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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BALDEO PRASAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/10/1960

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) KAPUR, J.L. SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1961 AIR  293            1961 SCR  (1) 970  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1962 SC1371  (42)  R          1971 SC 481  (47)  R          1971 SC1667  (29)  RF         1982 SC 710  (60)

ACT:  Goondas,  Control and Exclusive of--Constitutional  validity  of enactment--Test--Central Provinces and Berar Goondas Act,  1946  (X  Of 1946) as amended by Act XLIX of  1950,  ss.  4,  4-A--Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1)(d) & (e), 13.

HEADNOTE:  By an order passed under s. 4-A of the Central Provinces and  Berar  Goondas  Act,  1946 (X of 1946), as  amended  by  the  Madhya Pradesh Act XLIX of 950, the State of Madhya  Pradesh  directed the respondent to leave the district of Chhindwara,  which had been specified as a proclaimed area under the Act,  and  the District Magistrate by another  order  communicated  the  same to the respondent.  The respondent challenged  the  said orders under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground  that  the  Act violated his fundamental  rights  under  Art.  i9(i)(d)  and  (e) of the Constitution and  was,  therefore,  invalidated by Art. 13 Of the Constitution.  The High  Court  held that ss. 4 and 4-A of the impugned Act were invalid and  since they were the  971  main operative provisions of the Act, the whole Act was  in-  valid.  Held,  that  when  a statute  authorises  preventive  action  against the citizens, it is essential that it must expressly  provide  that  the  specified  authorities  should   satisfy  themselves  that the conditions precedent laid down  by  the  statute  existed  before  they  acted  thereunder.   If  the  statute  fails  to do so in respect of  any  such  condition  precedent,  that  is  an infirmity sufficient  to  take  the  statute out of Art. 19(5) Of the Constitution.  Although  there  can be no doubt that ss. 4 and 4-A  of  the  impugned  Act clearly contemplated as the primary  condition  precedent to any action thereunder that the person sought to

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be proceeded against must be a goonda, they fail to  provide  that  the  District Magistrate should first  find  that  the  person  sought  to  be proceeded against  was  a  goonda  or  provide any guidance whatsoever in that regard or afford any  opportunity to the person proceeded against to show that  he  was  not a goonda.  The definition of a goonda laid down  by  the  Act, which is of an inclusive character,  indicated  no  tests for deciding whether the person fell within the  first  part of the definition.  Gurbachan  Singh v. The State of Bombay, [1952] S.C.R.  737,  Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District’ Magistrate,  Thana, [1956] S.C.R. 533 and Hari Khenu Gawali v. The Deputy  Commissioner of Police, Bombay, [1956] S.C.R. 506,  referred  to.  Although the object of the impugned Act was beyond  reproach  and might well attract Art. 19(5) of the Constitution, since  the  Act itself failed to provide sufficient safeguards  for  the  protection of the fundamental rights and the  operative  sections  were  thus rendered invalid, the entire  Act  must  fail.

JUDGMENT:  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 271 of 1956.  Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 2, 1955,  of  the  former Nagpur High Court in Misc.  Petition No. 249  of  1955.  M.  Adhikari,  Advocate-General  for  the  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  B.  K.  B.  Naidu  and  I.  N.  Shroff,  for   the  appellants.  R. Patnaik, for the respondent.  1960.  October 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by  GAJENDRAGADKAR.  J.-This appeal with a certificate issued by  the Nagpur High Court under Art. 132(1) of the  Constitution  raises  a  question  about  the  validity  of  the   Central  Provinces and Berar Goondas  972  Act X of 1946 as amended by Madhya Pradesh Act XLIX of 1950.  It  appears  that against the respondent Baldeo  Prasad  the  State  of  Madhya Pradesh, appellant 1, passed an  order  on  June  16, 1955, under s. 4-A of the Act.   Subsequently  the  District Magistrate, Chhindwara, appellant 2, passed another  order  dated June 22, 1955, communicating to the  respondent  the   first  externment  order  passed  against  him.    The  respondent then filed’a writ petition in the High Court (No.  249 of 1955) under Art. 226 challenging the validity of  the  said  orders, inter alia, on the ground that the  Act  under  which  the said orders were passed was itself  ultra  vires.  The  appellants disputed the respondent’s  contention  about  the  vires of the Act.  The High Court, however, has  upheld  the respondent’s plea and has held that ss. 4 and 4-A of the  Act are invalid, and since the two sections contain the main  operative  provisions  of  the Act, according  to  the  High  Court, the whole Act became invalid.  It is the  correctness  of  this  conclusion which is challenged before  us  by  the  appellants.  It would be convenient at this stage to refer briefly to the  scheme of the Act and its relevant provisions.  The Act  was  passed in 1946 and came into force on September 7, 1946.  It  was subsequently amended and the amended Act came into force  on  November  24, 1950.  As the preamble shows the  Act  was  passed  because it was thought expedient to provide for  the  control  of  goondas  and  for  their  removal  in   certain  circumstances from one place to another.  Section 2  defines

