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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF BIHAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BASAWAN SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/03/1958

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. BOSE, VIVIAN BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  500            1959 SCR  195

ACT: Criminal  Law-Byibe-Trap-Testimony  of  the  raiding  Party- Reliability-Independent  corroboration-Whether-   essential- Whether   circumstantial  evidence  sufficient-Evidence   of Magistrate  interested in the trap-Evidence  of  accomplices and partisans-Reliability.

HEADNOTE: The respondent, a sub-inspector of police, was charged  with acceptance of Rs. 100 as a bribe from two persons, B and  P, for dropping a case which he had instituted against B  under the  Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,  1946.   The prosecution case was that when the demand for the bribe made by  the respondent could not be avoided, B and P  approached the  Anticorrosive Department, and it was arranged that  the respondent  should be paid at the police station  the  bribe money in the shape of currency notes produced by B and P and initialled  by M, who was in charge of  the  Anti-Corruption Department,  and that M, along with a Deputy  Superintendent of the Department and a first class Magistrate, should be at the  police  station  at the time  of  payment,  dressed  as ordinary  villagers ; that as soon as the amounts  in  notes were received by the respondent the officers disclosed their identity, that thereupon the respondent tried to throw  away the  currency  notes but that as a result  of  the  officers catching hold of his hands the notes were found in his  hand except  one  which  was missing and that as a  result  of  a search  made in the presence of two search  witnesses  later the  missing note was also found.  The respondent was  tried by  the Special judge who accepted the prosecution  evidence and  found  him guilty of the offence under s.  161  of  the Indian Penal Code.  On appeal to the High Court the  learned single  judge  who  disposed of the  appeal  held  that  the respondent  could not be convicted because (1) there was  no independent  witness  to  support the  testimony  of  the  " raiding  party " consisting of the two bribegivers  and  the three  officers, (2) the search witnesses did not prove  the transaction nor were they present at the time of the  occur- rence,  and  (3) the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur  Singh  v.

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State of Vindhya Pradesh, [1954] S.C.R. 1098, had laid  down an  invariable  rule  that  in  cases  of  this  nature  the testimony  of those witnesses who form what is called "  the raiding party " must be discarded, unless that testimony  is corroborated  by independent witnesses.  The State  appealed by special leave : Held,  (1)  that the evidence of the  two  search  witnesses provided independent corroboration in a material  particular to 196 the  testimony  of the raiding party,  because  the  missing currency note, one of the series testified to by the raiding party,  could be found where it was actually found  only  if the testimony of the raiding party was true. (2)that corroboration need not be by direct evidence  that the  accused  committed  the crime; it  is  sufficient  even though  it  is  merely by  circumstantial  evidence  of  his connection with the crime. Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, [1952] S. C. R. 377, followed. (3)that the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya  Pradesh, [1954] S.C.R. 1908, has not laid down  any inflexible  rule that the evidence of the witnesses  of  the raiding party must be discarded in all cases in the  absence of any independent corroboration. The correct rule is that if any of the witnesses are  accom- plices,  their evidence is admissible in law but  the  judge must  warn the jury of the danger of convicting the  accused on  the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice ;  if  the case  is tried without the aid of a jury, the  judge  should indicate in his judgment that he had this rule of caution in mind  and  give reasons for considering  it  unnecessary  to require  corroboration; if, however, the witnesses  are  not accomplices but are merely partisan or interested witnesses, who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must  be  tested  in the same way as  any  other  interested evidence is tested, and in a proper case, the Court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the  accused person.   If a Magistrate puts himself in the position of  a partisan  or interested witness, he cannot claim any  higher status and must be treated as any other interested witness.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 134  of 1955. