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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHENDRA KUMAR DAS AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/03/1970

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. SIKRI, S.M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1255            1971 SCR  (1)  87  1970 SCC  (1) 709  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1988 SC 117  (3,6)

ACT: Natural  Justice--Departmental  Enquiry--Consultations  held and   material   collected   behind   back   of   delinquent officer--Whether   enquiry  is  vitiated--Enquiry   is   not vitiated if such material not taken into account and enquiry officer not influenced. Assam Police Manual, Part III, Rule 66--Appointing Authority in case of Sub-Inspector is Superintendent of Police.

HEADNOTE: The  first  respondent  was  at the  relevant  time  a  Sub- Inspector  in the service of the State of Assam.  In  regard to  certain  allegations  a confidential  enquiry  was  held against him by the Superintendent of Police  Anti-Corruption Branch  who submitted his report to the Government in  1957. A  departmental enquiry was thereafter held.  On receipt  of the  enquiry officer’s report, the Superintendent of  Police asked  for  the respondent’s explanation and  thereafter  in December  1958  ordered  his  dismissal.   The  respondent’s appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and his revisions   before  the  Inspector-General  and  the   State Government  failed.  Thereupon the respondent filed  a  writ petition  before the High Court challenging the validity  of the  departmental enquiry and the order of  dismissal.   The High  Court  allowed  the petition on the  ground  that  the enquiry  officer  had  during  the  course  of  the  enquiry consulted  the  Superintendent  of  Police   Anti-Corruption Branch  and  had  taken  into  consideration  the  materials gathered  from  the records of  the  Anti-Corruption  Branch without  making  the  report of that  Branch  and  the  said material available to the respondent.  The State appealed to this  Court  by  special leave contending  that  :  (i)  the enquiry officer was not influenced by his consultations with the Superintendent of Police Anti-Corruption Branch and (ii) in  any event the Superintendent of Police  before  ordering the respondent’s dismissal had himself considered the entire evidence.   It was submitted that the  appellate  authority, i.e., the Deputy Inspector-General of Police had also made a

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similar  approach while considering the respondent’s  appeal and  therefore there had been no denial of natural  justice. On  behalf  of the respondent it was urged that  the  orders relating  to the appointment of the respondent as  permanent Sub-Inspector  had been passed by the  Inspector-General  of Police  and therefore the Superintendent of Police  was  not competent to order his dismissal. HELD  :  (i) It is highly improper for  an  enquiry  officer during  the conduct of an enquiry to attempt to collect  any materials from outside sources and not make that information so  collected,  available  to  the  delinquent  officer  and further  make  use of the same in the  enquiry  proceedings. There  may  also  be cases where a very  clever  and  astute enquiry  officer may collect outside information behind  the back  of  the delinquent officer and, without  any  apparent reference  to  the information so collected, may  have  been influenced  in the conclusions recorded by him  against  the delinquent officer concerned.  If it is established that any material  had been collected during the enquiry  behind  the back  of the delinquent officer and such material  had  been relied on by the enquiry officer, without being disclosed to the  delinquent officer, it can be stated that  the  enquiry proceedings are vitiated. [96 F-H] 88 In  the  present case however there was no warrant  for  the High  Court’s  view  that  the  enquiry  officer  took  into consideration  the  materials found by  the  Anti-Corruption Branch.   On the other hand, a perusal of the report  showed that  each and every item of charge had been discussed  with reference  to the evidence bearing on the same and  findings recorded on the basis of such evidence.  Therefore it  could not  be  stated that the enquiry officer in  this  case  had taken  into  account the materials if any that he  may  have collected  from the Anti-Corruption Branch.  Nor  was  there anything to show, in the discussion contained in his  report that  the enquiry officer was in any way influenced  by  the consultations  that he had with the Anti-Corruption  Branch. If  so,  it could not be held that the  enquiry  proceedings were violative of the principles of natural justice.