17 March 1954
Supreme Court
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THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD., BHILWARA AND OTHERS.

Bench: MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ),MUKHERJEA, B.K.,DAS, SUDHI RANJAN,BOSE, VIVIAN,HASAN, GHULAM
Case number: Appeal (civil) 103 of 1952


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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD., BHILWARA AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/03/1954

BENCH: HASAN, GHULAM BENCH: HASAN, GHULAM MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BOSE, VIVIAN

CITATION:  1954 AIR  396            1954 SCR 1229

ACT:   Industrial  Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1,947), s. 7(3)  (a), and  (b)  as  amended by s. 34 of  the  Industrial  Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950)- A Judge of a High Court  and a District Judge-whether includes a Judge of  the High  Court  and  a District Judge in the  former  State  of Jodhpur.

HEADNOTE:     Held,  that under s. 7(3) (a) and (b) of the  Industrial Disputes  Act  (XIV  of 1947) as amended by  s.  34  of  the Industrial  Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal)  Act  (XLVIII  of 1950)  the  phrase "a Judge of a High Court and  a  District Judge"  includes a Judge of the High ,Court and  a  District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPFLLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 103 of 1952.    Appeal  under article 133(1) (c) of the  Constitution  of India-  from the Judgment and Order, dated the 10th  August, 1951,  of  the  High Court of Judicature  for  Rajasthan  at Jodhpur   (Wanchoo   and  Bapna  JJ.),  in   D.   B.   Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 1951.     K.    S. Hajela, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, for  the appellant.    No appearance for the respondents.       1954.   March  17.   The Judgment  of  the  Court  was delivered by     GHULAM   HASAN  J.-This  appeal  is  brought   under   a certificate  granted  by the High Court of  Rajasthan  under article  133(c)  of  the Constitution  of  India  against  a judgment and order of that High Court in writ petition under article  226  holding the appointment of  one  Shri  Sukhdeo Narain  as invalid and directing that all proceedings  taken by  him  as  the Industrial Court under  section  7  of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act (No.  XIV of 1947)  are  null  and void.

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1130    We  are informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain has  ceased  to work  as  an  Industrial Tribunal and  the  present  appeal, therefore,  becomes infructuous, but we are invited  by  the Advocate-General on behalf of the State of Rajasthan who  is the  appellant  before us to decide the question as  to  the validity of the appointment, as it is likely to affect other awards made by tribunals under the Industrial Disputes  Act. We accordingly proceed to give our decision.    The  question  involved  in  the  case  is  whether   the appointment  of  Shri Sukhdeo Narain is invalid  because  he does not fulfil the qualifications laid down for a  tribunal under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.   Section 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Act says:-  "  Where  a  tribunal consists of  one  member  only,  that member,  and where it consists of two or more  members,  the chairman of the tribunal, shall be a person who- (a)  is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or  (b) is or has been a District Judge     .............................."   The  Industrial  Act  was  applied  to  Rajasthan  by  the Rajasthan  Adaptation  of   Central  Laws  Ordinance,   1950 (Ordinance  IV  of 1950), by the Rajpramukh on  January  24, 1950.   By this adaptation section 7 of the  Industrial  Act came  to be applied to Rajasthan.  Shri Sukhdeo  Narain  was appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notification which ran as follows:-   "In  exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.(XIV. of 1947) the  Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal consisting  of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge  of  the High   Court  of  the  erstwhile  Jodhpur  State   for   the adjudication  of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar  Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan.  "   The appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was objected to  by the respondent on the ground that, the 1131 words  "a  Judge of a High Court" in section 7(3) mean  "  a Judge  of  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  for   Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance,  1949" and  as  Shri Sukhdeo Narain had been a Judge  of  the  High Court  of the former State of Jodhpur, he could not be  held to  be  Judge of the High Court under section  7(3)  of  the Industrial  Act.   This objection was upheld  by  the  High Court.    Though  the  appointment of Shri Sukhdeo  Narain  in  the notification  was based upon the fact that he was a  retired Judge of the High Court of Jodhpur, in arguments it was also contended  before  the High Court that even if  he  was  not qualified for appointment as a former Judge of a High Court, he  was  certainly  qualified for appointment  as  a  former District  Judge.  The High Court repelled  this  contention. It  appears  that the United State of  Rajasthan  came  into existence  on April 7, 1949, and the United State of  Matsya was  integrated  with  it on May 15,  1949.   Section  5  of Ordinance No. IV of 1950 lays down that:   " For the purpose of the application of any Central law to Rajasthan, unless there be anything repugnant in the  suject or context,-   (ix)    references  therein to other civil,  criminal  and revenue   courts,   to  public  offices,  and   to   Judges, Magistrates,  officers or authorities shall be deemed to  be references to such courts, offices and Judges,  Magistrates, officers or authorities of or in Rajasthan.  "

