11 September 1996
Supreme Court


Case number: Appeal Civil 1174 of 1979






DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/09/1996




JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T SEN, J.      Francis De Costa, the first respondent herein, met with an accident  on June 26, 1971 while he was on his way to his place of  employment, a  factory at  a Koratty. The accident occurred at  a place  which was  about one kilometer away to the north  of the  factory. The  time of occurrence was 4.15 P.M,  It   has  been  stated  that  the  duty-shift  of  the respondent  would   have  commenced   at.  4.30  P.M  .  The respondent was  going to  his place  of work bicycle. He was hit by  a lorry  belonging to  his employers,  M/S J  and  P Coats(P) Ltd.      The  respondent’s  collar-  bone  was  fractured  as  a result of  the accident  and he  had to  remain in  hospital for 12  days, His claim for disablement benefit was  allowed by the  Employees’ State  Insurance Court.  The appeal filed against that  order was  dismissed by  the Kerala High Court which also  dismissed an  application   for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court. The petitioner filed an application for Special Leave to this Court on 16,4.1979. Special leave  was given  by this  Court, but the employers’ state Insurance  Corporation was  directed to  pay the first respondent the  compensation due  to him  in  terms  of  the order of  the Employees’  State Insurance Court and also  of this appeal  in any  event. It  has  been  stated  that  the compensation money  has  already  been  paid  to  the  first respondent.      Since there  was difference of opinion between the  two Judges who  heard the appeal, the matter was directed  to be placed before a larger Bench for deciding the controversy .      In order to appreciate the scope of the controversy, it will be  necessary to  set out  the  relevant, provisions of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948:      "2(8)"    "employment injury" means      a personal  injury to  an  employee      caused  by   accident.   or      an      occupational disease arising out of      and   in    the   course   of   his      employment,  being   an   insurable      employment,  whether  the  accident



    occurs or  the occupational disease      is contracted within or outside the      territorial  limits of India;       51. Disablement benefit.-  Subject      to the provisions of this Act-      (a)  a    person    who    sustains           temporary disablement  for not           less    than     three    days           (excluding    the    day    of           accident) shall be entitled to           periodical  payment   at  such           rates and  for such period and           subject to  such conditions as           may  be   prescribed  by   the           Central Government;           (b)  a  person   who  sustains           permanent         disablement,           whether  total   or   partial,           shall    be     entitled    to           periodical  payment   at  such           rates and  for such period and           subject to  such conditions as           may  be   prescribed  by   the           Central Government.      51-C.  Accidents   happening  while      travelling      in       employer’s      transport.-(1)     An      accident      happening while  an insured  person      is, with  the  express  or  implied      permission    of    his    employer      travelling as  a passenger  by  any      vehicle to  or from  his  place  of      work shall, notwithstanding that he      is under  no  obligation    to  his      employer to travel by that vehicle,      be deemed  to arise  out of  in the      course of his employment, if-      (a)  the accident  would have  been           deemed so  to have  arisen had           he been under such obligation;           and      (b)  at the  time of  the accident,           the vehicle-      (i)  is being  operated  by  or  on           behalf  of   his  employer  or           some other  person by  whom it           is provided  in  pursuance  of           arrangements  made   with  his           employer, and      (ii) is not  being operated  in the           ordinary  course   of   public           transport service.      (2)  In   this  section"   vehicle"      includes a vessel and an aircraft."      That the  first  respondent  has  suffered  a  personal injury is  not in  dispute. The  only dispute is whether the injury will  amount  to  "employment  injury"  with  in  the meaning of  Section 2(8),  so as to enable the respondent to claim  benefit  under  the  Act.  The  definition  given  to "employment  injury"   in  sub-section   (8)  of  Section  2 envisages a  personal injury  to an  employee caused  by  an accident or  an occupational  disease "arising out of and in the course  of his  employment", Therefore, the employee, in the order  to succeed  in this case, will have to prove that the  injury that he had suffered arose out of and was in the



