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PETITIONER: THE SAWATRAM RAMPRASAD MILLS CO.  LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BALIRAM UKANDAJI AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/09/1965

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  616            1966 SCR  (1) 764  CITATOR INFO :  R          1972 SC 451  (22)  D          1987 SC1960  (6)

ACT: Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), ss. 25 J, 31 and  33C- State    Act   applicable   to   industry-Application    for compensation for lay off-Jurisdiction to decide.

HEADNOTE: The  respondents,  who were the workmen  of  the  appellant, applied to the Second Labour Court, Bombay, under s.  33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming  compensation for   lay-off  during  a  certain  period.   The   appellant contended that : (i) the Labour Court had no jurisdiction as the  dispute  fell  to be tried under  the  C.P.  and  Berar Industrial  Disputes  (Settlement) Act, 1947; and  (ii)  the application  under s. 33C was incompetent, because,  it  was not  a claim for money due and calculations had to  be  made for  ascertaining the money due.  The Labour Court, as  well as   the  High  Court  under  Arts.  226  and  227  of   the Constitution. rejected the contentions. In -the appeal to this Court. HELD  :  (i) The argument that the controversy  was  wrongly before Labour Court was entirely erroneous. Chapter  V-A  of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act,  which  was inserted by s. 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953,  is  the  only Chapter in  which  there  is  provision regarding  lay off or compensation for lay off.  Though  the C.P.  and  Berar  Act applies to the  textile  industry,  it contain*  no provision either for recovery of money  or  for compensation for lay off and they are not matters over which the C.P. and Berar Act has any jurisdiction.      Therefore, if  a workman has a claim for lay off, it can only  come  up for  decision  under the Industrial Disputes Act.   Even  if ss. 31 and 25J save the  application of the C.P.  and  Berar Act, they do so, subject to the condition that the  question of  lay-off must be decided in accordance with Chapter  V-A. Since s. 33C provides that a dispute for any money due under Chapter  V-A has to go before the appropriate Government  or

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its  delegate, and since the delegate is the  Second  Labour Court, the respondents were entitled to go before the Labour Court  to realise due from the appellant under Chapter  V-A. [769 F] (ii) It is not essential that the claim which can be brought before  the Government or its delegate under s. 33C(1)  most always be for a predetermined sum. [769 G-H] Kays  Construction  Co.  (P) Ltd. v. State of  U-P.  &  Ors. [1965] 2 S.C.R. 276, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 525 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1962  of the  Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur  in  Special Civil Application No. 360 of 1961. 76 5 A.   S.   Bobde  G. L. Sanghi and Sardar  Bahadur,  for  the appellant. Janardan Sharma for respondent No. 1. H. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the intervener. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah,  J. In this appeal by certificate against  the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated August 25, 1962  the appellant  is the Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co., Ltd.,  Akola and  the respondents two of the workmen of the  Mills.   The respondents are claiming from the Mills compensation for lay off from March 5, 1960 to October 22, 1960.  The proceedings were commenced by an application to the Second Labour Court, Bombay under s. 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947 (Act  XIV of 1947).  The Mills objected on  various  grounds including  firstly  that  the Second  Labour  Court  had  no jurisdiction  to  hear the case as the dispute  fell  to  be tried   under   the  C.P.  &   Berar   Industrial   Disputes (Settlement)  Act, 1947 and, secondly, that the  application under  s.  33C, in any event, was incompetent.   The  Second Labour  Court  held against the Mills on both  the  grounds. The  Mills applied to the High Court of Bombay  under  Arts. 226  and 227 of the Constitution but by the  judgment  under appeal  their application was dismissed.  It may be  pointed out  here  that  there were similar  applications  for  com- pensation for lay off by the other workmen of the Mills  and on this preliminary point they were all heard together. In  this Court only these two grounds were urged.  The  con- tention on behalf of the Mills on the first ground was  two- fold.   The  Mills attempted to establish that  the  dispute could not be tried under the Central Act but only under  the C.P.  & Berar Act and further that even if the  Central  Act applied  the  calculation of the amount could  not  be  made under s. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act as that required proceedings other than those contemplated by that section. The  Industrial  Disputes  Act was passed in  1947  and  was brought  into  force on April 1, 1947.  It is  not  disputed that  it applied to the Textile Industry.  The C.P. &  Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act (23 of 1947) came  into force  on June 2, 1947 but only the first section  was  then brought  into  force.  Later, the  remaining  sections  were brought into force by a notification dated November 20, 1947 in  all industries except the Textile Industry.  From  March 1, 1951, the Act was also, 76 6 made  applicable  to  the Textile  industry.   In  1953  the Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947 was  amended  by  Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953.  The changes material to our