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a  goonda as meaning a hooligan, rough or a vagabond and  as  including  a,  person who is dangerous to  public  peace  or  tranquillity.  It would thus be seen that the definition  of  the  word  "  goonda " is an inclusive  definition,  and  it  includes  even persons who may not be hooligans,  roughs  or  vagabonds if they are otherwise dangerous to public peace or  tranquillity.  Section 3(1) empowers the State Government to  issue a proclamation that disturbed conditions exist or  are  likely  to  arise in the areas specified in  such  proclama-  tions if the State Government is satisfied that public peace  or tranquillity in any area is disturbed or is  973  likely  to  be disturbed.  The area in respect  of  which  a  proclamation  is thus issued is described in the Act as  the  proclaimed  area.  Section 3(2) limits the operation of  the  proclamation to three months from its date and provides that  it  may be renewed by notification from time to time  for  a  period  of  three months at a time.  The first  step  to  be  taken in enforcing the operative provisions of the Act  thus  is  that  a  proclamation has to be  issued  specifying  the  proclaimed  areas,  and the limitation on the power  of  the  State  Government to issue such a proclamation is  that  the  proclamation  can  be issued only after it is  satisfied  as  required  by s. 3(1), and its life will not be  longer  than  three months at a stretch.  Section 4 reads thus:  "  4(1).   During the period the proclamation  of  emergency  issued  or  renewed  under Section 3 is  in  operation,  the  District Magistrate having jurisdiction in or in any part of  the proclaimed area, if satisfied that there are  reasonable  grounds  for believing that the presence, movements or  acts  of  any goonda in the proclaimed area is prejudicial to  the  interests  of  the  general  public  or  that  a  reasonable  suspicion exists that any goonda is committing or is  likely  to  commit  acts calculated to disturb the public  peace  or  tranquillity may make an order-  (i)  directing such goonda to notify his residence  and  any  change  of  or absence from such residence during  the  term  specified and to report his movements in such manner and  to  such authority as may be specified ;  (ii)  directing that he shall not remain in  the  proclaimed  area  within his jurisdiction or any specified part  thereof  and shall not enter such area; and (iii) directing him so to  conduct himself during the period specified as the  District  Magistrate  shall deem necessary in the interests of  public  order:  Provided  that  no order  under  clause  (ii)  which  directs the exclusion of any goonda from a place in which he  ordinarily  resides shall be made except with  the  previous  approval of the State Government:  Provided further that no such order shall be     124  974  made directing exclusion of any goonda from the district  in  which he ordinarily resides.  (2)  No  order  under sub-section (1) shall  be  made  by  a  District Magistrate in respect of a goonda without giving to  such  goonda  a copy of the grounds on which  the  order  is  proposed to be made and without giving an opportunity to  be  heard :  Provided  that where the District Magistrate is  of  opinion  that  it is necessary to make an order without any delay  he  may  for reasons to be recorded in writing, make  the  order  and  shall, as soon as may be within ten days from the  date  on  which the order is served on the goonda concerned,  give  such  goonda a copy of the grounds and an opportunity to  be  heard.