course of his employment. Both the condition will have to be fulfilled before  he could  claim any benefit under the Act. It does  not appear that the injury suffered by the employee in the instant  case arose in any way out of his employment. The injury  was sustained  while the employee was on his way to the  factory where  he was  employed. the  accident  took place one  kilometer away  from  the  place  of  employment. Unless it  can be  said that his employment began as soon as he set  out for the factory from his home, it cannot be said that the  injury was  caused by  an accident "arising out of ...his employment".  A road accident may happen any where at any   time. But such  accident cannot be said to have arisen out of  employment. unless it can be shown that the employee was doing something  incidental to his employment.      In our  judgment,  by  using  the  words  "arising  out of....his employment  ", the  legislature gave a restrictive meaning to "employment injury ". the injury  must be of such an extent  as  can  be  attributed  to  an  accident  or  an occupational disease  arising out  of his   employment. "Out of" in  this context,  must mean  caused  by employment., Of course, the  phrase "out  of" has an exclusive meaning also. If a  man is described to be out of his employment, it means he is  without a  job. The  other meaning of the phrase "out of" is  "influenced,   inspired, or  caused by: out of pity; out of  respect for him". (Webster Comprehensive Dictionary- lnternational Edition-1984). In the context of Section 2(8), the words  "out of"  indicate that the injury must be caused by an  accident which  had its  origin in  the employment. A mere road  accident, while  an employee is on his way to his place of employment cannot be said to have its origin in his employment  in   the  factory.   The  phrase   "out   of-the employment" was  construed in  the case  of South   Maitland Railways Pty.  Ltd. v. James, 67 C.L.R 496, where construing the phrase  "out or  the employment",  Starke, J,, held "the words ’out of’ require that the injury had its origin in the employment".      Unless an  employee can  establish that the injury  was caused or  had its  origin in  the employment,  he    cannot succeed in  a claim  based on  Section 2(8) of the  Act. The words "accident  . .  . arising out of . . . his employment" indicate that any accident which occurred while going to the place of employment or for the purpose of employment, cannot be said  to have  arisen out  of his employment. There is no causal connection between the accident and the employment.      The other  words of  limitation  in  sub-section(8)  of Section  2  is  "in  the  course  of  his  employment".  The dictionary meaning  of "in the course of" is "during (in the course of  time, as  time goes by), while doing (The Concise Oxford Dictionary,  New  Seventh  Edition).  The  dictionary meaning indicates  that the  accident must take place within or during  the period  or employment. If the employee’s work shift begins  at 4.30  P.M., any  accident before  that time will not  be "in  the course of his employment". The journey to the  factory may  have been undertaken for working at the factory at  4.30 P.M.  But this journey was certainly not in course of  employment. If  employment begins from the moment the employee  sets from his house for the factory, then even if the  employee stumbles and falls down at the door-step of his house,  the accident  will have to be treated as to have taken  place   in  the   course  of   his  employment.  This interpretation leads to absurdity and has to be avoided.      We were referred to a number of cases on this point. In the case of Regina   v.  National Insurance Commissioner. Ex parte Michael, (1977)  1 Weekly  Law   Reports 109 the Court of Appeal in England had to     construe a phrase "caused by



accident arising out of and in the course of his employment" in Section 5(1)   of    the National   Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1965.  Lord Denning M.R. started his judgment with the  observation:-      "So we  come back,  once again,  to      those all  too      familiar  words      ’arising out  of and in the  course      of his  employment’. They have been      worth-to lawyers-a  King’s  ransom.      The reason  is because, although so      simple, they have to  be applied to      facts which very infinitely.  Quite      often the  primary faces are not in      dispute: or  they are proved beyond      question.   But the  inference from      them is matter of law.  And matters      or law can be taken higher. In  the      old days  they went up to the House      of    Lords.  Nowadays they have to      be determined,   not by the courts,      but by  the hierarchy of  tribunals      set   up    under   the    National      Insurance Acts."      Under  the  Employees’  State  Insurance  Act  1948,  a tribunal has  been set up to decide, inter alia, any   claim for  recovery  of  a  benefit  admissible  in  this  Act.  A reference lies  to the  High Court  on a question of law. In other words,  the decision  of the  Insurance Court  set  up under the  statute is  final and  bindings, so  far  as  the findings of fact are concerned. But, if any error of law has been committed  the Courts are expected to correct it and to give guidance to the Insurance Court.      Construing the  meaning of  the phrase "in the   course of his  employment", it  was noted  by Lord Denning that the meaning of  the phrase  had gradually  been widened over the last  30  years  to  include  doing    something  which  was reasonably incidental  to the     employee’s employment. The test of  "reasonably incidental"  was  applied  in  a  large number of English   decisions. Buts Lord Denning pointed out that in  all   those cases  the workman  was at the premises where he  or she  worked and was injured while on a visit to the   canteen or  other place  for a  break.  Lord  Denning, however, caution  that the  words "reasonably    incidental" should be  read in that context and should be limited to the cases of that kind. Lord Denning observed:-      "Take a  case where  a man is going      to or  from   his place  of work on      his own  bicycle, or  in   his  own      car. He  might i.e said to be doing      something  "reasonably  incidental"      to his    employment. But if he has      an accident  on the way  it is well      settled that  it does  not   "arise      out of  and in  the course  of  his      employment".   Even if his employer      provides the  transport, so that he      is going  to work as a passenger in      his employer’s  vehicle  (which  is      surely  reasonably  incidental"  to      his  employment) nevertheless if he      is injured  in an accident, it does      not arise  out of and in the course      of  his  employment.  It  needed  a      special "deeming"  provision  in  a      statute  to  make  it  "deemed"  to