[97 E-G] The  fact that a copy of the report, of the  Anti-Corruption Branch  was   not  furnished to the  respondent  was  of  no consequence  in  relation to the  actual  enquiry  conducted against the respondent inasmuch as he had a full opportunity to  cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution  and  of adducing  evidence in his favour.  Even assuming that  there was  some  defect in the enquiry proceedings, there  was  no violation  of principles of natural justice in  the  present case because the punishing authority, the Superintendent  of Police,  and the appellate authority, the Deputy  Inspector- General  of Police had independently considered  the  matter and  found the respondent guilty on the evidence on  record. [98 A-E] State  of Mysore v. S. S. Makapur, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 943,  The Collector  of Central Excise and Land Customs v.  Sanawarmal Purhoit, Civil Appeals Nos. 1362-1363 of 1967 decided on 16- 2-1968, applied. Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. Chandra  Kiran Tyagi, Civil Appeal No. 559 of 1967,  decided on 8-9-1969, distinguished. (iii)  In  view of Rule 66 of Part 11 of  the  Assam  Police Manual and in view of the evidence on record the  contention of  the respondent that the Superintendent of Police is  not the  appointing authority for a Sub-Inspector, could not  be accepted. [99 F-H; 100 C-D]

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2210 of 1966. Appeal by special   leave from the judgment and order dated January 20, 1966 of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule No. 184 of    1964. Naunit Lal, for the appellants. D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, is  directed against  the  judgment, dated January 20, 1966 of  the  High Court  of Assam and Nagaland, in Civil Rule No. 184 of  1964 by  which  the High Court quashed  the  inquiry  proceedings conducted by the 4th respondent therein and the order, dated December 3, 1958 passed by the 3rd respondent dismissing the first  respondent  (hereinafter shortly referred to  as  the respondent)  from  service and the orders of  the  appellate authorities confirming the same. 89 The  respondent  joined  the  Assam  Police  Service  as   a constable in 1933 and was promoted to the post of  Assistant Sub-Inspector  of Police in 1936.  He was then  promoted  as Sub-Inspector  of Police in 1944.  He was made permanent  as Sub-Inspector  of  .police  in  1952.   In  1955,  when  the respondent  was the Officer incharge of the  Sorbhog  Police Station,  certain  allegations  appear  to  have  been  made against  him in consequence of which a confidential  enquiry was  conducted  by  the  Superintendent  of  Police,   Anti- Corruption Branch, who submitted a report to the  Government on  December 21, 1957.  In view of the  complaints  received against  him, the respondent had already been  placed  under suspension with effect from July 24, 1957. The  Sub-Divisional  Police Officer,  Barpeta,  having  been authorised under s. 7 of the Police Act, 1861 framed charges against the respondent on March 22, 1958.  It is not  really necessary  to  enumerate the various items of  charges,  but they  can be grouped under three broad heads.  Under  charge no.  1,  the  respondent  was  alleged  not  to  have  taken cognisance  of the items of cognizable offences reported  to him  and enumerated under that charge and, as such,  he  had neglected to perform his duty as a police-officer in  charge of  a  Police  Station.  The second charge  related  to  his having  accumulated  assets in his name as well as  in  .the name  of his wife, far beyond his known sources  of  income. Items of assets purchased by the respondent were again given in  detail.   The  third charge related  to  the  respondent having  concealed the items, enumerated therein,  and  given false statements regarding his assets in the declaration  of assets submitted to the authorities on July 22, 1957. The  respondent submitted his explanation  contravening  the allegations made against him.  The enquiry was conducted  by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Barpeta (shortly referred to  as  the Enquiry Officer) and,. as many as  14  witnesses were   examined  on  the  side  of  the  prosecution.    The respondent  cross-examined  those  witnesses  and  he   also examined four witnesses on his side. The Enquiry Officer, by his report dated September 11,  1958 found   the  respondent  guilty  of  the  various   charges, excepting  regarding  one item under the first  charge.   He declined  to place any reliance on the evidence  adduced  by the  respondent  and rejected the explanation  furnished  by him.   Ultimately,  the Enquiry Officer, after  finding  the respondent    guilty,   submitted   his   report   to    the Superintendent  of  Police, Kamrup.  The  Superintendent  of

