REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 905 of 2010  

THE STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH       …APPELLANT

Versus

RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. …RESPONDENTS

WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 906 of 2010  

THE STATE OF TRIPURA      …APPELLANT

Versus

RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS   …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

INDU MALHOTRA, J.  

1. The issue  which  has  arisen for consideration in the  present

Criminal Appeals is whether the Gauhati High Court was

justified in issuing directions that road traffic offences shall be

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dealt with only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988 (“M.V. Act”), and in holding that in cases of road traffic or

motor vehicle offences, prosecution under the provisions of

Indian Penal Code,1860 (“IPC”) is without sanction of law, and

recourse to the provisions of the IPC would be unsustainable in

law? 2. The  Gauhati  High  Court,  Agartala  bench  vide  the impugned

judgment dated 22.12.2008 held that: i. Sections 183 and 184 of the M.V. Act,  which relate to

driving of motor vehicles at excessive speeds and

dangerously, and other offences under Chapter XIII of the

M.V. Act are compoundable before the Police, or in court,

and that no further proceeding shall be taken against the

accused after he has pleaded guilty. On this premise, it

was held “that the provisions of Cr.P.C must succumb to

the statutory provisions to the M.V.Act, and any

investigation, inquiry or trial contrary to the same, would

be illegal and unsustainable in law”. [Para 14 of the

impugned judgment]. ii. The IPC and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C”)

are placed in Entry No. 1 and 2 of the Concurrent List of

the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of  India. The

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M.V. Act,1988 falls under Entry No. 35 of the Concurrent

List. Hence, the status of the M.V. Act is at par with the IPC

and Cr.P.C, and it cannot be presumed that M.V. Act is

either a subordinate legislation, or inferior to the IPC and

Cr.P.C in status.  [Para 21 of the impugned judgment] iii. Section 5 of the IPC removes any kind of ambiguity about

the conviction and punishment of offenders under a

special enactment, which covers the field. Section 208 of

the M.V. Act has laid down a special procedure for

disposal of road traffic offences. Hence, recourse to the

IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC.  Section 5 of the IPC recognizes the supremacy of the

special laws, which cannot be diluted under the garb of

Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. [Paras 24­

26 of the impugned judgment] iv. The prosecution of road traffic offences under the IPC is

not permitted, since it has no sanction of law. The only

exception to this rule would be where the offence cannot

be adequately punished under the M.V. Act.  [Para 24­26

of the impugned judgment] v. Since road traffic offences can be regulated and

adequately  dealt  with  under the provisions of  MV  Act,

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resort to the provisions of the IPC, which is a general law

should be avoided. [Para 28 of the impugned judgment] vi. Sections 183 to 188 of the MV Act, which relate to

punishment for driving at excessive speed or dangerously

or in a drunken condition, etc., are silent about the

outcome of the accidents. These penal provisions do not

prescribe any separate punishment for causing hurt to

people or for damaging any property. However, this does

not mean that the Legislature was not aware or totally

oblivious to the consequences of dangerous driving while

enacting the M.V. Act. [Para 30 of the impugned

judgment]  vii. If a person cannot be convicted for causing hurt to any

person while driving a motor vehicle in a rash and

dangerous manner under the MV Act, then the said

offender cannot also be convicted under the  IPC, since

the IPC does not expressly take within its purview road

traffic offences. [Para 30 of the impugned judgment] viii. To permit the prosecution of offenders under the

provisions of any other penal law other than the M.V. Act

in cases of motor vehicle offences would amount to

overriding the  M.V.  Act,  which is  a special enactment

framed by Parliament for motor vehicle offences. By

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invoking provisions of the IPC for motor vehicle offences,

the basic character and structure of the M.V. Act would

get distorted, and would not help in curbing the rising

rate of motor vehicle accidents.  [Para 33 of the impugned

judgment] ix. Prosecution of offenders in cases of road traffic accidents

must be carried out under the M.V. Act as a general rule

subject to one exception i.e to try offenders in cases of

culpable homicide not amounting to murder under S. 304

IPC, because sentence of imprisonment of 6 months

provided under the M.V. Act appears to be inadequate,

going by the rising rate of violent road accidents.  The prosecution of offenders under the provisions of

the IPC is violative of settled principles of law and

contrary to the legislative intent of the M.V. Act. [Para 37

and 37.1 of the impugned judgment] x. The High Court directed the States of Assam, Nagaland,