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(3)  After hearing the goonda, the District Magistrate   may  cancel or modify the order as he thinks fit.  "  This section confers on the District Magistrate jurisdiction  to  make an order against a goonda if there  are  reasonable  grounds  for believing that his presence, movements or  acts  in  any proclaimed area is likely to be prejudicial  to  the  interests of the general public, or it there is a reasonable  suspicion that a goonda is committing or is likely to commit  prejudicial acts.  Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii)  indicate  the  nature  of  the  directions  and  the  extent  of   the  restrictions  which can be placed upon a goonda by an  order  passed  under  s. 4. Sub-section (2) requires  the  District  Magistrate to give the goonda a copy of the grounds on which  an  order  is  proposed  to be made,  and  to  give  him  an  opportunity  to  be heard why such an order  should  not  be  passed  against him.  The proviso to the section deals  with  an  emergency which needs immediate action.   After  hearing  the  goonda  the District Magistrate may  under  sub-s.  (3)  either cancel or modify the order as he thinks fit.  Section 4-A reads thus:  "   (1) Where the District Magistrate considers that with  a  view   to  maintain  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of   the  proclaimed area in his district it is necessary to direct  a  goonda  to remove himself outside the district in which  the  proclaimed area is comprised or  975  to  require him to reside or remain in any place  or  within  any area outside such district, the District Magistrate may,  after  giving the goonda an opportunity as required by  sub-  section  (2) of Section 4 forward to the State Government  a  report together with connected papers with a  recommendation  in that behalf  (2) On receipt of such report the State  Government may,  if  it is satisfied that the recommendation made by the District  Magistrate  is in the interests of the general public,  make  an order directing such goonda-  (a)  that  except in so far as he may be  permitted  by  the  provisions  of the order, or by such authority or person  as  may  be specified therein, he shall not remain in  any  such  area  or place in Madhya Pradesh as may be specified in  the  order;  (b) to reside or remain in such place or within such area in  Madhya Pradesh as may be specified in the order and if he is  not  already there to proceed to that place or  area  within  such time as may by specified in the order :  Provided that no order shall be made directing the exclusion  or removal from the State of any person ordinarily  resident  in the State."  Thus  an  order more stringent in character  can  be  passed  under this section.  The safeguard provided by the  section,  however, is that the District Magistrate is required to give  the  goonda an opportunity to be heard and further  required  to make a report to the State Government and forward to  the  State  Government papers connected with  the  recommendation  which the District Magistrate makes.  Sub-section (2) of  s.  4-A  then  requires  the State Government  to  consider  the  matter and empowers it to make an order either under cl. (a)  or  cl.  (b) of the said sub-section.  The proviso  to  this  section  lays down that Do order shall be made by which  the  goonda would be excluded or removed from the State where  he  ordinarily resides.  The last section to which reference may  be  made  is s. 6. It gives a goonda aggrieved by  an  order  made against him, inter alia, under s. 4 or s. 4-A to make a  representation to the State Government within the  976

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time  prescribed,  and it requires the State  Government  to  consider the representation and make such orders thereon  as  it may deem fit.  That in brief is the scheme of the Act.  At  this  stage it would be material to state  the  relevant  facts leading to the writ petition filed by the  respondent.  Appellant  1 issued a proclamation under S. 3 on August  10,  1954,  specifying the limits of Police Stations Parasia  and  Jamai   and  Chhindwara  Town  as  proclaimed  area.    This  proclamation  was  renewed in November, 1954  and  February,  1955.  Thereafter on May 9, 1955, appellant 1 issued  afresh  proclamation specifying the whole of the Chhindwara District  as the proclaimed area.  This proclamation was to remain  in  force till August 8, 1955.  Whilst  the  second  proclamation was in  force  the  second  appellant received reports from the District  Superintendent  of  Police,  Chhindwara,  against  the  respondent,  and  he  ordered  the  issue  of a notice to him to  show  cause  why  action  should  not be taken against him under  s.  4;  this  notice  required the respondent to appear before the  second  appellant on April 29, 1955.  The respondent, though served,  did  not appear before the second appellant.  Thereupon  the  second  appellant sent a report to appellant 1 on April  30,  1955, and submitted the case against him with a draft  order  for the approval of the said appellant under the first  pro-  viso to s. 4(1).  In the meantime the third notification was  issued  by appellant 1. The second appellant then  issued  a  fresh  notice against the respondent under s. 4 on  May  24,  1955.   The respondent appeared in person on May  30,  1955,  and  was given time to file his written statement  which  he  did on June 4, 1955.  The case was then fixed for hearing on  June  22,  1955.  Meanwhile the State Government  passed  an  order on June 16, 1955, directing that the respondent shall,  except  in  so  far as he may be  permitted  by  the  second  appellant  from  time to time, not remain in  any  place  in  Chhindwara  District.   This order was to  remain  in  force  until  August  8,  1955.   On  June  22,  1955,  the  second  appellant communicated the said order to the respondent  and  directed him to leave the District  977  before  10 a. m. on June 23, 1955.  The respondent  appealed  to appellant 1 to cancel the order passed against him.   The  first appellant treated the appeal as a representation  made  by  the  respondent under s. 6 and rejected it  on  July  9,  1955.   A  day before this order was passed  the  respondent  filed  his  writ petition in the High Court from  which  the  present appeal, arises.  The  respondent  challenged the validity of the Act  on  the  ground  that  it invades his fundamental rights  under  Art.  19(1)(d)  and  (e)  and as such it  becomes  invalid  having  regard  to  the provisions of Art. 13 of  the  Constitution.  This  plea has been upheld by the High Court.  On behalf  of  the  appellants  the  learned  Advocate-General  of   Madhya  Pradesh contends that the High Court was in error in  coming  to  the conclusion that the restrictions imposed by the  Act  did   not  attract  the  provisions  of  Art.  19(5).    The  legislative competence of the State Legislature to pass  the  Act  cannot  be disputed.  The Act relates to  public  order  which was Entry I in List II of the Seventh Schedule to  the  Constitution  Act of 1935.  There can also be no doubt  that  the  State  Legislature would be competent to  pass  an  act  protecting  the interests of the general public against  the  commission  of prejudicial acts which disturb  public  peace  and  order.  Section 3 of the Act indicates that it is  only  where the public peace or tranquillity is threatened in  any  ’given  area  of  the State that  the  State  Government  is