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purpose  were  the  addition of two definitions  and  a  new chapter  in  the  Act.  Previous to the  Act  there  was  an Ordinance  which the Act replaced but as nothing turns  upon the existence of the Ordinance we need not refer to it.  The two definitions introduced in s. 2 of the parent Act were :               "(kkk)   ’lay-off’   (with   its   grammatical               variations and cognate expressions) means  the               failure,  refusal or inability of an  employer               on  account of shortage of coal, power or  raw               materials or the accumulation of stocks or the               break-down  of  machinery  or  for  any  other               reason  to give employment to a workman  whose               name  is  borne  on the muster  rolls  of  his               industrial establishment and who has not  been               retrenched :               Explanation-Every  workman whose name is  home               on   the  muster  rolls  of   the   industrial               establishment  and  who presents  himself  for               work   at  the  establishment  at   the   time               appointed for the purpose during normal  work-               ing  hours  on  any  day  and  is  not   given               employment by the employer within two hours of               his  so presenting himself shall be deemed  to               have  been  laid-off for that day  within  the               meaning of this clause:                                 Provided, and    s.   (oo)   ’retrenchment’.    The   definition    of ’retrenchment’  need not be quoted here because no  question has been raised about retrenchment in this case.  Section  3 of  the 1953 Amendment Act inserted Chapter V-A headed  "Lay Off  and  Retrenchment".   Section 25C gave  a  right  to  a workman  to  ask for compensation if laid off,  provided  he fulfilled  certain  conditions.  It is not necessary  to  go into  those conditions here.  Section 25J then  provided  as follows :               "25J.   Effect of laws inconsistent with  this               Chapter.-               (1)   The  provisions  of this  Chapter  shall               have    effect    notwithstanding     anything               inconsistent  therewith contained in  any  law               including  standing  orders  made  under   the               Industrial  Employment (Standing Orders)  Act,               1946 (XX of 1946) :               76 7               Provided  that nothing contained in  this  Act               shall  have effect to derogate from any  right               which a work-man has under  any award for  the               time being in operation or     any    contract               with the employer.               (2)   For the removal of doubts, it is  hereby               declared   that  nothing  contained  in   this               Chapter   shall  be  deemed  to   affect   the               provisions of any other law for the time being               in  force in any State in so far as  that  law               provides  for  the  settlement  of  industrial               disputes,  but the rights and  liabilities  of               employers and workmen in so far as they relate               to   lay   off  and  retrenchment   shall   be               determined  in accordance with the  provisions               of this Chapter." In 1956 the Industrial Disputes Act was again amended by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956.  Section 23 of the Amending Act inserted  section 33C which reads as follows :               "33-C.    Recovery  of  money  due   from   an

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             employer.-               (1)   Where any money is due to a workman from               an employer under a settlement of an award  or               under  the  provisions  of  Chapter  V-A,  the               workman  may  without prejudice to  any  other               mode  of recovery, make an application to  the               appropriate Government for the recovery of the               money  due  to  him, and  if  the  appropriate               Government  is satisfied that any money is  so               due,  it  shall issue a certificate  for  that               amount  to the Collector who shall proceed  to               recover  the  same in the same  manner  as  an               arrears of land revenue.               (2)   Where any workman is entitled to receive               from the employer any benefit which is capable               of  being  computed  in terms  of  money,  the               amount   at  which  such  benefit  should   be               computed may, subject to any rules that may be               made  under  this Act, be determined  by  such               Labour  Court  as  may be  specified  in  this               behalf by the appropriate Government, and  the               amount  so  determined  may  be  recovered  as               provided for in sub-section    (1).               (3)   For the purposes of computing the  money               value of   a benefit, the Labour Court may, if               it  so thinks fit, appoint a commissioner  who               shall,  after taking such evidence as  may  be               necessary, submit a report to               76 8               the  Labour Court and the Labour  Court  shall               determine  the  amount after  considering  the               report   of   the   Commissioner   and   other               circumstances of the case."               The -powers of the Government under the  above               section admittedly have been delegated to  the               Second  Labour  Court Bombay.  Section  31  of               this Amending Act provides as follows               "31.  Act not to override State laws.               (1)   If, immediately before the  commencement               of  this Act, there is in force in  any  State               any  Provincial Act or State Act  relating  to               the  settlement or adjudication  of  disputes,               the operation of such an Act in that State  in               relation to matters covered by that Act  shall               not  be  affected by the  Industrial  Disputes               Act, 1947, as amended by this Act.               (2) From  these sections, which we have quoted, certain  conclu- sions  indisputably  arise.  The first  conclusion  is  that compensation  for  lay  off can  only  be  determined  under Chapter  V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.   This  follows from  s. 25J(2) as it is so stated there.  The next is  that the  workmen are entitled under s. 33C(1) to go  before  the Second  Labour  Court  to  realise  money  due  from   their employers  under Chapter V-A.  This is clearly stated in  s. 33C.   The  contention on behalf of the Mills,  however,  is that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not apply to the present  matter  but the C.P. &  Berar  Industrial  Disputes (Settlement)  Act does.  This argument is put in  two  ways. By  one argument the application of the Industrial  Disputes Act  is  sought to be evaded and by the second  the  C.P.  & Berar  Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act is sought to  be applied.   We shall examine these two arguments in the  same order.  The attempt to oust the Central Act is based upon s. 31  of the 1956 (Amendment) Act and the opening part  of  s.