Meghalaya,  Manipur, Tripura,  Mizoram and  Arunachal

Pradesh, and to issue appropriate directions to all

subordinate  officers to  ordinarily  register  cases against

offenders of motor vehicle accidents only under the

provisions of the M.V. Act subject to the exception under

S. 304 IPC.  

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3. The present Special Leave Petitions have been filed by the States

of  Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh before this Court,  wherein

vide Orders dated 12.05.2009 and 31.07.2009, the operation of

the impugned judgment was stayed.  This Court  vide  Order dated  26.04.2010 granted special

leave to  appeal, and  directed that the stay  of the impugned

judgment would continue to operate during the pendency of the

appeals.  4. Despite service of notice, none appeared for the Respondents.

Since there is no contest to the adjudication on the merits of the

case, we are not touching upon that part of the judgment.  5. The M.V.  Act is  a beneficial legislation, the  primary objective

being to provide a statutory scheme for compensation of victims

of  motor  vehicle accidents;  or, their family members who are

rendered helpless and disadvantaged by the untimely death or

injuries caused to a member of the family, if the claim is found

to be genuine.1  The Act provides a summary procedure for

claiming compensation  for the loss sustained  in an accident,

which  is  otherwise  applicable to  suits  and other  proceedings

while prosecuting a claim before a civil court.2  

1 The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs.  C. Padma and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 713; Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 385 2 Vimla Devi and Ors. vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 186

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5.1 The M.V. Act repealed the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The

need was felt to take into account changes in road

transport technology, pattern of passenger and freight

movements, development of the road network in the

country and particularly improved techniques in motor

vehicle management.  In M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty and Ors.3,

this Court made suggestions for raising the limit of

compensation payable in  motor  vehicle  accidents  wherein

death and permanent  disablement  had occurred, even  in

the event of there being no fault on the part of the person

driving the offending vehicle, and also in hit and run

accidents. The said suggestions were taken into

consideration  by the  Legislature and incorporated in the

M.V. Act, 1988.  5.2 Chapter XIII  of the M.V. Act, 1988 deals with “Offences,

Penalties and Procedure”. It deals with offences relating to

contraventions of the provisions of the M.V.  Act,  or  any

rule, regulation or notification made thereunder. It

primarily deals with offences relating to licenses, driving of

vehicles by unauthorized persons, control of traffic,

3 (1987) 4 SCC 284: AIR 1987 SC 2158

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maintenance of motor vehicles, using a vehicle in an

unsafe condition, or without registration or permit, driving

beyond speed limits,  driving dangerously or driving by a

drunken person,  or  by  a  person  under the influence  of

drugs, etc.  5.3 The relevant provisions of the M.V. Act,1988 (as they stood

at the time of commission of the offence in question) which

are necessary to advert to are extracted herein below:

183. Driving at excessive speed, etc. – (1) Whoever drives a motor vehicle in contravention of the speed limits referred to in section 112 shall be punishable with  fine  which  may  extend  to  four  hundred  rupees,  or,  if  having  been previously convicted of an offence under this sub-section is again convicted of an offence under this sub-section, with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.  (2) Whoever causes any person who is employed by him or is subject to his control in driving to drive a motor vehicle in contravention of the speed limits referred to in section 112 shall be punishable with fine which may extend to three hundred rupees,  or,  if  having been previously convicted of an offence under this sub-section, is again convicted of an offence under this subsection, with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees.  (3) No person shall be convicted of an offence punishable under subsection (1) solely on the evidence of one witness to the effect that in the opinion of the witness such person was driving at a speed which was unlawful, unless that opinion is  shown to be  based on an estimate obtained by  the use of  some mechanical device.  (4) The publication of a time table under which, or the giving of any direction that any journey or part of journey is to be completed within a specified time shall, if in the opinion of the Court it is not practicable in the circumstances of the case for that journey or part of a journey to be completed in the specified time without contravening the speed limits referred to in section 112 be prima facie  evidence  that  the  person  who  published  the  time  table  or  gave  the direction has committed an offence punishable under sub-section (2).  