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authorised  to issue a proclamation, and as we have  already  noticed,  it is in respect of such proclaimed areas and  for  the  limited duration prescribed by s. 3(2) that orders  can  be  passed against goondas whose prejudicial activities  add  to  the  disturbance in the  proclaimed  areas.   Therefore,  broadly  stated  the  purpose of the  Act  is  to  safeguard  individual rights and protect innocent and peaceful citizens  against  the prejudicial activities of goondas, and in  that  sense  the  Act may prima facie claim the  benefit  of  Art.  19(5).  This position is not seriously disputed.  The  argument against the validity of the Act  is,  however,  based on one serious infirmity in s. 4 and  978  s.4-A  which  contain the operative provisions of  the  Act.  This  infirmity is common to both the sections, and so  what  we will say about s. 4 will apply with equal force to s.  4-  A.   It  is clear that s. 4 contemplates  preventive  action  being  taken provided two conditions are satisfied ;  first,  that the presence, movements or acts of any person sought to  be  proceeded against should appear to the  District  Magis-  trate  to  be prejudicial to the interests  of  the  general  public,  or  that a reasonable suspicion should  exist  that  such  a  person is committing or is likely  to  commit  acts  calculated  to  disturb public peace or tranquillity  ;  and  second that the person concerned must be a goonda.  It would  thus be clear that it is only where prejudicial acts can  be  attributed  to a goonda that s. 4 can come  into  operation.  In  other  words, the satisfaction of  the  first  condition  alone  would  not be enough ; both the  conditions  must  be  satisfied  before  action can be taken against  any  person.  That clearly means that the primary condition precedent  for  taking  action  under s. 4 is that the person  against  whom  action  is  proposed  to be taken is a  goonda;  and  it  is  precisely  in  regard  to this condition  that  the  section  suffers from a serious infirmity.  The  section does not provide that the  District  Magistrate  must  first come to a decision that the person against  whom  he  proposes  to take action is a goonda, and gives  him  no  guidance or assistance in the said matter.  It is true  that  under s. 4 a goonda is entitled to have an opportunity to be  heard  after he is given a copy of the grounds on which  the  order  is proposed to be made against him; but there  is  no  doubt  that  all  that the goonda is  entitled  to  show  in  response  to the notice is to challenge the  correctness  of  the  grounds  alleged  against him.  The  enquiry  does  not  contemplate an investigation into the question as to whether  a  person is a goonda or not.  The position,  therefore,  is  that  the District Magistrate can proceed against  a  person  without  being required to come to a formal decision  as  to  whether the said person is a goonda or not; and in any event  no opportunity is intended to be given to the person to show  979  that he is not a goonda.  The failure of the section to make  a provision in that behalf undoubtedly constitutes a serious  infirmity in its scheme.  Incidentally it would also be relevant to point out that the  definition  of the word " goonda " affords no assistance  in  deciding  which citizen can be put under that category.   It  is  an inclusive definition and it does not  indicate  which  tests have to be applied in deciding whether a person  falls  in  the  first  part of the  definition.   Recourse  to  the  dictionary  meaning  of  the word would  hardly  be  of  any  assistance  in this matter.  After all it must be  borne  in  mind  that  the Act authorises the  District  Magistrate  to  deprive  a  citizen  of his  fundamental  right  under  Art.