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated’ January 13, 1955, of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 339 of 1953, arising out of the judgment and order dated May  22, 1953, of the Court of the Special Judge at Gaya  in Special Case No. 3  of 1952. C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A. K. Dutta     and S. P. Varina, for the appellant.  H.  J. Umrigar and Ratnaparkhi, A. G., for the respondent. 1958.  March 21.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 197  S. K. DAS J.-This appeal by special leave has been  brought by  the  State  of Bihar from the judgment and  order  of  a learned  single  Judge  of the High Court  of  Patna,  dated January  13, 1955, by which the learned Judge set aside  the conviction   and   sentence  passed  against   the   present respondent Basawan Singh and acquitted him of a charge under s.  161,  Indian  Penal Code, on which charge  he  had  been convicted  by  the  learned Special Judge  of  Gaya  by  his

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judgment and order, dated May 22, 1953. It is necessary to state here very briefly the salient facts of  the  prosecution  case.  One  Bhagwan  Das  (prosecution witness  no. 7) had a ration shop at a short  distance  from police  station Arwal in the district of Gaya.  One  of  the persons entitled to receive rationed articles from the  said shop  was Mahabir Prasad (prosecution witness no.  10),  who was  a  brother  of a businessman  named  Parmeshwar  Prasad (prosecution witness no. 11).  Mahabir Prasad held a  ration card  for  ten units, and on October 4, 1951,  he  purchased five maunds of wheat on the strength of his ration card from the  shop  of Bhagwan Das.  A cash memo was issued  for  the purpose,  and  the sale was entered in the register  of  the shop.  Mahabir Prasad carried the wheat in four bags on  two ponies.   He  himself went ahead on a cycle and  the  ponies followed him.  A gentleman named Ram Singhasan Singh, stated to be the Secretary of Arwal Thana Congress Committee,  sent an  information  to the police station to  the  effect  that Bhagwan  Das  had sold the wheat in what was  called  the  " black  market  ". On receipt of  this  information,  Basawan Singh, who is respondent before us and who was at that  time subinspector of police attached to the said police  station, instituted  a  case  under s. 7 of  the  Essential  Supplies (Temporary  Powers)  Act,  1946,  against  Bhagwan  Das  and Mahabir Prasad.  He seized the wheat which was being carried on  the  two  ponies, went to the shop of  Bhagwan  Das  and questioned  him about the transaction.  Bhagwan  Das  denied the   charge   of  blackmarketing  and  alleged   that   the transaction  was  a  bona  fide sale  on  the  strength  and authority of a ration 198 card.  He showed the duplicate copy of the cash memo and the entry   in  the  sale  register  to  the  respondent.    The respondent  then checked the stock of wheat in thee shop  of Bhagwan  Das  and  found that the  stock  tallied  with  the relevant  entry  in the, stock register.   In  the  meantime Mahabir  Prasad who had been sent for also came to the  shop with his cash memo and ration card.  These were shown to the respondent  who,  however,  arrested both  Bhagwan  Das  and Mahabir Prasad and took them to the police, station.  It was alleged  that at the police station the respondent  demanded Rs.  500  as a bribe from Mahabir  Prasad.   Mahabir  Prasad could not pay the amount, but said that he would consult his brother Parmeshwar Prasad and the latter would come and  pay to the respondent whatever sum was thought necessary.   Both Bhagwan  Das and Mahabir Prasad were then released on  bail. On the next day Bhagwan Das was called to the police station and  a  bribe Rs. 500 was demanded from him  also.   It  was alleged that the respondent told Bhagwan Das that if he  did not pay the amount, the respondent would harass him; but  if Bhagwan  Das paid the amount, the respondent would submit  a final  report  and  no case would be  started  against  him. Bhagwan  Das  expressed  his inability to pay  such  a,  big amount  and  it was alleged that ultimately the  amount  was reduced  to Rs. 300.  Bhagwan Das, however, did not  pay  it for  some  time,  and  the prosecution  case  was  that  the respondent took wheat from the shop of Bhagwan Das,  without payment of any price, between the date October 26, 1951, and November  30, 19 1 ;in this way, seven maunds and ten  seers of  wheat it was alleged, were taken by the respondent  from the shop of Bhagwan Das, though the sales were noted in  the sale register in the names of various persons.  On  December 1, 1951, the respondent, it was stated, agreed to accept Rs. 50  from Bhagwan Das in addition to the wheat already  taken by him, in full satisfaction of the demand of Rs. 300.