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Police,  after referring to the charges framed  against  the respondent,  the nature of the evidence adduced  before  the Enquiry Officer as well as the finding recorded by the  said Officer,  issued a memo, dated October 18, 1958  asking  the respondent to submit his explanation.  A copy of the  report of the Enquiry L 11 SupCI/70-7 90 Officer had already been given to the respondent.  Still the Superintendent  of  Police also sent a copy along  with  his memo. On receipt of this memo, the respondent requested the Super- intendent  of Police, by his letter dated October  29,  1958 for  being furnished with copies of the depositions  of  the prosecution  and defence witnesses recorded by  the  Enquiry Officer  to enable him to submit his explanation.  But  this request was rejected by the Superintendent of Police stating that there was no rule for giving copies of statements. The  respondent submitted a fairly long  explanation,  dated November  21,  1958.   He disputed the  correctness  of  the findings  recorded against him by the Enquiry  Officer  and, ultimately stated that he was innocent and was not guilty of any offence.  He prayed that if in case he was found guilty, he should not be awarded the extreme punishment of dismissal from service.  But he ,added a request to the effect that he should be allowed to examine witnesses and submit  documents and he should be exonerated by the Superintendent of  Police after a perusal and consideration of the same. On receipt of the explanation, the Superintendent of Police, by his order dated December 3, 1958 rejected the explanation of  the  respondent, accepted the findings  of  the  Enquiry Officer and holding that the charges had been proved  beyond all reasonable doubt, dismissed the respondent from  service with   immediate   effect.    In   the   said   order,   the Superintendent of Police had referred to the charges  framed against the respondent, the explanation furnished by him  as well  as  the evidence recorded during the enquiry  and  the findings recorded by the Officer and the explanation sent by the respondent to the show cause notice and ultimately  held that  the charges had all been proved established  and  that the  findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were  correct. With  regard  to the request made by the respondent  in  his explanation   dated  November  21,  1958  the   disciplinary authority stated that the respondent was afforded a full and fair  opportunity to adduce all evidence that he desired  to be  placed before the Enquiry Officer and  that  opportunity had  also been fully utilised by the respondent.   Therefore there was no further necessity for giving the respondent  an opportunity   to  furnish  documentary  or  oral   evidence. Regarding  the punishment to be awarded, the  Superintendent of  Police  stated  that  the  charges  proved  against  the respondent, who was a member of the Police force, were  very serious and hence no leniency could be shown. The respondent filed an appeal. before the Deputy Inspector- General of Police, Range, Assam, who, by his order dated May 11, 1960 dismissed the same. 91 The  respondent  thereupon  filed  a  revision  before   the Inspector  General  of  Police,  Assam,  which,  again,  was rejected on June 30, 1961.  A further revision, filed before the State Government was also dismissed on January 21, 1964. On August 17, 1964 the respondent filed the writ petition in question, challenging the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him and the orders of dismissal passed on the  basis of  the  enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer.   He  had taken several grounds of attack as against the  disciplinary

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proceedings.  He alleged that no reasonable opportunity  was afforded to him during the enquiry proceedings.  During  the enquiry,  the Enquiry Officer was in  frequent  consultation and contact with the Deputy Superintendent of Police of  the Anti  Corruption  Branch, regarding the charges  which  were being  tried  by  him.  In particular, he  referred  to  the record  made by the Enquiry Officer in his proceedings  that on   July   14  and  15,  1958  he  consulted   the   Deputy Superintendent  of Police, Anti Corruption Branch about  the proceedings  and  went through his records relating  to  the charges.  He averred that the nature of the consolation  and the  materials  collected by the Enquiry  Officer  from  the Deputy Superintendent, Anti Corruption Branch, were not made known to him and those materials had been taken into account in recording the findings against him.  He also alleged that copies  of the report of the Anti Corruption Department,  on the  basis  of  which  disciplinary  proceedings  had   been initiated, had not been furnished to him nor were the copies of  the evidence recorded during the enquiry given  to  him, though  a specific request was made in that behalf.  On  all these  grounds, he sought to have all the orders quashed  on the  ground  that there had been a gross  violation  of  the principles of natural justice.  