements  of prostitutes  and even for deporting them to  places  outside the  Jurisdiction of the Magistrate, Section  7(1)  provides for  the  punishment  of a prostitute,  if  she  carries  on prostitution in any premises Which are within a distance  of two hundred yards or any place of public religious  worship, educational institution, hostels, hospitals, nursing home or such other public place or any kind notified in that  behalf by  the Commissioner of- Police or the District  Magistrate, as  the  casec it may be.  Section 8 prohibits  seducing  or soliciting  for purpose of prostitution in any public  place or  within  sight of, and in such manner as to  be  seen  or heard  from,  any  public place,  whether  from  within  any building  or  house  or not, and makes  such  soliciting  or seducing an offence under the Act.  Section 18 provides  for the  closure of brothels and eviction of offenders from  the premises,  if  such premises are within a  distance  of  two hundred  yards from a public place mentioned in s. 7(1)  and are  used  or  run as a brothel by any  person  or  used  by prostitutes  for  carrying  on their  trade.   The  Act  was conceived  to  serve  a  public  social  purpose,  viz.,  to suppress  immoral  traffic  in women and  girls,  to  rescue fallen women and girls and to prevent deterioration in 1008 public morals.  The Act clearly defines a "prostitute",  and gives  definite  indications from which  places  prostitutes should  be’  removed or in respect whereof  their  movements should be restricted. With this policy in mind, let us now give close look to  the provisions of s. 20(1) of the Act.  The following procedural steps are laid down in s. 20 of the Act: (1) the enquiry  is initiated  by  a Magistrate on his receiving  the  requisite information  that  a woman a girl is a  prostitute;  (2)  he records the substance of the information; (4)     he  sends, along with the notice, a copy of the record; (5)  he   shall give the woman or girl an opportunity to adduce evidence  on two  points,  namely, (i) whether she is a  prostitute,  and (ii)  whether  in the interests of the  general  public  she should  be required to remove herself from the  place  where she  is  residing  or  which she  is  frequenting;  (6)  the

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Magistrate  shall give his findings on the  said  questions, and  on the basis thereof, he makes the  appropriate  order; and (7) the disobedience of the order entails punishment  of fine. It  is  argued that the enquiry is not in  respect  of  "of- fences", though disobedience of an order made thereunder may entail punishment of fine, and, therefore, the order is  one made   in  an  administrative  capacity.    The   expression "Magistrate" has been defined to mean a District Magistrate, a  Sub-Divisional Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate  or  a Magistrate  of  the first class specially empowered  by  the State  Government, by notification in the Official  Gazette, to exercise jurisdiction under this Act.  The definition shows  that special jurisdiction is conferred upon a  Magis- trate of comparatively high status who can safely be  relied upon  to discharge the onerous and delicate duties  inherent in  such jurisdiction.  The jurisdiction under s. 20 is  not conferred on such a Magistrate as a persona designata but is to  be  exercised  by him in his capacity  as  a  Magistrate functioning  within  the limits of  his  territorial  juris- diction.  The procedure prescribed thereunder, which we have analysed  earlier, approximates, as nearly as  possible,  to that  of a judicial enquiry.  The enquiry starts  on  infor- mation; notice, along with a copy of the record, is given to the alleged prostitute; she is given an opportunity to 1009 adduce evidence which necessarily implies a right to have  a public  enquiry,  to  engage an Advocate,  to  ask  for  the examination  of  the informant or informants and  to  cross- examine  them  and  to adduce her evidence,  both  oral  and documentary.  The Magistrate, on the basis of the  evidence, decides  the aforesaid two questions, and makes  a  suitable order  indicated  in the section.  The  right  with  respect whereof  the jurisdiction is exercised is an important  one. It is a fundamental right of personal liberty.  No right can be  more important to a person than the right to select  his or her home and to move about in the manner he or she likes. Even  depraved  woman  cannot be deprived of  such  a  right except  for  good reasons.  When the  Legislature  conferred Jurisdiction  on  a  Magistrate to decide  the  question  of imposing restrictions on such a right by following  judicial procedure,  it  is  reasonable to  hold  that  it  conferred jurisdiction on him as a court, unless the clear  provisions of the Act compel us to hold otherwise.  Indeed the analysis of  the section earlier made negatives any intention to  the contrary.   The fact that the enquiry does not relate to  an "offence  "  is  not decisive of the  question  whether  the Magistrate  is  functioning  as a  court.   There  are  many proceedings  under the Code of Criminal Procedure,  such  as those  under  ss. 133, 144, 145 and 488, which do  not  deal with  offences  but  still  it is  never  suggested  that  a Magistrate  in  making  an enquiry  in  respect  of  matters thereunder  is  not functioning as a court.   We  therefore, hold  that in the circumstances the Magistrate must be  held to  be acting as a court.  If the Magistrate is acting as  a court,  as  we  have held he is, it is obvious  that  be  is subject  to the revisional jurisdiction conferred under  ss. 435  and  439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   The  said sections  confer  ample authority on  the  courts  mentioned therein to set right improper orders passed by a  Magistrate in appropriate cases.  The result of the discussion is  that the Act discloses a clear policy affording a real guide  for the  Magistrate  to  decide the two questions  which  he  is called upon to adjudicate under s. 20 of the Act.  He  func- tions  as a court and decides the said two  questions  after

