09 July 1996
Supreme Court
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THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs RAJASTHAN AGRICULTURE INPUT DEALERS ASSN

Bench: PUNCHHI,M.M.
Case number: C.A. No.-004064-004064 / 1995
Diary number: 73844 / 1991
Advocates: Vs B. D. SHARMA


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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJASTHAN AGRICULTURE INPUT DEALERS ASSOCIATION ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/07/1996

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (6)   217        1996 SCALE  (5)51

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                  THE 9TH DAY OF JULY, 1996 Present:           Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.M. Punchhi           Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V. Manohar Aruneshwar Gupta, Adv. for the appellants G.L.Sanghi, Sr.Adv. Ravinder Narain, Adv. for M/s JBD & Co., N.K.Sagar, Adv. for B.D. Sharma, Adv. with him for the Respondents.                       J U D G M E N T      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered : The State of Rajasthan etc. V. Rajasthan Agriculture Input Dealers Association etc.                       J U D G M E N T Punchhi,J.      In Civil  Appeal Nos.4064  and 4065 of 1995, the common appellant is  the State  of Rajasthan  and in  Civil  Appeal Nos.4066 and  4067 of  1995, its ally, the Krishi Upaj mandi Samiti, Jaipur  is the  - common  appellant.  The  grievance voiced herein  by them is common and hence disposal of these appeals by a common order.      These appeals are directed against order dated 3.7.1990 passed by  a Division  Bench of  the Rajasthan  High  Court, Jaipur Bench,  allowing two  writ petitions preferred by the respective respondents  herein. Facts  giving  rise  thereto would require no elaboration, except reference to the barest minimal. The  respondents claim  themselves to be engaged in the business  of purchasing  and selling seeds. One of them, M/s Hindustan Lever Limited, in particular, raises and sells Bajra seeds, as claimed. According to the respondents, seeds cannot be termed to be agricultural Produce for the purposes of the  Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 and its Schedule,  as amended  from time  to time  by the  State Government in  exercise of powers under Section 40, enabling it to  add, amend or cancel any of the items of agricultural

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produce specified  in the  Schedule. It  is maintained  that seeds are  a processed  item  and  coated  by  insecticides, Chemicals and  other poisonous substances whereby the grains employed lose their use and utility as foodgrains and become unfit for  human or  animal consumption  or  for  extraction therefrom for  such consumption.  Since, as  claimed,  these were outside  the  ambit  of  the  expression  "agricultural produce  as  defined  in  Section  2(1)(i)  of  the  Act;  a definition inclusive  in nature  applying to produce whether of agriculture,  horticulture, animal husbandry or otherwise (emphasis supplied) as specified in the schedule, the demand of the  appellants in  requiring the  respondents to  obtain licenses for  engaging in  the trade of purchase and sale of seeds  was   uncalled  for,   as  well   as  the  threatened prosecutions, in  the event  of failure. The challenge posed by the respondents before the High Court was answered by the appellants maintaining  that foodgrains  of  all  sorts,  as mentioned in  the Schedule,  were seeds  per  se,  the  only exception  carved  out  from  the  items  mentioned  in  the Schedule being those relating to blue tagged certified seeds and white tagged certified foundation seeds; such exceptions having been  notified on May 16, 1980 by way of amendment to the Schedule,  in exercise  of the  State Government’s power under Section 40 of the Act.      The High  Court on  consideration of the entire Matter, took the  view that  when foodgrains of particular varieties were  treated   and  subjected   to  chemical   process  for preservation, those  grains  become  commercially  known  as "seeds". Reservation  was kept  however by the High Court to its statement afore-referred that in case a dealer was found dealing  in   foodgrains  under   the  garb  of  seeds,  the appellants, were not precluded from prosecuting the offender in a  Criminal Court.  In  sum,  it  was  ordered  that  the appellants stand precluded from requiring the respondents to take licenses under the provisions of the Act in relation to their business  of dealing  in seeds  of Bajra  or any other foodgrain,  as   well  as   restrained  from   realising  or recovering market  fees in respect thereof. Sequelly, it was ordered that  no licence under the Act was required for sale of such stands. this is how these appeals are before us.      Strong reliance  was placed  by Mr.  Aruneshwar  Gupta, learned counsel  for the  appellants on Kishan lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. - 1990 (Suppl) SCC 742 to contend that for the purposes of Section 2 (1)(i) and the Schedule of the Act, the  expression "agricultural  produce" is an inclusive definition which  could even  include processed  items  from foodgrains. Thus  processed foodgrains on becoming seeds, as alleged by  the  respondents,  would  all  the  same  remain foodgrains requiring  the respondents  to take license under the  Act.    Secondly,  it  was  urged  that  by  virtue  of Notification dated  16th  May,  1980,  certified  seeds  and foundation seeds  of a  description alone were excluded from the purview of the Schedule and no other seed.      We are  one with  Mr. Gupta,  learned counsel  for  the appellants, so  far as  the  definition  of  the  expression "agricultural produce"  being wide  and inclusive goes. But, then the  real difficulty  comes in  interpreting the  items mentioned in  the  schedule  as  to  whether  mention  of  a particular item  would ipso  facto mean inclusion of all its forms and  derivatives achieved by manufacture or processing or by some other method. On reading the schedule as it stood at the  relevant time,  we come to the view that such a wide interpretation to  the items in the schedule can in no event be given.  In Kishan  Lal case , Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar were brought in the Schedule as "agricultural produce"