He took a further ground  of attack  that he had been appointed by the Inspector  General of  Police  and  the order of  dismissal  by  a  subordinate authority,  viz., the Superintendent of Police, was  illegal and void. The allegations made by the respondent in the writ  petition were controverted by the appellants.  They averred that  the respondent  was not entitled to a copy of the report of  the Anti  Corruption Branch, which was only in the nature  of  a preliminary  investigation  into  the  complaints   received against the respondent to enable the disciplinary  authority to   consider  whether  disciplinary  action   against   the respondent  should  be  initiated or not.   It  was  further stated  that  the  respondent  was given  a  full  and  fair opportunity to participate in the enquiry and the  witnesses were  all  examined in his presence and, apart  from  cross- examining  the  prosecution witnesses, he had  also  adduced defence  evidence on his behalf.  The State further  averred that   the  mere  circumstance  that  the  Enquiry   Officer consulted the Deputy Superintendent of 92 Police, Anti Corruption Branch, did not vitiate the  enquiry proceedings  as no information or material gathered  therein had  been  used  by the Enquiry  Officer  when  he  recorded findings  against the respondent.  According to  the  State, the findings had been recorded on the basis of the  evidence adduced during the actual enquiry.  It was also pointed  out that the disciplinary authority, viz., the Superintendent of Police, after receipt of the report of the Enquiry  Officer, had  himself  gone into the various items of  evidence  and, after  a due consideration of the explanation  submitted  by the respondent, had agreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry  Officer  and, after further  consideration  of  the explanation  submitted by the respondent to the  show  cause notice,  ultimately  passed  the order  of  dismissal.   The appellate  authority,  the.   Deputy  Inspector  General  of Police  had also considered the matter in great  detail  and had upheld the order of the Superintendent of Police. The  State further averred that the appointing authority  of persons  like  the  respondent, was  the  Superintendent  of Police  and  not the Inspector General of  Police,  and,  as such,  the  order  of dismissal passed  by  the  former  was perfectly legal.  On these grounds the State maintained that

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the  enquiry  proceedings were valid and legal and  did  not suffer from any infirmity. Though,  as  pointed out above, several  grounds  of  attack against  the disciplinary proceedings initiated against  the respondent were taken in the writ petition, it is seen  from the  judgment of the High Court under appeal that the  order of  dismissal was ultimately assailed only on two grounds  : (1) The request of the respondent, made on October 29,  1958 after receipt of the second show cause notice dated  October 18, 1958 issued by the Superintendent of Police, for  supply of copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded at the enquiry,  was arbitrarily rejected on the ground that  there was no rule under which copies could be given and hence  the respondent  did not have any reasonable opportunity to  show cause  against  the  action proposed against  him.  (2)  The Enquiry  Officer,  during  the course  of  the  enquiry  was keeping himself in regular contact with the Anti  Corruption Branch  and  had utilised the material so gathered  by  him, behind the back of the respondent, against the respondent in the enquiry proceedings.  The respondent’s request for being furnished  with a copy of the report of the Anti  Corruption Branch had also been refused and therefore there had been  a violation  of  the  principles of  natural  justice  in  the conduct of the enquiry. So  far as the first ground of objection is  concerned,  the High Court did not accept the same as it was satisfied  that the  witnesses  were  all examined in  the  enquiry  in  the presence of the respondent 93 and  that  he  had a full and  fair  opportunity  of  cross- examining  the prosecution witnesses and also  of  examining witnesses  on  his  behalf.   Though  the  request  of   the respondent,  made  on October 29, 1958 for  being  furnished with copies of the evidence recorded during the enquiry  was rejected,  the  High  Court  was of the  view  that  as  the respondent  was  fully aware of the nature of  the  evidence adduced  in his presence during the enquiry,  his  grievance that  he had no reasonable opportunity to show cause to  the notice issued by the Superintendent of Police was unfounded. So far as the second ground of objection was concerned,  the High  Court  was  impressed by the  fact  that  the  Enquiry proceedings  showed that on July 14, 1958 and July 15,  1958 the  Enquiry Officer consulted the Deputy Superintendent  of Police  of the Anti Corruption Branch about the  proceedings and  went  through his records relating  to  those  charges. Based upon those entries found in the record of the  enquiry proceedings,  the High Court came to the conclusion that  it was abundantly clear that the Enquiry Officer had discussion with the Anti Corruption Branch, the report of which had not been  furnished  to  the respondent.   