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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: N.   VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/05/1963

BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1964 AIR   33            1964 SCR  (3) 742  CITATOR INFO :  R          1966 SC1783  (5)  R          1966 SC1786  (3)  R          1968 SC1323  (8)  R          1973 SC 913  (14)

ACT: Criminal   Law-Limitation-Prosecution  of  Police   Officers Police  Officer  torturing  suspects  during  investigation- Whether acts done under the provisions of law-Madras  Police Standing  Orders,  Or.   No. 145-If has the  force  of  law- Whether  mandatory- -Madras District Police Act, 1859  (Mad. 24 of s. 53.

HEADNOTE: During  the course of the investigation of a case of  house- breaking  and  theft  information was received  that  R  had received  the  stolen article.  The appellants, who  were  a Sub-Inspector  of Police, a Head Constable and a  Constable, respectively, took R into custody on January 6, 1957.   Less than  three days later R was found lying dead with a  number of injuries on the body. The appellants were prosecuted  for having  caused  injuries  to R, acting in  concert  for  the purpose  of extorting from him information which might  lead to  the  detection of an offence and restoration  of  stolen property,  and also for having his body thrown at the  place where  it  was  ultimately  found  with  the  intention   of screening   themselves  from  punishment.   The   appellants pleaded  inter alia (1) that the prosecution was  barred  by limitation  by  reason  of the provisions of s.  53  of  the Madras District Police Act, 1859, and (2) that the trial  of the appellants was vitiated by the fact that the  completion of the investigation of their case was done by an  Inspector of  Police and this contravened the Madras  Police  Standing Orders under which investigation in cases against the police for  torture  and  causing death had to be  conducted  by  a person of the rank of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent  of Police or by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Hold  that the prosecution of the appellants was not  barred by limitation under s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859.. No  provision  of law authorised police officers to  beat  a

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person with a view to induce him to make statement; and  743 though in the present case the act of beating was alleged to have been done when the appellants were engaged in  investi- gation,  there  could be no  reasonable  connection  between those  acts  and  the process of  investigation.   The  acts complained  of  could  not  be said to  have  been  done  or intended  to  be  done under any  provision  of  the  Madras District Police Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other   law   conferring   powers  on   the   police,   and, consequently, s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act had no application to the present case. Virupappa  Veerappa Kadampur v. The State of Mysore,  [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 6, followed. Held  further,  that  the provisions of  the  Madras  Police Standing Order No. 145 were nothing more than administrative instructions  by the Government of Madras and did  not  have the force of law; that, in any case, the requirement of  the Standing  Order was merely directory and not mandatory,  and non-compliance  did not make the investigation of  the  case illegal; and that even assuming that the Standing Order  had the  force of law, the trial of the appellants would not  be rendered  invalid  unless it was shown that  miscarriage  of justice   had  been  caused  on  account  of   the   illegal investigation. H.   N.  Rishbud  and  Inder Singh v. The  State  of  Delhi, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1150, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL   APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.  142 of 1961. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated August 31. 1960, of the Andra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 551 of 1958. A.   S.  R. Chari, K. R. Chaudhuri and P. D. Menon, for  the appellant. N. N. Keswani, for, the respondents. 1963.  May 9. The judgment of the court was delivered by DAs  GUPTA J.-The three respondents,  Venugopal,  Rangaswamy and Subbaiah were tried along with one Mittala Kamal Sab  by the Session Judge, 744 Anantapur  Division, on a number of charges.  Kamal Sab  was acquitted  of all the charges against him, but  these  three respondents  were convicted of several offences.  All  three of them were convicted under ss. 348, 331, and 201 read with s.  109  of the Indian Penal Code.   Venugopal  was  further convicted  under s. 343 of the Indian Penal Code.   For  the offence  under  s.  348 the respondents  were  sentenced  to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years; for the  offence under  s.  331  of the Indian Penal Code each  of  them  was sentenced  to rigorous imprisonment for five years; for  the offence  under s. 201 read with s. 109 of the  Indian  Penal Code they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for  three years each.  Venugopal was sentenced to one year’s  rigorous imprisonment  under  section 343 of the Indian  Penal  Code. All  of them were acquitted of the charge under s. 302  read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.  The sentences  imposed on them were directed to run concurrently.  These orders  of conviction and sentence were set aside by the High Court  of Andhra Pradesh in appeal and the three respondents have been acquitted  of  all the charges.  Against that  decision  the State of Andhra Pradesh has filed the present appeal,  after