184. Driving dangerously — Whoever drives a motor vehicle at a speed or in a  manner  which  is  dangerous  to  the  public, having  regard  to  all  the circumstances of the case including the nature, condition and use of the place where the vehicle is driven and the amount of traffic which actually is at the time  or  which  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  be  in  the  place,  shall  be punishable for the first offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend

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to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, and for any  second  or  subsequent  offence  if  committed  within  three  years  of  the commission of a previous similar offence with imprisonment for a term which may  extend  to  two  years,  or  with  fine which  may  extend  to  two  thousand rupees, or with both.

185.  Driving by a drunken person or by a person under the influence of drugs. - Whoever, while driving, or attempting to drive, a motor vehicle,--

(a) has, in his blood, alcohol exceeding 30 mg. per 100 ml. of blood detected in a test by a breath analyser, or (b) is under the influence of a drug to such an extent as to be incapable of exercising proper control over the vehicle. shall be punishable for the first offence with imprisonment for a term which may  extend  to  six  months,  or  with  fine which  may extend to  two thousand rupees,  or  with  both;  and  for  a  second  or  subsequent  offence  with imprisonment for term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to three thousand rupees, or with both

Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section, the drug or drugs specified by the Central Government in this behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette, shall be deemed to render a person incapable of exercising proper control over a motor vehicle.  

187. Punishment for offences relating to accident. – Whoever fails to comply with the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 132 or of section 133 or section 134 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both or, if having been previously convicted of an offence under this  section,  he  is  again  convicted  of  an  offence  under  this  section,  with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.  

208. Summary disposal of cases  -  (1) The Court taking cognizance of any offence (other than an offence which the Central Government may by rules specify in this behalf) under this Act,-- (i) may, if the offence is an offence punishable with imprisonment under this Act; and (ii)  shall,  in  any  other  case,  state  upon  the  summons  to  be  served  on  the accused person that he-- (a) may appear by pleader or in person; or (b) may, by a specified date prior to the hearing of the charge, plead guilty to the charge and remit to the Court, by money order, such sum (not exceeding the maximum fine that may be imposed for the offence) as the Court may specify, and the plea of guilt indicated in the money order coupon itself:

Provided that the Court shall, in the case of any of the offences referred to in sub-section (2), state upon the summons that the accused person, if he pleads guilty, shall so plead in the manner specified in clause (b) and shall forward his driving licence to the Court with his letter containing such plea.

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(2)  Where  the  offence  dealt  with  in  accordance  with  sub-section (1)is  an offence specified by the Central Government by rules for the purposes of this sub-section, the Court shall, if the accused person pleads guilty to the charge and forward his driving licence to the Court with the letter containing his plea, make an endorsement of such conviction on his driving licence.

(3) Where an accused person pleads guilty and remits the sum specified and has complied with the provisions of sub-section (1), or as the case may be, sub- sections (1) and (2), no further proceedings in respect of the offence shall be taken  against  him  nor  shall  he  be  liable,  notwithstanding  anything  to  the contrary contained in this Act, to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence by reason of his having pleaded guilty.

209. Restriction  on  conviction. -  No  person  prosecuted  for  an  offence punishable under section 183 or section 184 shall be convicted unless--

(a) he was warned at the time the offence was committed that the question of prosecuting him would be taken into consideration, or

(b) within fourteen days from the commission of the offence, a notice specifying the nature of the offence and the time and place where it is alleged to have been committed was served on or sent by registered post to him or the person registered as the owner of the vehicle at the time of the commission of the offence, or

(c) within twenty-eight days of the commission of the offence, a summons for the offence was served on him:

Provided that nothing, in this section shall apply where the Court is satisfied that--

(a) the failure to serve the notice or summons referred to in this sub-section was due to the fact that neither the name and address of the accused nor the name and address of the registered owner of the vehicle could with reasonable diligence have been ascertained in time, or

(b) such failure was brought about by the conduct of the accused.”