    arise out  of and  in the course of      his employment."      This is  precisely the  case before  us. Here  also, we have at case of a person going from his home to his place of work. But  he suffers  injury in  an accident on the way. It cannot be  said that  the accident  arose out  of and in the course of  his employment.  It was faintly  suggested by Mr. Chacko, appearing  on behalf  of  the  respondent  that  the bicycle was  bought by taking a loan from the employer. That however, is  of no  relevance. He  might have borrowed money from his  Company or  from somewhere else for purchasing the bicycle. But  the fact  remains that the bicycle belonged to him and  not the   employer.  If he  meets with  an accident while riding  his own  bicycle on  the way  to his  place of work, it  cannot   be said  that the accident was reasonably incidental to  the employment  and was  in the course of his employment. The deeming provision of Section 51-C which came into force  by way  of an  amendment effected  by Employee’s Life Insurance  (Amendment) Act of 1966 (Act No.44 of 1966), enlarged  the   scope  of  the  phrase  "in  the  course  of employment" to  include tavelling  as  a  passenger  by  the employer’s vehicle  to or  from the place of work. The legal fiction contained  in Section  51-C, however,  does not come into  play  in  this  case  because  the  employee  was  not travelling as  a passenger  in any vehicle owned or operated by   or on behalf of the employer or by some other person in pursuance of an arrangement made by the employer.      The  meaning  of  the  words  "in  the  course  of  his employment"  appearing   in  Section   3(1)   of   Workmen’s Compensation Acts  1923. was examined by this Court in   the case of Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v, Bai  Valu Raja, AIR 1958  SC 881. There, the appellant, a salt manufacturing company, employed  workmen both temporary and permanent. The salt works was situated near a creek opposite to the town of Porbandar. The  salt works  could be reached by at least two ways from  the town,  one an  over land  route nearly 6 to 7 miles long and the other via a creek which had to be crossed by a boat. In the evening of 12.6.1952, a boat carrying some of the workmen capsized due to bad weather and over-loading. As a  result of  this, some of the workmen were drowned. One of the questions that came up for consideration  was whether the accident had taken place in the course of the employment of the  workers. S.  Jafer Imam, J., speaking for the court, held "As  a rule,  the employment  of  a  workman  does  not commence until  he has  reached the  place of employment and does      not  continue  when  he  has  left  the  place  of employment, the  journey to and from the place of employment being excluded." After laying down the principle broadly, S. Jafer Imams, J., went or to observe that there might be some reasonable  extension   in  both  time  and  place  to  this principle. A  workman might  be regarded as in the course of his employment  even though  he had  not reached or had left his employer’s premises in some special cases. The facts and circumstances of  each case  would have  to be examined very carefully in  order to  determine whether the accident arose out of  and in  the course  of the  employment of a workman, keeping in  view  at  all  times  this  theory  of  notional extension.  But,   examining  the   facts  of  the  case  in particular, after  noticing the fact that the workman used a boat, which was also used as public ferry for which they had to pay the boatman’s dues, S.Jafer Imam, J. observed:-      "It is  well settled  that  when  a      workman is  on   a public road or a      public place  or  on  a      public      transport he  is there as any other