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obtaining special leave from this Court. Of the three respondents, Venugopal was the Sub-Inspector of Police,  Vempalli police station, in Cuddapah District  from July  20, 1956, to February 22, 1957; Rangaswamy was a  Head Constable  attached to the same police station from  May  4, 1955  to February 20, 1957; Subbaiah was a Police  Constable at  that police station from April 10, 1955 to February  20, 1957.   On  July 21, 1952 Mittala Kamal Sab, a  resident  of Vempalli  town  lodged  at the Vempalli  police  station  an information  of  -house-breaking  and theft  in  his  house. After  investigation  a charge-sheet wag  submitted  by  the police  against  one Patra Obanna and three  other  persons. Those three were arrested and tried and convicted on October 31, 1962;  745 but Patra Obanna remained absconding and the cut against him remained pending in the, Magistrate’s Court.  After sometime the  Magistrate.  wrote to the  District  Superintendent  of Police  of Anantapur, requesting him either to withdraw  the case or to try and arrest Patra Obanna. Thereafter,  Venugopal,  who  was  then  the  Vempalli  Sub- Inspector  of  Police, took action in this  matter  and  his attempt  to  arrest Patra Obanna met  with  success.   Patra Obanna  was actu  lly arrested on January 6, 1957.   On  the same  date on being informed by him that he had given the  g ld  gajjalu  which formed part of the stolen property  to  a person in Kadiri Taluk, Venugopal proceeded to Kadiri police station.  On the night of January 6, Venugopal,  accompanied by  Constables of the Kadiri police station  and  Rangaswamy and  Subbaiah,  who  had come with him  to  Kadiri  went  to Dasaravandlapalli in Gandlapenta police station and there on the identification of Patra Obanna as the person to whom  he had  given  the gold gajjallu book one  Aries  Ramanna  into custody.  The police party there returned with Arige Ramanna to Kadiri police station.  Less then three days later  Arige Ramanna  was found lying dead not far from the house of  one Sugali   Baginigadu,  in  Udumulagutta  Thanda,  in   Kadiri village.  There were a number of injuries on the body.   The prosecution  case is that these injuries had been caused  by the  three respondents acting in concert for the purpose  of extorting  from  him  information which might  lead  to  the detection of an offence and restoration of stolen  property. It is also the prosecution case that for this purpose  these three  respondents  wrongfully confined Arige Ramanna  in  a room at the Kadiri police station and it was the when he was thus   confined   that  the  injuries  were   caused.    The prosecution  case further is that when after  infliction  of the  injuries Arige Ramanna, appeared to be in a  bad  state these respondents hid him 746 removed  from the police station and his body thrown at  the place  where it was ultimately found with the  intention  of screening themselves from punishment. As to the events which led to such acts by the  respondents, the  prosecution  story is that Arige Ramanna had  on  being interrogated at the Kadiri police station given  information that    he   had   sold   the   gajjalu   to   Appalla    of Nallasanivandlapplli.   Following  up this  information  the three  respondents  accompanied by Patra  Obanna  and  Arige Ramanna  went  to  that  village  and  qeustioned  Nallasani Appalla.   One gold gajjlu was seized from his house and  to check  on Arige Ramanna’s statement that this had been  sold by  him  to  Apparent  in  the  presence  of  Fakruddin   of Kataruppalli, the Sub-Inspector tried to contact  Fakruddin. Fakruddin  was found at Madanapplli on January 8, 1957;  but