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and the  argument that  these items  were  not  agricultural produce per  se, and  thus incapable of being brought in the Schedule, was  repelled because when a particular item finds way in  the Schedule  in that  form, it  stays there for all purposes as  long as  it is  in some  way referable  to  the purpose for which the Schedule is set up.      The Schedule applicable on the relevant dates discloses that Item  2 is  titled as Dhanya" (foodgrains). Serial No.1 thereunder is  Gehun (wheat).  Serial No.II  is Aata  (wheat flour). Serial  No.12 is Maida (refined wheat flour). Serial No.13 is  Suji and  Serial No.14  is Rava  (both  semilona). Similarly, Serial  No.2 is Jau Ghat Sahit (barley as also in the dehusked  form). Serial  No.6 is Dhan (paddy) and Serial No.7 is  Chawal (rice).  The scheme of serializing processed items in this manner is reflective of a positive application of mind  that not  only the  original foodgrains  which  are foodgrains  per   se  included,   but  their   products  and derivatives too  are mentioned specifically as "agricultural produce’ due  to its  wide  definition,  Noticeably,  Serial Nos.3 to  5 are  Jawahar,Makka and  Bajra but  only in their natural form  and not  in any other form. Going further down in the  Schedule Item  No.6 is  Phal (fruit). At Serial No.8 thereof is  Kharbuja (Musk  Melon) and Serial No.9 is Tarbuj (Water Melon).  Going to  Item No.II Vividh (Miscellaneous), one finds  at Serial  No.14 Tarbuj  Ke Beej  (Seeds of Water Melon) and  at Serial  No.16 Kharbuje Ke Beej (Seeds of Musk Melon). It  is thus  evident that  wherever any  produce  of agriculture, horticulture  or animal  husbandry or otherwise is sought to be inducted in the Schedule, other than what it is in  the natural  form, it  is given  a name  and identity distinct from  the corpus  from which  it came.  Mr.  Gupta, learned counsel, could not point out to us anywhere if seeds of foodgrains,  inclusive of Bajra seed, per Item No.II were specifically mentioned  as such  in the  Schedule.  Wherever seeds were  intended to be separately serialized, like seeds of  musk  melon  and  water  melon,  they  distinctly  found mentioned in  contrast to  the fruits,  from which they came but as distinct products.      It is  undoubtedly true that foodgrains per se could be used as  seeds for being sown and achieving germination, but in  that   form  they  retain  the  dual  utility  of  being foodgrains as  well as  seeds. By  process  of  coating  and applying insecticides, other chemicals and poisonous substances to food grain meant to be utilized as  seed, one  of its  basic character,  i.e.,  its consumption as  food by  human  beings  or  animals  or  for extraction for the like purpose, gets irretrievably lost and such processed  seeds become  a commodity distinct form food grains as commonly understood. that distinction was borne in mind by  the High Court in allowing the writ petition of the respondents, and in our view rightly.      The next  argument of Mr. Gupta, learned counsel, based on the Notification dated May 16 1980 must also fail because by excepting from the purview of the Schedule, certified and foundation seeds,  bearing tags  of particular  colours,  it cannot be  spelt out that words relating to foodgrains would automatically include  inferences. what  is meant to contain therein shall  be explicit  and categoric. Nothing stops the State Government to add suitable words therein to coney that foodgrains,  as   processed  for   seeds,  would   also   be agricultural produce  within the meaning of the expression " of otherwise"  occurring in  Section 2  (1) (i)  of the Act. since no  such exercise has been taken, the State Government cannot be  permitted to  achieve indirectly  which it  could have achieved  directly, by  being specific  in that regard.

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The High  Court  rightly  rejected  such  contention  raised before it by the appellants.      For the  foregoing reasons,  we find  no merit in these appeals. the  same are accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.