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When Bhagwan Das found that he had no other alternative  but to pay the amount demanded by the 199 respondent,  he  decided  to  approach  the  Anti-Corruption Department of the Government of Bihar.  One S. P.  Mukherji, Deputy  Secretary to the Government of Bihar, -was  then  in charge  of the Department.  Bhagwan Das met Mukherji on  two dates,  December 3, 1951, and December 5, 1951, and filed  a written  petition  to  him.  Mukherji sent  for  his  Deputy Superintendent  of  Police,  a  gentleman  named  Dharnidhar Misra,   who  was  also  attached  to  the   Anti-Corruption Department.   Bhagwan  Das  produced  before  Mukherji  five Government  currency  notes of Rs. 10 each, the  numbers  of which were noted in his written petition.  Mukherji put  his initials  on these notes and then returned them  to  Bhagwan Das.   Mukherji  then requested the District  Magistrate  of Patna to depute a first class Magistrate, and one Rudra  Dev Sahai  was so deputed.  It was settled that on  December  8, 1951,  at about 7 p.m. the bribe money in the shape  of  the initialled notes would be paid to the respondent, and it was arranged that Bhagwan Das would meet the officers from Patna on the canal road from Patna to Arwal at some distance  from the police station.  Nothing, however, happened on  December 8,  1951,  because the respondent was away from  the  police station.   On  the next day, that is December 9,  1951,  the officers  from Patna, namely Mukherji, Misra and Sahai,  met Bhagwan  Das  at  the appointed place  at  about  6.30  p.m. Bhagwan  Das then told the officers that  Parmeshwar  Prasad had  also  arrived there for paying Rs. 50 as bribe  to  the respondent  for  the  release of the wheat  which  had  been seized   and  which  was  still  at  the   police   station. Parmeshwar Prasad was then brought to Mukherji at about 7.30 p.m.  Mukherji  questioned him and  recorded  his  statement which  was  endorsed  by the Magistrate,  Rudra  Dev  Sahai. Parmeshwar  Prasad then produced five notes of Rs. 10  each, the numbers of which were also noted in the statement.   The notes  were  then initialled by Mukherji.  After  this,  the party  went  to the police station.  The  officers  who  had dressed  themselves  as ordinary villagers any posed  to  be relatives  of Bhagwan Das squatted on the ground a few  feet away 200 from  the  verandah  of the quarters  which  the  respondent occupied, and Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar Prasad stood on the steps  of  the  verandah  where  the  respondent  met  them. Leaving  out  details,  which  are  not  necessary  for  our purpose, what happened then was this.  Bhagwan Das paid  Rs. 50  in currency notes which the respondent took in his  left hand.   Parmeshwar Prasad also paid his amount in  notes  to the  respondent.   The  officers  were  then  called.    The Magistrate and the Deputy Superintendent of Police disclosed their  identity,  and  the Deputy  Superintendent  told  the respondent  that  he had received a bribe.   The  respondent tried  to  throw away the currency notes,  but  the  ’Deputy Superintendent  of Police caught hold of his left  palm  and the  Magistrate caught hold of his right hand.  There was  a scuffle,  and  the  respondent was  brought  down  from  the verandah  and was taken to an open place south-west  of  the police station.  Nine currency notes were found ’in the hand of  the respondent and they tallied with the  numbers  noted down earlier.  One currency note was not found till a search was  made by means of a petromax lantern in the presence  of two search witnesses, Ganesh Prasad (prosecution witness no. 5)  and Janki Sao (prosecution witness no. 4).   The  search was made at about 9 p.m. and the missing note was found in a

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crumpled  condition  in  the  southwestern  corner  of   the verandah.  A report of the whole incident was then  prepared by  the Deputy Superintendent of Police and handed  over  to the officer in charge of Arwal police station.  The case was then  investigated into by another Deputy Superintendent  of Police  one  Hasan  of  Aurangabad.   After  completion   of investigation  the  Deputy  Inspector  General  of   Police, C.I.D.,   accorded  sanction  to  the  prosecution  of   the respondent on April 1, 1952.  Thereafter, the respondent was tried by the Special Judge of Gaya who, by his judgment  and order dated May 22, 1953, found the respondent guilty of the offence  under s. 161, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced  him to rigorous imprisonment for one year only. It may be here stated that the defence of the 201 respondent  was  that in the case against  Bhagwan  Das  and Mahabir  Prasad, he had submitted a final report on  October 8, 1951, to the effect that there was a mistake of fact with regard  to  the allegation of black-marketing and  that  the case  should be entered as false-’, mistake of fact ",  This report was supported by the Inspector of Police,  Jehanabad, and accepted by the Sub-divisional Magistrate on October 19, 1951.  