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he  denied any knowledge about the sale of gold  gajjalu  by Arige  Ramanna  to Appalla.  The respondent  Venugopal  then returned to Kadiri police station bringing Arige Ramanna and Apparent with him.  It was then the early morning of January 9, 1957.  Both Arige Ramanna and Appalla were then taken  by Venugopal  into  the Sub-Inspector’s room at  Kadiri  police station.   Subbase and Rangaswamy also went into  the  room. There,  after some further interrogation, Arige Ramanna  was beaten up by Subbase, Rangaswamy, and Kamal Sab, who was the complainant  in  the theft case, under the  instructions  of Venugopal. These  three  respondents as well as Kamal Sab  pleaded  not guilty.   We are not concerned with the case of  Kamal  Sab. He was acquitted by the Session judge and after the  State’s appeal against the acquittal order was dismissed by the High Court the State has not sought to appeal against that  order of dismissal.  747 The  defence  of these three respondents was that  they  had nothing  to  do with the injuries that were found  on  Arige Ramanna’s body.  The fact that Arige Ramanna was taken  into custody and brought by them to the Kadiri police station was not  disputed,  though they dispute the correctness  of  the prosecution  story  that this happened on January  6,  1957. They  do not also deny the visit to Appalla and the  seizure of a gold gajjalu from his house and the visit thereafter to Madanapplli  to meet Fakruddin nor the fact  that  Fakruddin denied  having  witnessed any sale of gold  gajjalu.   Their case however is that after the return from Madanappalli both Arige Ramanna and Appalachia were asked to go away and  they went  away  and did not come to the police station  at  all. After  this  they  say they as well as Obanna  came  to  the police  station  and slept there.  According  to  them,  the whole  story  of  Arige Ramanna being taken  into  the  Sub- Inspector’s  room and being beaten up, there and then  being taken away from there is entirely false. On  a consideration of the evidence, oral  and  documentary, and the statements of the accused persons the Sessions judge believed  the  prosecution case about  the  confinement  and beating  up  of Arige Ramanna by these appellants  and  that when  Arige Ramanna was in a bad state after  receiving  the injuries  they got him removed from the police station.   He also rejected the defence contention that the  investigation in  the present case -had not been made in  accordance  with the  law.   Accordingly, the Session judge  convicted  these respondents, as already stated, under sections 348, 331  and 201 read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code.  The  learned judge also held that as after the arrest of Arige Ramanna on the  night  of  January  6, 1957 he  was  not  sent  to  the magistrate  and  kept  in  restraint  for  three  days,  the respondent Venugopal committed the further offence under  a. 343 of the Indian Penal Code.  He 748 found  that the case against Kamal Sab had not  been  proved and acquitted him of all the charges. When  the  appeal’ preferred by Venugopal,  Rangaswany,  and Subbaiah came up for hearing before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh a preliminary point was raised on their behalf  that the prosecution was barred by reason of the provisions of s. 53  of  the Madras District Police  Act,  1859  (hereinafter referred  to as the "police Act").  Thereupon Basi Reddy  J, before  whom  this  point was raised  framed  the  following question :               "In  the  circumstances of this case,  is  the               prosecution   of  the  appellants  barred   by

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             limitation  by  reason  of  the  provision  of               section 53 of the Madras District Police  Act,               1859 ?" and referred it for determination by a Division Bench of two judges.   The Division Bench to whom the case  was  referred this  question and a further question framed by them,  viz., In  what circumstances, the bar of limitation prescribed  by s.  53 of the Madras District Police Act would be  available to an accused officer ?, for determination by a Full  Bench. After   discussing   the  relevant  legal   provisions   and authorities  the Full Bench disposed of the matter in  these words :-               "We would therefore answer the first  question               referred to us by saying that the bar of limi-               tation prescribed by s. 53 of the Act would be               available to an accused officer only when  the               It  complained  of has been committed  in  the               discharge  of  his official duties.   We  have               already  laid  down that the  question  as  to               whether a particular act would be regarded  as               having  been  done in the discharge  of  one’s               official duties would have to be determined on               the facts and particular circumstances                749               of  the  case.  It is unnecessary  for  us  to               answer  the  second question.   This  will  be               decided by a Single judge." The   appeal   then  came  to  be  heard  by   Mr.   justice Anatanarayana  Ayyar.   The learned judge  was  of  opinion, after considering the decision of the Full Bench and certain observations  in  some  other  cases,  that  if  the  police officers were alleged to have committed the acts  complained of  "when" they were investigating into the cases of  house- breaking  and  theft, s. 53 of the Police Act  would  apply. Observing that there was no doubt or dispute about the  fact that  these officers were investigating the case  of  house- breaking  and  theft officially at all material  times  they were alleged to have committed the offences which formed the subject  matter  of the charges, he concluded, that  as  the prosecution  was made beyond the period prescribed in s.  53 of  the Police Act they were entitled to an  acquittal.   