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PETITIONER: RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: U.O.I. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/11/1992

BENCH: [M.H. KANIA ,  CJ.,  N.M. KASLIWAL AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.]

ACT: Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 4, 6, 9 and 10-Notification- challenge to-Delay-Not properly explained effect of.

HEADNOTE: Notification under  Section 4  of the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894  was issued  in respect of certain lands including the lands  belonging to the appellant-foundation situated at two different places. The appellant-Foundation filed objections. Subsequently notifications under  Sections 6 and Notices under Sections 9 and 10 were also issued. The appellant-Foundation challenged the notifications  in respect of the land situated at one of the two  places, by  way of  a Writ Petition before the High Court and  the same  was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to  the   petitioner  to  agitate  the  matter  in  a  suit. Thereupon, the  appellant-Foundation filed  a suit  and  the same was  dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court. The Letters  Patent   Appeal  filed  against  that  decision  is pending. In respect  of the  land situated at the other place, a Writ Petition  was filed  by the  appellant before  the High Court,  which   came  to   be  dismissed     as   withdrawn. Thereafter,  another   Writ  Petition   was  filed   by  the appellant-Foundation before  the High  Court challenging the notifications. The High  Court having dismissed the Writ Petition, the appellant-Foundation preferred the present appeal. On behalf  of the  appellants,   it was  contended that they filed their objections under Section 5A of the Act, but the same were rejected without  affording any opportunity of personal hearing,  and  the  denial  of  such    opportunity invalidated the  notifications; and  that the  land  of  the appellants  being  wakf  property  it  ought  to  have  been excluded on the basis of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.  Alternatively it  was contended that the appellant has been  running several  educational institutions  on  the very land and that if the exemption for wakf property is not applicable to  such educational  and charitable institutions run by Hindus or non-Muslims, then such a notification would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Respondents  contested the  appeal  on  grounds  of delay, laches   and  acquiescence in fling the Writ Petition challenging the  acquisition proceedings. It was also stated that the  appellants  were  given  opportunity  of  personal hearing.

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Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.  The conduct  of the appellants in raising the plea that  no opportunity  of personal  hearing was given to the appellants  in respect  of the  objections  filed  under Section 5A  of the  Land Acquisition  Act, 1894  was totally baseless  and   factually  incorrect  and  such  conduct  is reprehensible. It  is well-settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal the material facts. [431-F, G] Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad & Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of the  City of  Ahmedabad & Anr., [1977] 1 SCR 71, referred to. 2. The  challenge to  the acquisition  proceedings  was mainly based  on the  ground that  in the notification dated 13.11.1959 issued  under Section  4 of  the Act the lands of wakf property  were excluded and the lands of the appellants being also  used for educational and charitable purposes the same were  also liable  to be  excluded. At  a later stage a ground was  also    taken  that  if  wakf  property  in  the aforesaid notification under Section 4 of the Act meant only wakf properties  of the  Mohammedans, then such notification was discriminatory  and  violative  under  Art.  14  of  the Constitution  as   there  was   no  reasonable   ground   to discriminate such  properties of Hindus or non-Muslims meant for charitable  purposes. Thus  the challenge was in respect of notifications  under Sections  4 and  6 of the Act  alone and though  in the  prayer clause  relief has been sought to quash the  notification under  Sections 9  and 10 of the Act also which  were issued  in 1972,  no ground  whatsoever has been pleaded  in the writ petition nor raised in the present appeal as  to how  the notifications under Sections 9 and 10 had any  concern for  explaining the delay in respect of the Challenge to notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, Admittedly the  notices  under  sections  9  and  10  issued appellants in 1972 were in respect of a portion of the land. The challenge  on the  other Land in the writ petition is in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 covering the entire land.  There is no justification at all in explaining the delay  on the  ground that  no award has been passed nor the appellants  have been  dispossessed so far.  This cannot be an  explanation for  not  challenging  the  notifications under Sections  4 and  6 of  the Act and in the present case the appellants had themselves sought stay from this Court as early as  15.11.1978 for  not making and declaring the award and not  to dispossess  the appellants.  Thus  there  is  no justification at  all for  the delay in not  challenging the notification issued under Section 4 on 13.11.1959 till 1973. Even notifications under Section 6 of the Act were issued in 1968 and 1969 but not challenged till 1973. [435-H; 436-A-G] Aflatoon &  Ors. v. Lt. Governor Delhi & Ors., [2975] 1 SCR 802, relied on.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2213 of 1978.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  31.1.1978  of  the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978.      V.M. Tarkunde,  S.B. Wad, Mrs. J.S. Wad and Mrs. Tamali Wad for the Appellants.      K.T.S. Tulsi,  Solicitior General,  T.C. Sharma  and P. Parmeshwaran  for the Respondents.      Kirpal  Singh   and  M.A.   Krishna  Moorthy   for  the