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25J.  Section 31 can have no application because s. 33C  has been included for the purpose, among others, of enabling the workmen  to claim any money due from their  employers  under the provisions of Chapter V-A.  This is expressly so  stated in  that section.  Chapter V-A is the only Chapter in  which there is provision regarding lay off or compensation for lay off.  The C.P. & Berar Act contains no provision either  for the  recovery of money or for compensation for lay off.   It is thus obvious that 76 9 if a workman has a claim for lay off it can only come up for decision  under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  and, indeed, s. 25J(2) says so in express terms.  The attempt  to keep  out  the provisions of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act, particularly  Chapter V-A and s. 33C must, therefore,  fail. The next attempt, namely, that the C.P. & Berar Act  applies is also ineffective.  It is pointed out that the preamble of the  C.P.  &  Berar Act shows that it was  an  Act  for  the promotion of peaceful and amicable settlement of  industrial disputes  by conciliation and arbitration, that  ’industrial disputes’ means any dispute or difference connected with  an industrial  matter  arising  between  an  employer  and   an employee   or  between  employers  or  employees  and   that ’industrial matter’ means any matter relating to pay, wages, reward,  etc.  It is submitted, therefore, that the  dispute must come under the C.P. & Berar Act because of S. 31 of the 1956 (Amendment) Act and S. 25J of the 1953 (Amendment)  Act already  quoted.   The argument is the last one  in  another form.  This argument is fallacious at the very start because lay off and compensation for lay off are to be found only in Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  There  is no mention of lay off or compensation for lay off as one  of the  matters  over  which  the C.P.  &  Berar  Act  has  any jurisdiction.   Next,  even  if  ss. 31  and  25J  save  the application  of the C.P. & Berar Act they do so  subject  to the  condition that question of lay off must be  decided  in accordance with Chapter V-A and S. 33C clearly provides that a  dispute  for any money due under Chapter V-A  has  to  go before the appropriate Government or its delegate.  Here the delegate  is the Second Labour Court, Bombay.  The  argument that  this controversy is wrongly before the  Second  Labour Court, Bombay is, therefore, entirely erroneous and must  be rejected. The  next contention is that the claim for lay off is not  a claim  for  money due because calculations have to  be  made before  the money due can be found.  This argument has  been considered  on  more than one occasion and it  was  rejected recently by this Court in Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd.  v. State of U.P. & Ors(1).  It is not essential that the  claim which  can be brought before the Government or its  delegate under S. 33C(1) must always be for a predetermined sum.  The Government or the Labour Court may satisfy itself about  the exact  amount and then take action under that  section.   In the  present  case the dates of lay off are known  and  each workmen  will  show to the Second Labour Court  that  he  is qualified to receive compensation for 1. [1965] 2 S.C.R. 276. up.C165-6 770 lay  off. That will be shown from the muster roll which  the employer  is  required  to maintain and it will  then  be  a simple  arithmetical calculation which, in our judgment,  s. 33C  permits to be made.  If there is any  question  whether there  was lay off or not the Labour Court will  decide  it. This argument, therefore, has no force.

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The  result  is that the appeal must fail and  is  dismissed with   costs.   The  employers  have.  by  prolonging   this litigation  on  a preliminary point, managed  to  avoid  the trial  of the real issue for a number of years and  we  hope that the Second Labour Court will now deal with this  matter as expeditiously as possible. Appeal dismissed. 771