http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: THE SINDHU RESETTLEMENT CORPORATION LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL OF GUJARAT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/09/1967

BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA HIDAYATULLAH, M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  529            1968 SCR  (1) 515  CITATOR INFO :  E          1970 SC1205  (9)  RF         1972 SC1352  (9)  R          1978 SC1088  (7)  D          1979 SC1709  (13A)  D          1984 SC1467  (4)

ACT: Industrial  Disputes-Employee of a company employed in  its. subsidiary     company-Termination     with     retrenchment compensation    by   subsidiary   company-If    retrenchment compensation,  payable by parent company also-Demand for  by payment of retrenchment compensation, not for reinstatement- Reference, if competent.

HEADNOTE: The  services of respondent No. 3- a permanent  employee  of appellant-corporation,  were  placed  at  the  disposal   of appellant’s  subsidiary company.  The subsidiary company  by an order appointed respondent No. 3. on probation and stated that  he  would  be confirmed after  the  end  of  probation period.   After  respondent  No.  3  had  worked  with   the subsidiary  company for more than the  probationary  period, his  services were terminated and he was  paid  retrenchment compensation.  Respondent No. 3 asserted continuance of  his employment  under the appellant, which was declined,  There- upon   he  demanded  retrenchment  compensation   from   the appellant  also,  which, too, was refused.  The  matter  was referred for adjudication     by  the State Government,  and the Tribunal directed reinstatement     of respondent No.  3 with  back  wages.  In appeal to  this  Court,the  appellant Corporation contended that (i) respondent No. 3 having  been given  permanent appointment in the subsidiary company,  and having obtained retrenchment compensation from that company, could  not  claim that he was still holding a  post  in  the appellant-corporation   and  could  not,  therefore,   claim reinstatement;  and  (ii) the dispute that  was  raised  was confined to compensation.for retrenchment and did not relate to  the  validity of the retrenchment or  reinstatement,  so that  the State Government had no jurisdiction to refer  the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. HELD: (i) Respondent No. 3 could not claim reinstatement  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

the appellant-corporation. Though  he did not cease to be an employee of the  appellant when  his services were first placed at the disposal of  the subsidiary  company  by the appellant, he ceased  to  be  an employee of the appellant later when he was confirmed in the subsidiary  company.   He  also  accepted  the  retrenchment compensation at the time of termination of the employment in the  subsidiary company.  In case he had continued to be  in the  service  of  the appellant, he  would.  not  have  been entitled  to retrenchment compensation from  the  subsidiary company  and, even if the subsidiary company had  any  legal liability  to  contribute towards his  retrenchment  compen- sation which might have become ultimately payable to him  on his retrenchment from the appellant-corporation, that amount would  have  been  paid by the  subsidiary  company  to  the appellant  and not to respondent No. 3 himself.  Further  he was  not entitled to any retrenchment compensation  when  he left the service of the appellant willingly for there was no compulsion on him to go to the subsidiary company. [519C-F] Nokes v. Doncaster Amalagamated Collieries Ltd., [1940] A.C. 1014 held inapplicable. (ii) The respondents. in their claims Put forward before the management  of  the  appellant  requested  for  payment   of retrenchment compensation and did not raise any dispute  for reinstatement. 516   Since no such  dispute about reinstatement was  raised  by the respondents before the management of the appellant,  the State  Government was not competent to refer a  question  of reinstatement  as an industrial dispute for adjudication  by the  Tribunal . The dispute that the State Government  could have  referred  competently  was  the  dispute  relating  to payment  of  retrenchment compensation by the  appellant  to respondent No. 3 which had been refused.  A mere "demand  to a Government without a dispute being raised by the  workmen, with  their  employee cannot become an  industrial  dispute. [522H-523D].