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Intervener.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KASLIWAL, J.  This appeal  by the  Ramjas Foundation, a society duly   registered  under the  Societies Registration Act, 1960 and five others who are the Secretary and trustees of the  Ramjas Foundation  is directed  against the order of the Delhi  High Court  dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the civil Writ Petition No.106 of 1978 in limine.      On November  13, 1959,  the  Chief  Commissioner  Delhi issued  a     Notification  under  Section  4  of  the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) Land measuring 34070 acres was notified as land likely to be acquired by  the Government  at the  public  expense  for  a public purpose,  namely, the  planned development  of Delhi. The following  land   was excluded  from the  scope  of  the notification:      (a)  Government  land  and  evacues      land;      (b) the land already notified,      either under Section 6 of the  Land      Acquisition Act for any Government      Scheme;      (c)  the   land  already   notified      either under  Section 4  o.   under      Section 6  of the  Land Acquisition      Act,   for        House    Building      Cooperative Societies  mentioned in      annexure-lII;      (d)  the   land  under  graveyards,      tombs,   shrines   and   the   land      attached to  religious institutions      and Wakf property.      The aforesaid  land measuring 34070 acres included land measuring about  872 bighas,  9 biswas  situated in  Chowkri Mubarikabad and  measuring  about  730  bighas  situated  in Chowkri Sadhurakhurd,  belonging to  the Ramjas  Foundation. The present  appeal relates  to the land situated in Chowkri Sadhurakhurd.   The Ramjas  Foundation on  December 11, 1959 filed objections  under Section 5A of the Act for the entire land situated  in Mubarikabad  as well  as Sadhurakhurd. The Lt. Governor  of  Delhi  subsequently  issued  notifications under  Section   6  of  the  Act  on  15.4.1968,  27.4.1968, 15.5.1968,   19.8.1968, 14.1.1969  and  18.1.1969.  The  Lt. Governor also  issued notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act on  December 27,  1972 for Sadhurakhurd land. As regards the land  in Mubarikabad notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on February 28, 1968. Ramjas Foundation filed a writ  petition in  may,  1968  in  the  Delhi  High  Court challenging the  action of the Government in acquiring their lands situated  in Mubarikabad.  In the  said writ  petition Sachar, J.  (as he  then was)  who heard the petition was of the view that the matter ought to be tried in a suit instead of writ  proceedings. He,  therefore,  by  his  order  dated August 10,  1971 permitted the Ramjas Foundation to withdraw the petition  with liberty  to agitate  the matter in a suit and as  such the  writ petition  was dismissed as withdrawn. The Ramjas  Foundation then  filed a  suit in the Delhi High Court on  November 8,  1971 for  quashing the  notifications issued under  Sections 4  and 6 of the Act in respect of the land situated  in   Mubarikabad. The  suit was  dismissed by Awadh Behari  Rohtagi,  J.  of the Delhi High Court by order dated 21.3.1977  reported in  AIR 1977  Delhi 261.   Learned Counsel for  the  appellants  brought  to  our  notice  that Letters Patent  Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court is  pending against  the  aforesaid  Judgment  of  the

