REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8071 OF 2014

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

N. GANGARAJ .....RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

1. The State is in appeal aggrieved against an order passed by the

High  Court  of  Karnataka  on  25th August,  2011  whereby  the

challenge  to  an  order  passed  by  the  Karnataka  Administrative

Tribunal1 on  12th March,  2009  setting  aside  the  punishment  of

dismissal from the service imposed upon the respondent remained

unsuccessful.

2. The respondent was working as a Police Inspector at Mysore from

31st July,  1997 to 31st October,  1998.   On the complaint  of  one

Nirmala, the Lokayukta Police had laid a trap.  On the basis of a

criminal  complaint  lodged,  Crime  No.  15/1998  was  registered

against  respondent  in  Mysore  Lokayukta  Police  Station  under

1  for short, ‘Tribunal’

1

Section 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) under the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1998. A charge sheet against the respondent was

filed  in  the  Court  of  Special  Judge,  Mysore  for  the  offences

punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The said

criminal trial resulted in the acquittal of the respondent.

3.  In  addition  to  the  criminal  trial,  the  respondent  was  also

proceeded  against  for  the  misconduct  in  departmental

proceedings. The respondent was served with a charge sheet. The

respondent faced departmental proceedings on the following two

charges:

“1.  You, the Accused Police Officer,  Sri.  N.  Gangaraj, while working as Police Inspector in City Crime Record Bureau  of  the  office  of  the  Commissioner  of  Police, Mysore  City  from  31/07/97  to  31/10/98,  one  Miss. Chandrika resident of Nandanavana, Ulsoor, Bangalore City, has lodged a complaint dated 08/08/98 with Sri. Kempaiah, Commissioner of Police, Mysore City, against one  Mr.  Mahendra  of  Indiranagar,  Bangalore,  stating that he promised to marry her and taken her in car No. KA-05-9795 along with his friends and raped her.  She has  requested  therein  to  take  action  against  Mr. Mahendra and his friends.  The Commissioner of Police, Mysore  City  has  sent  the  said  petition  to  Police Inspector, City Crime Branch, Mysore for enquiry and to send the report.  You being a responsible Police Officer, shown utter misconduct in managing to obtain a Xerox copy  of  the  said  petition  through  illegal  means  and contacting the wife of the Driver of above said vehicle demanded  illegal  gratification  of  Rs.40,000/-  and negotiating the deal for Rs.20,000/- with instructions to the  party  to  pay  the  amount  on  27/08/98  at  your residence.

2.  Even though the petition of Miss. Chandrika, lodged with the Commissioner of Police, Mysore City was not at all concerned to you, you managed to get it’s copy with ulterior motto through illegal means and contacted Mrs. B.J. Nirmala wife of Mr. Sampathkumar, Driver of car No. KA-05-9795 by sending Mr. Puttaraju CHC 141 and Mr.

2

Shivakumar  CPC 22 to  Bangalore  and also  contacted the  above  parties  over  telephone  and  demanded Rs.40,000/- as illegal gratification for not including the car in the case.  When the parties were not agreed to pay, you negotiated the amount to Rs.20,000/-.  Being a responsible  Police  Officer  and knowing  fully  well  that accepting illegal gratification is against to Rule 7, 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of P.C. Act, you behaved in a way to bring down  the  prestige  of  the  department,  showing dereliction  of  duty,  utter  misconduct  and  an  at  of unbecoming of a Police Officer as well as a Government Servant.”

4. The respondent denied the charges.  The Deputy Superintendent of

Police, West Circle, Mangalore was appointed as the Inquiry Officer

(IO).  The IO returned a finding that the charges levelled against

the respondent  have been proved.   Thereafter,  a  second show-

cause  notice  was  issued  to  the  respondent.   Considering  the

contentions  of  the  respondent,  the  Director  General  and  the

Inspector  General  of  Police  passed an order  of  dismissal  of  the

respondent from service on 30th September, 2005.  The period of

suspension was ordered to be treated as the period of suspension

only.  The respondent filed an appeal before the Government which

came to be dismissed on 8th September, 2006.