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 656 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave. from the judgment and order  dated June 29/30, 1964 of the Gujarat High Court in Special  Civil Application No. 589 of 1961. A.   K. Sen and N. H. Hingorani, for the appellant. R.   Gopalakrishnan, for respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. R. S. Ambwaney, respondent No. 3, was  employed by the Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd., the  appellant. as an Accounts Clerk at Gandhidham on 13th December, 1950 in the pay-scale of Rs. 150-10-250 on a salary of Rs. 200  plus 20  per  cent as site allowance.  This  site  allowance  was discontinued  in  March,  1952.   In  the  year  1953,   the Government of India decided to develop Kandla as a port  and a  subsidiary company was formed by the appellant under  the name of Makenzies Heinrich Bulzer (India) Ltd. in which  one of  the  principal  shareholders was  the  appellant.   This Company  later came to be known as Sindhu  Hotchief  (India) Ltd.   For  convenience,  both  Makenzies  Heinrich,  Bulzer (India)  Ltd.,  and  Sindhu  Hotchief  (India)  Ltd.   shall hereinafter  be  referred  to as  "Sindhu  Hotchief".   This subsidiary  Company,  Sindhu Hotchief, wanted  some  trained employees  and;  amongst others the services  of  respondent No..3  were  placed at its disposal by the  appellant.   The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

case of respondent No., 3 was that he was told orally by the officers of the appellant on 2nd September, 1953 that he was to  work  in the subsidiary company.  Respondent No.  3  was appointed  in  Sindhu  Hotchief  by  its  order  dated   5th September,,1953  on a salary of Rs. 240 p.m. as an  Accounts Clerk -on the conditions of service laid down in that order. It  appears  that,  just  about this  time,  the  father  of respondent  No.  3  died and he was  granted  leave  by  the appellant  for  the  period  from  2nd  September  to   17th September, 1953.  With effect from 18th September 1953,  his services were placed at the’ disposal of Sindhu Hotchief and an  order to that effect was issued in writing on behalf  of the  appellant  on 24th September, 1953.  Respondent  No.  3 worked with Sindhu Hotchief up to 20th February, 1958  ’when his’ services were terminated after payment. of retrenchment compensation  and  all other dues payable to him.   On  21st February, 1958, respondent No. 3 went to the office of  the, appellant,  reported himself for duty and requested that  he might, 517 be  given  posting orders in, the  appellant.   Corporation. The appellant informed respondent NO. 3 of I its  inability, to re-employ him on the ground that the post, -which he  had been  occupying  in  1953 had  been  permanently  filed  up. Thereupon,   respondent   No.   3   demanded    retrenchment compensation’,   from  the  appellant  also.This  was   also refused.His   case was  taken  up by Mazdoor  Mahajan Sangh, Gandhidham,  Kutch,’  respondent  No.2.  The  Secretary   of respondent No. 2 also, wrote a letter to the, management  of the  appellant,  asking  for payment  of  retrenchment  com- pensation  to  respondent  No.  3 on  the  ground  that  the appellant  had refused to take him back in  its  employment. It  seems  that, thereafter, there  were  some  conciliation proceedings   and,  subsequently,  on  the  report  of   the Conciliation  Officer,  the  Government  of  the  State   of Gujarat,  by  its notification dated  15th  November,  1960, referred the dispute to the, Industrial Tribunal,,  Gujarat, for adjudication.  The matter referred for adjudication  was described in the notification as follows: -               "Demand  No. 1-Shri R. S. Ambwaney  should  be                             reinstated  in  the  service  of  M/s.    Sindhu               Resettlement  Corporation Ltd., and he  should               be paid his wages from 21st February, 1958." The  Triunal, after hearing the parties, gave its  Award  on 10th August, 1961, directing reinstatement of respondent No. 3  and payment of back wages from 21st February, 1958.   The appellant  challenged  this award before the High  Court  of Gujarat  by  a petition under Articles 226 and  227  of  the Constitution, but the petition was dismissed.  Consequently, the  appellant has come up to this Court in this  appeal  by special leave. In  this appeal, three points have been urged on  behalf  of the  appellant  to challenge the orders  of  the  Industrial Tribunal and the High Court.  The points are :               (1)  that respondent No. 3, having been  given               permanent  appointment in Sindhu Hotchief  and               having obtained retrenchment compensation from               that  Company,  could not claim  that  he  was               still   holding  a  post  in   the   appellant               Corporation  and could not,  therefore,  claim               reinstatement,               (2)  that  the  dispute  that  was  raised  by               respondent  No. 3 as well as respondent No.  2               with  the  management  of  the  appellant  was