5.4 Section 183 provides for the offence of driving a vehicle at

excessive speed in contravention of the speed limits referred

in Section 112 of the M.V. Act; while Section 184 M.V. Act

deals  with the offence of  driving dangerously. In order  to

constitute an offence under Section 184, the following

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ingredients are required to be proved:  (a) the accused

should be driving a motor vehicle; (b) the vehicle should be

driven at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the

public  having regard to  all the circumstances of a case,

including the nature, condition and use of the place where

the vehicle is driven and the volume of traffic at the time of

the accident or which might reasonably be expected to be in

the place.  Section 183 and 184 must be read with Section 209 of

M.V. Act, which provides that a warning,  notice  or

summons, is mandatorily required to be given for an offence

punishable under Section 183 or 184. 5.5 Section 185 of the M.V. Act pertains to the offences of

driving after consuming alcohol, or driving under the

influence of drugs. Any person who while driving or

attempting  to drive, (a) has alcohol  exceeding 30 mg. per

100 ml. present in his blood, detected by a breath analyser;

or (b) is under the influence of a drug to such an extent that

he is incapable of exercising proper control over the vehicle,

shall be guilty of an offence under Section 185 of the M.V.

Act. 5.6 Section 187 pertains to offences arising from accidents. The

offence is for breach of duty and failure to comply with the

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provisions of Section 132(1)(c) or Section 133 or Section 134

of the M.V. Act.  

Clause (c) of Section 132 (1) was omitted by S. 40 of

the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994   (w.e.f.  14­11­

1994); Section 133 relates to the duty of the owner to give

information regarding the  name and  address  of,  and the

licence held by, the driver or conductor, who is accused of

any  offence  under this  Act  on  the  demand of  any  police

officer; while Section 134 relates to the duty of the driver in

case of an accident and injury to a person, to take all

reasonable steps to secure medical attention for the injured

person, by conveying him to the nearest medical practitioner

or hospital, and providing necessary information to the

police and insurer of the vehicle about the accident.  

5.7 The offences under Chapter XIII  of the MV Act  provide a

summary procedure for disposal of cases, which are

compoundable in nature under Section 208 (3) of the M.V.

Act. Section 208(3) provides that if an accused pleads guilty

and deposits the fine imposed, then “no further proceeding

in respect of offence shall be taken against him nor shall he

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be liable, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained

in this Act, to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence

by reason of his having pleaded guilty”. 5.8 The  IPC,  on the other hand,  is  punitive  and deterrent  in

nature. The principal aim and object is to punish offenders

for offences committed under the IPC. The relevant

provisions of the IPC which are necessary to advert to are

extracted herein below:

5. Certain laws not to be affected by this Act .- Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the Government of India or the provisions of any special or local law.

279. Rash driving or riding on a public way.- Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

304.     Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder  . Whoever  commits  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to  murder,  shall  be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;

or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

304A. Causing  death  by  negligence  -  Whoever  causes  the  death  of  any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others. - Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished

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with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.

338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others. -  Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly  or  negligently  as  to  endanger  human life,  or  the  personal  safety  of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

5.9 Section 279 IPC falls under Chapter XIV – “Offences

affecting  Public  Health,  Safety,  Convenience,  Decency  And

Morals”, and provides for offences relating to rash and

negligent driving which endanger human life.  Section 279  IPC makes rash driving,  or riding on a

public road, punishable if such rash driving or riding

endangers human life, or is likely to cause hurt or injury to

any person. It is the rash or negligent manner of driving or

riding which endangers human life, or is likely to cause hurt

or injury to any person, which constitutes an offence under

Section 279 IPC.  5.10 Sections  304  Part II, 304A,  337  and  338 IPC fall  under