The  High  Court  was further of the view that the Enquiry Officer had taken  into consideration the materials gathered from the records of the Anti Corruption Branch.  It was the further view of the High Court  that  inasmuch as a copy of the report  of  the  Anti Corruption  Branch  as  well  as  the  materials  that  were gathered by the Enquiry Officer during his consultation with that  Branch had not been furnished to the  respondent,  the enquiry held under such circumstances was in clear violation of  the principles of ’natural justice and hence  the  order dismissing  the respondent from service was void.   In  this view  the  High Court set aside the order of  dismissal  and allowed the writ petition, Mr.  Naunit  Lal, learned counsel for the  appellant  State, raised  two  contentions  : (1) The report  of  the  Enquiry Officer,  dated  September 11, 1958 clearly shows  that  the

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findings   against   the  respondent  have   been   recorded exclusively on the basis of the evidence adduced before  him and  there is nothing to show that the  Enquiry  Proceedings have  been influenced by the consultations that the  Enquiry Officer  had with the Deputy Superintendent of Police,  Anti Corruption  Branch, on July 14-15, 1958. (2) In  any  event, the  disciplinary  authority, viz.,  the  Superintendent  of Police,  before  accepting  the  findings  recorded  by  the Enquiry Officer, has himself considered the entire  evidence bearing upon the charges and the explanations offered by the respondent and it is after such a consideration that he  has agreed  with the findings of the Enquiry  Officer  regarding the  guilt of the respondent.  The appellate authority,  the Deputy Inspector General of Police, has also made a  similar approach when disposing of the appeal 94 filed  by  the respondent and therefore there  has  been  no violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. D. N. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the respondent, has urged  that the High Court’s view that the enquiry  proceed- ings  is vitiated inasmuch as the Enquiry Officer has  acted upon  the  information collected from  the  Anti  Corruption Branch  is  perfectly justified, especially in view  of  the record made by the Enquiry Officer himself.  Counsel pointed out that the examination of witnesses commenced on June  23, 1958  and concluded only on August 30, 1958.  It was  during this period when the. enquiry was actually going on that the Enquiry Officer, on July 14 and 15, 1958 consulted the  Anti Corruption Branch about the matters     connected  with  the enquiry proceedings and had gone through     the     records available with that Branch relating to the charges  levelled against  the  respondent and which were being tried  by  the Enquiry Officer.  Counsel further urged that the  respondent was  not  furnished with a copy of the report  of  the  Anti Corruption Branch nor was he furnished with the  information and  materials that must have been gathered by  the  Enquiry Officer in his consultation with the Anti Corruption  Branch and from their records which he inspected on July 14 and 15, 1958.  All these circumstances would clearly show that there had been a violation of the principles of natural justice in the   conduct  of  the  enquiry.   When  once  the   enquiry proceedings were so vitiated,, the order of dismissal  based upon  the  findings recorded at such an  enquiry,  has  been rightly held by the High Court to be illegal and void. We  are of opinion that in the particular  circumstances  of this case, which will be indicated presently, the High Court has  not  made  a  proper  approach  when  it  came  to  the conclusion that there had been a violation of the principles of  natural  justice in the conduct of the enquiry,  on  the second  ground of objection raised by the  respondent.   The principle, in this regard, has been laid down by this  Court in State of Mysore v. S. S. Makapur(1)               "For  a correct appreciation of the  position,               it is necessary to repeat what has often  been               said that tribunals exercising  quasi-judicial                             functions  are  not courts and  that therefore               they  are  not bound to follow  the  procedure               prescribed for trial of actions in Courts  nor               are  they bound by strict rules  of  evidence.               They   can,   unlike   Courts,   obtain    all               information  material  for  the  points  under               enquiry  from  all sources,  and  through  all               channels, without being fettered by rules  and               procedure, which govern proceedings in  Court.