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Learned Single Judge.      So far  as the land situated in Sadhurakhurd with which we are  concerned in  the present appeal a Writ Petition No. 213 of  1973 was  filed in  the High  Court and the same was dismissed as  withdrawn on  30th   March,  1977.  Thereafter another Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 was filed  challenging the notifications  issued under  Sections 4,  6, 9 and 10 of the Act  and the same was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order  dated January  31, 1978 in limine as already mentioned above.      We have  heard Mr. Tarkunde, Learned Senior Advocate on behalf of  the appellants  and Mr. Tulsi, Learned Additional Solicitor General  on behalf  of  the  respondents.  Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants had submitted their  objections under  Section 5A  of the Act on 11.12.1959 but  the same were rejected without affording any opportunity of  personal hearing.  It was  submitted that it was mandatory  on the  part of the respondents to have given an opportunity  of personal  hearing specially when the same was desired  and a  denial of  such opportunity of  personal hearing invalidates  the notifications issued under Sections 6 and  9 of  the Act.  Reliance  in  respect  of  the  above contention is  placed on  Farid Ahmed  Abdul Samad & Anr. v. Municipal Corporation  of the  City  of  Ahmedabad  &  Anr., [19771 1 SCR 71.      It was  also contended on behalf of the appellants that the notification  issued under  Section 4  of the Act itself excludes the  land of  wakf property.    It  has  thus  been contended that  so far  as the land in question is concerned the same  being also  a wakf  property as such ought to have been  exempted    under  the  notification  itself.  It  was submitted  that   Ramjas  Foundation   is    an  educational charitable   society which  is running  several schools  and post graduate  college  in  Delhi  and  several  educational institutions are  being run  on the  alleged  acquired  land itself. As an alternative argument it was submitted that  in case  this Hon’ble  Court takes  the view that wakf  property mentioned  in the  alleged  notification does not include the educational and charitable institutions run by Hindus or non-Muslims then such notification  is void for violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.      As regards  the  objection  of  the  violation  of  the mandatory provisions  of Section  5A of  the Act  in.    not affording an  opportunity of personal hearing while deciding such objections,  we granted  an opportunity  to the Learned Additional  Solicitor   General  to   place  material  after examining  the   original  record.     We   granted,    this opportunity to the respondents on account of the reason that the writ  petition had  been dismissed by the High Court  in limine without issuing notice to the respondents and as such the respondents  had not  been given  any opportunity before the  High   Court  to  place  any  material  to  refute  the allegations made  by the  appellants  in  this  regard.  The Additional  Solicitor  General  during  the  course  of  the hearing  of   the  matter   placed  an  order  of  the  Land Acquisition Collector,   Delhi  dated   23.2.1968 which  has been taken  on record and for the purposes of identification has been marked as Annexure ’X’. A copy of the said Annexure ’X’  was   also  given   to  the  Learned  counsel  for  the appellants. A perusal of the aforesaid order dated 22.3.1968 clearly  shows   that  the  Ramjas  Foundation  Society  was represented through  Sh. Ratan  Lal Gupta,  Advocate who was given a  personal hearing.  From a  perusal of the aforesaid document Annexure  ’X’ dated 23.2.1968 it is clear that full opportunity of  hearing through  counsel was afforded to the

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Ramjas Foundation.   It  has been  further mentioned in this order that the Ramjas Foundation Society was also allowed to file fresh  objections if  so desired,  but  Sh.  Ratan  Lal Gupta, Learned  Advocate for the Petitioner society declined and stated   that  there was  nothing more  to  add  in  the previous  objection   petition.  After   bringing  the  said document Annexure  ’X’ to  the notice of the Learned counsel for the  appellants, no satisfactory explanation or argument came forward on behalf of the appellants. The conduct of the appellants in  raising  the  plea  that  no  opportunity  of personal hearing  was given to the  appellants in respect of the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act was totally baseless  and   factually  incorrect  and  such  conduct  is reprehensible. lt  is well settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should  not conceal  the material  facts. The  objection regarding not  affording an  opportunity of personal hearing in   respect of objections filed under Section 5A of the Act was one of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as  well as  in the  Special Leave  Petition  filed before this  Court and  ought we know if such ground had not been taken  this Court would have entertained this appeal or not.   The appellants  have taken the advantage of obtaining the stay  order also from this Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the Special Leave Petition was filed in 1978 itself.      It  may  be  further  noted  that  a  common  objection petition under  Section 5A of the Act in respect of both the lands situated  in Mubarikabad   as  well as in Sadhurakhurd was  filed  on  11.12.1959  through  Sh.  Ratan  lal  Gupta, Advocate. The  said objections were heard in the presence of Shri   Ratan Lal  Gupta,   Advocate and  disposed of  by one common order  Annexure ’X’  and we  cannot believe  an  ipse dixit  explanation   made  orally    during  the  course  of arguments on  behalf of  the appellants  that they  had   no knowledge of  any personal hearing being given to Shri Ratan Lal Gupta,  Advocate. It  is also  important to note that no such objection was taken in respect of land in Mubarikabad.      Another ground  on which  the present  appeal has  been contested is   the  ground of delay, laches and acquiescence in filing  the writ  petition  challenging  the  acquisition proceedings.     As  already   mentioned  above   a   common notification was  issued under  Section 4  of the Act for an area of  34070 acres  of land needed for planned development of Delhi.   Between  1959 and  1961, about,    six  thousand objections were  filed under  Section 5A  of  the  Act.  The objections  were   overruled.     On  March  18,  1966,  the declaration under  Section 6  of the  Act was  published  in respect of  a portion  of  the  area.  Thereafter,  in  1970 notices were  issued under  Section 9(1) of the Act and some of the persons who had received such notices challenged the validity of acquisition proceedings by filing writ petitions before the  High Court  of Delhi.   The High Court negatived all the  contentions raised in those cases and dismissed the writ petitions. Thereafter appeals by grant of special leave against the judgment of the Delhi High Court as well as writ petitions filed  directly under  Art. 32 of the Constitution were heard  and disposed  of  by  this  Court  by  a  common Judgment reported in Aflatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Governor Delhi & Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 802. In the aforesaid case a Constitution Bench of  this Court held that in the case of an acquisition of a  large area  of land comprising several plots belonging to different  persons, the  specification of the purpose can only be  with regard  to the  acquisition of the whole area.