Chapter XVI – “Offences Affecting the Human Body” which

makes provision for offences relating to culpable homicide

not amounting to murder, causing death by negligence by

doing any rash or negligent act, and causing hurt or

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grievous hurt, by endangering the life or personal safety of

others.  5.11 Where the rash or negligent driving results in hurt or

grievous hurt being caused to any person, an offence under

Section 337 or 338 IPC is committed.  5.12 Where the rash or negligent driving, results in the death of a

person, without the knowledge that the said act will cause

death, Section 304A IPC would be applicable. In other

words, Section  304A applies to cases where there is no

intention to  cause death,  and no  knowledge that the  act

done in all probability will cause death. Negligence and

rashness are essential elements of Section 304A.4  The three ingredients of Section 304­A, which are

required to be proved are: (1) the death of a human being;

(2) the accused caused the death;  and  (3) the death was

caused by the doing of a rash or negligent act, though it did

not amount to culpable homicide of either description.5

The requirement  of  culpable rashness under  S.304A

IPC is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law

of  tort to create liability.6   Criminal  or  culpable rashness

means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the

4 Naresh Giri v.  State of M.P. (2008) 1 SCC 791;  Rathnashalvan v.  State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 SCC 474 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 84 5 Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 6 N.K.V Bros (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal & Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 457

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knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton, and the further

knowledge that it may cause injury, but done without any

intention to cause injury or knowledge that the act would

probably cause.7

5.13 When a person drives a vehicle so recklessly, rashly or

negligently that it causes the  death of a  person, and of

which he had knowledge as a reasonable man, that such act

was dangerous enough to cause death, he may be attributed

with the knowledge of the consequence, and may held liable

for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which is

punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.  5.14 Sections 279, 304­A, 337 and 338 IPC may be invoked only

if the act of the accused  is  a negligent or  rash act. It is

manifest from the scheme of Sections 279, 304­A, 336, 337

and 338 IPC that these offences are punishable because of

the inherent danger of the acts specified therein,

irrespective of the knowledge or intention of the offender.  With respect to Section 304 Part II IPC, the

prosecution has to prove that the death of the person was

caused by the act of the accused, and that he had

knowledge that such act was likely to cause death.8  To

7 Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 SCC 474 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 84 8 Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953

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constitute an offence under this Section, the knowledge of

the  offender  as required  under  Section  300  IPC  is to  be

proved and established.  6. In our view there is no conflict between the provisions of the IPC

and the MV Act. Both the statutes operate in entirely different

spheres. The offences provided under both the statutes are

separate and distinct from each other. The penal consequences

provided under both the statutes are also independent and

distinct from each other. The ingredients of offences under the

both statutes, as discussed earlier, are different, and an offender

can be tried and punished independently under both statutes.

The principle that the special law should prevail over the general

law, has no application in cases of prosecution of offenders in

road accidents under the IPC and M.V. Act. 7. It  is pertinent to mention that there is no provision under the

M.V. Act which separately deals with offences causing death, or

grievous  hurt,  or  hurt  by  a  motor vehicle in  cases  of  motor

vehicle accidents.   Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act is silent about

the act of rash and negligent driving resulting in death, or hurt,

or grievous hurt, to persons nor does it prescribe any separate

punishment for the same; whereas Sections 279, 304 Part  II,

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304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC have been specifically framed to

deal with such offences. 8. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides, “Where an

act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more

enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted

and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall

not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.”  It is well settled that an act or an omission can constitute

an offence under the IPC and at the same time, be an offence

under any other law. The  finding of the High Court that the

prosecution of offenders under two statutes i.e. the M.V. Act and

the IPC, is unsustainable and contrary to law, is therefore, set

aside.  A similar issue arose in the case of  T.S. Baliah v. T.S.

Rangachari 9, wherein the appellant was prosecuted both under

Section 177 of the IPC, and Section 52 of the Income Tax Act,

1922. This Court held as follows: “6. We proceed to consider the next question arising in this case viz. whether the

appellant can be prosecuted both under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and

Section 52 of the 1922 Act [Income Tax Act, 1922] at the same time. It was argued

on behalf  of  the appellant  that  in view of  the provisions  of Section 26 of the

General clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897) the appellant can be prosecuted either under

Section 52 of the 1922 Act or under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and not