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  The High Court held that the word "Rajasthan" as  defined in  Ordinance I of 1949 means the United State of  Rajasthan and  "the Judges an d other officers" mentioned  in  section 5(ix) must be held to be those in the service of the  United State of Rajasthan.  Accordingly they held that Shri Sukhdeo Narain  could not be held to be a District Judge within  the meaning  of  section  7(3) (b) and  his  appointment  as  an Industrial  Tribunal  under  that  section  was,  therefore, invalid.  We are of opinion that this appeal can be  decided on  a  short  ground.  The  Industrial  Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal)  Act (XLVIII of 1950) came into force on  May  20, 1950.   By section 34 it was provided that the 1132    Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, shall be amended in the  manner  specified  in the  Schedule  and  the  Schedule substituted sub-section (2) to section (1) of the Industrial Act as follows :-   "It  extends  to the whole of India except  the  State  of Jammu and Kashmir.  "     As  we  have  already stated  the  appointment  of  Shri Sukhdeo Narain was made on October 9, 1950, i.e., after  the Industrial Disputes Act had become applicable to  Rajasthan. It  is not necessary therefore to invoke the  provisions  of Ordinance.IV  of  1950  in  deciding  the  question  of  the validity of the appointment.  The argument based on  section 34  of  Act XLVIII of 1950 was put forward before  the  High Court  at  the time of the hearing of  the  application  for leave to appeal and it was contended that in view of section 34  the provisions of Rajasthan Adaptation of  Central  Laws Ordinance,  1950,  namely section 5, subsections  (vii)  and (ix), stood amended or repealed but the High Court  observed that  even if this argument had been raised before  them  in appeal,  it  would  have made no difference.   It  has  been contended  before  us by Mr. Hajela, the  learned  Advocate- General  on behalf of the State, that after  the  Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 was extended to Rajasthan by section 34 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act,  XLVIII of  1950,  the  provisions of the former  stood  amended  by section 34 and could not be read subject to section 5 of the Rajasthan  Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance IV of  1950. We  think there is force in this contention.  The effect  of section 34, as we have already indicated, was to extend  the territorial  application  of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947,  to  the  whole  of  India  including  Rajasthan   the exception  being the State of Jammu and Kashmir only.   This being  so the words "A Judge of a High Court and a  District Judge" used in section 7(3) (a) and (b) respectively of  the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947, must be held now to  include "A  Judge  of  the High Court and a District  Judge  in  the former  State  of Jodhpur".  There is now no  room  for  the application  of section 5 of Ordinance IV of 1950  according to which a Judge of the High Court 1133 and  a District Judge could only. mean a Judge of  the  High Court  for  Rajasthan established under the  Rajasthan  High Court Ordinance 1949 and a District Judge of or in Rajasthan within  the meaning of section 5(ix) of Ordinance No. IV  of 1950.   Accordingly  we hold that the  appointment  of  Shri Sukhdeo Narain was perfectly valid.    We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court  but without costs, as the respondent is not, represented.    Agent for the appellant: R. H. Dhebar.