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Unlike in  the case  of an  acquisition of  a small area, it might be  practically difficult  to specify  the  particular purpose for  which each  and every item of land comprised in the area is needed.      It was  further held  in the  above case that about six thousand objections  were filed  under Section 5A by persons interested in the property. Several writ petitions were also filed in  1966 and  1967 challenging  the  validity  of  the acquisition proceedings.  The Government  had necessarily to wait for the disposal of the objections and petitions before proceeding further  in the matter. The High Court was of the view that  there was no  inordinate delay on the part of the Government in  completing the  acquisition proceedings.  The conclusion of the High Court was held to be correct.  It was also held  in the  above case  that the  writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay on the part  of the  petitioners.  In the above case this Court had found  that the appellants of that case had not moved in the matter  even after  the declaration  under Section 6 was published in  1966.    They  approached the  High Court with their writ  petitions only  in 1970  when the  notices under Section 9  were issued  to them. This Court then observed as under:      "There was apparently no reason why      the writ  petitions    should  have      waited till  1972 to  come to  this      Court for  challenging the validity      of the  notification issued in 1959      on the  ground that the particulars      of the  public purpose    were  not      specified.  A   valid  notification      under Section  4 is    sine qua non      for initiation  of proceedings  for      acquisition   of property.  To have      sat on  the fence  and allowed  the      Government    to    complete    the      acquisition  proceedings   on   the      basis that  the notification  under      Section  4  and  the    declaration      under Section 6 were valid and then      to  attack    the  notification  on      grounds  which  were  available  to      them  at   the   time   when   tile      notification was published would be      putting  a   premium  on   dilatory      tactics.  The  writ  petitions  are      liable  to   be  dismissed  on  the      ground of  laches and delay  on the      part of the petitioners".      The delay  and laches  in the  case before  us are even worse than  those in  the above  cited Aflatoon’s  case. The appellants had  initially filed  a writ  petition No. 213/73 challenging the  notification dated 13.11.1959 under Section 4 of  the Act and notification dated 27.4.1968 under Section 6 of the Act with respect to 245 bighas and 1 biswas of land situated in  the revenue  estate  of  Sadhurakhurd  and  the notices dated  27.12.1972 under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act issued by the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi with respect to  Khasra  No.  1040/353  (12  bighas  and  8  biswas).  On 30.3.1977 Shri  M.C. Gupta,  Learned counsel  for the Ramjas Foundation stated  that he had instructions from his clients to state  that they  did not  want to press the petition and wish to  withdraw it.   The  statement of Sh. Gupta had been separately recorded.   The  Court,  in  these  circumstances permitted to withdraw the petition and dismissed the same as