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

             confined to compensation for retrenchment  and               did   not  relate  to  the  validity  of   the               retrenchment  or  reinstatement, so  that  the               Government  of Gujarat had no jurisdiction  to               refer  the dispute to the Industrial  Tribunal               which it did-, and               (3)  that, in any case. since the validity  of               the retrench               of respondent No. 3 by the appellant was not 518               challenged, the, Tribunal committed a manifest               error  in directing reinstatement  instead  of               awarding retrenchment compensation. After  hearing learned counsel for parties, we have come  to the conclusion that the first two grounds urged on behalf of the  appellant must be ’accepted, while the third  does  not arise. The  lease put forward on behalf of the  respondents  before ,the  Industrial  Tribunal was that respondent No. 3  was  a permanent employee of the appellant and, when he joined  the service  of Sindhu Hotchief in the year 1953, he  only  went there  on deputation -or transfer, so that he  continued  to hold  a  lien  on  his  permanent  post  in  the   appellant Corporation.   Two facts, no doubt, support this plea.   One is that Sindhu Hotchief was only a Subsidiary Company of the appellant,  and the other is that, in its order  dated  24th September,  1953,  the appellant merely  stated  that,  with effect  from the 18th September, 1953, the services of  res- pondent  No.  3  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Sindhu Hotchief.   No  specific ;order was passed  terminating  his services   in   the  appellant   Corporation   Though   this circumstance would raise a presumption that respondent No. 3 did  not cease to be an employee 0 the appellant  when  this order was issued on 24th September 1953, this presumption is rebutted by two circumstances.  The first is that respondent No. 3 was appointed in Sindhu Hotchief under the order dated 5th September, 1953, which-laid down that in that Company he would be on a probation for a period of three months in the first instance.  The probationary period may have  to be  further extended by any period upto three  months.   The confirmation  of his appointment would be considered at  the end  of  his  probationary period and would  depend  on  the efficiency  and  utility  of his services  to  the  Company. Thereafter,  respondent  No. 3 continued to  serve  in  that Company  until  20th February, 1958, i.e. for a,  period  of about  4 1/2 yars.  Clearly, he must have been confirmed  in his  appointment in that company.  Once he was confirmed  in Sindhu  Hotchief, he could obviously not continue to  be  an employee  of the appellant-corporation simultaneously.   The High  Court  did  not  attach any value  to  this  order  of appointment  dated  5th September, 1953,  issued  by  Sindhu Hotchief, on the ground that no evidence was tendered before the Tribunal to show that this order was actually served  on respondent  No.  3. In proceeding on this  basis,  the  High Court  clearly  fell into an error, because, in  this  case, when  the adjudication of the industrial dispute was,  taken up  by  the Tribunal, all the parties  contented  themselves with  filing documentary evidence and no oral  evidence  was given by any party.  At no stage was it challenged that  the documents filed could not be taken into account until proved formally  in the manner ’required to be proved in a  regular civil  proceeding in accordance with the provisions  of  the Indian  Evidence Act.  This order of Sindhu  Hotchief  dated 5th  September,  was addressed to respondent No.  3  himself and, when there