The respondent denied that he ever demanded any bribe from  either  of the two aforesaid persons or  that  he  had accepted as a bribe ten currency notes from Bhagwan Das  and Parmeshwar  Prasad  on December 9, 1951.  It  was  suggested that the officers did not actually see what had happened  on the  steps of the verandah and were, deluded  into  thinking that  nine currency notes were recovered from him and,  with regard  to the crumpled note found on the verandah,  it  was suggested  that Bhagban Das might have planted it,  when  he bowed down before the respondent The learned Special judge accepted the prosecution  evidence as  trustworthy  and rejected the defences  as  unworthy  of credences. Against his conviction the respondent filed an appeal to the High  Court  and  the learned single Judge,  who  heard  the appeal,  acquitted  the respondent on the main  ground  that there was no independent witness to support the testimony of the  " raiding party " consisting of the  two  bribe-givers, Bhagwan  Das and Parmeshwar Prasad, and the two  Magistrates and the police officer, namely.  Mukherji, Sahai and  Misra. The learned Judge referred to the decision of this Court  in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (1),  and he  expressed  the  view that that  decision  laid  down  an invariable  rule that in cases of this nature the  testimony of  those  witnesses who form what is  called  the  "raiding party"   must  be  discarded,  unless  that   testimony   is corroborated  by independent witnesses.  He then  posed  the question  if  there were any independent  witnesses  in  the present case, and observed- "  There  are no independent witnesses  on  the  transaction itself.  It was submitted, however, that there (1)  [1954] S C R. 1098. 26 202 are  search witnesses and they are independent; indeed  they are.   But they have proved nothing except this that at  the quarters of the appellant a ten-rupee note crushed was found and   a  few  other  articles.   They  did  not  prove   the transaction  nor  they  were  present at  the  time  of  the occurrence  itself.   The prosecution case depends  for  all practical purposes on the evidence of the witnesses who  are members of the raiding party." The  principal  questions which fall for  decision  in  this

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appeal  are: (1) whether the learned Judge is right  in  his view  that the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh (1),  lays down any universal or inflexible rule that the testimony  of witnesses  who  form the raiding party  must  be  discarded, unless  corroborated by independent witnesses; (2)  if  not, what  is the correct rule with regard to such  testimony  in cases  of this nature; and (3) whether the learned Judge  is right in his view that there is no independent corroboration of  the testimony of the witnesses of the raiding  party  in the present case.  But before we consider these three  ques- tions,  it is advisable to dispose of the findings  of  fact which  have  been affirmed on appeal or arrived  at  by  the learned  Judge.   In  his judgment  the  learned  Judge  has observed: "  The first point to be determined in this case is  whether Bhagwan  Das  was in fact, arrested in connection  with  the case  under the Essential Supplies (Temporary  Powers)  Act. That  has been well proved and it has not  been  challenged. It is also established that the appellant did arrest Bhagwan Das  as  well as Mahabir Prasad and that on  that  very  day Bhagwan Das was released.  It is also well established  that Bhagwan Das had gone to Mr. Mukherji at Patna and related an incident and as a result of that a trap was laid and on  the alleged  date of occurrence the three officers, namely,  Mr. Mukherji,  Mr.  Sahai and Mr. Misra, had gone to  the  Arwal police  station followed by the Gorkha Police.  It  is  also well   established  that  the  appellant  on  the  date   of occurrence  was  in  his  quarters  and  that  it  is   also established  beyond  doubt that Bhagwan Das  and  Parmeshwar were with the appellant in his quarters that evening. (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1098. 203 It  is  also established that the three officers  were  just near the quarters of the appellant and they were dressed  in dhotis,  kurtas,  etc.,  like  "dehaties".   It  is  further established  that the appellant was caught by Mr. Misra  and Mr. Sahai and in his possession were found the nine notes of Rs. 10 each and that it was established that one Rs. 10 note was  found  in  the  verandah  of  the  quarters.   