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withdrawn. lt is important to note that in the statement Sh. M.C.Gupta, Learned  counsel for  the petitioners  stated  as under:      "I may  be  permitted  to  withdraw      this  petition   in  view   of  the      Judgment  delivered   by  Hon.  Mr.      Justice Awadh Behari in Suit 451 of      1971 decided  on 21st  March, 1977,      between   the parties,  wherein the      contentions  urged  were  precisely      the same as urged in this petition,      my     clients     reserved     the      opportunity to file a fresh suit if      so     necessitated      by     the      circumstances in future."      It may  be noted that the reference with regard to suit No. 451 of 1971 decided on 21st March, 1977 is in respect of the land  of petitioners  situated  in  Mubarikabad.  It  is surprising that though the opportunity was sought for filing a fresh suit, the appellants again filed a writ petition No. 106 of  1978  in  the  High  Court  on  7.1.1978  which  was ultimately dismissed  by the  High Court  in limine  on 31st January, 1978  by a  Division  Bench  comprising  of  T.P.S. Chawla and  Awadh Behari,  JJ. In this writ petition No. 106 of 1978  the appellants conveniently omitted to mention that the permission  to withdraw the petition No. 213 of 1973 was granted on  the statement of Sh. M.C. Gupta that his clients reserved the liberty to file a fresh suit and not writ. Thus no liberty  was sought  or given  for filing  a  fresh  writ petition.  In  any  case  there  were  no  fresh  ground  or circumstances available  to the  appellants to  file a fresh writ petition  No. 106  of 1978  on  7.1.1978  on  identical grounds when  the earlier  writ petition No. 213 of 1973 had been  dismissed  as  withdrawn  on  30.3.1977.  Nothing  had happened between  30.3.1977 and  7.1.1978 for giving a fresh cause of action to the appellants  to file the writ petition No. 106  of 1978.  Awadh Behari,  J. had dismissed  the suit No. 451  of 1971  by order  dated 21.3.1977 in regard to the lands in  Mubarikabad and  he was  also one of the Judges of the Division  Bench who  passed  the  impugned  order  dated January 31,  1978 dismissing  the writ petition in limine as he  was  fully  aware  of  the  entire  background  of  this litigation.   The appellants  are themselves responsible for creating confusion  in initiating  separate  proceedings  at different period of time in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad  and   Sadhurakhurd  though   challenge  to  the acquisition  proceedings  was  on  common  grounds.  Learned counsel for  the appellants was unable to satisfy in respect of such  conduct of  hide  and  seek  on  the  part  of  the appellants. In  case, as  sought  to  be  explained  by  Mr. Tarkunde, Learned  Senior Counsel  for the  appellants,  the appellants were  depending on  the result  of the civil suit filed in  respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad there was no justification for filing the writ petition No. 213 of 1973 in  respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd as the suit was  not decided  in 1973  but was in fact dismissed on 21.3.1977. We  find no  justification for  filing  the  writ petition in  respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd in 1973 and  subsequently withdrawing the writ petition on 30th March, 1977  reserving the  liberty to file a fresh suit but thereafter  again  filing  the  writ  petition  on  7.1.1978 instead of suit.      Independently,  of   all  the  circumstances  mentioned above, we  shall now  consider the  question  of  delay  and laches in  filing the writ petition No.  106 of 1978 and the