5. Aggrieved  against  the  order  of  punishment,  the  respondent

invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  The Tribunal set aside the

order of punishment by holding that the criminal court on the same

set  of  facts  has  not  placed  reliance  on  the  deposition  of  the

witnesses,  therefore,  it  was  not  proper  on  the  part  of  the

Disciplinary Authority to rely upon such evidence to come to the

conclusion  that  the  respondent  has  demanded  an  amount  of

3

Rs.40,000/- and he settled for Rs.20,000/-.  The Tribunal further did

not agree with the findings of the IO or the Disciplinary Authority

that the charges have been proved as there is no charge on record

of receipt of Rs.20,000/-.  The Tribunal further held that the water

in which the hands of the respondent were washed, turned pink

due to  the ink of  the pen,  as  deposed by PW-3 Balaraju in  his

statement.  The High Court found that similar evidence has not

been accepted in criminal trial and that there are discrepancies in

the evidence of the witnesses which make it unreliable.  The High

Court  recorded  the  following  four  discrepancies  in  the

departmental proceedings:

“(i)  In  the  complaint  Smt.  Nirmala  says  that  on 26.08.1998 for the first time she met the applicant in his house at Mysore but in the deposition, she states that  she  went  to  the  house  of  the  applicant  on 27.08.1998 for the first time along with panch witness Saroja and the money was offered;

(ii)  If the evidence of PW.4 Puttaraju CHC 141 is to be believed, he and PW.5 Shivakumar CPC 22 went to the house of complainant Nirmala on 13.08.1998, whereas the evidence of PW.5 shows that both of them went to the house of the complainant on 14.08.1998.  According to  the  complaint  both  of  them  had  gone  to  the complainant’s house on 24.08.1998 and not earlier;

(iii)   According  to  the  complainant  she  had  given complaint in the first instance in English Written by her and later the present complaint, marked in the inquiry was got typed; the original complaint given in English has been suppressed.

(iv)   The  complaint  was  registered  on  27.08.1998 whereas  the  evidence  shows that  panch  witness  had been informed to come on 26.08.1998.  The complaint does not say anywhere that she had gone to the office of the Lokayukta Police on 26.08.1998.”

4

6. The  Disciplinary  Authority  has  taken  into  consideration  the

evidence led  before  the IO to  return  a  finding that  the charges

levelled against the respondent stand proved.  

 7. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the

Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error.

The power  of  judicial  review is  confined to  the  decision-making

process.   The  power  of  judicial  review  conferred  on  the

constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate

authority.   

8. In  State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.  v.  S. Sree Rama Rao2,  a

three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not

a court  of  appeal over the decision of  the authorities holding a

departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to

determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent

in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that

behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.

The Court held as under:

“7.  …The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over  the  decision  of  the  authorities  holding  a departmental  enquiry  against  a  public  servant:  it  is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that  behalf,  and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence,  which the authority entrusted with

2  AIR 1963 SC 1723

5

the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support  the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence….”

9. In  B.C. Chaturvedi  v.  Union of  India & Ors.3,  again,  a three

Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is

not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which

the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure

that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that

the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in

the eyes of  the court.  The Court/Tribunal  in its  power of  judicial

review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the

evidence  and  to  arrive  at  its  own  independent  findings  on  the

evidence. It was held as under:

“12.  Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power  of  judicial  review is  meant  to  ensure  that  the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the  conclusion  which  the  authority  reaches  is necessarily  correct  in  the eye of  the court.  When an inquiry  is  conducted  on  charges  of  misconduct  by  a public  servant,  the  Court/Tribunal  is  concerned  to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the  authority  accepts  that  evidence  and  conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is

3  (1995) 6 SCC 749

6

entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of  judicial review  does  not  act  as  appellate  authority  to reappreciate  the  evidence  and  to  arrive  at  its  own independent  findings  on  the  evidence.  The Court/Tribunal  may interfere where the authority held the  proceedings  against  the  delinquent  officer  in  a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would  have  ever  reached,  the  Court/Tribunal  may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.  Where  appeal  is  presented.  The  appellate authority has co- extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability  of  evidence  cannot  be  permitted  to  be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel  [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that  if  the conclusion,  upon consideration of  the evidence,  reached  by  the  disciplinary  authority,  is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”