It   is, therefore,  not necessary to discus& the evidence  on  these points  because,  as  I  have said,  these  facts  are  well established  and  admitted before me in the  course  of  the argument." It is fairly obvious from the observations quoted above that the learned Judge accepted the testimony of the witnesses of the  raiding  party  as  to  the  essential  parts  of   the prosecution  case and in particular, their evidence  to  the effect that nine initialled notes of Rs. 10 each were  found in  the possession of the respondent; this finding which  is tantamount  to  accepting the prosecution  case  as  correct militates against his later observation that in the  absence of independent corroboration, he cannot accept the testimony of the witnesses of the raiding party.  We say this  without meaning  any  disrespect,  but  the  learned  Judge  perhaps thought  that  the  witnesses  of  the  raiding  party  were intrinsically  trustworthy  and gave true evidence,  yet  he based  his  order of acquittal on what he  thought  was  the effect  of  the  decision in Rao  Shiv  Bahadur  Singh  (1), namely, the adoption of an inflexible rule, in the words  of the learned Judge, " that the evidence of the raiding  party is  necessarily  tainted............ and on  their  evidence alone,  it would be difficult to carry the guilt home  "  to the  respondent.  In two respects on questions of fact,  the learned  Judge expressed a view different from that  of  the trial Court: first, with regard to the motive or reason  for

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the  bribe  and secondly, with regard to the purchase  of  7 maunds 10 seers of wheat, without payment, between the dates October  26,  1951 to November 30,1951.  As to  motive,  the learned   Judge  referred  to  the  circumstance  that   the respondent had already submitted a final report on (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1098. 204 October  8, 1951, which was accepted by  the  Sub-divisional Magistrate on October 19, and, therefore, there was no  case pending  against  Bhagwan  Das and Mahabir  Prasad  and  the motive  for the bribe could not be what was alleged  by  the prosecution.   The learned Judge then indulged in  a  highly speculative  finding to the effect that the " possession  of the nine notes can be reasonably explained by the fact  that his (the present respondent’s) advice was sought for a  land dispute  between  the relations " (meaning thereby  the  two Magistrates  and  the Deputy Superintendent  of  Police  who posed as relations of Bhagwan Das).  This line of  reasoning adopted  by the learned Judge completely  overlooks  certain salient facts and circumstances on which the trial Court had relied.  The trial Court had found, on the evidence given in the case, that Bhagwan Das had no information that the  case against  him had ended in a final report; besides the  wheat seized  had not been released and Mahabir  Prasad  naturally wanted  the wheat back.  Then, again, there was  nothing  to prevent the respondent from demanding a bribe even after the submission of a final report, saying that he would otherwise harass  Bhagwan Das and Mahabir Prasad, and, lastly, it  was nobody’s case, nor was there any evidence in support of  it, that  the  nine notes were accepted by  the  respondent  for giving legal advice in a land dispute.  The suggestion of  a land dispute was made to allay any suspicion as to the  pre- sence  of  Mukherji, Sahai and Misra, who  were  dressed  as ordinary villagers; none of the witnesses said that the nine notes  were  paid  for  advice in  connection  with  a  land dispute.  The respondent himself did not suggest that he had accepted  nine notes for giving legal advice; his  case  was that  no  notes  were found on him.  In this  state  of  the evidence  the learned Judge was clearly in error in  holding that the motive for the bribe was something other than  what was  alleged by the prosecution.  His finding on this  point is based on no evidence and is mere speculation. As to the 7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat, the learned  Judge found  that  the prosecution had not  satisfactorily  proved that the respondent was supplied                             205 with  wheat without payment.  The trial Court  pointed  out, however,  that  at  least two of the  entries  in  the  sale register  of Bhagwan Das (Ex. 10/10 and 11/11) stood in  the name of the respondent, and it was not the respondent’s case that  he  had  paid for the wheat referred  to  in  the  two entries.   Whatever  be the correct finding with  regard  to -the sale or supply of these 7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat, we  agree with the trial Court that the prosecution case  is not  essentially or vitally dependent on the sale or  supply of  7  maunds  10  seers  of  wheat  free  of  cost  to  the respondent.   The  charge  against  the  respondent  is  the acceptance  of  Rs.  100 as a bribe  from  Bhagwan  Das  and Parmeshwar Prasad on December 9, 1951.  That charge does not necessarily depend upon the truth or otherwise of the supply of  7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat between  certain  earlier dates. Having  dealt with the findings of fact, we proceed  now  to consider the principal questions which arise in this appeal. We  take first the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur  Singh  (1).