9 (1969) 3 SCR 65 : AIR 1969 SC 701 : (1969) 72 ITR 787

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under both the sections at the same time. We are unable to accept this argument

as correct. Section 26 of the General clauses Act states: “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.—

Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments,

then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or

any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same

offence.” A plain reading of the section shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction

of the offender under both enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of

the offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that

where  an  act  or  omission  constitutes  an  offence  under  two  enactments,  the

offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but

shall  not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.  We accordingly

reject the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case.” [emphasis supplied]

Similarly, in  State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan10, the

accused was prosecuted under Sections 26 and 30 of the Food

and Safety Standards Act, 2006 as well as Sections 188, 272,

273 and 328 of the IPC for transportation and sale of prohibited

gutka/pan masala. The High Court held that Section 55 of the

Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 being a specific provision

made in a special enactment, Section 188 of the IPC was

inapplicable.   The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court,

and held that : “8. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different

enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the

offence.  Where  an  act  or  an  omission  constitutes  an  offence  under  two

enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both

10 Criminal Appeal No. 1195-1207 of 2018, Decided on September 20, 2018

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enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. The

same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different

laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under the

IPC and at the same time, an offence under any other law.     The High Court ought

to have taken note of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as

follows: “Provisions  as  to  offences  punishable  under  two  or  more  enactments

-Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments,

then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or

any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same

offence.” 9.     In     Hat Singh's     case this Court discussed the doctrine of double jeopardy and

Section  26 of  the  General  Clauses  Act  to  observe that  prosecution  under  two

different Acts is permissible if the ingredients of the provisions are satisfied on the

same facts. While considering a dispute about the prosecution of the Respondent

therein for offences under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)

Act  1957  and  Indian  Penal  Code,  this  Court  in State  (NCT  of

Delhi) v. Sanjay held that there is no bar in prosecuting persons under the Penal

Code where the offences committed by persons are penal and cognizable offences.

A perusal of the provisions of the FSS Act would make it clear that there is no bar

for  prosecution  under  the  IPC  merely  because  the  provisions  in  the  FSS  Act

prescribe penalties. We, therefore, set aside the finding of the High Court on the

first point.” [emphasis supplied]

9. The legislative intent of the MV Act, and in particular Chapter

XIII of the MV Act, was not to override or supersede the

provisions of the IPC  in so  far  as  convictions of  offenders  in

motor vehicle accidents are concerned. Offences under Chapter

XIII of the MV Act, cannot abrogate the applicability of the

provisions under Sections 297, 304, 304A, 337 and 338 of the

IPC. The offences do not overlap, and therefore, the maxim of

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“generalia  specialibus  nonderogant” is inapplicable,  and could

not have been invoked. The offences prescribed under the IPC

are independent of the offences prescribed under the M.V. Act. It

cannot  be  said that  prosecution of road  traffic/motor  vehicle

offenders under the IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC, as

held by the High Court, in so far as punishment for offences

under the M.V. Act is concerned. 10. Considering the  matter from a  different perspective, offences

under Chapter XIII of the MV Act are compoundable in nature in

view of Section 208(3) of the MV Act, whereas offences under

Section 279, 304 Part II and 304A IPC are not.  If the IPC gives way to the MV Act, and the provisions of

CrPC succumb to the provisions of the MV Act as held by the

High Court, then even cases of culpable homicide not

amounting to murder, causing death, or grievous hurt, or simple

hurt by rash and negligent driving, would become

compoundable. Such an interpretation would have the

consequence of letting an offender get away with a fine by

pleading guilty, without having to face any prosecution for the

offence committed.  11. This Court has time and again emphasised on the need to

strictly punish offenders responsible for causing motor vehicle

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accidents. With rapidly increasing motorisation, India is facing

an increasing burden of road traffic injuries and fatalities. The

financial loss, emotional and social trauma caused to a family

on losing a bread winner, or any other member of the family, or

incapacitation of the victim cannot be quantified.  12. The principle of proportionality between the crime and

punishment has to be borne in mind. The principle of just

punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal

offence.11   The maximum imprisonment for a first time offence

under Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, is up to only six months;

whereas the  maximum  imprisonment for a first time  offence

under the IPC in relation to road traffic offences can go upto 10

years under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The sentence

imposed by the courts should be commensurate with the

seriousness of the offence, and should have a deterring effect on

wrong­doers.12  The punishment of offenders of  motor vehicle

accidents  under the IPC is stricter and  proportionate to the

offence committed, as compared with the M.V. Act.  13. We thus hold that a prosecution, if otherwise maintainable,

would lie both under the IPC and the MV Act, since both the

statutes operate with full vigour, in their own independent

11 Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608 12 State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basanagouda Aregoudar (2002) 3 SCC 738

