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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF BOMBAY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ALI GULSHAN.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/1955

BENCH: AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA BENCH: AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA IMAM, SYED JAFFER

CITATION:  1955 AIR  810            1955 SCR  (2) 867

ACT: Constitution of India-Article 31-Public purpose-Bombay  Land Requisition  Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948), s.  C(4) (a)-Requisition for a public purpose of certain premises  by the State of Bombay-For ’housing a member of the staff of  a foreign  consulate’ -Whether the requisition was made for  a ’public purpose’ within the meaning of the Act.

HEADNOTE: Held,  that  the Government of Bombay  was  entitled,  under clause  (a)  of sub-section (4) of s. 6 of the  Bombay  Land Requisition  Act,  1948  (Bombay  Act  XXXIII  of  1948)  to requisition  as for a public purpose, certain  premises  for ’housing a member of the staff of a foreign consulate’. The purpose for which the requisition was made was a "public purpose" within the meaning of the Act; and the  requisition was  made  in this case more as a State purpose  than  as  a Union purpose. In any event "other public purpose", is a category  distinct from "Union purpose" and "State purpose" and the acquisition or  requisitioning of property by the State except  for  the purpose of the Union, is within its competence under item 36 of the State List. An  undertaking may have three different facets  or  aspects and  may  serve the purpose of a State, the purpose  of  the Union and a general public purpose.  Even if one may  regard the requisition of a room for the accommodation of a  member of  a consulate as one appertaining to a Union  purpose,  it does  not  necessarily  cease to be a  State  purpose  or  a general  public purpose.  Therefore on this view  also,  the requisition  in the present case must be held to  have  been validly made. Courts should lean against a construction which would render words in a statute mere surplusage.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 229 of 1953.

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Appeal  under  Article 132(1) of the Constitution  of  India from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th December 1952  of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 110 of 1952. M.   C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Porus 110 868 A.   Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant. Rajinder Narain for the respondent. 1955.  October 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRASEKHARA   AIYAR  J.-Was  the  Government  of   Bombay entitled, under’ clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section  6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act  XXXIII of 1948), to requisition , as for a public purpose,  certain premises  for  "housing a member of the staff of  a  foreign consulate"?,  is  the question we have to consider  in  this appeal, which has arisen out of a writ petition filed  under article  226  of the Constitution by the respondent  in  the Bombay  High  Court  to restrain the State  of  Bombay  from taking such action. On  the  bearing of the petition before Tendolkar,    J. the State succeeded on the ground that the purpose for which the requisition  was  made was a "public  purpose"  within,  the meaning of the Act.  But, on appeal, it was held that though the  requisition was for a public purpose,  the  requisition order  was invalid, ’as the public purpose must be either  a purpose of the Union, or a purpose of the State and in  this particular case the accommodation being required for housing a  member of a foreign Consular staff was a  Union  purpose, which was outside the scope of the powers of the State. Clause  (a)  of  sub-section  (4)  of  section  6,  omitting portions  unnecessary  for our present  purposes,  runs,  in these terms:- "The State Government may, by order in writing, requistition the premises for the purpose of a State or any other  public purpose, and may use or deal with the premises for any  such purpose in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient". The   validity  of  the  Act  is  not  questioned   as   un- constitutional  or  as beyond the scope of  the  legislative competence of the State.  As the premises were required  for housing a member of the staff of a Con- 869 sulate,  there  can  be no doubt that it was  wanted  for  a public purpose. The  ultimate source of authority to requisition or  acquire property  is  be found in arcticle 31 of  the  Constitution. The requisition or acquisition must be for a public  purpose and  there must be compensation.  This article applies  with equal  force  to Union legislation  and  State  legislation. Items 33 and 36 of List I & List II of the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution empower respectively Parliament and  the State Legislatures to enact laws with respect to them. The  reasoning by which the learned appellate Judges of  the Bombay  High Court reached their conclusion is shortly  this There  can be no public purpose, which is not a  purpose  of the  Union or a purpose of the State.  There are only  these two  categories to consider under the statute, as the  words "any other purpose" in the particular context should be read ejusdem  generis  with  "the purpose  of  the  State".   The provision  of  accommodation  for a member  of  the  foreian consulate  staff  is  a "purpose of the  Union"  and  not  a "purpose of the State". We  are  unable  to uphold this view  as  regards  both  the standpoints.   Item 33 in the Union Legislative  List  (List I)refers  to "acquisition or requisitioning of property  for the purposes of the Union".  Item 36 in the State List (List