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It  is not necessary to recapitulate -all the facts of  that case;  it is sufficient to state that in the trap  that  was laid  in  that  case, the most  important  witness  was  one Nagindas  who  offered the sum of Rs. 25,000,  and  the  two important  witnesses  of  the  raiding  party  were   Pandit Dhanraj,   Superintendent,  Special  Police   Establishment, Delhi, and Shanti Lal Ahuja, Additional District Magistrate, Delhi.  Nagindas, who was acting on behalf of his master Sir Chinubhai  did not have the money to offer as a  bribe,  and the money was provided by the police authorities which money was  offered by Nagindas in that case.  The first point  for consideration  in  the  case was whether  Nagindas  and  one Pannalal,  who was also a servant of Sir Chinubhai  and  who accompanied Nagindas, were accomplices and, therefore, their evidence should be treated on that basis.  This was answered in  the negative, on the ground that neither of them  was  a willing  party  to the giving of the bribe  and,  therefore, they  did  not  have the necessary  criminal  intent  to  be treated as abettors or accomplices. (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1098. 206 This brings out the first distinction which has to be  made: the  distinction between a witness who is an accomplice  and one who is not.  How the evidence of an accomplice is to  be treated is no longer open to any doubt; the matter has  been dealt  with  in  a large number of  decisions,  and  as  was observed  by  this  Court  in  Rameshwar  v.  The  State  of Rajasthan (1), the rule laid down in Rex v. Baskerville (2), with  regard  to  the admissibility  of  the  uncorroborated evidence  of  an accomplice is also the law in  India.   The rule is that such evidence is admissible in law; but it  has long  been  a rule of practice, which has  virtually  become equivalent  to a rule of law, that the judge must  warn  the jury  of  the  danger of convicting a prisoner  on  the  un- corroborated  testimony  of an accomplice.   In  Rameshwar’s case(l) it was pointed out: "  The  only clarification necessary for  purposes  of  this country is where this class of offence is sometimes tried by a  judge  without the aid of a jury.  In these cases  it  is necessary that the Judge should give some indication in  his judgment  that he has had this rule of caution in  mind  and should   proceed   to  give  reasons  for   considering   it unnecessary  to  require corroboration on the facts  of  the particular case before him and show why he considers it safe to convict without corroboration in that particular case." If  the  witnesses are not accomplices, what then  is  their position  ?  In  Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh’s case  (3)  it  was observed,  with regard to Nagindas and Pannalal,  that  they were partisan witnesses who were out to entrap the appellant in  that case, and it was further observed: " A  perusal  of the evidence......... leaves in the mind the impression that they were not witnesses whose evidence could be taken at its face  value."  We have taken the observations  quoted  above from a full report of the decision, as the authorised report does not contain the discussion with regard to evidence.  It is  thus  clear  that  the decision did  not  lay  down  any universal  or inflexible rule of rejection even with  regard to  the evidence of witnesses who may be called partisan  or interested witnesses.  It is plain and obvious (1) [1952] S.C.R. 377. 385 (3)  [1954] S.C.R. I098. (2) [1916] 2 K.B. 658. 207 that  no  such rule can be laid down; for the value  of  the testimony of a witness depends on diverse factors,, such as,

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the  character  of the witness, to what extent and  in  what manner  he  is  interested,  how  he  has  fared  in  cross- examination,  etc.  There is no doubt that the testimony  of partisan  or interested witnesses must be  scrutinised  with care and there may be cases, as in Rao Shiv Bahadur  Singh’s case (1), where the Court will as a matter of prudence  look for  independent  corroboration.  It is wrong,  however,  to deduce  from that decision any universal or inflexible  rule that the evidence of the witnesses of the raiding party must be discarded, unless independent corroboration is available. With  regard to the other two witnesses, Pandit Dhanraj  and Shanti  Lal  Ahuja, it was observed that the  former  was  a willing  tool  in  the hands of  Nagindas,  and  the  latter reduced  himself  to  the  position  of  a  police  witness; therefore,  their  evidence  " was not such  as  to  inspire confidence  in  the  mind  of the Court  ".  Here  again  no universal or inflexible rule is being laid down.  It  should be  noticed  that in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh’s case  (1)  the police  authorities provided the money, and that  was  taken into  consideration in assessing the value of the  testimony of  Pandit Dhanraj and Shantilal Ahuja.  In the case  before us,  no  such consideration arises, because  the  money  was provided  by  Bhagwan  Das and Parmeshwar  Prasad,  and  the officers went there to see -what happened.  We must make  it clear  that we do not wish it to be understood that  we  are deciding  in this case that if the money offered as a  bribe is provided by somebody other than the bribe-giver, it makes a  distinction in principle.  That question does  not  arise for decision here.  All that we say and have said so far  is that  in assessing the value of the testimony of a  witness, diverse  factors  must  arise  for  consideration  and   the comparative importance of this or that factor must depend on the facts or circumstances of each case.  