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giving full opportunity to the alleged prostitute to  repre- sent  her  case and examine her evidence.  His  decision  is subject to revision by the Sessions Court or the High 1010 Court, as the case may be.  In the circumstances it is  riot possible  to say that uncanalised power is conferred on  the Magistrate  as an executive authority to decide the fate  of an alleged prostitute in an arbitrary manner. The next question is whether the policy so disclosed offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.  It has been well settled  that Art. 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification for  the purpose  of legislation and that a law would not be held  to infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution if the.  classification is  founded  on  an intelligible differentia  and  the  said differentia has a rational relation to the object sought  to be  achieved  by the said law.  The  differences  between  a woman  who  is  a prostitute and one who  is  not  certainly justify  their being placed in different classes.   So  too, there are obvious differences between a prostitute who is  a public  nuisance  and  one who is  not.   A  prostitute  who carries on her trade on the sly or in the unfrequented  part of the town or in a town with a sparse population may not be so dangerous to public health or morals as a prostitute  who lives  in a busy locality or in an overcrowded town or in  a place  within  the easy reach of  public  institutions  like religious  an  educational institutions.  Though  both  sell their  bodies,  the  latter is far more:  dangerous  to  the public,  particularly to the younger generation  during  the emotional   stage   of  their  life.    Their   freedom   of uncontrolled  movement  in  a crowded -locality  or  in  the vicinity of public institutions not only helps to demoralise the  public morals, but, what is worse, to  spread  diseases not  only  affecting the present generation,  but  also  the future ones.  Such trade in public may also lead to scandals and  unseemly broils.  There are, therefore, pronounced  and real differences between a woman who is a prostitute and one who is not, and between a prostitute, who does not demand in public  interests  any restrictions on her movements  and  a prostitute,  whose  actions in public places  call  for  the imposition  of  restrictions  on  her  movements  and   even deportation.   The  object of the Act, as has  already  been noticed is not only to suppress immoral traffic in women and girls,  but  also  to improve  public  morals  by  removing. prostitutes  from  busy public  places in  the  vicinity  of religious   and  educational.,  tutions.   The   differences between these two- classes of 1011 stitutes have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.  Section 20, in order to prevent  moral decadence  in  a  busy  locality,  seeks  to  restrict   the movements  of  the  second category of  prostitutes  and  to deport  such  of  them  as the  peculiar  methods  of  their operation in area may demand. judicial decisions arising under the Act and under analogous Acts  were  cited  at  the  Bar.   The  question  whether  a particular provisions offends Art. 14 of the Constitution or not  depends  upon the provisions of the  Act  wherein  that section appears.  The decisions oil other Acts do not afford any  guidance to decide the Vires of s. 20 of the  Act.   We shall, therefore, briefly notice the decisions which have  a direct bearing on s. 20 of the Act. A  Division  Bench  of the Bombay High Court,  in  Begum  v. State(1)   bad to consider the same question now before  us. It held that the provisions of s. 20 of the Act would not be bit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, though it held that  the

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provisions of s. 20 of the Act which enable a Magistrate  to direct  a prostitute to remove herself from the place  where she  is residing to a place without the local limits of  his jurisdiction   was  an  unresonable  restriction  upon   the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(d) and (e)  of the Constitution.  We agree with the High Court in so far as it  held  that the section does not offend Art.  14  of  the Constitution, but we cannot accept the view expressed by  it in  respect  of  Art. 19(1)(d) and (e)  thereof.   We  shall consider this aspect at a later stage. In  Shama  Bai v. State of U. P. (2), Sabai  J.,  though  he dismissed  the  writ petition without giving notice  to  the other party, made some observations indicating his view that the  said  provision  prima facie offends  Art.  14  of  the Constitution.   For the reasons already stated by us, we  do not agree with this view.  We, therefore, hold that s. 20 of the Act does not infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution. Now coming to Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution, the question that arises is whether s. 20 of the Act imposes  an unreasonable  restriction on girls and women leading a  life of prostitution.  To state it differently, (1) A.I.R. 1963 Bom. 17. (2) A.I.R. 1959 All. 57 1012 does s. 20 of the Act impose reasonable restrictions on  the exercise  of the fundamental right of the prostitutes  under Art.  19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution in the  interests of  the general public.  Under Art. 19(1)(d) the  prostitute has  a fundamental right to move freely throughout the  ter- ritory of India; and under sub-cl.(e) thereof to reside  and settle  in any part of the territory of India.  Under s.  20 of  the Act the Magistrate can compel her to remove  herself from place where she is residing or which she is frequenting to  places  within  or  without  the  local  limits  of  his jurisdiction by such route or routes and within such time as may  be  specified in the order and prohibit  her  from  re- entering the place without his permission in writing.   This is certainly a restriction on a citizen’s fundamental  right under Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution.  Whether  a restriction  is reasonable in the interests or  the  general public cannot be answered on a priori reasoning; it  depends upon  the peculiar circumstances of each case.  Mahajan  J., as  he then was, speaking for the Court in Chintaman Rao  v. The  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh(1)  succinctly  defined  the expression "reasonable restrictions" thus : "The-   phrase   "reasonable   restriction"   connotes   the limitation  imposed  on a person in enjoyment of  the  right should  not be arbitrary or of an excessive  nature,  beyond what  is required in the interests of the public.  The  word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates." A fairly exhaustive test to  ascertain the reasonableness of a  provision is given by Patanjali Sastri C.J. in The  State of  Madras  v.  V. G. Row(2).   Therein  the  learned  Chief justice observed thus : "It  is important in this context to bear in mind  that  the test  of  reasonableness,  wherever  prescribed)  should  be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be  laid down  as applicable to all cases.  The nature of  the  right alleged  to have been infringed, the underlying  purpose  of the restrictions               (1) [1950] S.C.R. 759, 763. (2) [1952]_ S.C.R. 597, 607. 1013