He proceeded  however to consider the case also on  the  merits and came to the conclusion that on facts also there was room to  doubt  the guilt of these officers on the  charges.   In this  view of the law and facts the learned judge set  aside the  orders of conviction and sentence passed by  the  Trial Court  and acquitted these three respondents of the  charges framed against them. In our opinion, the High Court is clearly wrong in  thinking that the prosecution was barred by s. 53 of the Police  Act. That  section  provides in the first place for a  period  of limitation  for certain actions and prosecutions  and  makes certain  other provisions in respect of civil  actions  with which  we are not concerned., The actions  and  prosecutions for   which  the  limitation  is  prescribed  can  be   best understood  from the, actual words used by the  legislature, which are these               "All  actions  and  prosecutions  against  any               person,  which  may be  lawfully  brought  for               anything               750               done   or  intended  to  be  done  under   the               provisions of this Act or under the provisions               of  any other law for the time being in  force               conferring powers on the police shall be  com-

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             menced  within  three  months  after  the  act               complained  of shall have been  committed  and               not otherwise." It  is  plain that in order that any person against  whom  a prosecution  has  been launched can get the benefit  of  the three  months period of limitation thus prescribed, it  must appear either, (i) that the act complained of was done under the provisions of the Police Act or (ii) the act  complained of was done under the provisions of some other law in  force conferring powers on the police or (iii) the act  complained of  was  intended  to be done under the  provisions  of  the Police Act, i. e., though strictly speaking the act was  not done  under the provisions of the Act, the intention of  the accused in doing the act was to act under the provisions  of the Police Act or (iv) the act complained of was intended to be  done  under the provisions of some other  law  in  force conferring  powers  on the police i.e., though the  act  was strictly  speaking  not done under the  provisions  of  such other law the intention of the accused in doing the act  was to act under such provisions. The  Police Act contains several provisions under which  the police  officers or other persons may act or intend to  act. Section  6 vests in police authorities appointed  under  the Act all powers riot inconsistent with the provisions of  the Act  which up to the passing of the Act belonged by  law  to the  existing  police authorities.  Section 7  confers  full powers  of a magistrate on the Inspector-General  of  Police and  authorises  the State Government to vest  the  District Superintendents of Police with all or any of these  powers., Under s. 9 the Inspector-General may from time to time frame rules and regulations inter alia  751 for   collecting   and   communicating   intelligence    and information;  section 21 describes the duty of every  police officer  to  be "to use his best endeavors  and  ability  to prevent  all  crimes,  offences  and  public  nuisances;  to preserve  the peace; to apprehend disorderly and  suspicious characters;  to  detect and bring offenders to  justice;  to collect  and communicate intelligence affecting  the  public peace;  and  promptly  to obey and execute  all  orders  and warrants  lawfully issued to him." Section 42 which  is  the next  section  in  the act-the original sections  22  to  43 having  been  repealed by the Central Act XVII  of  1862-em- powers  any police officer above the rank of a constable  or any  member of the Madras Fire Service above the rank  of  a fireman to do a number of things.  These include the closure of a street or passage in or near which any fire is  burning and  the breaking into or through, or pulling down or  using the passage of houses or other appliances, any premises  for the purpose of extinguishing the fire. The  effect  of  s.  53  of  the  Police  Act  is  that  all prosecutions  whether against a police officer or  a  person other  than a police officer (e.g., a member of  the  Madras Fire Service, above the rank of a fireman acting under s. 42 of the Act) must be commenced within three months after  the act complained of, if this act is one which has been done or intended  to be done "under" any of the provisions  detailed above.  The protection of s. 53 is not confined however only to acts done or intended to be done under the provisions  of the  Police Act.  It extends to acts done or intended to  be done under the provisions of any other law conferring powers on  the  police.   One  such law is  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure  which  confers numerous powers on the  police  in respect  of arrest, search,and investigation.   Among  other laws  conferring powers on the police may be  mentioned  the