    member of  the public  and  is  not      there  in   the     course  of  his      employment unless the very   nature      of   his    employment   makes   it      necessary   for him  to be there. A      workman is  not in  the   course of      his employment  from the  moment he      leaves his  home and  is on his way      to his   work.  He certainly  is in      the course of his  employment if he      reaches the  place of  work or    a      point or an area which comes within      the   theory of notional extension,      outside of   which  the employer is      not liable to pay  compensation for      any accident  happening to  him. In      the present  case, even  if  it  be      assumed that  the theory  of notion      extension   extends upon  point  D,      the  theory  cannot  be    extended      beyond it.  The  moment  a  workman      left point  B in  a  boat  or  left      point A  but   had not  yet reached      point B,  he could not be   said to      be in  the course of his employment      and any  accident happening  to him      on the    journey between these two      points could  not be   said to have      arisen out of and in the course  of      his    employment.     Both     the      Commissioner   for        Workmen’s      Compensation  and  the  High  Court      were in error in supposing that the      deceased    workmen  in  this  case      were still  in the course  of their      employment when  they were crossing      the creek  between points  A and B.      The  accident which took place when      the boat  was   almost at  point  A      resulting in  the death of  so many      workmen was  unfortunate,  but  for      that  accident the appellant cannot      be made liable."      The point raised before us can be answered on the basis of the  principle laid  down in the aforesaid two cases. But Mr. Chacko,  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondent  has contended that  proximity of  time end  place is a factor to the borne  in mind.  The employee  was to report for duty at 4.30 P.M.  The accident  took place  at 4.15  P.M. only  one kilometer away  from the factory. In our view this cannot be a ground  for departing  from the principle laid down by the aforementioned cases that the employment of the workman does not commence  until he  has reached she place of employment. What happens before that is not in course  of employment. It was also  pointed out  by Lord Denning in the aforesaid case of Regina  v. National  Insurance   Commissioner, Ex.  Parte Michael (supra)  that the  extension of  the meaning  of the phrase "in  the course of his employment" has taken place in some cases   but  in all those cases, the workman was at the premises where  he or  she worked and was injured while on a visit to  the canteen or some other place for   a break. The test of  what was "reasonably incidental" to employment, may be extended  even to  cases while  an employee  is  sent  on errand by  the employer outside the factory premises. But in such cases  it must  be shown  that he  was doing  something



incidental to  his employment. There may also be cases where an employee   has  to go  out of  his workplace in the usual course of  his employment.  Latham, C.J.  in South  Maitland Railways Proprietary Limited v. James (67 CLR 496)  observed that when  the workmen  on a  hot day  in course    of their employment had  to go  for a  short time  to get   some cool water to  drink to  enable them to continue to  work without which they  could not have otherwise continued, they were in such cases doing something in the course of their employment when they  went out for S water. But the case before us does not fall  within the exceptions mentioned by Lord Denning or Latham, C.J.  The case squarely comes within the proposition of law propounded by S. Jafar Imam, J.      Strong  reliance   was  placed  by  Shri  Chacko  on  a decision  of   this  Court   in  General  Manager,  B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay  v. Mrs.  Agnes (1964  (3) SCR  930). In this case,  one bus  driver of  the  appellant-  Corporation after finishing  the day’s  work left  for  home  in  a  bus belonging  to  employer’s  undertaking  which  met  with  an accident as  a result  of which  he died.  His widow claimed compensation under  the Workmen’s  Compensation Act  and the question was  whether the  accident had arisen out of and in course  of   employment.  It  was  held  by  Subba  Rao  and Mudholkar, JJ.  (Raghubar Dayal, J. dissenting) that the bus driver was given facility by the management to travel in any bus belonging  to the  undertaking.  It  was  given  because efficiency of  the service demanded it. Therefore, the right of the  bus driver to travel in the bus was to discharge his duty punctually  and efficiently.  This was   a condition of service and  there was  an obligation to  travel in the said the buses  as a  part of  his duty.  It was held that in the case of a factory, the premises of an employer was a limited one but  in the  case of City  Transport Service, the entire fleet of buses forming the service would be "premises". This decision in  our view does not come to the assistance of the employee’s case.  An employee of a Transport Undertaking was travelling in  a vehicle  provided by  the employer.  Having regard to  the purpose  for which he was travelling and also having regard  to the obligation on the part of the employee to travel in the said buses as a part of his duty, the Court came to  the conclusion that this journey was the  Course of his employment  because the entire fleet of buses formed the premises within which he worked.      But in  the case  before us,  the  facts  are  entirely different. The  employee was  not obliged  to travel  in any particular way  under the terms of employment nor  can it be said that  he was  travelling in a transport provided by the employer.      In the  case of  Sadgunaben Amrutlal  and others v. The Employees State  Insurance Corporation, Ahmedabad (1981 LAB. I.C 1653),  it was held by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court  that though  as a  rule, employment of a workman did not commence until he reach  the place of employment and did  not  continue  after  he      has  left  the  place  of employment, the  proposition was  subject to  the theory  of notional extension  of the employer’s premises. The notional extension theory  could not  be  related  to  the  place  of employment only. It could also be taken recourse to in order to extend  the time  in a  reasonable manner. The court took the view  in the  case, where  an employee on his way to the factory died  of acute cardiac arrest, that it was caused by accident arising  out of  and in  course of  employment. The employee was employed as a jobber in the Wrapping Department of the  mill. He  worked in  the premise from 8 A.M. to 4.30 P.M. On  December 22,1974, while was on duty in the mill, he