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19(1)(d)  and (e), and though the object of the Act and  its  purpose  would  undoubtedly attract the provisions  of  Art.  19(5)  care must always be taken in passing such  acts  that  they  provide sufficient safeguards against  casual,  capri-  cious or even malicious exercise of the powers conferred  by  them.  It is well known that the relevant provisions of  the  Act are initially put in motion against a person at a  lower  level  than  the District Magistrate, and so  it  is  always  necessary  that sufficient safeguards should be provided  by  the  Act  to  protect the  fundamental  rights  of  innocent  citizens and to save them from unnecessary harassment.  That  is why we think the definition of the word " goonda " should  have  given necessary assistance to the District  Magistrate  in  deciding  whether a particular citizen falls  under  the  category of goonda or not; that is another infirmity in  the  Act.  As we have already pointed out s. 4-A suffers from the  same infirmities as s. 4.   Having  regard  to  the  two  infirmities  in  ss.  4,  4-A  respectively we do not think it would be possible to  accede  to  the  argument of the learned Advocate-General  that  the  operative  portion of the Act can fall under Art.  19(5)  of  the  Constitution.   The person against whom action  can  be  taken  under the Act is not entitled to know the  source  of  the  information received by the District Magistrate; be  is  only  told  about his prejudicial activities  on  which  the  satisfaction of the District Magistrate is based that action  980  should be taken against him under s. 4 or s. 4-A.  In such a  case  it is-absolutely essential that the Act  must  clearly  indicate by a proper definition or otherwise when and  under  what  circumstances a person can be called a goonda, and  it  must  impose  an obligation on the  District  Magistrate  to  apply  his  mind to the question as to  whether  the  person  against  whom  complaints are received is such a  goonda  or  not.  It has been urged before us that such an obligation is  implicit  in ss. 4 and 4-A.  We are, however, not  impressed  by  this argument.  Where a statute empowers  the  specified  authorities  to take preventive action against the  citizens  it  is essential that it should expressly make it a part  of  the duty of the said authorities to satisfy themselves about  the  existence  of what the statute  regards  as  conditions  precedent  to  the exercise of the said authority.   If  the  statute  is  silent  in respect of one  of  such  conditions  precedent  it  undoubtedly constitutes a  serious  infirmity  which would inevitably take it out of the provisions of Art.  19(5).  The result of this infirmity is that it has left  to  the  unguided  and unfettered discretion  of  the  authority  concerned to treat any citizen as a goonda.  In other words,  the  restrictions  which  it allows to  be  imposed  on  the  exercise of the fundamental right of a citizen guaranteed by  Art.  19(1)(d) and (e) must in the circumstances be held  to  be  unreasonable.  That is the view taken by the High  Court  and we see no reason to differ from it.  In this connection we may refer to the corresponding  Bombay  statute the material provisions of which have been  examined  and upheld by this Court.  Section 27 of the City of  Bombay  Police  Act,  1902  (4  of 1902),  which  provides  for  the  dispersal of gangs and bodies of persons has been upheld  by  this  Court  in Gurbachan Singh v. The State of  Bombay  (1)  whereas s. 56 and s. 57 of the subsequent Bombay Police Act,  1951  (22  of  1951), have been  confirmed  respectively  in  Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District  Magistrate,  Thana  (2) and Hari Khemu Gawali v. The Deputy  Commissioner  of Police, Bombay (3).  It would be  (1) [1952] S.C.R. 737.          (2) [1956] S.C.R. 533.

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(3)  [1956] S.C.R. 506.  981  noticed  that the relevant provisions in the latter Act  the  validity of which has been upheld by this Court indicate how  the mischief apprehended from the activities of  undesirable  characters  can be effectively checked by making  clear  and  specific provisions in that behalf, and how even in  meeting  the   challenge  to  public  peace  and   order   sufficient  safeguards can be included in the statute for the protection  of  innocent’  citizens.   It  is  not  clear  whether   the  opportunity  to  be heard which is provided for by  s.  4(2)  would include an opportunity to the person concerned to lead  evidence.   Such an opportunity has, however, been  provided  by  s. 59(1) of the Bombay Act of 1951.  As we have  already  mentioned there can be no doubt that the purpose and  object  of the Act are above reproach and that it is the duty of the  State   Legislature   to  ensure  that  public   peace   and  tranquillity is not disturbed by the prejudicial  activities  of  criminals and undesirable characters in society.   That,  however,  cannot  help the appellants’ case because,  as  we  have indicated, the infirmities in the operative sections of  the  Act are so serious that it would be impossible to  hold  that the Act is saved under Art. 19(5) of the  Constitution.  There is no doubt that if the operative sections are invalid  the whole Act must fall.  In  the  result  the  order passed  by  the  High  Court  is  confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.                       Appeal dismissed.  982