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Opium Act, the Excise Act, the Petroleum Act, etc. 752 Any prosecution in respect of any act done or intended to be done  under the provisions of any of these laws has also  to be  commenced within three months of the act complained  of. It is clear that if in any of this cases the prosecution  is commenced  beyond three months after the act complained  of, it will be the duty of the courts to dismiss the same.   But it  is  equally  clear that unless  the  act  complained  of appears  to have been done or intended to be done "   under" the  provisions  of  the police Act or  of  the  other  laws conferring powers on the police the protection of s. 53 will not  be  available.   Thus, if the  prosecution  is  for  an offence  under s. 341 of the Indian Penal Code said to  have been committed by the act of closing a street or passage  in or near which a fire is burning in exercise of powers  under s. 42 (b) of the Police Act, or for an offence under.  426 of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by  the pulling down of a house for the purposes of extinguishing  a fire,  under  s. 42 (e) of the Police Act,  the  prosecution must  fail  unless brought within three months  of  the  act complained of So also if a police officer is prosecuted  for an  offence  under s. 323 of the Indian Penal Code  said  to have  been  committed in making an arrest,  the  prosecution must  fail unless commenced within three months of  the  act complained of. It  is easy to see that if the act complained of  is  wholly justified  by law, it would not amount to an offence at  all in view of the provisions of s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code. Many  cases  may  however arise where in  acting  under  the provisions of the Police Act or other law conferring  powers on the police the police officer or some other person may go beyond  what is strictly justified in law.  Though s. 79  of the  Indian  Penal  Code will have no  application  to  such cases,  s.  53  of the Police Act will  apply.   But  s.  53 applies to only a limited class of persons.  So, it  becomes the task of the court, whenever  753 any  question whether this section applies or not arises  to bestow  particular care on its decision.  In doing  this  it has  to ascertain first what act is complained of’ and  then to  examine if there is any provision of the Police  Act  or other law conferring powers on the police under which it may be said to have been done or intended to be done.  The Court has  to  remember  in this connection that  an  act  is  not "under" a provision of law merely because the point of  time at  which it is done coincides with the point of  time  when some  act  in  the exercise of the  powers  granted  by  the provision  or in performance of the duty imposed by it.   To be  able to say that an act is done "’under" a provision  of law,  one  must  discover  the  existence  of  a  reasonable relationship  between  the provisions and the act.   In  the absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to be done under" the particular provision of law. This  aspect  of  the matter was emphasized  by  this  Court recently  in  Virupappa Veerappa Kadampur v.  The  State  of Mysore  (1)  when  examining  the  language  of  a   similar provision in the Bombay District Police Act. These  principles  apply  equally to  the  decision  of  the question whether the act complained of was "’intended to  be done"  under the provisions of the Police Act or some  other law  conferring powers ’on the police.  When we apply  these principles to the facts of the present case we look in  vain for  any  provision of law-whether under the Police  Act  or under  some  other law under which the acts  complained  of,

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viz., beating a person suspected of a crime or confining him or  sending him away in an injured condition can be said  to have  any relation.  Mr. Keswani tried to say-it is fair  to him  to staterather faintly-that these acts were done  under the provisions of s. 161 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure. That section empowers any police officer [1963]Supp.2 S.C.R.6 754 investigating a crime or any other police officer acting  on his requisition to examine orally any person supposed to  be acquainted with the facts and circumstances  of  the   case. The section further provides that  such   person  shall   be bound to answer all questions relating  to such case put  to him by such officer,     other  than  questions  answers  to which  would  have a tendency to expose him  to  a  criminal charge  or  to a penalty or forefeiture.  By no  stretch  of imagination  can  it  be said that the  provisions  of  this section authorise the officer examining a person to beat him or to confine him for the purpose of inducing him to make  a particular  statement.  