10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar

v.  Shashikant S. Patil & Anr.4, this Court held that interference

with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such

authority  had  held  proceedings  in  violation  of  the  principles  of

natural  justice or in violation of  statutory regulations prescribing

the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article

226 of the Constitution. It was held as under:

4  (2000) 1 SCC 416

7

“16.  The Division Bench of  the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against  the  order  of  the  administrative/disciplinary authority  of  the  High  Court.  Interference  with  the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while  exercising  jurisdiction  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution if  such authority had held proceedings in violation  of  the  principles  of  natural  justice  or  in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of  such  enquiry  or  if  the decision of  the  authority  is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at  such  a  conclusion,  or  grounds  very  similar  to  the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is  that  if  there  is  some legal  evidence  on  which  the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya5,

this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court

and  reassess  the  evidence  led  in  the  domestic  enquiry,  nor

interfere  on  the  ground  that  another  view  is  possible  on  the

material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held

and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy

of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be

ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.

The Court held as under:  

“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in

5  (2011) 4 SCC 584

8

the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material  on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings  are  based  on  evidence,  the  question  of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence  will  not  be  grounds  for  interfering  with  the findings  in  departmental  enquiries.  Therefore,  courts will  not  interfere  with  findings  of  fact  recorded  in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based  on  no  evidence  or  where  they  are  clearly perverse.  The  test  to  find  out  perversity  is  to  see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts  will  however  interfere  with  the  findings  in disciplinary  matters,  if  principles  of  natural  justice  or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India - 1995 (6) SCC 749, Union of India vs. G. Gunayuthan - 1997 (7) SCC 463, and Bank of India vs. Degala Suryanarayana - 1999 (5) SCC 762, High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil - 2001 (1) SCC416).

xx xx xx

12. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt,  will  not  in  any  way  render  a  completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of  guilt  or  consequential  punishment.  The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different  from  the  standard  of  proof  required  in departmental  enquiries,  the  same  charges  and evidence  may  lead  to  different  results  in  the  two proceedings,  that  is,  finding  of  guilt  in  departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental  proceedings  are  more  proximate  to the incident,  in  point  of  time,  when compared to  the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will  have no effect  on previously  concluded domestic enquiry.  An  employee  who allows  the  findings  in  the enquiry  and  the  punishment  by  the  disciplinary authority  to  attain  finality  by  non-challenge,  cannot after  several  years,  challenge  the  decision  on  the ground  that  subsequently,  the  criminal  court  has acquitted him.”

9

13. In  another  judgement  reported  as  Union  of  India  v. P.

Gunasekaran6, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence

the  High  Court  cannot  act  as  an  appellate  authority  in  the

disciplinary proceedings.   The Court  held the parameters  as  to

when  the  High  Court  shall  not  interfere  in  the  disciplinary

proceedings:

“13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of  India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”  

14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent relies upon

the judgment reported as  Allahabad Bank  v. Krishna Narayan

Tewari7, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority

records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever

or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could

interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not

find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High

Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary

6  (2015) 2 SCC 610 7  2017 2 SCC 308

10

authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are

perverse.  The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct

has  been  interfered  with  only  on  the  ground  that  there  are

discrepancies  in  the  evidence  of  the  Department.  The

discrepancies  in  the  evidence  will  not  make  it  a  case  of  no

evidence.  The  Inquiry  Officer  has  appreciated  the  evidence  and

returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.  

15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry

officer and had passed an order of punishment.  An appeal before

the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has

been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power

of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere

with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if

the Courts  are the Appellate Authority.  We may notice that the

said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree

Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore,

the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from

patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly,

appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal and the High

Court  are  set  aside  and  the  order  of  punishment  imposed  is

restored.  

.............................................J. (S. ABDUL NAZEER)

11

.............................................J. (HEMANT GUPTA)

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 14, 2020.

12