No standard higher or stricter than this can be laid down, or was laid down  in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh’s decision (1). We  must advert here to two other aspects of that  decision. It was observed there in clear and emphatic (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1098. 208 words  that  it  is the duty of the  police  authorities  to prevent  crimes being committed; but it is no part of  their business  to provide the instruments of the  offence.   With these observations we are in agreement.  In Brannan v.  Peck (1), a police officer went inside a public house and made  a bet  on  a  horse, which act amounted to  an  offence.   The motive  in making that bet was to detect the  offence  under the  Street Betting Act, 1906, which was being committed  by the  accused person in that case.  In  these  circumstances, Goddard C. J. made the following observations: " I hope  the day is far distant, when it will become a common practice in this  country  for police officers to be told to  commit  an offence  themselves  for  the purpose  of  getting  evidence against  someone  ". We also express the same hope  for  our country,  but must hasten to add that in the case before  us no  offence  was  committed by any of  the  three  officers, Mukherji, Sahai and Misra, in order to get evidence  against the respondent.  This point was again emphasised in a  later decision  of  this Court in Ramjanam Singh v. The  State  of Bihar (2).  It was therein observed: "  The  very  best  of men  have  moments  of  weakness  and temptation, and even the worst, times when they repent of an evil  thought and are given an inner strength to  set  Satan behind  them  and  if  they do, whether  it  is  because  of caution,  or because of their better instincts,  or  because some  other  has  shown  them either  the  futility  or  the

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wickedness  of wrongdoing, it behaves society and the  State to protect them and help them in their good resolve; not to. place  further  temptation in their way and start  afresh  a train of criminal thought which had been finally set  aside. This  is  the type of case to which the strictures  of  this Court  in  Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of  Vindhya  Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 322 at p. 334 apply." The other aspect of the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh’s case  (3) is the employment of Magistrates as  witnesses  of police traps.  Here again, we are in full agreement with the view that the independence and impartiality of the judiciary requires that Magistrates (1)  [1947] 2 All E.R. 572. (3)  [1954] S.C.R. 1098. (2) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 643,651. 209 whose normal function is judicial should not be relegated to the position of partisan witnesses and " required to  depose to  matters  transacted by them in their  official  capacity unregulated  by any statutory rules of procedure or  conduct whatever  At  the  same time it is necessary  to  make  some distinctions.   In  a  large part of the  country  now,  the directive principle laid down in Art. 50 of the Constitution has been implemented, and there has been a separation of the judiciary  from the executive.  The principles on which  the employment  of Magistrates as witnesses of police traps  has been  condemned  have  hardly  any  application  where   the Magistrates concerned are executive Magistrates who  perform no  judicial functions or where the officers  concerned  are officers of the Anti-Corruption Department whose duty it  is to  detect offences of corruption.  In the case  before  us, Mukherji and Misra belonged to such a department.  Moreover, however inexpedient it may be to employ Magistrates as  trap witnesses,  their  evidence  has to be judged  by  the  same standard  as  the evidence of other partisan  or  interested witnesses, and the inexpediency of employing Magistrates  as trap witnesses cannot be exalted into an inflexible rule  of total  rejection  of  their  evidence,  in  the  absence  of independent  corroboration.  The  learned  Solicitor-General referred in the course of his arguments to the difficulty of detecting  corruption  cases and of securing  conviction  in such  cases.   We  do not think that  such  a  consideration should  influence  the  mind of a judge.   Whatever  be  the difficulties,  admissible evidence given in a case  must  be judged  on  its  own merits, with due,  regard  to  all  the circumstances of the case. In  some  of the cases which have been cited at  the  bar  a distinction  has  been drawn between two kinds  of  ’traps’- legitimate and illegitimate-as In re M. S. Mohiddin (1), and in  some  other cases a distinction has  been  made  between tainted  evidence of an accomplice and interested  testimony of  a partisan witness and it has been said that the  degree of  corroboration necessary is higher in respect of  tainted evidence than for partisan (1)  (1952) Cr.L.J. 1245. 27 210 evidence (see Ram Chand Tolaram Khatri v. The, ,State  (1)). We  think  that for deciding the questions before  us,  such distinctions  are somewhat artificial, and in the matter  of assessment  of  the  value of evidence  and  the  degree  of corroboration  necessary  to inspire  confidence,  no  rigid formula can or should be laid down.  For the aforesaid reasons, we think that the learned  Judge of the High Court did not correctly appreciate the effect of