It is worth noticing here s. 163  of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  The first sub-section of s. 163 prohibits any police officer from making any inducement, threat or promise for tile purpose of obtaining a statement. The second sub-section provides that no police officer shall prevent  by  caution or otherwise any person from  making  a statement  which he may be disposed to make on his own  free will.   The  provisions of s. 163 thus emphasised  the  fact that  s.  161  of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  does  not authorise the police officers to beat or to confine a person with a view to induce him to make a statement. The  act of beating or the act of confining was, it is  true alleged  to be done at a time when Venugopal was engaged  in investigation, But it is not possible to see what reasonable connection these acts had with the process of investigation. Nor  can  one see how the act of sending  away  the  injured person had any relation to the process of investigation. The High Court fell into the error of thinking that whatever a police officer does to a person suspected of a crime at  a time when the officer is engaged in investigating that crime should be held to  755 be  done in the discharge of his official duties  to  inves- tigate  and  as such under the provisions of  the  law  that imposed  this duty on him.  This view is wholly  unwarranted in law. In  our  opinion, it cannot possibly be said that  the  acts complained  of in the present case were done or intended  to be done under any provision of the Police Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law conferring powers on the police.   Section  53  of the Police Act  had  therefore  no application to this case. After holding that the prosecution was barred under s. 53 of the Police Act., the High Court still proceeded to  consider the  merits of the case and recorded a conclusion  that  the evidence  left  room for doubt as regards the guilt  of  the accused on the different charges.  When the High Court  held that  the conviction had to be set aside on the  preliminary ground   that   the  prosecution  had  been   commenced   in contravention of s. 53, it might have chosen not to  examine the merits of the case.  When it did choose, however, to  do so,  it was necessary that this should be done  with  proper care.  We are constrained to say that the examination of the evidence  was  done by the High Court in what  can  only  be called  a cursory or casual manner.  It has  been  necessary therefore  for  us  to  try  to  assess  the  evidence   for

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ourselves. But  before we proceed to the discussion of the evidence  we must   consider  a  contention  raised  on  behalf  of   the respondents  that  the very trial was vitiated by  the  fact that the investigation was not done in accordance with  law. The  argument  is  that under  the  Madras  Police  Standing Orders,  the investigation in cases against the  police  for torture and causing death has to be conducted by a person of the rank of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of police 756 or  by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.  In the present  case, though  the initial investigation was conducted by the  Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Penkondu, it was taken up from him by an Inspector of the Police, C.I.D., Hyderabad.  It was  this Inspector  of  Police who completed  the  investigation  and submitted  the charge-sheet.  It has to be noticed that  the respondents  do  not say that the investigation was  not  in accordance  with  the  provisions of the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.  Their case, as raised before the Session  Court, apparently at the time of argument and again repeated  here. is  that the investigation by the Inspector contravened  the Madras Police Standing Orders. Order   No.  145  of  the  Madras  Police  Standing   Orders prescribes  the procedure, in respect of charges of  torture or of death or grievous hurt against a police officer.  This order it may be mentioned, superseded the previous order No. 157  on  the  subject and was in force in  1957.   The  main features of the procedure     when  the case occurs  in  the Mufassal in the  State of     Madras are that :- (1)  A  Gazetted  Police  Officer  on  hearing  of  such  an occurrence  on a complaint made to him or  otherwise  should immediately   start  an  informal  investigation  but   when information  is received by a police officer below the  rank of Assistant or Deputy  Superintendent of Police, he  should instead  of making an investigation himself report the  case to  his Assistance or Deputy Superintendent of  Police.   