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

519 was  no challenge on behalf of respondent No. 3 that he  did not  receive this order, there was no justification for  the High  Court to hold that this.,order had not been served  on him.  In proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal,  strict proof of documents in accordance with the provisions of  the Indian Evidence Act is not required.  Parties having  agreed to base their case on the documents filed, this order issued to respondent No. 3 could not be ignored on the ground  that no oral evidence had been tendered to prove that  respondent No.  3 actually received it.  It was in accordance with  the conditions  of  service  laid  down  in,  this  order   that respondent  No. 3 was appointed -in Sindhu Hotchief and,  by joining  service there and continuing in that service for  4 1/2  years, respondent No. 3 clearly agreed to work in  that Company on these conditions.  As -we have indicated earlier, one of the conditions was that he would be confirmed at  the end of the: probationary period and, once he was  confirmed, he would become a permanent employee of Sindhu Hotchief  and would  cease  to be the employee of the  appellant.   Thus,. though  respondent No. 3 did not cease to be an employee  of the  appellant  when his services were first placed  at  the disposal of Sindhu Hotchief by the appellant witheffect from  18th September, 1953, he ceased to be an  employee  of the  appellant  later  when  he  was  confirmed  in   Sindhu Hotchief.  The  other  circumstance  that  bears  out   this conclusion  is  that,  at the time  of  termination  of  the employment  of respondent No. 3 in Sindhu Hotchief,  he  was given retrenchment compensation which he accepted.  In  case he  had continued to be in the service of the appellant.  he would  not have been entitled to  retrenchment  compensation from  Sindhu Hotchief and, even if Sindhu Hotchief  had  any legal  liability  to  contribute  towards  his  retrenchment compensation  which might have become ultimately payable  to him  on  his retrenchment from the  appellant  Corpn.,  that amount  would  have  been paid by  Sindhu  Hotchief  to  the appellant  and not to respondent No. 3 himself.  It  appears that  respondent No. 3 very well knew that he had  become  a permanent employee of Sindhu Hotchief and, consequently,  on retrenchment, he accepted the compensation but,  thereafter, he seems to have decided to assert his claim to  continuance of  employment under the appellant.  This claim.  was  also, however, very halfhearted.  No doubt, at the first stage  on 21st  February,  1958,  he  demanded  reinstatement  in  the appellant  Corpn.,  but  very  soon  thereafter,  when  that request  was refused, he demanded retrenchment  compensation and  one month’s salary in lieu of notice.  This demand  was put  forward  by him in his letter dated  7th  March,  1958, wherein  he  stated  that,  if  the  appellant  refused   to recognise  Sindhu Hotchief as a sister concern and  did  not take  him back in its Organisation, where he had  a  genuine claim  of service, the appellant should please pay  off  his legal claims in respect of retrenchment compensation and one month’s  pay in lieu of notice.  This position taken  up  by respondent  No. 3 himself thus shows that he was aware  that his services under the appellant Corpn. had already 520 come   to  an  end.   Learned  counsel  appearing  for   the respondents  urged that we should not hold that services  of respondent no. 3 in teh appellant Corpn. had come to an  end when  he  was  absorbed  in  Sindhu  Hotchief,  because   no retrenchment compensation was given to respondent  No. 3  by the appellant  Corporation   at the stage, when his services -ended  in  that Corporation.  The submission  ignores  the, circumstances  that,  when respondent  No.3 went  to  Sindhu

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

Hotchief,  be did so willingly.  There was no compulsion  on him to,. go, to that Company.  His terms of service with the appellant  did  not entitle The appellant  to  transfer  his services to the Subsidiary Company and the mere office order placing  his  services at the disposal  of  Sindhu  Hotchief could  not have been made effective unless respondent No.  3 also voluntarily agreed to take service in Sindhu  Hotchief. At no stage was it asserted on behalf -of respondent - No. 3 that he did not go voluntarily or with his consent to Sindhu Hotchief.   In case he took the service in  Sindhu  Hotchief and  accepted  permanent  appointment  there  willingly,  it cannot  be  held that his services were  retrenched  by  the appellant   Corporation.   He  was  not  entitled   to   any retrenchment  compensation when he left the service  of  the appellant   willingly.   The  nonpayment   of   retrenchment compensation  by  the  appellant at  that  stage  does  not, therefore,  indicate that the services of respondent  No.  3 with the appellant had not come to an end.  On the facts  of this case, it is clear that the Tribunal committed an  error in  drawing  the  legal  inference  that  respondent  No.  3 continued to be in the service of the appellant  Corporation even  after he had received permanent appointment in  Sindhu Hotchief.   On  a correct inference, it is  clear  that  the services of respondent No. 3 under the appellant Corporation had  come  to an end and, when he was retrenched  by  Sindhu Hotchief, he could not claim reinstatement in the  appellant Corporation.    In  this  connection,  Mr.   Gopalakrishnan, learned counsel for the respondents, relied on some  remarks of  the  House of Lords in Nokes  v.  Doncaster  Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.(1), where it was held:               "Counsel  for  the  appellant  argued  that  a               contractual  right to personal service  was  a               personal   right  of  the  employer  and   was               incapable  of  being  transferred  by  him  to               anyone  else,  and  that a  duty  to  serve  a               specific  master  could  not be  part  of  the               property-or  rights of that master capable  of               becoming,  by transfer, a duty to serve  some-               ,one else.  It is, of course indisputable that               (apart   from  statutory  provision   to   the               contrary)  the benefit of a  contract  entered               into  by  A to render personal  service  to  X               cannot  be transferred by X to Y  without  A’s               consent,  which  is the same thing  as  saying               that, in order to produce the desired  result,               the old contract between A and X would r  have               to  be  terminated  by  notice  or  by  mutual               consent and a. new contract of service entered               into by agreement between A and Y." (1) [1940] A.C. 1014. 521 This  principle  laid  down by teh House  of  Lords  is  not applicable  to  the  facts of  teh  case  before  us,because we have already held that respondent No.3 joined the service of  Sindhu Hotchief villingly and with his consent,  and  it was not a case where he was transferred to Sindhuy  Hotchief by  the appellant without his consent.  This case  does  not help ,the respondents. The second  ground urged on behalf  of the appellant is that in this case no. dispute relating relating to  reinstatement was’   actually  raised  either  by  respondent  No.  2   or respondent  No.  3  before. the reference was  made  to  the Industrial  Tribunal  by  the Government  of  Gujarat  and,. consequently.   that   reference  itself   was   ,   without jurisdiction.   When  Mr.  A.  K.  Sen,  counsel  for   the.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