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spheres. Even assuming that some of the provisions of the MV

Act and IPC are overlapping, it cannot be said that the offences

under both the statutes are incompatible.  14. The High Court has given a contradictory finding by holding on

the one hand that the provisions of the Cr.P.C must succumb to

the provisions of the M.V. Act, as executive authorities cannot

take away a beneficial provision under a special law enacted by

Parliament (para 14 of the  impugned judgment),  while on the

other hand, it has opined that the M.V. Act is not a complete

code in itself, and there is no complete bar to investigate road

traffic offences under the provisions of Cr.P.C. (para 23 of the

impugned judgment).  15. In our considered view the position of law is well­settled. This

Court has consistently held that the M.V. Act,1988 is a complete

code in itself in so far as motor vehicles are concerned.13

However, there is no bar under the M.V. Act or otherwise, to try

and prosecute offences under the IPC for an offence relating to

motor vehicle accidents. On this ground as well, the impugned

judgment is liable to be set aside.  

13 National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Annappa Irappa Nesaria, (2008) 3 SCC 464 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 99 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 945; Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2007) 13 SCC 446 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 662

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16. The object  behind punishing  persons  found guilty  of  causing

motor vehicle accidents has been succinctly stated by this Court

in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana14 in the following words:   

“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on Section 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under Section 304-A IPC, that  road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent and the toll is galloping day by day in India, and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarter to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that “more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country”, the saturation of accidents toll was not even half of what it is today.  So  V.R.  Krishna  Iyer,  J.,  has  suggested  in  the  said  decision  [Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 719 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 17] thus: (SCC p. 720, para 3) “Rashness and negligence are relative concepts,  not absolute abstractions.  In our current  conditions, the  law  under  Section  304-A  IPC  and  under  the  rubric  of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy duty vehicles and of speeding menaces.” 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna [(1987) 1 SCC 538 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 198] this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under Section 304-A IPC to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and  causing  the  death  of  a  human  being.  In  that  case  this  Court  enhanced  the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine.

13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the  prime  considerations  should  be  deterrence.  A  professional  driver  pedals  the accelerator  of  the  automobile  almost  throughout  his  working  hours.  He  must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being;  or even if  such death ensues he might  not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the

14  (2000) 5 SCC 82

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offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles. ”

        [emphasis supplied]

In Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka15, the Court opined

that there is a constant concern of the Court on imposition of

adequate sentence in respect of commission of offences in cases

of motor vehicle accidents. In that case, the appellant was found

guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 337, 338, 279

and 304­A IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment

for six months along with fine. The Court held that:

“32. We may note with profit that an appropriate punishment works as an eye-opener for the persons who are not careful while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit a careless attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they would be shown indulgence or lives of others are like ‘flies to the wanton boys’. They totally forget that the lives of many are in their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being is given an indecent burial by their rash and negligent act.

33. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a proportion between the crime and the punishment.  It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored.”

         [emphasis supplied]

17. In view  of the above  discussion,  we set  aside the  directions

issued by the Gauhati High Court to the States of Assam,

Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and

Arunachal Pradesh to issue  appropriate instructions to their

15 (2012) 8 SCC 734 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972

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subordinate officers to prosecute offenders in motor vehicle

accidents only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles

Act,1988 and not the IPC. 18. The Criminals Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. The

interim order passed on 26.04.2010 is made absolute. All

pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.  Ordered accordingly.

.......................................J. (INDU MALHOTRA)

...…...............………………J. (SANJIV KHANNA)

New Delhi; October 4, 2019.

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