In either  case  a report should be sent to the  Revenue  Divi- sional Officer; (2)  The  Revenue  Divisional  Officer  should  conduct   an informal  enquiry  to  see whether  there  are  grounds  for launching   a   criminal   prosecution  and   to   fix   the responsibility on individual officers; (3)  Where  a  complaint has been filed in the  Court  of  a judicial magistrate as regards the  757 occurrence  the  Revenue  Divisional  Officer  should  after arriving  at  his own findings keep  them  confidential  and decide  on the further course of action in the light of  the judicial decision when it is available; (4)  When  no complaint has been filed in the court  of  the judicial  Magistrate the Revenue Divisional  Officer  should after completing the investigation submit his report to  the Collector.   The  Collector  shall  where  necessary   issue instructions  for laying a formal complaint by  the  Revenue Divisional  Officer  before  the  Court  of  the  1st  Class judicial Magisrate. It is contended that the provisions of the Code of  Criminal Procedure for investigation of crime arc superseded by  this Standing  Order and so the investigation by  the  Inspector, C.I.D., was illegal.  In our opinion, there is no  substance in this argument.  It appears to us that this Standing Order is  nothing  more than administrative  instructions  by  the Government  of Madras and has not the force of law.   It  is worth noticing in this connection that in the Madras  Police Standing Orders as published by the Government of Madras  it

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is  mentioned in the prefatory note that the  orders  marked with asterisk were issued by the Inspector-General of police under  s.9 of the Madras District Police Act.  The  Standing Order 145 is not marked with asterisk and it could be safely held  that  it  was  not issued under s.  9  of  the  Madras District Police Act.  The marginal note against the order as printed  shows that it was issued by a Government  Order  of the  Home  Department dated October 12, 1955.  It  does  not appear  that  this was done under any  statutory  authority. There  can be no doubt that quite apart from the  fact  that the  Government may and often should issue  instructions  to its  officers, including police officers, such  instructions have not however the authority of law.  We are not satisfied therefore  that the Standing Order No. 145 had the force  of law, 758 We are further of opinion that, in any case, the requirement of this order was merely directory and not mandatory.   Non- compliance with the provisions of this order therefore  does not make the investigation of the case illegal. It  is  also  to be mentioned that  no  objection  that  the investigation  had  been  conducted  in  violation  of   the Standing  Orders  appears to have been taken  at  any  stage earlier  than the trial in the Sessions Court.  It  will  be proper to hold therefore on the authority of Rishbud’s  Case (1),  that even if the provision that the investigation  had to  be held and completed by a Magistrate had the  force  of law  and  was  mandatory the trial  would  not  be  rendered invalid unless it was shown that miscarriage of justice  had been  caused  on  account  of  the  illegal   investigation. Learned Counsel was not able to show how the accused were in any  way prejudiced by reason of the fact that the  investi- gation  was completed by the Inspector of Police.   We  have therefore  no hesitation in rejecting the contention  raised on  behalf of the respondent that the trial was bad  in  law because  investigation  was  completed by  an  Inspector  of Police.  (See Munnalal’s Case, Criminal Appeal Nos.  102-104 of 1961, decided on April 17, 1963). Turning now to the evidence in the case we find it proved by unimpeachable evidence, and also undisputed fact that  Arige Ramanna  was taken away from his house by these  respondents and  was with them on January 8, 1957.  It is  also  clearly proved  and is Dot disputed that Arige Ramanna’s  dead  body was found on January 9, lying by the side of a hut in Sugali Tanya.  The report of the Asstt.  Civil Surgeon who held the post  mortem  examination of the body on  January  11,  1957 shows that the body bore nine injuries.  Seven of these were contusions on different parts of the body and two abrasions. One of the contusions on the right parietal scalp had (1)  [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1150  759 the  internal  injury of the congestion of  the  brain  with capillary  hemorrhage  corresponding to  it.   The  doctor’s report  shows that this injury would be  necessarily  fatal. The  question  is: Has the prosecution been  able  to  prove beyond  reasonable doubt its case that these  injuries  were caused on the morning of January 9, at Kadiri police station by these accused persons. [After discussing the evidence His Lordship proceeded.] When  all these circumstances are considered  together  they show  one clear connected picture that intent  upon  getting some  clue about a gold gajjalu which had been  stolen  from Kamal Sab’s house in 1952 and exasperated by what he thought to  be  Arige Ramanna’s deliberate attempt  to  conceal  the truth, Venugopal brought Arige Ramanna back to Kadiri police