appellant,  raised  this  ground,  it  Was  urged  by"   Mt. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of the respondents that this ground was being taken for the first time in this Court and had not been  raised at any earlier stage, so that it should not  be allowed to be taken in this Court.  It, however,appears that the  question  of jurisdiction of the  State  Government  to refer  the demand for reinstatement for adjudication to  the Tribunal  was specifically urged in the High Court  and  the High   Court  actually  dealt  with  it  in  its   judgment, dismissing  the petition filed on behalf of  the  appellant. The  High  Court clearly mentions that the counsel  for  the appellant  contended  that the Industrial  Tribunal  had  no jurisdiction as the question referred to it and which it was called  upon  to  adjudicate relating  to  reinstatement  of respondent No. 3 in the service of the Corporation would not fall  within the scope of item 3 in the Second  Schedule  to the  Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947.  It was  further  urged that, since the third respondent was neither discharged  nor dismissed  by  the  appellant, the  question  of  relief  of reinstatement  would  not arise under that item  and,  there being  no item under which the demand would fall, the  State Government  had no jurisdiction to refer such a  demand  for adjudication to the Tribunal.  These points urged before the High  Court  would  cover the ground now urged  by  Mr.  Sen before  us.  It is true that the form in which it was  urged before  the High Court was slightly different.   There,  the point raised was that a demand for reinstatement, when there had  been retrenchment only and no discharge  or  dismissal, could  not be held to constitute an industrial dispute.   On the  facts  of the case as they appeared from  the  material before  the  Tribunal, it is now urged that,  in  fact,  the demand, which was being pressed with the management by  both the respondents, was in respect of retrenchment compensation and  not reinstatement.  The demand for reinstatement  seems to have been given up, because the respondents realised that the services of respondent No. 3 had not been terminated  by discharge  or dismissal, but by retrenchment only, and  that retrenchment  not  being. the result of  any  unfair  labour practice or victimization, respondent No. 3 could only claim retrenchment compensation.  In the evidence given before the Tribunal, there were included two letters written by the two respondents   containing   the   demand   for   retrenchment compensation. 522 We  have already referred to one of these letters which  was sen   on  7th  March,  1958  by  respondent.No.  3  to   the Administrative Officer of the. appellant.  The other  letter was  sent  on  10th July 1959 by the  General  Secretary  of respondent  No. 2 in which again it was stated  that  Sindhu Hotchief  had paid retrenchment dues to respondent No. 3  in respect of the services he had rendered in than Company, but the   appellant   Corporation  was   responsible   for   his retrenchment dues for the service which had been rendered by respondent  No. 3 in the, appellant Corpn., The  prayer  was that,  as  the  appellant  had  refused  him  re-employment, arrangement  should  be made to pay  his  retrenchment  dues according  to  section 25F of the Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947.   Thus,  both  the respondents, in  their  claims  put forward  before the management of the  appellant,  requested for  payment of retrenchment compensation and did not  raise any dispute for reinstatement.  Since no such dispute  about reinstatement was raised by either of the respondents before the management of the appellant, it is clear that the  State Government  was not competent to refer a, question of  rein- statement as ’an industrial dispute for adjudication by  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