felt unwell.  He took  medical treatment  on  the  next  day (December 23,1974) which was an off-day for him. On December 24, 1974,  he left  his residence at about 7.20 A.M. i.e. 40 minutes before  the   reporting  time.  Hi  walked  a  short distance from  his house  to the  nearest bus  stop and  was waiting for a bus to take him to the mill. While waiting for the bus,  he felt unwell. He complained to an ex-employee of the mill  who was  also waiting to board the that it was due to the  excessive and  strenuous nature of work which he was required to  do at the mill that he was feeling unwell. When the bus  arrived, Amrut  Lal, the employee was about to step into the  bus when  he collapsed and became unconscious. The postmortem reavealed  that he  died of cardiac failure. Both the Employees  Insurance Court  and the  single Judge of the High Court  held that  the employee had not died as a result of an  accident in  the course of employment. On appeal, the Division Bench  held that both the Employees Insurance Court and the single Judge were in error in holding that the death was not in course of employment.      It is  doubtful whether this decision can be reconciled with the  principle laid  down by  S. Jafer  Imam, J. in the case of Surashtra Salt Manufacturing  Co.(supra). It is also to be  noted that  the death was  not caused by an accident. The death  was due  to acute  cardiac  failure.  The  causal connection between  the death   and  employment had not been established. Moreover,  walking to  the bus  stop  from  the employee’s residence  and boarding  the bus for going to the place of work cannot be acts in course of employment.      In the  case of  Bhagubai v.  Central Railway,  Bombay, (1954) L.L.J.,  a Division Bench of Bombay High Court  dealt with a case where a workman on his way to work was murdered. There was  no evidence to show that he murder was due to any motive against  the deceased  workman. It  was held that the death took  place because   of  an accident  arising out  of employment. Chagla,  C.J. emphasised  that there  must be  a causal connection  between the accident and the death before it could  be said  that the accident arose out of employment of the  concerned workman.  In that  case, the  deceased was employed by Central Railway at Kurla Station and he lived in the railway  quarters adjoining the station. It was found as a fact  that the  only access  for  the  deceased  from  his quarters to  the  Kurla  railway  station  was  through  the compound of  the railway  quarters. On December 20,1952, the decease left  his quarters  a few minutes before midnight in order to join duty. While on his way, he was stabbed by some unknown persons.  It is  not disputed by the railway company that the deceased died as a result of an accident nor was it disputed that  the accident  arose  in  the  course  of  his employment. The  dispute was limited to the question whether the accident arose out of the employment of the deceased.      It is of significance that the deceased used to live in the railway  quarters adjoining  the railway station and the compound through  which he  had to  go   the place  of  work belonged to  the railway  company. In other words he died on the premise  belonging to  the   railways. It was found as a fact that  the stabbing  which  led to the death was not due to any  personal enmity.  That means  it was an occupational hazard of  the employee  who went  to join  work at midnight from the  railway quarter to the railway station through the railway compound.  The facts of the case before us are quite dissimilar to  the facts  on the  basis of which the case of Bhagubai (supra) was decided.      We were  also referred  to two  American decisions. The first case  is J.J.O’  Leary, Deputy Commissioner Fourteenth Compensation District, Etc. v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., et