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imposed,  the  extent and urgency of the evil sought  to  be remedied  thereby, the disproportion of the imposition,  the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict." If we may say so, with respect, this passage summarized  the law on the subject fully and precisely.  The  reasonableness of  a  restriction  depends upon the values  of  life  in  a society,  the circumstances obtaining at a particular  point of time when the restriction is imposed, the degree and  the urgency  of  the evil sought to be  controlled  and  similar others. If   in   a  particular  locality  the   vice   of prostitution isendemic degrading        those who  live by prostitutionand  demoralising others who  come  into contact with them, the Legislature may have to impose severe restrictions  on the right of the prostitute to  move  about and  to  live  in a house ’of her choice.  If  the  evil  is rampant,  it may also be necessary to provide for  deporting the  worst  of them from the area of their  operation.   The magnitude  of  the evil and the urgency of  the  reform  may require  such drastic remedies.  It cannot be gainsaid  that the vice of prostitution is rampant in various parts of  the country.   There cannot be two views on the question of  its control and regulation.  One of the objects of the Act is to control  the growing evil of prostitution in public  places. Under s. 20 of the Act the freedom of movement and residence are regulated, but, as we have stated earlier, an  effective and  safe  Judicial machinery is provided to carry  out  the objects of the Act.  The said restrictions placed upon  them are certainly in the interests of the general public and, as the  imposition  of  the  restrictions  is  done  through  a judicial process on the basis of a clearly disclosed policy, the said restrictions are clearly reasonable. It is said that the restrictions on prostitutes, though they may be necessary, are excessive and beyond the  requirements the  eradication  of  the evil demands.   The  movements  of prostitutes,  the argument proceeds, maybe  controlled,  but that  part  of the section which enables the  Magistrate  to deport them outside his jurisdiction is far in excess of the requirements.   It is suggested that by  consecutive  orders made by various Magistrates, the point may be reached when a prostitute may be deported out of India. 1014 The second argument borders on fantasy.  The first  argument also  has  no force.  If the presence of a prostitute  in  a locality  within  the  Jurisdiction of a  Magistrate  has  a demoralising  influence  on  the public  of  that  locality, having regard to the density of population, the existence of schools,  colleges  and other public  institutions  in  that locality  and  other similar causes, we (lo not see  how  an order  of deportation may not be necessary to curb the  evil and to improve the public morals.  Once it is held that  the activities  of  a prostitute in a  particular  area,  having regard   to  the  conditions  obtaining  therein,   are   so subversive  of public morals anti so destructive  of  Public health that it is necessary in public interest to deport her from  that  place,  we  do  not  see  any  reason  why   the restrictions  should  be held to be  unreasonable.   Whether deportation  out  of the jurisdiction of the  Magistrate  is necessary or not depends upon the facts of each case and the degree of the demoralizing influence a particular prostitute is exercising in a particular locality.  If in a  particular case  a  Magistrate goes out of the way and makes  an  order which  is  clearly disproportionate to  the  evil  influence exercised  by a particular prostitute, she has a  remedy  by way of revision to an appropriate court.

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The  Division  Bench of the Bombay High Court  in  Begum  v. State(1) no doubt held that the portion of s. 20 of the  Act which  enables  the  Magistrate to direct  a  prostitute  to remove herself from the place where she is living to a place without  the local limits of his  jurisdiction  unreasonably encroaches upon the fundamental right guaranteed under  Art. 19(1)(d)  and  (e) of the Constitution  and  is,  therefore, invalid.   For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot  agree  with this view. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of s. 20 of the  Act are  reasonable  restrictions  imposed  in  public  interest within  the  meaning of s. 19(5) of  the  Constitution  and, therefore,  do  not infringe the fundamental rights  of  the respondents under Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) thereof. In  the result, the appeals are allowed.  The orders of  the High  Court  are  set  aside and  those  of  the  Additional Sessions  judge are restored.  The City Magistrate will  now proceed with the enquiry on merits. Appeals allowed. (1) A.I.R. 1963 Bom. 17. India/64-16-1 -65-2500 1