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the  decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh’s case (2 )  and  he was  in error in thinking that that decision laid  down  any inflexible  rule that the-evidence of the witnesses  of  the raiding  party  must  be discarded in  the  absence  of  any independent  corroboration.  The correct rule is this  :  if any  of  the  witnesses are accomplices  who  are  particeps criminis  in  respect  of the actual  crime  charged,  their evidence  must be treated as the evidence of accomplices  is treated;  if  they are not accomplices but are  partisan  or interested  witnesses, who are concerned in the  success  of the  trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way  as other  interested evidence is tested by the  application  of diverse  considerations which must vary from case  to  case, and  in  a  proper  case,  the  Court  may  even  look   for independent  corroboration  before  convicting  the  accused person.   If a Magistrate puts himself in the position of  a partisan  or interested witness, he cannot claim any  higher status and must be treated as any other interested witness. This brings us to the last question: if in the present case, there is any independent corroboration.  We have pointed out that  the two search witnesses Janki Sao and  Ganesh  Prasad (prosecution witnesses 4 and 5) were independent  witnesses, who  had nothing to do with the raiding party.   They  found one crumpled ten-rupee note, one of the series initialled by Mukherji  and  the  numbers  of  which  were  noted  in  the statements  of  Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar  Prasad,  at  the southwestern  corner of the verandah, where  the  respondent when  seized  by the raiding party tried to throw  away  the notes.  In our view, the evidence of the two search (1) A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 287. (2) [1954] S.C.R. 1098. 211 witnesses  does  provide  independent  corroboration,  in  a material particular, to the testimony of the raiding, party. The  crumpled note, one of the series testified’ to  by  the raiding party, could not come of itself to the verandah ; it could  be  found  where it was actually found  only  if  the testimony of the raiding party was true.  The learned  Judge said  that the search witnesses came later and did  not  see the  actual transaction, that is, the giving and  taking  of the  bribe.  That is correct; but independent  corroboration does not mean that every detail of what the witnesses of the raiding party have said must be corroborated by  independent witnesses.  As was observed by Lord Reading in Baskerville’s case  (1) even in respect of the evidence of an  accomplice, all that is required is that there must be " some additional evidence  rendering  it  probable  that  the  story  of  the accomplice  is  true and that it is reasonably safe  to  act upon  it ". In Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan  (2),  to which  we have referred in an earlier paragraph, the  nature and  extent  of  corroboration  required,  when  it  is  not considered  safe  to  dispense with it,  have  been  clearly explained  and  it  is merely necessary  to  reiterate  that corroboration  need  not  be by  direct  evidence  that  the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient even though it is merely by circumstantial evidence of his connection  with the crime. While referring to the findings of fact we have pointed  out that  the  learned  Judge himself accepted  as  correct  the prosecution  case in its essential parts.  There is  in  our opinion  no  difficulty in accepting the testimony’  of  the raiding  party  in  this case, supported as  it  is  by  the independent testimony of the two search witnesses. Learned counsel for the respondent has urged before us, as a last  resort, that we should not exercise the  extraordinary

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jurisdiction vested in this Court by Art. 136, in a case  of acquittal  by the High Court, unless exceptional or  special circumstances  are shown to exist or substantial  and  grave injustice  has  been done.  He has drawn  attention  to  our decision in The (1) [1916] 2 K. B. 658.        (2) [1952] S.C.R. 377, 385. 1 212 State  Government,  Madhya Pradesh v.  Ramkrishna  Ganpatrao Limsey  and  others (1).  In this case,  the  learned  Judge accepted as correct all the essential facts constituting the offence with which the respondent was charged, but he passed an order of acquittal on a misconception as to the effect of a decision of this Court.  We have no doubt whatsoever  that this  is  a fit case for the exorcise  of  our  jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution. In  view of the findings of fact arrived at by  the  learned Judge, the only reasonable conclusion is that the respondent is  guilty of the offence with which he was charged and  the order of acquittal is clearly erroneous.  A point about  the validity  of  the  order  sanctioning  prosecution  of   the respondent  was urged before the learned Special Judge,  who held  that  the sanction was in order.  This point  was  not dealt  with in the High Court.  But learned counsel for  the respondent  has  frankly conceded before us that  he  cannot successfully  urge that point here.  It is,  therefore,  un- necessary  to  remand the appeal for a  further  hearing  on merits. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed.   The judgment  and order of the learned single Judge of the  High Court  of Patna, dated January 13, 1955, are set aside;  the respondent is convicted of the offence under s. 161,  Indian Penal  Code, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for  one year, namely, the same sentence as was passed by the learned Special Judge of Gaya.  The respondent must now surrender to serve out his sentence.                             Appeal allowed. (1) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 20. 213