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             The  only  obligation which the law  casts  on               them is that they should not (1) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 943, 947. 95               act on any information which they may  receive               unless  they put it to the party against  whom               it  is  to  be  used  and  give  him  a   fair               opportunity  to  explain it.  What is  a  fair               opportunity  must  depend  on  the  facts  and               circumstances  of each case but where such  an               opportunity  had been given,  the  proceedings               are not open to attack on the ground that  the               enquiry  was not conducted in accordance  with               the procedure followed in courts." It has been further laid down by this Court in The Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs v. Sanawarmal Purohit (1) that:               "A  quasi-judicial authority would  be  acting               contrary to the rules of natural justice if it               acts  upon information collected by  it  which               has not been disclosed to the party  concerned               and  in respect of which full  opportunity  of               meeting  the inferences which arise out of  it               has not been given." The  above  two extracts, it will be noted,  emphasize  that rules  of  natural justice can be considered  to  have  been violated   only  if  the  authority  concerned   acts   upon information collected by it and the said information has not been  disclosed to the party against whom the  material  has been used. In  paragraph  10 of his writ petition  the  respondent  had alleged  that the Enquiry Officer had, during the course  of the  enquiry, maintained regular correspondence and  contact with  the Deputy Superintendent of Police,  Anti  Corruption Branch, Gauhati.  In para 12 he had further alleged that the Enquiry Officer started recording statements of witnesses on and from July 23, 1958 and after recording the statements of thirteen witnesses, came to Gauhati on July 14, 1958 and had consultation with the Deputy Superintendent, Anti Corruption Branch,  about  the proceedings against the  respondent  and also  went through the record of the Anti Corruption  Branch on  July 15, 1958.  The request of the respondent for  being furnished  with a copy of the report of the Anti  Corruption Branch  was not complied with.  He further alleged that  the enquiry proceedings show that the enquiry officer had  taken into  consideration, against the respondent, the  report  of the Anti Corruption Branch. In  the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State,  filed  in the  writ  petition, it was contended in para  10  that  the report  of the Anti Corruption Branch being  a  confidential document  and  not  having been used as an  Exhibit  in  the disciplinary proceedings, the respondent was not entitled to a copy of the same.  It was further averred in para 11  that the findings of the Enquiry Officer, (1)  Civil Appeals Nos. 1362-1363/1967 decided on 16-2-1968. 96 Barpeta,  recorded against the respondent were based on  the evidence  recorded  during  the  enquiry  and  not  on   any consultation  with the Anti Corruption Branch officers.   It was  further  averred in Para 13 that as the report  of  the Anti Corruption Branch was not exhibited in the disciplinary proceedings,  there was no question of the  Enquiry  Officer taking  the said report into consideration and, as a  matter of fact also the report was not taken into consideration  by the Enquiry Officer and the findings against the  respondent

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had  been recorded on the basis of the evidence recorded  by the Enquiry Officer and no part of it is based on the report of the Anti Corruption Branch. From  the above averments it will be noted that the  respon- dent no doubt made a grievance of the consultation stated to have taken place during the midst of the enquiry between the Enquiry  Officer  and the Anti Corruption Branch.   But  his specific averment was that the findings against him recorded in  the  enquiry  were based upon the  report  of  the  Anti Corruption  Branch  the copy of which was not  furnished  to him.   The State, on the other hand, did not controvert  the fact that the Enquiry Officer did have consultation with the Anti Corruption Branch on the dates mentioned in the  record of proceedings.  But, according to the State, no part of any information  contained  in that report had been  taken  into account  in  the enquiry proceedings and that on  the  other hand the report of the Enquiry Officer was exclusively based on the evidence adduced during the enquiry. A perusal of the report of the Enquiry Officer, in the  pro- ceedings  before  us,  shows that  there  is  absolutely  no reference to any data or material, if any, collected by  him when he consulted the Deputy Superintendent of Police,  Anti Corruption Branch on July 14 and 15, 1958.  But, we have  to state  that  it is highly improper for  an  Enquiry  Officer during  the conduct of an enquiry to attempt to collect  any materials   from   outside  sources  and   not   make   that information,  so  collected,  available  to  the  delinquent officer  and  further make use of. the same in  the  enquiry proceedings.   