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station  on the morning of January 9, 1957 and  there  under his instruction, his subordinates the two police constables, Rangaswamy  and Subbaiah beat up Arige Ramanna  and  between them inflicted the injuries which were ultimately discovered by the doctor. It  is  not possible to accept Venugopal’s  suggestion  that ’after he returned from Madanappalli to Kadiri early in  the morning  of January 9, he asked Arige Ramanna and  Nallasani Appalia  to go away.  It would not be normal  human  conduct for  him  to  acknowledge  defeat  at  that  stage  and  the probabilities of the case strongly support what is proved by the direct evidence of the witnesses that Arige Ramanna  was taken  by  him to Kadiri police station on  the  morning  of January 9, and not allowed to go away. We  are  unable to find a single  circumstance  inconsistent with  the prosecution case that these three respondent  beat up Arige Ramanna at Kadiri police 760 station for the purpose of extorting from him information as regards  the disposal of a gold gajjalu that might  lead  to further  detection  in connection with the  case  of  house- breaking  and theft committed at the house of Kamal  Sab  in 1952. The  circumstances  that have been established  are  in  our opinion  incapable  of explanation of any  other  reasonable hypothesis than the truth of the prosecution case that these respondents voluntarily caused hurt to Arige Ramanna for the purpose  of  extorting from him  information  regarding  the disposal  of  the gold gajjalu which might  lead  to  fuller detection of the crime.  The circumstances speak so  clearly that  any  other  view would,  we  think,  be  unreasonable, arbitrary and indeed perverse. On  a consideration of the injuries that were caused, we  do not find it possible to be certain that the respondents  had the  intention  of causing grievous hurt to  Arige  Ramanna. What is proved beyond doubt however is that they voluntarily caused  hurt  to  Arige Ramanna for  the  purpose  mentioned above.   Thereby, they committed an offence under s. 330  of the Indian Penal Code, though not under s. 331 of that Code. In view of this conclusion from the circumstantial  evidence adduced  in the case it is hardly necessary to  discuss  the direct testimony given by Nallasani Appalla, the prosecution witness No. 1. As however the Trial Court on a consideration of the evidence believed it to be substantially true  except as  regards the fourth accused Kamal Sab, who is  no  longer before  us,  and  the High Court has  expressed  a  contrary opinion, we shall briefly refer to his evidence. We  think  it proper to point out that the judgment  of  the High Court does not contain any discussion worth the name of what this witness has said or  761 of the reasons which induced the High Court to  characterize it as "unreliable". [After discussing the evidence His Lordship proceeded.] On a Consideration of all the circumstances of the case,  we are  of  opinion  that the Session judge was  right  in  his assessment  of this witness’s testimony against these  three respondents and the High Court was wrong in considering  his evidence as wholly unreliable. Nallasani’s evidence by itself would be sufficient to  prove that  the accused had committed an offence under s.  330  of the  Indian Penal Code.  But the circumstantial evidence  we have discussed above so clearly establishes their guilt  for this  offence  that it is unnecessary to  seek  any  further support for it.

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For  the  reasons  mentioned  above, we  have  come  to  the conclusion  that the decision of the High Court  that  there was  any doubt about the truth of the prosecution case  that these  respondents  beat  up Arige  Ramanna  does  not  bear scrutiny  and  is  wholly  unjustified.   The  interests  of justice  demand  that  the High  Court’s  decision  on  this question should not be allowed to stand. Accordingly, we set aside the order of High Court acquitting the respondents altogether in respect of injuries caused  to Arige  Ramanna, and convict them all of an offence under  s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code. On  behalf of the State Mr. Chari does not press the  appeal against  the  acquittal  of the  respondents  on  the  other charge;,  viz , ss. 343, 348 and s. 201 read with s. 109  of the Indian Penal Code. 762 The learned Session judge awarded a sentence of five  years’ rigorous  imprisonment for the offence under s. 331  of  the Indian Penal Code.  Though we have altered the conviction to one  under s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code, we do not  think we  shall be justified in reducing the sentence.  A  serious view  cannot  but  be taken of such a  barbarous  method  of dealing  with persons suspected of a crime as was  committed by  these  respondents in this case.  It is  necessary  that deterrent sentences should be inflicted for  such an offence when established. Accordingly, we convict the respondents under s.  330 of the Indian  Penal  Code  and we sentence each of  them  to  five years’ rigorous imprisonment. The  appeal  is  thus allowed in part and  is  dismissed  as regards  the acquittal of the respondents on other  charges. The accused to surrender to their bail. Appeal allowed in part.  763