al (95  L.ed. 483=340 us 504-510). In this  case an employee of a  Government  contractor  was  at  a  recreation  center maintained by  his employer  near an ocean shore along which ran a  channel so  dangerous for  swimmers that  its use was forbidden and  signs to  that effect  erected. On perceiving that two  men standing  on a  reef beyond  the channel  were signalling for  help, he  undertook with others, to swim the channel, and  was drowned. The Administrative Tribunal found that the employee’s death arose "out of and in course of his employment". Six  member of the U.S. Supreme Court concurred with the  opinion of  Frankfurter J. that the administrative decision  was   supported  by   "substantial  evidence"  and therefore was  beyond  the  scope  of  permissible  judicial review. Minton, J., with whom Jackson and Burton ,JJ. agreed was of  the opinion  that the   administrative  finding  was without any evidence.      This case  really is  an authority  on  the  scope  and extent of  power of  judicial review  of  an  administrative order. The  important fact  which was noted in that case was that the  deceased along with other employees had discovered that third  persons who  were in danger were in a recreation area maintained  by his  employer for  the  benefit  of  the employees. This  finding was held to be based on substantial evidence. Frankfurter, J. observed that "We do not mean that the evidence  compelled this interference; we do not suggest that when  the Deputy  Commissioner had  decided against the claim, the  court  had  been  justified  in  disturbing  his conclusion. We  hold only  that on this record, the decision of the District Court that the award should not be set aside should be sustained". In other words, Frankfurter, J. was of the view  that from  the   evidence on record, either of the two conclusion  could have  been drawn.  It is  well settled that  the   Court  will   not  disturb   a  finding   of  an administrative tribunal merely because it could have taken a contrary view  had it  heard the  case on evidence, when the view taken by the Tribunal is also a plausible view.      The other  American decision  is  in  the  case  of  O’ Keeffe, Deputy  Commissioner. v.  Smith, Minchman  &  Grylls Associates, Inc.,  et al.(13  L.ed.2d 895).  In that case, a private   engineering concern’s  employee hired  to work  in South Korea  on a 365-day basis was drowned while boating on a  South  Korea  lake.  The  Deputy  Workmen’s  Compensation Commissioner determined  that the employee’s death arose out of and  in course  of employment  so as to entitle his widow and minor  child  to  death  benefits.  The  decision  being challenged by  a writ,  a panel  of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the award. The Supreme Court held that there  was no  scope for  reviewing the decision of the Deputy Commissioner.  The Court of Appeal erred in summarily reversing the  judgment. It  was observed  that "while  this Court may not have reached the same conclusion as the Deputy Commissioner, it  cannot be  said that  his holding that the decedent’s death,  in a  zone of danger, arose out of and in the course  of  his  employment  is  irrational  or  without substantial evidence on the record as a whole."      Here  again,   the  U.S.   Supreme  Court  declined  to intervene  with   the  decision   reached  by   the   Deputy Commissioner on  evidence and  reversed the  decision of the Court of  Appeal for  doing what  it should not have done by adopting what appeared to the Court to be a better view.      We fail  to understand  how these tow American decision which really  dealt with  the scope  and extent  of judicial review of  a decision  based essentially  on finding of fact can come to the aid of the employee in this case.      It has  to be  borne in mind that this is not a case of



judicial review.  The Employees’  State Insurance  Act, 1948 provides for  reference to  the High  Court by the statutory court set  up under the Act, any question of law arising out of its decision (Section 81). There is  also a provision for appeal  in  certain  cases  on  a  substantial  question  of law(Section 82).      We are  of the view that in the facts of this case,  it cannot be  said that  the injury suffered by the workman one kilometer away  from the  factory while he was on his way to the factory  was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.      In the  case of  Dover Navigation  Company  Limited  v. Isabella Craig(1940 A.C 190), it was observed by Lord Wright that-      "Nothing could  be simpler than the      words" arising  out of  and in  the      course of  the employment."  It  is      clear that  there are two condition      to be  fulfilled.  What  arise  "in      the course of" the employment is to      be distinguished from what arises "      out of  the employment." The former      words relate to time conditioned by      reference to the man’s service. the      latter  to   causality.  Not  every      accident  which   occur  to  a  man      during the  time when  he is on his      employment,  that  is  directly  or      indirectly   engaged on  what he is      employed to  do, gives  a claim  to      compensation unless  it also arises      out of  the employment  . Hence the      section imports a distinction which      it does not define. The language is      simple and unqualified."      Although the  facts of  this case are quite dissimilar, the principle  laid down  in this  case, are instructive and should be  borne in mind. In order to  succeed, it has to be proved by  the employee  that (1)  there was an accident,(2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment and (3) the  accident  must  have  bee  suffered  in  course  of employment. In  the facts  of this  case, we are of the view that the  employee was unable to prove that the accident had any causal  connection with  the work  he was  doing at  the factory and  in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.      The appeal,  therefore ,  succeeds. The judgement dated 25.11.1977 passed  by the  High Court is set aside. However, in terms of the order passed by this Court on 16.4.1979, the appellants will have to bear the costs of this appeal in any event. The  costs are assessed at Rs.3000/- and will be paid by the  appellant to  the fist respondent within a period of four   week from  date. The  first respondent  will also  be entitled to  retain the  money paid  to them by the Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation pursuant to the order of this Court passed on 16.4.1979.