There may also be cases where a  very  clever and  astute enquiry officer may collect outside  information behind  the back of the delinquent officer and, without  any apparent reference to the information so collected, may have been  influenced in the conclusion recorded by  him  against the delinquent officer concerned., If it is established that the  material behind the back of the delinquent officer  has been collected during the enquiry and such material has been relied  on by the enquiry officer, without its  having  been disclosed  to the delinquent officer, it can be stated  that the  enquiry proceedings are vitiated.  It was,  under  such circumstances,  that this Court, in Executive  Committee  of U.P. State 97 Warehousing  Corporation v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi(1)  accepted the view of the High Court that the enquiry proceedings were vitiated by the enquiry officer collecting information  from outside  sources  and  utilising the same  in  his  findings recorded  against the delinquent officer without  disclosing that  information  to the accused officer.   It  was  again, under  similar circumstances that this Court  in  Sanawarmal Purohit’s  Case  (2  ) upheld the order of  the  High  Court holding  the  enquiry  proceedings to  be  contrary  to  the principles  of natural justice when the enquiry officer  had collected information from third parties and acted upon  the information so collected, without disclosing the same to the accused.   If  the disciplinary authority himself  had  been also  the  enquiry  officer and, during the  course  of  the enquiry  he had collected materials behind the back  of  the accused and used such materials without disclosing the  same to  the officer concerned, the position will be still  worse and  the  mere  fact  that  such  an  order  passed  by  the disciplinary authority had even been confirmed by an  appel- late  authority  without anything more, will not  alter  the position in favour of the department. But,  in  the case before us, it is no doubt true  that  the enquiry officer has made a note that he consulted the Deputy

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Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch on July  14 and  15,  1958  and  perused the  records  relating  to  the charges.   But  the  enquiry  report  does  not  show   that materials, if any, collected by the Enquiry Officer on those two days, have been utilised against the respondent.  We  do not find any warrant for the High Court’s view that :               "there is no doubt that the S.D.P.O. took into               consideration the materials found by the Anti-               Corruption Branch. . . ." On  the other hand, a perusal of the report shows that  each and  every item of charge had been discussed with  reference to the evidence bearing on the same and findings recorded on the basis of such evidence.  Therefore, it cannot be  stated that the Enquiry Officer in this case has taken into account materials  if any that he may have collected from  the  Anti Corruption  Branch.  Nor is there anything to show that,  in the discussion contained in his report, the Enquiry  Officer was  in any way influenced by the consultation that  he  had with  the Anti Corruption Branch.  If so, it cannot be  held that the enquiry proceedings are violative of the principles of natural justice. The fact that a copy of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch, dated December 21, 1957 was (1)  C. A. No. 559 of 1967, decided on 8-9-1969. (2)  Civil Appeals Nos. 1362-1363/67 decided on 16-2-1968. 98 not  furnished to the respondent is, in our opinion,, of  no consequence  in  relation to the  actual  enquiry  conducted against  the  respondent.  That report was  necessitated  in view  of the complaints received against the respondent  and the enquiry made by the Anti Corruption Branch was only  for the  purpose of enabling the Government to consider  whether disciplinary  proceedings  should be initiated  against  the respondent.   On receipt of the report, the Government  felt that  disciplinary  proceedings will have  to  be  initiated against   the  respondent  and  that  is  how  the   enquiry proceedings  were  commenced.  The validity of  the  enquiry will  have to be decided only by the manner in which it  has been  conducted.  So far as that is concerned, it  is  clear from  the record that the respondent had a full  opportunity of  participating  in the enquiry and adducing  evidence  on behalf  of himself and of cross-examining the witnesses  for the prosecution and the entire evidence was recorded in  his presence.   The non-furnishing of the copy of the report  of the  Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch,  does not vitiate the enquiry proceedings. Over  and above these circumstances, it is also to  be  seen that the enquiry officer was not the disciplinary  authority competent  to impose the punishment against the  respondent. The  competent  authority is the Superintendent  of  Police. The show cause notice, issued on October 18, 1958 as well as the  order  of  dismissal passed by  the  Superintendent  of Police,  dated December 3, 1958 clearly show that  the  said officer  has independently gone into the evidence on  record in respect of the charges for which the respondent was tried and   has,  after  taking  into  account  the   explanations furnished by him, independently come to the conclusion  that the  respondent is guilty.  Similarly, the Deputy  Inspector General  of Police, Range Assam, before whom the  respondent filed   an   appeal  has  also  very  elaborately   and   in considerable detail discussed the entire evidence on  record and  has agreed with the conclusions regarding the guilt  of the  respondent.   We  have already held that  there  is  no violation  of  the rules of natural justice in  the  enquiry proceedings.  Even assuming that there was any defect in the