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II)  relates to "acquisition or requisitioning of  property, except  for  the  purposes  of the  Union,  subject  to  the provisions  of  entry  42  of List III".   Item  42  of  the Concurrent  Legislative  List  (List  III)  speaks  of  "the purpose  of the Union or of a State or for any other  public purpose".   Reading the three items together, it  is  fairly obvious  that the categories of "purpose"  contemplated  are three  in number, namely, Union purpose, State purpose,  and any  other  public purpose. Though every  state  purpose  or Union purpose must be a public purpose, it is easy to  think of   cases   where  the  purpose  of  the   acquesition   or requisition,  is neither the one nor the other but a  public purpose.  Acquisition of sites for the building of hospitals or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a ’Public purpose, 870 though  it  will not strictly be a State or  Union  purpose. When  we  speak of a State purpose or a  Union  purpose,  we think  of  duties and obligations cast on the State  or  the Union to do particular things for the benefit of the  public or a section of the public.  Cases where the State  acquires or  requisitions  property  to facilitate  the  coming  into existence  of  utilitarian institutions, or  schemes  having public  welfare  at  ’heart,  will  fall  within  the  third category above.mentioned. With  great  respect,  we are constrained to  say  that  the ejusdem generis rule of construction, which found favour  in the court below for reaching the result that the words  "any other  public purpose" ’are restricted -to a public  purpose which  is  also a purpose of the State.,  has  scarcely  any application.   A  part from the fact that the rule  must  be confined within narrow limits, and general or  comprehensive words  should receive their full and natural meaning  unless they  are  clearly restrictive in their  intendment,  it  is requisite  that there must be a distinct genus,  which  must comprise  more  than  one species, before the  rule  can  be applie  If  the  words "any other  public  purpose"  in  the Statute  in  question have been used only to  mean  a  State purpose,  they would become mere surplusage;  Courts  should lean against such a construction as far as possible. Even  if it is conceded that the law contemplates  only  two purposes,  namely,  State purpose and Union purpose,  it  is difficult to see how finding accommodation for the staff  of a  foreign  consulate  is a Union purpose and  not  a  State purpose.  Item I 1 in the Union list specifies  "diplomatic, consular  and trade representation" as one of  the  subjects within  the legislative competence of Parliament, and  under article  73 of the Constitution, the executive power of  the Union  shall extend to all such matters.  It can  hardly  be said  that  securing a room for a member of the staff  of  a foreign   consulate  amounts  to  providing   for   consular representation,  and that therefore it is a purpose  of  the Union for which the State cannot legislate.  It was conceded by Mr. Rajinder Narain, Counsel for 871 the Respondent, that there is no duty cast upon the Union to provide accommodation for the consulate staff, and this must be so, when we remember that the routine duties of a  Consul in modern times are to protect the interests and promote the commercial  affairs  of the State which he  represents,  and that his powers, privileges and immunities are not analogous to  those of an ambassador.  The trade and commerce  of  the State  which  appoints  him with the State in  which  he  is located  are  his primary concern.  The State of  Bombay  is primarily  interested in its own trade and commerce  and  in

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the efficient discharge of his duties by the foreign  consul functioning within the State.  We are inclined to regard the purpose for which the requisition was made in this case more as a State purpose than as a Union purpose. In any event, as already pointed out, "other public purpose" is  a  distinct category for which the State of  Bombay  can legislate, as the acquisition or requisitioning of  property except  for  the  purposes  of  the  Union,  is  within  its competence under item 36 of the State List. There  is another way of looking at the  question  involved. An  undertaking may have three different facets or  aspects, and  may  serve the purpose of a State, the purpose  of  the Union and a general public purpose.  Even if one may  regard the requisition of a room for the accommodation of a  member of  a Consulate as one appertaining to a Union  purpose,  it does not necessarily cease to be a State purpose or a  gene- ral  public purpose.  In this view also, the requisition  in this case must be held to have been validly made. For  the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed and  the order of Tendolkar J. is restored with costs payable to  the appellant by the respondent throughout. 872