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earlier writ  petition No.  213 of 1973 relating to lands in Sadhurakhurd.     Mr.  Tarkunde,   Learned  Senior   Counsel vehemently contended  that there is no limitation prescribed for filing  the writ  petition and the question of delay and laches has  to be  examined independently  in the  facts and circumstances  of   each  case.   He  has  argued  that  the appellants are  continuing  in  possession  uptil  date  and though  challenge   has  been    made  to  the  validity  of notifications issued  under Section  4 in 1959, Section 6 in 1968 and  1969 and  Section 9  and 10  in 19722, there is no delay, since no award has been passed so far and no loss has occasioned to  the  respondents due to lapse of time. It has been submitted  that there  was no  change of  circumstances during the  intervening period and the delay had  been fully explained on  the aforesaid grounds. It has also been argued that notifications  under Sections  9 and  10 were issued in 1972 and soon there after the appellants came forward with a writ petition  No. 213 of 1973 challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4, 6, 9 and 10 of the Act.  We find no force at all in the above contentions.      It is  an admitted fact that notification under Section 4 of  the Act  was issued  as early  as  1959  and  all  the notifications under  Section 6 of the Act in relation to the land of  the appellants  in Sadhurakhurd were issued in 1968 and 1969.   The challenge to the acquisition proceedings was mainly   based on  the ground that in the notification dated 13.11.1959 issued  under Section  4 of  the Act the lands of wakf property  were excluded and the lands of the appellants being also  used for educational and charitable purposes the same were  also liable  to be  excluded. At  a later stage a ground was also taken that if wakf property in the aforesaid notification under  Section 4  of the  Act meant  only  wakf properties of  the Mohammedans,  then such  notification was discriminatory  and   violative  under   Art.  14   of   the (Constitution  as   there  was   no  reasonable   ground  to discriminate such  properties of  Hindus or non-Muslims also meant for  charitable purposes.  So far as the notifications under Section  6 of  the Act  are concerned  the  same  were attacked on  the ground  that  no  opportunity  of  personal hearing was given to hear the objections filed under Section 5A of  the Act.   Thus  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  the challenge was  in respect  of notifications under Sections 4 and 6  of the  Act alone  and though  in the  prayer  clause relief had  been sought  to  quash  the  notification  under Sections 9  and 10 of the Act also which were issued in 1972 but no  ground whatsoever  has  been  pleaded  in  the  writ petition nor  raised before  us as to how the  notifications under Sections  9 and  10 had any concern for explaining the delay in  respect of  the challenge  to notifications  under Sections 4  and 6  of the Act. It is worthwhile to note that according to  the appellants  own showing  the notices under Sections 9  and 10  issued to the appellants in 1972 were in respect of  the land being Khasra No. 1040/353 which related to 12  bighas and  8 biswas only. The challenge on the other hand in  the writ   petition  is in respect of notifications under Sections  4 and  6 covering  the entire land measuring about 730 bighas situate in village Sadhurakhurd. We find no justification at  all in  explaining the delay on the ground that no  award has  been passed nor the appellants have been dispossessed so  far.  This cannot be an explanation for not challenging the notifications under  Sections 4 and 6 of the 9Act and  in the  present case the appellants had themselves sought stay  from this  Court as early as 15.11.1978 for not making and  declaring the  award and  not to  dispossess the appellants.   Thus we  find no  justification at all for the

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delay in  not  challenging  the  notification  issued  under Section 4 on 13.11.1959 till 1973.  Even notifications under Section 6  of the  Act were  issued in 1968 and 1969 but not challenged  till    1973.  As  already  mentioned  above  in Aflatoon’s case  (supra) a  Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly  held that  even  after  the  declaration  under Section 6  of the  Act published in 1966, the appellants had approached with  their  writ  petitions  in  1970  when  the notices under  Section  9  were  issued  to  them  the  writ petitions were  liable to  be dismissed  on the  grounds  of laches and delay.  Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior counsel made strenuous   effort to  distinguish the aforesaid case on the ground that  in the  aforesaid case the Court was influenced with the  fact that the petitioners had sat on the fence and allowed the  Government to  complete  (emphasis  added)  the acquisition proceedings.  Much emphasis has been laid on the word ’to  complete’ the acquisition proceedings.  We find no force in this submission  as the facts narrated in the above case clearly  shows that  the petitioners in those cases had filed writ  petitions in  the High  Court in 1970 and in the Supreme Court  in 1972  after the  issuance of notices under Sections 4,  6 and  9 of  the  Act.  The  use  of  the  word complete’  was   not  of  much  significance  and  the  main reasoning of  the  case  was  that  grounds  to  attack  the notification  under  Sections  4  and  6  of  the  Act  were available at the  time of publication of such notifications. In the  facts and  circumstances of  the case  before us the appellants were  also sitting  on the fence and did not take any steps  of challenging  the notification under Sections 4 and 6  of the Act till 1973 though the grounds now sought to be urged  were available  to the  appellants as soon as such notifications were  issued.   Thus viewing  the  matter from any angle  we are clearly of the view that the writ petition was also  liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the appellants apart from other grounds already dealt  by us.   In  the face  of the  aforesaid view taken by  us,   it is  not necessary  at all  to go on other questions raised  in the  case.   We decline  to express any opinion on any questions of law raised in the appeal.      In the  result we  dismiss this  appeal with  costs. In view of  the dismissal  of the  appeal  itself  all  interim orders stand vacated automatically. G.N. Appeal dismissed.