Tribunal.  The dispute that the State Government could  have referred competently was the dispute relating to payment  of retrenchment compensation by the appellant to respondent No. 3 which had been refused.  No doubt, the order of the  State Government making the reference mentions that the Government had  considered  the report submitted  by  the  Conciliation Officer   under  sub-section  (4)  of  section  12  of   the Industrial  Disputes Act, in respect of the dispute  between the,appellant and workmen employed under it over the  demand mentioned  in the Schedule appended to that order;  and,  in the Schedule, the Government mentioned that the dispute  was that of reinstatement of respondent No. 3 in the service  of the  appellant and payment of his wages from 21st  February, 1958.  It was urged, by Mr. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of  the respondents  that  this  Court cannot  examine  whether  the Government,  in  forming  its  opinion  that  an  industrial dispute exists, came to its view correctly or incorrectly on the  material  before it.  This proposition  is,  no  doubt, correct;  but the aspect that is being examined-is  entirely different.  It may be that the Conciliation Officer reported to  the  Government  that an industrial  dispute  did  exist relating  to  the  reinstatement of  respondent  No.  3  and payment  of wages to him from 21st February, 1958, but  when the  dispute came up for adjudication before  the  Tribunal, the  evidence produced clearly showed that no  such  dispute had   ever  been  raised  by  either  respondent  with   the management  of  the  appellant.  If no dispute  at  all  was raised  by the respondents with the management, any  request sent  by  them to the Government would only be a  demand  by them  and not an industrial dispute between them  and  their employer.   An  industrial dispute, as defined,  must  be  a dispute  between  employers  and  employers,  employers  and workmen,  and  workmen  and workmen.  A  mere  demand  to  a Government,  without a dispute being raised by  the  workmen with 523 their   employer   cannot  become  an   industrial   dispute Consequently,  the  material  before  the  Tribunal  clearly showed that no such industrial dispute, as was purported  to be  referred  by the State Government to the  Tribunal,  had ever   existed   between  the  appellant  Corpn.   and   the respondents and the State Government in making a  reference, obviously  committed  an  error in basing  its  opinion  ’on material which was not relevant to the formation of opinion. The Government had to come to an opinion that an  industrial dispute  did exist and that opinion could only be formed  on the basis that there was a dispute between the appellant and the  respondents relating to reinstatement.   Such  material could  not possibly exist when, as early as March and  July, 1958, respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 2 respectively had confined  their  demands to the management  to  retrenchment compensation   only  and  did  not  make  any   demand   for reinstatement.   On  these  facts,  it  is  clear  that  the reference  made  by the Government was not  competent.   The only reference that the Government could have made had to be related  to payment of retrenchment compensation  which  was the only subject-matter of dispute between the appellant and the respondents. So far as the third ground is concerned, it loses force  and (toes  not  arise in view of our decision  relating  to  the first  ground.  We have already held, when dealing with  the first  ground,  that  the appellant  had  neither  dismissed respondent  No. 3, nor had it discharged him  from  service. There was no question of wrongful dismissal or discharge  by the  appellant.   It was not even a  case  of  retrenchment.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

because  respondent  No. 3 had willingly gone  to  join  the service  under  Sindhu Hotchief.  He  obviously  joined  the service   in  Sindhu  Hotchief  because  of  the   financial advantages that were to accrue to him.  In September,  1953, he was drawing a salary of Rs. 200 P.m. in the scale of  Rs. 150-10--250 while serving the appellant.  The site allowance of  20  per cent, which he had been receiving  earlier,  had been discontinued from March, 1952 and he was not getting it at  the time when he went to join Sindhu Hotchief, where  he was  given  a  start  of  Rs.  240  in  the  grade  of   Rs. 200--20-400.   Consequently,  in addition to  the  immediate rise  in  salary  of Rs. 40 P.m., he had  the  advantage  of working in the higher grade, in which, within two years,  he exceeded  the  maximum  of the scale in which  he  had  been working with the appellant.  He served Sindhu Hotchief for a period  of’ about 4 1/2 years and became confirmed there  in accordance with the terms and conditions which were  offered to  him  by Sindhu Hotchief.  In  these  circumstances,  the respondents cannot’ urge that the services of respondent No. 3 were retrenched by the appellant, either when he went  and joined Sindhu Hotchief, or when he wanted to get back to his post with the appellant.  His appointment in the service  of the appellant having terminated, no question could arise  of retrenching  him  at the stage when he wanted to  come  back after serving Sindhu Hotchief.  His services, 524 were in fact retrenched by his employer Sindhu hotchief  and from  that  Company he received  retrenchment  compensation. The third ground, therefore, needs consideration The  appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The award of the  Tri- bunal  is quashed.  In the circumstances of this case  there will be no order as to costs,, Y.P.                                          Appeal allowed. 525