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said   enquiry  proceedings,  inasmuch  as   the   punishing authority and the appellate authority, the Superintendent of Police   and   the  Deputy  Inspector-General   of   Police, respectively,  have independently considered the matter  and found  the respondent guilty on the evidence on  record,  it must  be held that in the circumstances of this  case  there has  been no violation of the principles of natural  justice when the order of dismissal was passed. We  may  state  that  the  respondent,  when  he  sent   his explanation  on November 21, 1958 to the show  cause  notice issued  by the Superintendent of Police on October 18,  1958 did not make any 99 grievance regarding the consultation by the Enquiry  Officer with  the  Anti Corruption Branch on July 14 and  15,  1958. For  the  first  time the respondent  took  this  ground  of objection to the enquiry proceedings only when he filed  the appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the latter  has  quite rightly rejected this  objection  holding that any consultation that the Enquiry Officer had with  the Anti Corruption Branch has not affected the case in any  way since the findings had been recorded against the  respondent entirely  on the evidence adduced during the  enquiry.   The High Court has not considered the various aspects,  referred to  above.  Both the contentions of the learned counsel  for the  appellant,  in  the  circumstances,  will  have  to  be accepted and, in consequence, it must be held that the  view of the High Court that the order of dismissal is illegal and void is erroneous. Mr.  Mukherjee, learned counsel for the  respondent,  raised the  contention that the materials on record  disclose  that the respondent was appointed permanent Sub-Inspector by  the Inspector-General  of Police whereas the order of  dismissal has   been   passed   by  a   subordinate   authority,   the Superintendent   of  Police  and  therefore  the  order   of dismissal  is illegal and void.  Normally,  this  contention should not be entertained, because it is stated by the  High Court  that apart from the two points considered by  it,  no other  grounds  of objection were raised by  the  respondent against the order of dismissal.  But, if really the  records support this contention of Mr. Mukherjee, that will make the order  of dismissal illegal and so we permitted the  counsel to  raise  this contention.  But, after a reference  to  the material on record, we are satisfied that this contention is devoid of merit. The respondent, no doubt, averred in his writ petition  that he, was appointed to the substanive post of Sub-Inspector of Police  by order of the Inspector-General of Police,  Assam, and therefore the order of dismissal passed by a subordinate authority,  viz., the: Superintendent of Police, is  illegal and ultra vires.  In the counter affidavit filed before  the High Court, the State maintained that the Superintendent  of Police  was the appointing authority of a  Sub-Inspector  of Police and it placed reliance upon rule 66, as corrected  by the Correction Slip No. 150, dated June 1, 1938 of the Assam Police  Manual, Part 111.  The State  further  categorically stated  that the Superintendent of Police is the  appointing and  punishing authority of the Sub-Inspector of Police  and the  respondent has been properly and validly  dismissed  by the  competent  authority.   Rule  66,  referred  to  above, clearly  supports  the’.  contention of the  State  in  this regard. Annexure X to the counter-affidavit of the State in the High Court  is  the  order of the  Inspector-General  of  Police, Assam,,

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100 dated  December 16, 1952.  That refers to the selection  for confirmation  as Sub-Inspectors of.  Police of  the  persons mentioned therein.  The respondent is serial number 5 in the said  order.  Note no. 2 to this order specifically  directs the  Superintendents  of Police to send  to  the  Inspector- General  of  Police, Assam, copies  of  confirmation  orders issued  by them in respect of the officers.   In  accordance with  the orders of the, Inspector-General of  Police  dated December  16,  1952 the Superintendent of Police  passed  an order D.O. No. 3777 dated December 31, 1952 that among other officers,  the  respondent,  who  was  officiating  as  Sub- Inspector,  has  been  selected  for  confirmation  as  Sub- Inspector  of  Police  (Unarmed  Branch)  with  effect  from September  1,  1951 and that he has been confirmed  as  Sub- Inspector of Police (Unarmed Branch) from the same date  and absorbed  against  an existing substantive  vacancy  in  the district.  These orders clearly show that the respondent was appointed  permanent  Sub-Inspector  of Police  not  by  the Inspector-General  of  Police but by the  Superintendent  of Police.    Obviously  because  of  these  records,  such   a contention, as is now taken on behalf of the respondent, was not raised before the High Court. The  appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment  of  the High  Court  set aside.  The first respondent will  pay  the costs of the appeal to the appellants. G.C.                   Appeal allowed. 101